1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:03,870 John Greenewald: 180 days, if you're anything like me, you've 2 00:00:03,870 --> 00:00:09,840 been waiting for this day for at least 180 days. Now it's here. 3 00:00:10,110 --> 00:00:12,930 And what's it all worth the wait? What's up everyone? This 4 00:00:12,930 --> 00:00:16,320 is John Greenewald, Jr, founder and creator of the black vault 5 00:00:16,350 --> 00:00:21,330 calm. And that's right, the UFO or UAP, or whatever you want to 6 00:00:21,330 --> 00:00:25,380 call them report is here. And I'll go over just some of the 7 00:00:25,380 --> 00:00:30,450 key points about it. Because that report, all whopping nine 8 00:00:30,450 --> 00:00:34,530 pages of it is this subject of this quick blast. Stay tuned. 9 00:00:42,090 --> 00:00:48,150 That's right, the UFO UAP report is here. Now, I was debating on 10 00:00:48,150 --> 00:00:50,250 whether or not I was going to do this video. And I thought, you 11 00:00:50,250 --> 00:00:52,830 know what, let's just go ahead and throw something out quickly 12 00:00:52,830 --> 00:00:56,910 update you guys. I'm not going to go over every single aspect 13 00:00:57,180 --> 00:01:00,120 of the report. But I am going to point out a few things. I know 14 00:01:00,120 --> 00:01:03,390 some of you. And I'm surprised because I thought everybody use 15 00:01:03,390 --> 00:01:06,510 social media, but doesn't use social media like Twitter or 16 00:01:06,510 --> 00:01:09,960 Facebook, stuff like that, that you primarily just watch YouTube 17 00:01:09,960 --> 00:01:11,670 and those types of videos. So I thought, you know what, let's 18 00:01:11,670 --> 00:01:15,180 get this video out there and update you guys that the report 19 00:01:15,600 --> 00:01:21,450 is here. Fantastic. So let's get into it. Because I do believe 20 00:01:21,450 --> 00:01:25,410 that. Well, you might be a little letdown if you had high 21 00:01:25,410 --> 00:01:30,030 hopes. Now, if you did see my video about this, if you saw 22 00:01:30,060 --> 00:01:33,390 what essentially was kind of more little speculation and 23 00:01:33,390 --> 00:01:37,530 stuff like that on my part, but but also juxtaposing that with 24 00:01:37,530 --> 00:01:42,420 history, the question mark was, what were we going to get? And I 25 00:01:42,420 --> 00:01:45,450 truly thought that we weren't going to get much, and we 26 00:01:45,450 --> 00:01:50,520 didn't. But what really surprised me he was the fact 27 00:01:50,550 --> 00:01:54,630 that we didn't get really anything at all. Yes, there are 28 00:01:54,630 --> 00:01:57,990 nine pages, but I thought it would be a little bit lengthier. 29 00:01:58,320 --> 00:02:01,170 And what I wanted to see and bear with me here because you 30 00:02:01,170 --> 00:02:04,470 might get mad at me for saying this is I wanted to see 31 00:02:04,500 --> 00:02:09,390 debunking on a small level, because it would show us that 32 00:02:09,390 --> 00:02:14,160 they actually are researching, investigating, and can solve 33 00:02:14,160 --> 00:02:17,820 some of this leaked material that has come out that they 34 00:02:17,880 --> 00:02:21,420 admitted was real, admitted that they were that it was taken by 35 00:02:21,420 --> 00:02:26,280 US Navy pilots, but they would not put a designation on it. 36 00:02:26,730 --> 00:02:30,360 They said it was even being utilized by the task force that 37 00:02:30,360 --> 00:02:34,860 created this report that you're about to go over with me. yet. 38 00:02:35,100 --> 00:02:39,000 They wouldn't say if it was unidentified or not. And I I'll 39 00:02:39,000 --> 00:02:42,210 be the first to say I thought that was part of the plan. I 40 00:02:42,210 --> 00:02:45,240 thought that meant that they were going to take that material 41 00:02:45,240 --> 00:02:49,380 and say, You know what, Senator Rubio and your committee we can 42 00:02:49,380 --> 00:02:53,010 identify this, the media got grabbed ahold of it made a big 43 00:02:53,010 --> 00:02:55,650 thing out of it. But there are some other ones that we can't 44 00:02:55,650 --> 00:02:58,680 identify. But essentially, it would have shown us they are 45 00:02:58,680 --> 00:03:03,120 doing their job. In reality, we heard about no specific cases 46 00:03:03,450 --> 00:03:07,350 whatsoever. It was this broad overview. And as you can see 47 00:03:07,350 --> 00:03:10,170 from the cover page here, preliminary assessment, 48 00:03:10,170 --> 00:03:13,590 unidentified aerial phenomena, with today's date, this was the 49 00:03:13,590 --> 00:03:21,000 cover page. So that, in itself, at first glance, was a letdown 50 00:03:21,000 --> 00:03:25,830 to me, because I truly felt that we would get some type of 51 00:03:26,160 --> 00:03:31,140 admission to cases solved or not. But I thought that they 52 00:03:31,140 --> 00:03:34,260 would go into detail and they really did not. They kept it 53 00:03:34,260 --> 00:03:38,940 very, very, very broad. And that would be my initial reaction to 54 00:03:38,940 --> 00:03:41,640 it. I've read through it a couple times, but obviously, 55 00:03:41,640 --> 00:03:43,890 this is very new to me. We're going to go over it a little bit 56 00:03:43,890 --> 00:03:47,070 together. But it's one of those things you do need to read a 57 00:03:47,070 --> 00:03:49,950 couple of times. I'm not going to read it like I said word for 58 00:03:49,950 --> 00:03:53,700 word. This is page one with the scope and assumptions. What I do 59 00:03:53,700 --> 00:03:57,270 want to point out about this would be this paragraph here. 60 00:03:57,600 --> 00:04:00,060 odni which is the Office of the Director of National 61 00:04:00,060 --> 00:04:02,220 Intelligence prepared this report for the congressional 62 00:04:02,220 --> 00:04:06,780 intelligence and armed services committee UAP TF and the odni 63 00:04:06,810 --> 00:04:10,440 National Intelligence manager for aviation drafted this 64 00:04:10,440 --> 00:04:18,390 report, with input from USD ins DEA FBI NRO nga NSA Air Force 65 00:04:18,420 --> 00:04:22,920 Army, Navy, Navy slash o ni or Office of Naval Intelligence. 