1 00:00:02,850 --> 00:00:08,940 John Greenewald: His name is John Ramirez. A retired CIA 2 00:00:08,970 --> 00:00:13,710 officer, John spent 25 years with the agency specializing in 3 00:00:13,710 --> 00:00:19,650 ballistic missile defense systems. And signals analysis of 4 00:00:19,650 --> 00:00:24,750 weapons system radars. And along the way, he's learned some stuff 5 00:00:24,750 --> 00:00:27,390 that he now feels he wants to share with the world. 6 00:00:27,510 --> 00:00:31,830 John Ramirez: And then we have what appears to be also V 7 00:00:31,830 --> 00:00:35,910 energy. That's the best way I can describe it, that people 8 00:00:35,910 --> 00:00:36,720 have also seen, 9 00:00:36,930 --> 00:00:40,290 John Greenewald: but he is no whistleblower. The information 10 00:00:40,290 --> 00:00:44,580 he's about to share comes after a CIA Review of the information 11 00:00:44,580 --> 00:00:48,150 he wants to convey. And they gave their approval that John 12 00:00:48,150 --> 00:00:53,250 can talk about at all. This doesn't mean the CIA endorses 13 00:00:53,250 --> 00:00:57,900 his information, but rather, it was reviewed by the CIA to 14 00:00:57,900 --> 00:01:03,510 ensure no classified information is given to you or me. So what 15 00:01:03,510 --> 00:01:08,190 does he want to share that the CIA is okay with? Well, how 16 00:01:08,190 --> 00:01:11,490 about knowledge about a working group within the intelligence 17 00:01:11,490 --> 00:01:16,170 community studying orbs? Or how about the reality that 18 00:01:16,170 --> 00:01:20,880 internally, CIA personnel within the agency talked about UFO 19 00:01:20,880 --> 00:01:26,880 related events? And yes, so much more, I saw my orb. Stay tuned, 20 00:01:27,240 --> 00:01:30,150 you're about to journey inside the black vault. 21 00:01:56,910 --> 00:01:59,400 That's right, everybody. As always, thank you so much for 22 00:01:59,400 --> 00:02:02,850 tuning in. And taking this journey inside the black vault 23 00:02:02,850 --> 00:02:06,540 with me. I'm your host, John Greenwald, Jr. and I've got a 24 00:02:06,540 --> 00:02:09,120 very special guest today, someone that I've wanted to talk 25 00:02:09,120 --> 00:02:14,130 to on this program for quite some time, he has definitely 26 00:02:14,280 --> 00:02:17,910 popped onto the scene here and has done quite a few interviews, 27 00:02:18,120 --> 00:02:22,440 and a very popular guest where he appears, and rightfully so 28 00:02:22,440 --> 00:02:25,980 he's got a lot of information to share. John Ramirez, John, thank 29 00:02:25,980 --> 00:02:29,430 you so much for joining me on the program and taking a little 30 00:02:29,430 --> 00:02:30,870 bit of time with me and my audience. 31 00:02:31,590 --> 00:02:35,250 John Ramirez: Well, John, thank you for having me. And so your 32 00:02:35,250 --> 00:02:38,640 audience might be interested to know a little backstory. When I 33 00:02:38,640 --> 00:02:42,420 was attending some of these UFO conferences with a colleague of 34 00:02:42,420 --> 00:02:47,250 mine. You were waiting to go on stage. And we actually talked to 35 00:02:47,250 --> 00:02:51,360 you when you're like very young, many, you know, I believe it 36 00:02:51,360 --> 00:02:53,880 will say conference in Orange County, you have to write for 37 00:02:53,880 --> 00:02:57,060 Orange County. And when you went up on stage to do your 38 00:02:57,060 --> 00:03:00,660 presentation, he and I looked at each other kind of smiled and 39 00:03:00,660 --> 00:03:05,760 said, you know, that guy really needs to talk to us. And here I 40 00:03:05,760 --> 00:03:09,720 am talking to you. So I consider that as a circle that was close. 