Background In December 2015, the OIG Office of Inspections and Forensic Auditing initiated an evaluation of the General Services Administration (GSA) Office of 18F (18F), based on concerns expressed to us by several senior GSA officials about the management of 18F. The objective of this evaluation was to review 18F’s business operations. Our evaluation included a review of 18F’s business model to determine if it operates within the requirements of its funding source, the Acquisition Services Fund (ASF). We also reviewed 18F’s reimbursable agreements process, including its process for billing and collecting from clients. We identified issues with 18F’s plan…
Author: John Greenewald
Background This Instruction: 1.1 . Reissues reference (a) to implement policy, assign responsibilities, and prescribe guidance on the classification methodology for Information Operations (10) programs and capabilities within the Department of Defense. 1.2. Establishes guidance for proper protection of 10 activities. 1.3. Identifies and provides classification guidance on categories of IO activities. While this Instruction identifies the classification or classification ·range for specific items of classified information, it is not intended to be used as an itemized guide for applying Special Access Program (SAP) prota;tive measures. If required, SAP protective measures shall be in addition to the protections that are…
Background This initial release consists of material from the FBI’s files related to the William J. Clinton Foundation, a non-profit 501(c)(3) organization. The bulk of these records come from a 2001 FBI investigation into the pardon of Marc Rich (1934-2013), aka Marcell David Reich, by President Clinton in 2001; it was closed in 2005. The material is heavily redacted due to personal privacy protections and grand jury secrecy rules. FBI Release of material, October 31, 2016 [129 Pages, 13.9MB] The Clinton Foundation – Additional Information The Clinton Foundation (founded in 1997 as the William J. Clinton Foundation), and called beginning…
Background TSA’s multi-layered process to vet aviation workers for potential links to terrorism was generally effective. In addition to initially vetting every application for new credentials, TSA recurrently vetted aviation workers with access to secured areas of commercial airports every time the Consolidated Terrorist Watchlist was updated. However, our testing showed that TSA did not identify 73 individuals with terrorism-related category codes because TSA is not authorized to receive all terrorism-related information under current interagency watchlisting policy. TSA had less effective controls in place for ensuring that aviation workers 1) had not committed crimes that would disqualify them from having unescorted access to secure airports areas, and 2) had lawful status…
Background Mr. Andrew Ghazee of the AFMC Restoration Office, requested that AFRLIHEST conduct an archival search, review, and analysis of existing records for the 1948 through 1970 time frame to determine the potential for the residual presence of BW/CW agents, munitions, and training devices at AFMC bases and related sites. This action was in response to a tasking received from AF/ILEVR in September 1997. In order to accomplish this research, AFRLIHEST contracted with STI under AF contract F41624-97 -D-6002 to examine any plans, records, and reports that may indicate the presence of BW/CW materiel on AFMC bases and related sites during this time period. Archival records and…