66 00:04:23,190 --> 00:04:29,190 DARPA, FAA, NOAA nga odni slash nim emerging and disruptive 67 00:04:29,190 --> 00:04:32,640 technology odni National counterintelligence and security 68 00:04:32,640 --> 00:04:36,810 center and odni National Intelligence council Say that 69 00:04:36,810 --> 00:04:41,910 three times fast, but that is one heck of an alphabet soup 70 00:04:41,910 --> 00:04:46,560 that contributed or allegedly contributed to this report. Nine 71 00:04:46,560 --> 00:04:50,820 pages doesn't seem like it culminated information from all 72 00:04:51,090 --> 00:04:54,120 of those agencies and components, but be that as it 73 00:04:54,120 --> 00:04:57,810 may I at least wanted to point that out to you on also on page 74 00:04:57,810 --> 00:05:00,750 one, the assumptions various forms of sensors That register 75 00:05:00,750 --> 00:05:04,890 UAP generally operate correctly and capture enough real data to 76 00:05:04,890 --> 00:05:09,930 allow initial assessments. But some UAP may be attributable 77 00:05:09,990 --> 00:05:13,710 attributable to sensor anomalies. It's a little 78 00:05:13,710 --> 00:05:19,950 disconcerting that they say, the equipment or sensors generally 79 00:05:19,980 --> 00:05:24,270 operate correctly, I would hope that they would always operate 80 00:05:24,270 --> 00:05:28,860 correctly. But that will probably be a video for another 81 00:05:28,860 --> 00:05:33,450 day. The next page gives us what we always look for we as an 82 00:05:33,450 --> 00:05:37,440 investigators, researchers, essentially the executive 83 00:05:37,440 --> 00:05:42,240 summaries are key to understanding a lot of what big 84 00:05:42,240 --> 00:05:46,140 government reports have. The downside to this UAP report is, 85 00:05:46,170 --> 00:05:48,870 it's really not big at all. So it really wouldn't matter if 86 00:05:48,870 --> 00:05:53,250 they had an executive summary or not. But regardless, the first 87 00:05:53,520 --> 00:05:58,680 information page, we'll call it is just that. So this summarizes 88 00:05:58,710 --> 00:06:02,520 their findings. This essentially takes Well, not in this case, 89 00:06:02,520 --> 00:06:06,540 but a 200 page report, a 500 page report condenses it down to 90 00:06:06,540 --> 00:06:09,900 a couple of pages. In this particular case, the report 91 00:06:09,900 --> 00:06:13,290 itself is obviously even less than nine pages, that was the 92 00:06:13,290 --> 00:06:18,390 total, but it condensed it into a page. So let's go over some of 93 00:06:18,390 --> 00:06:22,770 the key key facts that they wanted in the executive summary. 94 00:06:25,020 --> 00:06:27,480 The limited amount of high quality reporting on 95 00:06:27,480 --> 00:06:31,320 unidentified aerial phenomena hampers our ability to draw firm 96 00:06:31,320 --> 00:06:36,510 conclusions about the nature or intent of UAP. Now I'm going to 97 00:06:36,510 --> 00:06:39,240 tell you right now, from a historical perspective, I 98 00:06:39,240 --> 00:06:41,700 laughed when I read that the first time because that is 99 00:06:41,700 --> 00:06:46,110 absolutely Project bluebook. That that's exactly what they 100 00:06:46,110 --> 00:06:50,640 said they tried to say a lot about the 701. We know now that 101 00:06:50,640 --> 00:06:55,110 that's a much bigger number, but the 701 unknowns in the project 102 00:06:55,110 --> 00:06:58,140 bluebook collection, they essentially said that they felt 103 00:06:58,140 --> 00:07:03,810 a lot of that was due to essentially lack of quality of 104 00:07:03,810 --> 00:07:08,670 evidence, lack of evidence, lack of, of essentially detail. So 105 00:07:08,670 --> 00:07:11,640 right off the bat, they're blaming taking a page from the 106 00:07:11,640 --> 00:07:15,750 project bluebook era and blaming the fact that they just didn't 107 00:07:15,750 --> 00:07:18,330 have enough data, even though that they've been collecting it 108 00:07:18,330 --> 00:07:23,340 for some time. Here's another quote from the report as a 109 00:07:23,340 --> 00:07:27,090 result, the UAP ATF when I say that it's UAP taskforce for 110 00:07:27,090 --> 00:07:29,520 those who aren't aware, concentrated its review on 111 00:07:29,520 --> 00:07:34,410 reports that occurred between 2004 and 2021, the majority of 112 00:07:34,410 --> 00:07:37,680 which are result of this new tailored process to better 113 00:07:37,680 --> 00:07:41,790 capture UAP events through formalized reporting. Most of 114 00:07:41,790 --> 00:07:45,120 the UAP reporting probably do represent physical objects, 115 00:07:45,120 --> 00:07:48,720 given that a majority of UAAP were registered across multiple 116 00:07:48,720 --> 00:07:52,170 sensors to include radar, infrared, electro optical weapon 117 00:07:52,170 --> 00:07:55,380 seekers and visual observation. Essentially, what they're saying 118 00:07:55,380 --> 00:07:59,010 here is as technology advanced, they had better capability, they 119 00:07:59,010 --> 00:08:03,210 also had in turn, better capability to see or at least 120 00:08:03,510 --> 00:08:08,850 capture some type of visual imagery with this UAP phenomena, 121 00:08:08,850 --> 00:08:12,750 what whatever it is, it allowed them to, to essentially do that. 122 00:08:13,590 --> 00:08:16,170 Another point that they put in a in a limited number of 123 00:08:16,170 --> 00:08:19,890 incidents, UAP reportedly appeared to exhibit unusual 124 00:08:19,890 --> 00:08:23,730 flight characteristics. These observations could be the result 125 00:08:23,730 --> 00:08:28,740 of sensor errors, spoofing, or observer misperception and 126 00:08:28,740 --> 00:08:33,420 require additional rigorous analysis. So this started off 127 00:08:33,420 --> 00:08:37,050 interesting. So they were exhibiting unusual flight 128 00:08:37,050 --> 00:08:39,930 characteristics and they immediately shoot it down pardon 129 00:08:39,930 --> 00:08:44,850 upon blaming potential sensor errors, spoofing, or the 130 00:08:44,850 --> 00:08:49,260 observer or the witness themselves. There are probably 131 00:08:49,260 --> 00:08:53,010 multiple types of UAP, requiring different explanations based on 132 00:08:53,010 --> 00:08:55,920 the range of appearances and behaviors described in the 133 00:08:55,920 --> 00:08:59,340 available reporting. Well, this is kind