41 00:03:09,720 --> 00:03:13,710 360 degrees, we close that circle, with my appearance with 42 00:03:13,710 --> 00:03:14,790 you. Yeah. And 43 00:03:14,790 --> 00:03:18,480 John Greenewald: I'm excited about it. I was I was surprised 44 00:03:18,480 --> 00:03:23,370 when you reminded me because I remember, if you recall, where 45 00:03:23,370 --> 00:03:26,250 we were standing, if I was on stage, it was to the right 46 00:03:26,250 --> 00:03:30,450 before I went on. And when you guys had approached me, and you 47 00:03:30,450 --> 00:03:35,610 had mentioned CIA? I did hope I didn't show it to you. But I 48 00:03:35,670 --> 00:03:38,670 think I started sweating a little bit going, why are people 49 00:03:38,670 --> 00:03:42,180 from the CIA here? Well, you know, waiting to watch me go up 50 00:03:42,180 --> 00:03:45,300 on stage. But I'm glad you reminded me. And that was quite 51 00:03:45,300 --> 00:03:48,240 a few years ago, like I said, and it's great to have you on 52 00:03:48,240 --> 00:03:52,020 the program and be able to pick your brain now that you have 53 00:03:52,020 --> 00:03:58,500 retired from your 25 year career in the CIA, and have decided to 54 00:03:58,500 --> 00:04:02,370 come out and start talking openly about topics that I would 55 00:04:02,370 --> 00:04:07,800 say not a whole lot of, of CIA agents personnel like to talk 56 00:04:07,800 --> 00:04:09,870 about. And let me ask you, I wanted to ask you before the 57 00:04:09,870 --> 00:04:13,500 show, what is an accurate term for you? Were you an agent or 58 00:04:13,500 --> 00:04:16,740 were you a employee? What's what's what's proper? 59 00:04:17,370 --> 00:04:20,010 John Ramirez: Well, we're not agents. There are no agents in 60 00:04:20,010 --> 00:04:24,480 CIA. We hire agents, there are foreign nationals, that for 61 00:04:24,480 --> 00:04:28,410 compensation could be monetary goods and services. They agree 62 00:04:28,410 --> 00:04:31,710 to spy against their own government because they have 63 00:04:31,710 --> 00:04:35,730 access into their own government and provide us with information. 64 00:04:36,120 --> 00:04:42,180 And so that is a major reason why there's so much secrecy and 65 00:04:42,180 --> 00:04:49,560 a lot of our most valuable intelligence sources are people 66 00:04:49,560 --> 00:04:54,600 who, if the information was known publicly, and only like a 67 00:04:54,600 --> 00:04:57,780 very few people would have that information in his or her 68 00:04:57,780 --> 00:05:03,060 country. Their lives will be at stake And so that's a very 69 00:05:03,060 --> 00:05:06,300 precarious situation for them and for us, because exposes our 70 00:05:06,300 --> 00:05:10,860 sources, it may expose other sources if they interrogate this 71 00:05:10,860 --> 00:05:16,500 person. And also the method of extraction method sources and 72 00:05:16,500 --> 00:05:19,740 methods, the method of extraction becomes very fragile, 73 00:05:19,770 --> 00:05:23,310 we won't be able to use that extraction method ever again. 74 00:05:23,880 --> 00:05:27,810 And so that's why a lot of the secrecy occurs. And so it's not 75 00:05:27,810 --> 00:05:31,860 like we're hiding information. It's more like, we need to 76 00:05:31,860 --> 00:05:35,160 protect these sources of methods, because we may want to 77 00:05:35,160 --> 00:05:39,600 use the source, again, or other sources, and we need to protect 78 00:05:39,600 --> 00:05:43,410 how we get information out of that country, an adversarial 79 00:05:43,410 --> 00:05:50,460 country, to the United States. And so that's that type of 80 00:05:50,460 --> 00:05:54,300 person is an agent. I say, no, no. How 81 00:05:54,300 --> 00:05:56,850 John Greenewald: would you describe yourself? Officers? 82 00:05:56,940 --> 00:05:58,020 Officers? Gosh, 83 00:05:58,019 --> 00:06:01,829 John Ramirez: officers, yeah. So operations officers, analytic 84 00:06:01,829 --> 00:06:06,929 officers, Science and Technology Officers, it could be logistics 85 00:06:06,929 --> 00:06:10,799 officers, you name it. I gotcha, the full gamut of all of our 86 00:06:10,919 --> 00:06:13,079 positions. We're just officers. 