of a you know, word 134 00:08:59,340 --> 00:09:03,600 mash, where that's kind of a given not all ua peas are going 135 00:09:03,600 --> 00:09:07,170 to have one explanation. We know that so they're just kind of 136 00:09:07,170 --> 00:09:11,610 fluffing this up, in my opinion. UAP clearly pose a safety of 137 00:09:11,610 --> 00:09:14,670 flight issue and may pose a challenge to us national 138 00:09:14,670 --> 00:09:18,720 security. Absolutely. There's the threat word. Yet that's 139 00:09:18,720 --> 00:09:21,300 something I've never shied away from history proves it. 140 00:09:21,300 --> 00:09:23,760 Documentation proves that evidence proves it, witnesses 141 00:09:23,760 --> 00:09:27,780 prove it, there is a potential threat behind whatever this 142 00:09:27,780 --> 00:09:30,900 phenomena is. And they're drilling that in this report, 143 00:09:30,930 --> 00:09:34,890 not a big surprise, because that more than all else will get the 144 00:09:34,890 --> 00:09:38,820 attention of the senate Intel committee, Armed Services 145 00:09:38,820 --> 00:09:40,020 Committee and beyond. 146 00:09:42,210 --> 00:09:45,270 Consistent consolidation of reports from across the federal 147 00:09:45,270 --> 00:09:48,180 government standardized reporting, increased collection 148 00:09:48,180 --> 00:09:51,930 and analysis and a streamlined process for screening. All such 149 00:09:51,930 --> 00:09:54,960 reports against a broad range of relevant relevant United States 150 00:09:54,960 --> 00:09:58,680 government data will allow for some Morphosis sophisticated 151 00:09:58,680 --> 00:10:02,820 analysis of UAP That is likely to deepen our understanding, 152 00:10:03,150 --> 00:10:05,610 what are they saying here, give us more money, we'll figure it 153 00:10:05,610 --> 00:10:10,380 out. And that there in lies. What I have felt is truly 154 00:10:10,380 --> 00:10:14,760 underlying all of this is to get additional funding and 155 00:10:14,760 --> 00:10:19,320 resources. I am not saying that is a bad thing. But what I am 156 00:10:19,320 --> 00:10:25,800 saying is that this up here, justifies this down here. For 157 00:10:25,800 --> 00:10:28,710 those listening to the audio version, this up here is the 158 00:10:28,710 --> 00:10:33,090 potential threat. This down here is give us money and resources, 159 00:10:33,090 --> 00:10:37,050 and we'll figure it out. And I think that that truly is the 160 00:10:37,050 --> 00:10:42,120 root of a lot of this. I would say, talk about that potential 161 00:10:42,120 --> 00:10:46,950 threat. Again, I don't disagree with it. I don't think it's a 162 00:10:46,950 --> 00:10:50,670 bad thing. Some people are using that as a, they're just wasting 163 00:10:50,670 --> 00:10:54,360 money on military spending. No, on the contrary, I support it. 164 00:10:54,750 --> 00:10:58,290 But if this is what had to happen, to get them to look at 165 00:10:58,290 --> 00:11:03,960 unidentified objects, and UFOs, uaps, whatever, then that's, I 166 00:11:03,960 --> 00:11:07,680 think, a win that even though and I'll say it right now, after 167 00:11:07,680 --> 00:11:11,580 I went through the executive summary, even though this is 168 00:11:11,580 --> 00:11:14,820 only a nine page document, that we didn't get case files, we 169 00:11:14,820 --> 00:11:18,480 didn't get visuals, we didn't get photos, links to videos, 170 00:11:18,480 --> 00:11:23,910 evidence denims. And nothing, even though we didn't get that 171 00:11:24,270 --> 00:11:28,710 this is something that actually is beneficial. Because there's 172 00:11:28,710 --> 00:11:32,670 no way around them saying you know what, the UAP phenomena, 173 00:11:33,150 --> 00:11:36,180 it's a waste of time, let's not even focus on it. On the 174 00:11:36,180 --> 00:11:39,930 contrary, this is supporting that they should focus on it, 175 00:11:40,110 --> 00:11:43,560 even though if they're taking from the pages of Project 176 00:11:43,560 --> 00:11:46,350 bluebook, and the Condon report and so on saying well, we could 177 00:11:46,350 --> 00:11:50,370 probably explain most of it, earthly explanations, all that 178 00:11:50,370 --> 00:11:53,940 jazz, we just need more money and resources to do it. So I 179 00:11:53,940 --> 00:11:57,810 consider this a baby step. But at least on the surface, it 180 00:11:57,810 --> 00:12:03,990 looks like a baby step when which is what I feel is is is 181 00:12:03,990 --> 00:12:07,200 the key takeaway for me. A couple other things, I'll go 182 00:12:07,200 --> 00:12:09,540 over really quick and I invite you to read it. For those who 183 00:12:09,540 --> 00:12:12,180 haven't noticed yet, in the description of this video, you 184 00:12:12,180 --> 00:12:15,090 will find a link over to the black vault. When I was 185 00:12:15,090 --> 00:12:17,640 recording this DNI was having a lot of problems with their 186 00:12:17,640 --> 00:12:20,490 website, some were able to download it no problems, others 187 00:12:20,490 --> 00:12:24,030 were getting an error screen. So if you're having a problem, 188 00:12:24,030 --> 00:12:26,520 don't worry, the link down there, my site hasn't crashed, 189 00:12:26,520 --> 00:12:30,570 at least not yet. So go ahead and you can download it from 190 00:12:30,570 --> 00:12:30,900 there. 191 00:12:32,190 --> 00:12:35,310 So what what happens after an executive summary is they 192 00:12:35,310 --> 00:12:37,980 essentially go into more detail about all those bullet points 193 00:12:37,980 --> 00:12:42,330 that I went through to through with you. Now again, I won't go 194 00:12:42,330 --> 00:12:45,030 over every word, but I feel that there's a couple things that do 195 00:12:45,030 --> 00:12:48,570 need to be pointed out. This under the heading of available 196 00:12:48,570 --> 00:12:52,740 reporting largely inconclusive. limited data leaves most UAP 197 00:12:52,740 --> 00:12:56,070 unexplained This, to me is the one of the most glaring errors. 