87 00:06:13,499 --> 00:06:15,419 John Greenewald: So I want to talk a little bit, just for a 88 00:06:15,419 --> 00:06:18,719 couple minutes about what you did for the CIA. I spoke a 89 00:06:18,719 --> 00:06:20,849 little bit about it in the introduction, everybody just 90 00:06:20,849 --> 00:06:27,989 saw, but as I just mentioned, 25 years, you were quite busy in 91 00:06:27,989 --> 00:06:32,009 that in that timeframe. Give me a nutshell version about those 92 00:06:32,009 --> 00:06:36,899 25 years if you can. And what did you do for the for the CIA? 93 00:06:37,529 --> 00:06:40,199 John Ramirez: Okay, so I can talk about his signals 94 00:06:40,199 --> 00:06:44,069 intelligence. Everyone knows that the National Security 95 00:06:44,069 --> 00:06:47,279 Agency does and what's intelligence there, the 96 00:06:47,279 --> 00:06:51,659 functional mission manager, the director of NSA, what we call 97 00:06:51,689 --> 00:06:55,319 danza is the functional Mission Manager for signals 98 00:06:55,319 --> 00:07:00,899 intelligence, CIA does human intelligence. So humans, and 99 00:07:00,959 --> 00:07:04,859 open source intelligence are also sent. And so that's our, 100 00:07:04,949 --> 00:07:08,849 that's our focus. But within the CIA, there are other 101 00:07:08,849 --> 00:07:14,849 capabilities that are also capabilities and other agencies. 102 00:07:15,269 --> 00:07:19,559 But the focus of our capabilities is to support 103 00:07:20,159 --> 00:07:25,439 operations. So from a citizen intelligence standpoint, our 104 00:07:25,439 --> 00:07:31,499 second officers deploy to protect operations, they may do 105 00:07:31,499 --> 00:07:38,519 counter surveillance, they may provide gadgets, in order to do 106 00:07:38,519 --> 00:07:40,889 some of that extraction that I talked about this highly 107 00:07:40,889 --> 00:07:48,389 sensitive. So in my role, I did electronic intelligence, and 108 00:07:48,389 --> 00:07:52,469 electronic intelligence is the analysis of weapons related 109 00:07:52,499 --> 00:07:57,299 radar signals, missile seekers, air defense radar systems 110 00:07:57,329 --> 00:08:02,639 associated with larger weapon systems. And so we would like 111 00:08:02,639 --> 00:08:05,909 collect signals and analyze them in a lab 112 00:08:07,170 --> 00:08:10,950 to get the internals of that signal. When I mean by 113 00:08:10,950 --> 00:08:15,330 internals, we want to reverse engineer that radar, just based 114 00:08:15,330 --> 00:08:20,070 on the signals that we collect. And any photographs may, we may 115 00:08:20,070 --> 00:08:24,120 have, have the source the radar antennas, for example, we can 116 00:08:24,120 --> 00:08:27,390 measure, combined with the signals combined with other 117 00:08:27,390 --> 00:08:31,620 information provided by our overhead reconnaissance systems 118 00:08:31,890 --> 00:08:36,270 of how much power that we collected. And together, we can 119 00:08:36,270 --> 00:08:41,130 then model that radar system. And that information goes to a 120 00:08:41,130 --> 00:08:44,070 weapon systems analyst who's looking at for example, if it's 121 00:08:44,070 --> 00:08:47,940 a surface to air missile system, we might do the radar signals 122 00:08:47,940 --> 00:08:52,620 analysis for that system. And they may do the interceptor, the 123 00:08:52,620 --> 00:08:56,640 actual shooting in of that weapons system, combining our 124 00:08:56,640 --> 00:09:02,130 data with the interceptor data, they'll have a better picture of 125 00:09:02,130 --> 00:09:08,310 that system. Now dia does the same thing. Dia has the missile 126 00:09:08,310 --> 00:09:11,220 and space Intelligence Center in Huntsville, Alabama. They also 127 00:09:11,220 --> 00:09:14,700 have a lab and they do the same thing. So what's the difference? 128 00:09:14,760 --> 00:09:19,560 Well, the DIA is more interested in an adversarial system 129 00:09:20,640 --> 00:09:26,250 performance against what we have in inventory. So when we look at 130 00:09:26,280 --> 00:09:31,830 a system, we're looking at the nuts and bolts and the internals 131 00:09:31,890 --> 00:09:35,640 of a system that is probably just being developed, so they 132 00:09:35,640 --> 00:09:40,140 don't have like hundreds of them scattered over a country that 133 00:09:40,140 --> 00:09:43,260 would have just like one or two that they're working on, and 134 00:09:43,260 --> 00:09:49,230 they test. But dia looks at the entire deployed system, what 135 00:09:49,230 --> 00:09:52,560 they call the electronic order of battle, all the emanations 136 00:09:52,560 --> 00:09:56,280 coming from deployed systems, and they model against what 137 00:09:56,280 --> 00:10:00,000 we're flying because they need to inform policymakers. This 138 00:10:00,000 --> 00:10:04,290 adversary has a new surface air missile system. And its 139 00:10:04,290 --> 00:10:09,780 performance is this. And we have, let's say, the F two F 22, 140 00:10:09,780 --> 00:10:14,730 F 35 fighter planes. And we know the, the performance of those 141 00:10:14,730 --> 00:10:19,890 fighter planes. And they have to model and simulate what our 142 00:10:19,890 --> 00:10:24,540 planes can do against that system, or what that system can 143 00:10:24,540 --> 00:10:28,350 do against our planes. So the DIA does that type of work in 144 00:10:28,350 --> 00:10:32,940 great detail. And dia reports. You know, you heard of dirts, 145 00:10:33,060 --> 00:10:38,460 just like a few pages, d i, Defense Intelligence Report from 146 00:10:38,460 --> 00:10:43,800 the DIA. I've seen hundreds and hundreds of pages. And that's 147 00:10:43,800 --> 00:10:47,430 one of the things that the IA doesn't like to release. And 148 00:10:47,430 --> 00:10:51,330 it's probably not foreseeable, because it's extremely 149 00:10:51,330 --> 00:10:55,950 sensitive, because it reveals our capabilities, if revealed, 150 00:10:55,980 --> 00:10:59,850 reveals those capabilities that we need to work on in order to 151 00:11:00,030 --> 00:11:04,590 counter a weapon system that's deployed. And what we provide is 152 00:11:04,590 --> 00:11:08,310 weapon systems that are going to be deployed so that they can cue 153 00:11:08,310 --> 00:11:12,510 up the acquisition side of the department saying, Okay, this 154 00:11:12,510 --> 00:11:17,700 adversary has this weapon system are our counter to that isn't as 155 00:11:17,700 --> 00:11:20,670 good, we need to either improve that weapon system or build a 156 00:11:20,670 --> 00:11:25,080 new one. And so that's the relationship of what we do 157 00:11:25,080 --> 00:11:30,510 versus let's NSA and dia. But we do have a lab. And surprisingly, 158 00:11:31,470 --> 00:11:35,700 every September is family day. So the family members who are 159 00:11:35,700 --> 00:11:41,910 uncleared to children, close relatives, of staff members and 160 00:11:41,910 --> 00:11:47,160 contractors invite their family members uncleared to tour the 161 00:11:47,160 --> 00:11:50,760 CIA, they practically have a full run of the house, as long 162 00:11:50,760 --> 00:11:55,560 as they're escorted by a badged officer or a badge contractor. 