198 00:12:56,340 --> 00:13:00,480 And I want to show you guys why. limited data and inconsistency 199 00:13:00,480 --> 00:13:04,140 and reporting are key challenges to evaluating UAP. No 200 00:13:04,140 --> 00:13:07,410 standardized reporting mechanism existed until the Navy 201 00:13:07,410 --> 00:13:12,570 established one in March of 2019. The Air Force subsequently 202 00:13:12,570 --> 00:13:17,190 adopted that mechanism and in November of 2020, but it remains 203 00:13:17,190 --> 00:13:21,390 limited to US government reporting. The UAE PTF regularly 204 00:13:21,390 --> 00:13:24,240 heard anecdotally, during its research about other 205 00:13:24,240 --> 00:13:27,300 observations that occurred, but which were never captured in 206 00:13:27,300 --> 00:13:31,860 formal or informal reporting by these observers. Here is the key 207 00:13:32,310 --> 00:13:38,850 part of this entire report that in, in my opinion, is wrong and 208 00:13:38,850 --> 00:13:42,420 fabricated. And here's my proof. I'm going to pull up an article 209 00:13:42,420 --> 00:13:47,400 I wrote back in 2019. This is when I was pushing to get the 210 00:13:48,420 --> 00:13:53,580 Navy's UFO or UAP guidelines that were classified, I was 211 00:13:53,580 --> 00:13:57,600 trying to get them declassified. Now first off credit to Brian 212 00:13:57,600 --> 00:14:01,860 bender of Politico. He broke the story that these guidelines even 213 00:14:01,860 --> 00:14:08,760 existed. So credit to him. What I did was I took those that that 214 00:14:08,790 --> 00:14:11,820 information and filed numerous FOIA requests for what was 215 00:14:11,820 --> 00:14:14,970 called the message to the fleet, which when Mr. Bender had 216 00:14:14,970 --> 00:14:20,340 reported it was in draft form, and tried to get that message in 217 00:14:20,340 --> 00:14:25,020 the process of doing that found that it was no longer in draft 218 00:14:25,020 --> 00:14:29,400 form was issued. But when I tried to get it through FOIA, I 219 00:14:29,400 --> 00:14:33,300 was denied that this was something that essentially was 220 00:14:33,300 --> 00:14:36,960 going to remain classified. But I want to read you guys 221 00:14:36,960 --> 00:14:40,170 something, because this is what was really interesting about 222 00:14:40,170 --> 00:14:43,980 that message. Now in short, that message was essentially showing 223 00:14:43,980 --> 00:14:47,310 the guidelines or at least pointing to the guidelines for 224 00:14:47,310 --> 00:14:51,660 the US Navy and how to report UAP it was instructing all of 225 00:14:51,660 --> 00:14:55,770 those that saw UAP to report them and then again, either had 226 00:14:55,770 --> 00:14:59,790 or pointed to the guidelines for reporting them in the process of 227 00:14:59,790 --> 00:15:03,900 research. The story I discovered this, although the original 228 00:15:03,900 --> 00:15:07,080 headline at Politico and I'm reading my own writing here, so 229 00:15:07,110 --> 00:15:10,290 let me start that over. Although the original headline at 230 00:15:10,290 --> 00:15:13,560 Politico insinuated that the UFO guidelines were quote new. 231 00:15:13,920 --> 00:15:17,700 Subsequent statements released later in May by US Navy Public 232 00:15:17,730 --> 00:15:21,840 Affairs Officer, Joseph gratis shirt to the New York Times said 233 00:15:21,840 --> 00:15:24,960 they were not. Mr gratis sure explained that the guidelines 234 00:15:24,960 --> 00:15:28,620 were an update to an older 2015 directive in response to 235 00:15:28,620 --> 00:15:33,240 multiple UFO encounters around the USS Theodore Roosevelt in 236 00:15:33,240 --> 00:15:38,640 2014. And 2015, he told The New York Times that although some of 237 00:15:38,640 --> 00:15:41,790 the objects could have been commercial drones, Mr. gratis 238 00:15:41,790 --> 00:15:45,150 are also added. We don't know who's doing this, we don't have 239 00:15:45,150 --> 00:15:48,540 enough data to track this. So the intent of the message to the 240 00:15:48,540 --> 00:15:52,440 fleet is to provide updated guidance on reporting procedures 241 00:15:52,440 --> 00:15:57,240 for suspected intrusions into our airspace. So this shows that 242 00:15:57,240 --> 00:16:03,720 the guidelines were already in existence in 2015, based on the 243 00:16:03,720 --> 00:16:08,580 2014 and 2015 encounters, let me go back to that report that 244 00:16:08,580 --> 00:16:11,070 we've been going over, they said that they didn't have a 245 00:16:11,070 --> 00:16:16,260 reporting mechanism until March of 2019. I personally don't 246 00:16:16,260 --> 00:16:19,530 think that that is correct, based on the fact that that was 247 00:16:19,530 --> 00:16:23,130 just a re issuance of Gov guidance that was already 248 00:16:23,130 --> 00:16:27,720 issued, those guidelines had been around per the US Navy for 249 00:16:27,720 --> 00:16:31,620 at least four years prior to this date here. So that's an 250 00:16:31,620 --> 00:16:35,430 extra four years worth of data that they could have potentially 251 00:16:35,430 --> 00:16:38,460 been collecting. Now, maybe they didn't adhere to it, which is 252 00:16:38,460 --> 00:16:42,840 why they re issued it. And I get that. But regardless, for them 253 00:16:42,840 --> 00:16:45,630 to essentially say that in the report, I'm not trying to 254 00:16:45,630 --> 00:16:49,440 nitpick here, I'm just saying there's potential for years 255 00:16:49,440 --> 00:16:53,640 worth of some type of data, even if not everybody was following 256 00:16:53,640 --> 00:16:57,420 it. That could potentially be there. yet. They said that it 257 00:16:57,420 --> 00:17:01,770 wasn't until 2019, just two years ago, little over two years 258 00:17:01,770 --> 00:17:05,190 ago when they had it. My opinion, that's wrong. Is that a 259 00:17:05,190 --> 00:17:09,330 mistake? Quite possibly. Am I mistaken? Oh, it's based on US 260 00:17:09,330 --> 00:17:13,650 Navy official statements that they said 2015. But who knows 261 00:17:13,680 --> 00:17:16,560 maybe that they issued the guidelines, and not a single 262 00:17:16,560 --> 00:17:19,950 person ever followed them or read them? That's a possibility, 263 00:17:19,950 --> 00:17:21,510 too. I won't rule that out. 264 00:17:22,950 --> 00:17:26,370 Jumping along here into the report, here is the number that 265 00:17:26,370 --> 00:17:30,840 the reports that they analyzed. And this was a number that I 266 00:17:30,840 --> 00:17:34,560 think the New York Times said something to the effect of 210. 