163 00:11:56,190 --> 00:12:00,300 And so here's my top secret SCI lab and I would giving tours of 164 00:12:00,300 --> 00:12:04,200 my lab and putting up demonstrations pumping in 165 00:12:04,200 --> 00:12:08,010 signals to simulate a radar system. And it's just showing 166 00:12:08,010 --> 00:12:11,820 how we do things. So in a way, it's highly secret. But in a 167 00:12:11,820 --> 00:12:15,630 way, it's it's not the fact of it's not secret. So, 168 00:12:15,720 --> 00:12:18,210 John Greenewald: you know, John, I could have happily been your 169 00:12:18,210 --> 00:12:22,410 son that day, when we would go in there. And no, that's 170 00:12:22,590 --> 00:12:26,100 fascinating. And and one of the other job titles that stuck out 171 00:12:26,100 --> 00:12:29,670 to me, which is one thing I want to deal with, before we move on 172 00:12:29,670 --> 00:12:32,580 from your background, is that you were a founding member of 173 00:12:32,580 --> 00:12:34,800 the Office of the Director of National Intelligence is 174 00:12:35,070 --> 00:12:41,970 national counterproliferation center or NC PC. Yeah. I believe 175 00:12:41,970 --> 00:12:46,800 that the history of that office began at CIA then was moved. Is 176 00:12:46,800 --> 00:12:48,330 that that correct? ODNI? 177 00:12:48,720 --> 00:12:52,350 John Ramirez: Well, it's one of the offices that reside both at 178 00:12:52,350 --> 00:12:56,700 CIA and at the ODNI level at CIA. It's the 179 00:12:56,700 --> 00:13:01,410 counterproliferation division underneath the director of 180 00:13:01,410 --> 00:13:05,430 operations. And in fact, the most infamous member of that 181 00:13:05,430 --> 00:13:09,840 division, we all know, what's Valerie Plame? She worked for 182 00:13:09,840 --> 00:13:15,780 CP. I work for NCPC at the ODNI level where we have 183 00:13:16,080 --> 00:13:19,530 counterproliferation efforts throughout the government. And 184 00:13:19,530 --> 00:13:24,780 we were coordinating the United States government's response to 185 00:13:24,810 --> 00:13:32,370 the tear to stop proliferation of nuclear materials. And we 186 00:13:32,370 --> 00:13:35,280 were making sure that at the policy, not the operational 187 00:13:35,280 --> 00:13:39,210 level at the policy level, that we weren't doing things that 188 00:13:39,210 --> 00:13:43,620 were redundant, that we were like providing resources to them 189 00:13:43,650 --> 00:13:48,240 be advocates for resources to these other CP organizations, 190 00:13:48,480 --> 00:13:54,510 such as at the FBI, NASA security branch. There is a CP 191 00:13:54,510 --> 00:14:02,490 division at NSA in a directorate called S director for cygan. And 192 00:14:02,490 --> 00:14:05,940 in a subdirectory, called S two which is analysis in production. 193 00:14:06,420 --> 00:14:10,770 There is a office of counterproliferation. So there's 194 00:14:10,770 --> 00:14:13,740 just two examples of other counterproliferation efforts. 195 00:14:14,280 --> 00:14:18,120 So, now, we want to make sure that we don't redundantly, like, 196 00:14:18,480 --> 00:14:22,710 provide capabilities, that when we build something for the CP 197 00:14:22,710 --> 00:14:26,160 equity, that everyone has access to it, and that they all can 198 00:14:26,160 --> 00:14:31,470 provide inputs into that capability. So that when we buy 199 00:14:31,470 --> 00:14:36,240 that capability, through NRO, for example, with a defense 200 00:14:36,240 --> 00:14:38,700 contractor, let's say it's Lockheed Martin Building a 201 00:14:38,700 --> 00:14:42,210 satellite or something like that, that all of their equities 202 00:14:42,210 --> 00:14:45,930 are addressed in that sensor system. And all the capabilities 203 00:14:45,930 --> 00:14:50,280 they want that to do so we brokered that kind of like, and 204 00:14:50,280 --> 00:14:53,100 I can speak on the second side and that we also have biology 205 00:14:53,100 --> 00:14:56,550 and nuclear as the other parts of NBC. 206 00:14:56,729 --> 00:14:59,969 John Greenewald: Yeah. Valerie Plame is a name I haven't heard 207 00:14:59,999 --> 00:15:03,599 In a quite a few years, that's funny. Bring her up and you 208 00:15:03,599 --> 00:15:06,479 refreshed my memory on a couple of FOIA cases that I had many, 209 00:15:06,479 --> 00:15:10,109 many years ago. But that's a different show in itself. So So 210 00:15:10,109 --> 00:15:13,109 let me ask you, somebody who's involved in that type of work 211 00:15:13,109 --> 00:15:15,389 and weapon systems. And obviously, you answered one of 212 00:15:15,389 --> 00:15:19,049 my other questions already. Your lab was top secret SCI. So you 213 00:15:19,049 --> 00:15:22,079 were highly cleared at these levels? It's kind of obvious. 