267 00:17:35,430 --> 00:17:40,530 Here is the number 144 reports originated from US government 268 00:17:40,530 --> 00:17:44,460 sources, at reports involve observation with multiple 269 00:17:44,460 --> 00:17:48,000 sensors, most reports described UAP as objects that interrupted 270 00:17:48,000 --> 00:17:52,710 pre planned training, or other military activity. To me, that's 271 00:17:52,740 --> 00:17:55,050 pretty interesting. I think that's part of the story here. 272 00:17:55,050 --> 00:17:58,440 that'll probably be a tidbit in the future. Why is it always 273 00:17:58,470 --> 00:18:01,950 around training missions and essentially military activity? 274 00:18:03,240 --> 00:18:08,880 That is, I guess, open to interpretation. But the 275 00:18:08,910 --> 00:18:12,480 obviously the the incidents that we have heard about away from 276 00:18:12,480 --> 00:18:15,450 this UAP report, but the Nimitz encounter, they were doing a 277 00:18:15,450 --> 00:18:19,020 training mission, they had new radar, and an instrumentation 278 00:18:19,020 --> 00:18:22,860 that they were testing, same with the 2014 15 Roosevelt 279 00:18:22,860 --> 00:18:25,530 encounters, they were out there with new equipment on on 280 00:18:25,560 --> 00:18:30,660 essentially training missions out there. So is that some type 281 00:18:30,660 --> 00:18:34,170 of you know, common trait? Is there a reason for that? Or is 282 00:18:34,170 --> 00:18:37,380 that you know, potentially just a coincidence. I'll let you guys 283 00:18:37,380 --> 00:18:40,260 decide that I'm not gonna say either way, cuz I don't know. 284 00:18:40,590 --> 00:18:43,740 But it is kind of interesting that that seems to be a thread 285 00:18:43,740 --> 00:18:47,340 here. I'm gonna jump up because I want to read this paragraph to 286 00:18:47,340 --> 00:18:49,740 you as well. After carefully considering this information. 287 00:18:49,740 --> 00:18:53,730 The UAP ETF focused on reports that involved UAP largely 288 00:18:53,730 --> 00:18:56,580 witnessed firsthand by military aviators, and that were 289 00:18:56,580 --> 00:19:00,030 collected from systems we considered to be reliable. These 290 00:19:00,030 --> 00:19:04,230 reports describe incidents that occurred between 2004 and 2021. 291 00:19:04,500 --> 00:19:06,930 With the majority coming in the last two years as the new 292 00:19:06,930 --> 00:19:09,990 reporting mechanism became better known to the military 293 00:19:09,990 --> 00:19:14,310 aviation community, we were able to identify one reported UAP 294 00:19:14,310 --> 00:19:17,640 with high confidence. In that case, we identified the object 295 00:19:17,640 --> 00:19:21,540 as a large deflating balloon, the others remain unexplained. 296 00:19:22,560 --> 00:19:25,440 The first thing that came to my mind on that with the deflating 297 00:19:25,440 --> 00:19:28,950 balloon was the USS Omaha footage that looked like a 298 00:19:28,950 --> 00:19:31,950 sphere slowly descending, hitting the water and 299 00:19:31,950 --> 00:19:34,650 potentially either you know, popping or just getting lost in 300 00:19:34,650 --> 00:19:37,380 a wave popping then and so on and so forth. Because it seems 301 00:19:37,380 --> 00:19:40,770 like it gets lost, comes back gets lost again. MC West, I 302 00:19:40,770 --> 00:19:43,410 think I'm not speaking for him the one of the last videos, I 303 00:19:43,560 --> 00:19:47,520 think one of his last, he was kind of looking at maybe a flare 304 00:19:47,520 --> 00:19:51,480 of some kind and the sphere looking was part of the glare. I 305 00:19:51,480 --> 00:19:54,180 don't know I'm not an analyst, so I'm not going to pretend I 306 00:19:54,180 --> 00:19:57,390 know. But it was very interesting for them to 307 00:19:57,420 --> 00:20:02,010 essentially bring in some one case that we have no idea what 308 00:20:02,010 --> 00:20:05,790 it is that they were able to identify what that was at this 309 00:20:05,790 --> 00:20:09,240 point is kind of a mystery. I saw some people thinking was 310 00:20:09,240 --> 00:20:13,350 this the Batman balloon? I doubt it didn't look like a deflating 311 00:20:13,350 --> 00:20:17,280 balloon to me. But you know, who knows, a balloon did look like a 312 00:20:17,280 --> 00:20:21,000 balloon. Sorry to upset anybody with that, but a deflating one 313 00:20:21,000 --> 00:20:24,300 that just didn't. But the Omaha footage, you know, potentially 314 00:20:24,300 --> 00:20:30,930 that was that was something that could have been some of the 315 00:20:30,930 --> 00:20:34,290 other points here. And again, I'm even though I've read this a 316 00:20:34,290 --> 00:20:38,100 couple times, just kind of going over it with you here. And I 317 00:20:38,100 --> 00:20:40,770 don't want to speak forever on a nine page document where I'm not 318 00:20:40,770 --> 00:20:43,410 going word for word, but just kind of wanted to give you guys 319 00:20:43,410 --> 00:20:47,130 some reactions. And I'm also curious to your reactions, what 320 00:20:47,130 --> 00:20:51,150 you feel is the most important so go ahead and put any comments 321 00:20:51,150 --> 00:20:53,580 down there. And if you are listening to the audio version, 322 00:20:53,580 --> 00:20:57,300 just head to the black vault comm slash live. Make sure you 323 00:20:57,300 --> 00:21:00,120 subscribe to the YouTube channel because I think the visual 324 00:21:00,120 --> 00:21:02,940 presentations are much more interesting because you can see 325 00:21:02,940 --> 00:21:09,960 what I'm actually pointing to. Here's a paragraph about 326 00:21:10,110 --> 00:21:14,130 potential patterns that they are seeing patterns where again when 327 00:21:14,130 --> 00:21:17,880 I talked about the military sightings in the training 328 00:21:17,880 --> 00:21:22,020 missions. Let me just read you this line. UAP sightings also 329 00:21:22,020 --> 00:21:24,780 tended to cluster around us training and testing grounds but 330 00:21:24,780 --> 00:21:27,600 we assess that this may result from a collection bias as a 331 00:21:27,600 --> 00:21:30,510 result of focused attention, greater numbers of latest 332 00:21:30,510 --> 00:21:34,500 generation sensors operating in those areas unit expectations 333 00:21:34,500 --> 00:21:38,160 and guidance to report anomalies so good on them for for 334 00:21:38,160 --> 00:21:41,490 realizing that there was potentially a collection bias on 335 00:21:41,490 --> 00:21:42,870 the the evidence there. 336 00:21:44,370 --> 00:21:48,150 A handful of UAP appear to demonstrate advanced technology. 337 00:21:48,150 --> 00:21:51,210 This is where it started to get at least a little interesting 338 00:21:51,450 --> 00:21:56,250 and 18 incidents described in 21 reports, observers reported 339 00:21:56,250 --> 00:22:00,810 unusual UAP movement patterns or flight characteristics. Some UAP 340 00:22:00,810 --> 00:22:04,320 appeared to remain stationary and winds aloft move against the 341 00:22:04,320 --> 00:22:08,340 wind maneuver abruptly or move at considerable speed without 342 00:22:08,340 --> 00:22:11,880 discernible means of propulsion, and a small number of cases, 343 00:22:12,060 --> 00:22:15,810 Military Aircraft Systems processed radio frequency energy 344 00:22:16,080 --> 00:22:20,730 associated with UAP sightings. The UAP TF holds a small amount 345 00:22:20,730 --> 00:22:24,720 of data that appear to show UAP demonstrating acceleration, or a 346 00:22:24,720 --> 00:22:28,590 degree of signature management. Additional rigorous analysis are 347 00:22:28,590 --> 00:22:32,160 necessary by multiple teams or groups of technical experts to 348 00:22:32,160 --> 00:22:35,940 determine the nature and validity of these data. We are 349 00:22:35,940 --> 00:22:38,490 conducting further analysis to determine if breakthrough 350 00:22:38,490 --> 00:22:43,200 technologies were demonstrated. So obviously, that's a little 351 00:22:43,200 --> 00:22:46,470 bit more interesting from what they've already tried to blow 352 00:22:46,470 --> 00:22:49,590 out of the water with deflating balloons and lack of evidence. 353 00:22:49,620 --> 00:22:52,440 So we're starting to get into obviously a much smaller 354 00:22:52,440 --> 00:22:55,620 percentage of cases they've collected, but a percentage of 355 00:22:55,620 --> 00:22:59,340 cases nonetheless, back to that original point about a single 356 00:22:59,340 --> 00:23:03,870 explanation. And of course, uaps is just kind of obvious. These 357 00:23:03,870 --> 00:23:07,830 are the categories that they feel uaps could fit into one of 358 00:23:07,830 --> 00:23:13,140 these five airborne clutter. According to them, that would be 359 00:23:13,140 --> 00:23:17,490 birds. I really wanted to see seagulls in that area just to 360 00:23:17,490 --> 00:23:22,350 kind of take a friendly jab at at that entire debate online. If 361 00:23:22,350 --> 00:23:24,660 you don't know what I'm talking about. Then inside joke to the 362 00:23:24,660 --> 00:23:30,000 UFO Twitter crowd but birds, balloons, recreational unmanned 363 00:23:30,000 --> 00:23:34,650 aerial vehicles, or airborne debris like plastic bags that 364 00:23:34,650 --> 00:23:38,010 muddle a scene and affect an operator's ability to identify 365 00:23:38,010 --> 00:23:40,950 true targets such as enemy aircraft. That's category one. 366 00:23:41,580 --> 00:23:44,730 Category two natural atmospheric phenomenon natural atmospheric 367 00:23:44,730 --> 00:23:47,820 phenomena includes ice crystals, moisture and thermal 368 00:23:47,820 --> 00:23:52,410 fluctuations. US government or industry developmental programs 369 00:23:52,410 --> 00:23:57,780 this I found interesting. I really did. Because there is a 370 00:23:57,780 --> 00:24:01,410 big question on whether or not some of this UAP is classified 371 00:24:01,410 --> 00:24:04,560 tech. And some of that argument about well, it's unidentified, 372 00:24:04,560 --> 00:24:09,030 so it can't be well, here is potentially a category that 373 00:24:09,030 --> 00:24:14,010 they're saying that UAP fits into some UAP observations could 374 00:24:14,010 --> 00:24:17,790 be attributable to developments in classified programs by us 375 00:24:17,790 --> 00:24:21,450 entities. We were unable to confirm, however, that these 376 00:24:21,450 --> 00:24:25,260 systems accounted for any of the UAP reports we collected. The 377 00:24:25,260 --> 00:24:31,230 question mark is here. What point and what access did they 378 00:24:31,230 --> 00:24:36,960 have and looking into potential black budget programs, stuff 379 00:24:36,960 --> 00:24:39,720 like the stealth aircraft that was in development for decades 380 00:24:39,720 --> 00:24:44,910 before being acknowledged? Does the UAP taskforce have that type 381 00:24:44,940 --> 00:24:49,050 of access? The fact that they're considering that as a as a 382 00:24:49,050 --> 00:24:53,370 category, yet they were saying that we were unable to confirm 383 00:24:53,940 --> 00:24:57,060 I'm not sure if I lean towards the fact that maybe they're not 384 00:24:57,060 --> 00:25:02,100 as cleared to see all of that And that is a question that I 385 00:25:02,100 --> 00:25:05,760 think we may never have the answer to. And that is would 386 00:25:05,760 --> 00:25:10,320 they have access to let's say the saps, the unacknowledged 387 00:25:10,320 --> 00:25:14,910 saps, the black budget programs, all of that kind of stuff that 388 00:25:14,910 --> 00:25:18,240 we've heard bantered about for decades and decades, would they 389 00:25:18,240 --> 00:25:21,570 be able to access that information and understand that 390 00:25:21,600 --> 00:25:25,770 maybe it's not even an aircraft unmanned drone versus a manned 391 00:25:25,770 --> 00:25:29,130 aircraft or a piece of technology? You know, that's 392 00:25:29,130 --> 00:25:33,420 that that is carried aloft into the atmosphere, whatever that 393 00:25:33,420 --> 00:25:36,540 might be. Again, lots of different possibilities there. 394 00:25:36,720 --> 00:25:40,650 But I found that interesting that they that they had US 395 00:25:40,650 --> 00:25:43,320 government developmental programs in their foreign 396 00:25:43,320 --> 00:25:47,130 adversary system, some UAE UAP may be technologies deployed by 397 00:25:47,130 --> 00:25:50,760 China, Russia, another nation or non government entity. Of 398 00:25:50,760 --> 00:25:53,190 course, that is what we keep hearing about from the Senate 399 00:25:53,190 --> 00:25:57,360 Congress. Whomever is outspoken about uaps is it Russia is 400 00:25:57,390 --> 00:26:00,930 China. Who could it be? So that's not a surprise other. 