214 00:15:22,079 --> 00:15:27,749 But you know, just to set that up, how do you have a focus like 215 00:15:27,749 --> 00:15:33,659 that with the CIA, and wind up at UFO conferences? And you, you 216 00:15:33,659 --> 00:15:37,829 know, showed up at my at one of the, you know, my appearances? 217 00:15:39,059 --> 00:15:43,439 What's that bridge? What got you into the UFO side of this? Was 218 00:15:43,439 --> 00:15:45,209 it anything official or personal? 219 00:15:45,630 --> 00:15:47,880 John Ramirez: Well, first of all, let me preface I don't 220 00:15:47,880 --> 00:15:52,950 remember, we identified as CIA, I think because of the way we 221 00:15:52,950 --> 00:15:56,070 behaved, you might have surmised us to be CIA. 222 00:15:56,280 --> 00:15:57,900 John Greenewald: You might be right. But to be honest with 223 00:15:57,900 --> 00:16:02,490 you, I could have, maybe I could absolutely be wrong, and maybe I 224 00:16:02,490 --> 00:16:08,430 picked up on it. But I remember being nervous. Like, why are 225 00:16:08,430 --> 00:16:11,670 they in and again, maybe it was just an assumption on my part. 226 00:16:12,330 --> 00:16:14,850 So yeah, forgive me if I miss remember that part. 227 00:16:15,090 --> 00:16:19,830 John Ramirez: Yeah, we would not identify CIA and a sec to your 228 00:16:19,860 --> 00:16:26,100 question. We went there, because we were personally interested. 229 00:16:26,430 --> 00:16:30,750 And you follow it. So my friend and I, we were both 230 00:16:30,750 --> 00:16:36,420 experiencers. And we both had sightings. And so we had an 231 00:16:36,420 --> 00:16:39,330 interest. But having that interest in CIA was not 232 00:16:39,360 --> 00:16:44,760 official, both of us we informed CIA officers security, the fact 233 00:16:44,760 --> 00:16:47,700 that we're going to this conference, the hotels were 234 00:16:47,700 --> 00:16:52,530 staying at the flights were taking, and, and to verify that 235 00:16:52,590 --> 00:16:56,010 we're paying for everything, the flights, the hotels and the 236 00:16:56,010 --> 00:17:00,060 conference fees out of out of pocket, as long as they know 237 00:17:00,060 --> 00:17:04,140 where we at. They didn't care where we went. And it's within 238 00:17:04,140 --> 00:17:07,740 CONUS. So it's not like we're traveling overseas. Sure. So 239 00:17:07,740 --> 00:17:12,330 that makes it a lot easier. So it was a personal interest. And 240 00:17:12,510 --> 00:17:18,420 many people at CIA who worked in other areas, not even close to 241 00:17:18,450 --> 00:17:22,440 the weapons intelligence area I worked. But in other areas, were 242 00:17:22,440 --> 00:17:27,660 also hobbyists, I would say, of the entire topic. And I know 243 00:17:27,660 --> 00:17:31,560 that because I was an administrator of a discussion 244 00:17:31,590 --> 00:17:36,060 database and Lotus Notes, which really dates the technology, IBM 245 00:17:36,060 --> 00:17:39,900 Lotus Notes, and they had little discussion database areas within 246 00:17:39,900 --> 00:17:45,930 Lotus Notes. And one of them's called the users group, th U G, 247 00:17:45,990 --> 00:17:50,640 and we put a little s it, it's pronounced thugs. And all of a 248 00:17:50,640 --> 00:17:54,840 sudden, a lot of folks who served my time will remember Oh, 249 00:17:54,840 --> 00:17:57,870 that's