401 00:26:01,680 --> 00:26:04,350 Although most of the UAP described in our dataset, 402 00:26:04,680 --> 00:26:08,400 probably remain unidentified, to limited data or challenges to 403 00:26:08,400 --> 00:26:12,150 collection, processing or analysis. We may require 404 00:26:12,150 --> 00:26:15,480 additional scientific knowledge to successfully collect on, 405 00:26:15,750 --> 00:26:19,830 analyze and characterize some of them. We would group such 406 00:26:19,830 --> 00:26:23,070 objects in this category, pending scientific advances that 407 00:26:23,070 --> 00:26:26,520 allow us to better understand them. The ua PTF intends to 408 00:26:26,520 --> 00:26:30,090 focus additional analysis on the small number of cases where a 409 00:26:30,090 --> 00:26:34,230 UAP appeared to display unusual flight characteristics or 410 00:26:34,230 --> 00:26:35,550 signature management, a 411 00:26:37,080 --> 00:26:39,780 whole section on UAP threatened flight safety and possible 412 00:26:39,780 --> 00:26:42,600 national security. We have already gone over that. But they 413 00:26:42,600 --> 00:26:45,870 go into more details, I recommend you you get into that 414 00:26:46,980 --> 00:26:50,250 explaining UAP will require analytic collection and resource 415 00:26:50,250 --> 00:26:53,670 investment. And there is more detail about potentially 416 00:26:53,670 --> 00:26:56,700 standardizing the reporting called consolidating the data, 417 00:26:57,180 --> 00:26:59,940 deepening the analysis and essentially doing that with 418 00:26:59,940 --> 00:27:03,810 additional resources and of course, funding to make all of 419 00:27:03,810 --> 00:27:09,390 that happen. There look looking to expand the collection, they 420 00:27:09,390 --> 00:27:12,480 have a whole section on that the UAP ATF is looking for novel 421 00:27:12,480 --> 00:27:16,500 ways to increase collection of UAP cluster areas when US forces 422 00:27:16,800 --> 00:27:21,000 are not present as a way to baseline standard UAP activity 423 00:27:21,240 --> 00:27:26,100 and mitigate the collection bias in the dataset. Is that a 424 00:27:26,100 --> 00:27:31,770 pathway for them to potentially look at sightings by the normies 425 00:27:31,800 --> 00:27:35,850 out there, the US and me's the people that are not on a 426 00:27:35,850 --> 00:27:39,780 military mission or training mission at you know, 35,000 427 00:27:39,780 --> 00:27:43,980 feet, we're not flying in an FAA team? Are they going to go out 428 00:27:43,980 --> 00:27:47,280 there and ask us questions if we go out there and see what we 429 00:27:47,280 --> 00:27:51,660 would call a UAP. And I think that if they do go down that 430 00:27:51,660 --> 00:27:57,120 route that would allow them to see is this a essentially a 431 00:27:57,120 --> 00:28:00,240 collection bias where it's mostly around military training 432 00:28:00,240 --> 00:28:06,090 areas and so on? Or will this open up a whole new world, to 433 00:28:06,180 --> 00:28:12,030 the Congress to Senate to the UAE, PTF to God, upper 434 00:28:12,030 --> 00:28:15,750 management, whomever? Will it open up that world to show them 435 00:28:15,750 --> 00:28:20,730 this phenomena is happening nationwide, worldwide to 436 00:28:20,760 --> 00:28:24,690 everybody from every background, and it does not discriminate, 437 00:28:24,870 --> 00:28:28,860 who it shows itself to or who it potentially threatens. So if 438 00:28:28,860 --> 00:28:31,860 they open it up to commercial pilots, those that are flying 439 00:28:31,860 --> 00:28:34,440 for, let's say, Southwest Airlines, American Airlines 440 00:28:34,440 --> 00:28:39,360 united, what are they doing here? And I think that i think 441 00:28:39,360 --> 00:28:42,300 that that is a that is one of the bigger steps forward one 442 00:28:42,300 --> 00:28:45,150 proposal reading from the document here one proposal is to 443 00:28:45,150 --> 00:28:49,260 use advanced algorithms to search historical data captured 444 00:28:49,260 --> 00:28:53,070 and stored by radars. I'm wondering what they saw to 445 00:28:53,070 --> 00:28:57,480 actually create that type of a drive and recommendation to do 446 00:28:57,480 --> 00:29:01,440 that. Here's that investment word increase investment in 447 00:29:01,440 --> 00:29:05,010 research and development in the UAE PTF has indicated that 448 00:29:05,010 --> 00:29:07,440 additional funding for research and development could further 449 00:29:07,440 --> 00:29:11,220 the future study of the topics laid out in this report. Such 450 00:29:11,220 --> 00:29:15,180 investment should be guided by a UAP collection strategy UAP r&d 451 00:29:15,180 --> 00:29:20,040 technical roadmap and a UAP program plan. That was 452 00:29:20,040 --> 00:29:22,770 essentially the end of the report. The appendix with 453 00:29:22,770 --> 00:29:26,580 definitions, I don't really count that. But you can see they 454 00:29:26,580 --> 00:29:29,430 define unidentified aerial phenomena they're going 455 00:29:29,430 --> 00:29:33,480 definition, by the way, is airborne objects not immediately 456 00:29:33,480 --> 00:29:38,550 identifiable. The acronym UAP represents the broadest category 457 00:29:38,550 --> 00:29:43,620 of airborne objects reviewed, reviewed for analysis. So not as 458 00:29:43,680 --> 00:29:46,950 I would say sexy as we would all think that that definition would 459 00:29:46,950 --> 00:29:52,110 be a true definition to UAP has been very hard to come by. I got 460 00:29:52,110 --> 00:29:57,420 one about two years ago from the the Navy and it looks like is 461 00:29:57,420 --> 00:30:02,160 it's pretty much all along the lines of this, I'll dig that up 462 00:30:02,160 --> 00:30:06,240 for you guys and link it as well. But airborne objects not 463 00:30:06,240 --> 00:30:08,700 immediately identifiable. I mean, that's essentially what 464 00:30:08,700 --> 00:30:12,060 they've gone towards for some time, but you can see some of 465 00:30:12,060 --> 00:30:17,010 the other terms there. And then Appendix B, this was about, 466 00:30:17,460 --> 00:30:20,730 essentially what the Senate was requesting, from them details 467 00:30:20,730 --> 00:30:25,170 about what they had requested. So there you have it, there are 468 00:30:25,170 --> 00:30:30,240 some initial reactions, I have quite a few other thoughts that 469 00:30:30,240 --> 00:30:35,370 I won't go into yet. Here's my closing one for you guys, 470 00:30:35,370 --> 00:30:39,030 though. And I hope that I hope that you do take a couple 471 00:30:39,030 --> 00:30:43,470 moments to read those nine pages that doesn't take long digested 472 00:30:43,470 --> 00:30:47,700 and read it again. Because the reaction I got from myself, the 473 00:30:47,700 --> 00:30:51,450 second time was a lot different than from the first time. And I 474 00:30:51,450 --> 00:30:55,830 really was let down when I took at first glance of this. The 475 00:30:55,830 --> 00:30:58,950 second time, I was still really let down. But at least I was 476 00:30:58,950 --> 00:31:02,970 starting to pick up that there were tidbits that there were 477 00:31:02,970 --> 00:31:07,380 nuggets that we can find and be encouraged by. But one thing 478 00:31:07,380 --> 00:31:11,490 that I will say and what I even tweeted out today, for those who 479 00:31:11,490 --> 00:31:14,730 were watching with me, and we were all frantically pressing 480 00:31:14,730 --> 00:31:19,920 refresh on the DNS website, and really anticipating this 481 00:31:19,920 --> 00:31:20,520 together 482 00:31:21,810 --> 00:31:25,530 is that this is not the end, right? This this is not, 483 00:31:25,560 --> 00:31:28,950 regardless of this being the letdown, that it might be to 484 00:31:28,950 --> 00:31:32,340 you. Or maybe it's encouraging to you, maybe this is more than 485 00:31:32,340 --> 00:31:36,960 you thought. It doesn't matter what you think this is far from 486 00:31:36,960 --> 00:31:41,130 the end, not only for me, on a personal level, I've been doing 487 00:31:41,130 --> 00:31:44,940 this for 25 years pursuing UFO UAP information with the 488 00:31:44,940 --> 00:31:47,400 government. So I'm not going to stop now. But I hope it 489 00:31:47,400 --> 00:31:51,120 motivates all of you as well. Because even though this report, 490 00:31:51,570 --> 00:31:55,350 I can almost bet for all of you didn't have everything that you 491 00:31:55,350 --> 00:31:59,820 wanted in it. At least this shows us that there is movement, 492 00:32:00,060 --> 00:32:03,870 that the UAP topic is being taken seriously, that it is 493 00:32:03,870 --> 00:32:08,580 being acknowledged that it is being essentially looked at as a 494 00:32:08,580 --> 00:32:12,270 potential threat. And as much as some of you do not like that 495 00:32:12,270 --> 00:32:18,120 word that will pave the way for them, meaning the Senate to look 496 00:32:18,120 --> 00:32:23,610 at this, that is not exciting or extraordinary by itself. But 497 00:32:23,610 --> 00:32:27,660 that is the route. Because once additional funding, I'll be at 498 00:32:27,660 --> 00:32:32,250 maybe a small amount, that additional funding goes in, and 499 00:32:32,250 --> 00:32:36,210 that expansion of the data happens, and they expand it to 500 00:32:36,210 --> 00:32:40,770 commercial aviation pilots. they expand it to just the Jo schmoes 501 00:32:40,770 --> 00:32:44,970 of the world that are seeing UFOs to essentially then really 502 00:32:45,270 --> 00:32:49,890 tackle this from a scientific standpoint, that is what we 503 00:32:49,890 --> 00:32:53,940 should all praise. I'm mad too, we didn't get what we really 504 00:32:53,940 --> 00:32:58,410 truly wanted. But if this is the route to potentially a bigger 505 00:32:58,410 --> 00:33:03,540 program, that will then pave that way for a bigger data set 506 00:33:03,540 --> 00:33:08,670 for them to call on. Hopefully, we the people will have access 507 00:33:08,670 --> 00:33:13,620 to that. But at least those are baby steps forward, forward to 508 00:33:13,620 --> 00:33:18,780 where I'm on the journey with you because I have no idea. As I 509 00:33:18,780 --> 00:33:21,150 said earlier, I'm always interested in your thoughts. If 510 00:33:21,150 --> 00:33:24,630 you're watching on YouTube, of course, post them down there. A 511 00:33:24,630 --> 00:33:27,420 big thumbs up always helps on the video. And of course, 512 00:33:27,690 --> 00:33:30,360 sharing the word make sure you are subscribed to the channel, 513 00:33:30,360 --> 00:33:33,930 turn the notifications on. Because I would bet money 514 00:33:33,930 --> 00:33:37,290 there's probably a live stream coming up sometime in the future 515 00:33:37,500 --> 00:33:40,380 where that toll free line is going to be open. And we can all 516 00:33:40,380 --> 00:33:42,330 chat and have a good time because the last time I did 517 00:33:42,330 --> 00:33:45,060 that, that was a lot of fun. So make sure you do that if you are 518 00:33:45,060 --> 00:33:48,210 listening on the podcast version. This is the first time 519 00:33:48,210 --> 00:33:52,530 I've put more of what I call a quick blast on as a podcast. 520 00:33:52,530 --> 00:33:57,030 Generally these are more long form on the audio, but let me 521 00:33:57,030 --> 00:33:59,340 know what you think about that. If you'd like to see more of 522 00:33:59,340 --> 00:34:02,880 these because there's a lot of videos I do not drop in podcast 523 00:34:02,880 --> 00:34:06,000 form. So if you want to see more, please drop me a line. 524 00:34:06,180 --> 00:34:10,200 It's pretty straightforward contact at the black vault comm 525 00:34:10,200 --> 00:34:13,560 that will come directly to me. And of course if you're 526 00:34:13,560 --> 00:34:18,030 listening on those podcast platforms, I aim for five stars 527 00:34:18,060 --> 00:34:21,330 reviews are very, very helpful. And of course, make sure you 528 00:34:21,330 --> 00:34:24,480 help spread the word on the podcast as well. All of that 529 00:34:24,480 --> 00:34:27,240 said thank you all for listening and watching. This is John 530 00:34:27,240 --> 00:34:29,760 Greenewald Jr signing off, and we'll see you next time.