that John Ramirez from thugs, because I was one of the 250 00:17:57,870 --> 00:18:00,990 administrators and I used to contribute a lot into the 251 00:18:01,080 --> 00:18:08,310 computer hobbyists that used to post in that particular data 252 00:18:08,310 --> 00:18:13,950 discussion base. But one of the topics was like what DNI, 253 00:18:14,040 --> 00:18:18,600 Abraham's calls the other topic. And so we had a catch all of 254 00:18:18,600 --> 00:18:23,400 things that we just contributed. And that's where a lot of people 255 00:18:23,430 --> 00:18:30,750 talked about the Anunnaki. The money emits on Mars, anomalies 256 00:18:30,750 --> 00:18:34,020 on the on Mars and the Moon and things like that are mostly 257 00:18:34,020 --> 00:18:38,160 speculative in nature. I brought up the remote viewing program, 258 00:18:39,420 --> 00:18:43,170 and MK Ultra, and all these things that we all know from 259 00:18:43,200 --> 00:18:49,140 foils that CIA was involved in, we just discussed it at that 260 00:18:49,140 --> 00:18:51,720 level. And it's supposed to be unclassified. So we're not going 261 00:18:51,720 --> 00:18:55,260 to put in anything in there of a current operation or current 262 00:18:55,260 --> 00:18:58,380 capability. Yeah, it's more historical looking back and 263 00:18:58,380 --> 00:19:05,130 personal, personal experiences. And so in that context, that's 264 00:19:05,130 --> 00:19:10,500 how I was able to interface with that entire topic at an 265 00:19:10,500 --> 00:19:13,680 unofficial level. But having said that, I got phone calls on 266 00:19:13,680 --> 00:19:17,850 the secure line, that what CIA officers are know the green 267 00:19:17,850 --> 00:19:21,720 phone, so I say green phone, they know exactly what phone was 268 00:19:21,720 --> 00:19:26,010 ringing. The green phone rang and people will tell me about 269 00:19:26,580 --> 00:19:30,270 certain things that they witnessed in the course of their 270 00:19:30,270 --> 00:19:32,940 careers, or even some in the course of their military 271 00:19:32,940 --> 00:19:37,230 careers. For example, the strong association with Navy and the 272 00:19:37,230 --> 00:19:41,010 phenomenon. One CIA officer called me up and say, yeah, when 273 00:19:41,010 --> 00:19:46,800 I was on the USS Boston, and we're off the coast of Vietnam, 274 00:19:47,160 --> 00:19:50,970 we had to fight off a UFO. My ship went to jury quarters, and 275 00:19:50,970 --> 00:19:55,650 we fought off a UFO. And I looked at the deployment of that 276 00:19:55,650 --> 00:20:01,020 ship, and where we're when that ship was Off the coast of 277 00:20:01,020 --> 00:20:06,030 Vietnam, the Gulf of Tonkin, or what they call Yankee station. 278 00:20:07,050 --> 00:20:11,940 There's nothing there that would even hint at that occurring. I 279 00:20:11,940 --> 00:20:15,810 looked at the cruise, the cruise books at Navy people know that 280 00:20:15,810 --> 00:20:20,220 when you go on like a cruise into the Pacific West packs or 281 00:20:20,370 --> 00:20:23,640 to the Met the Met cruises, that there's a cruise book like a 282 00:20:23,670 --> 00:20:27,780 high school annual. And I looked in there for any incidence of 283 00:20:27,810 --> 00:20:29,940 anything strange occur. And of course, that's not going to be 284 00:20:29,940 --> 00:20:33,810 in there. But he affirmed that, yeah, that happened. And so in 285 00:20:33,810 --> 00:20:37,800 that level, that's where I got involved with some quiet, 286 00:20:37,980 --> 00:20:40,200 personal as well as semi official. 287 00:20:41,880 --> 00:20:44,370 John Greenewald: Let's talk about the semi official. Were 288 00:20:44,370 --> 00:20:47,760 you able to peek anybody's interest internally with the CIA 289 00:20:47,760 --> 00:20:51,150 about these types of reports that you were getting through 290 00:20:51,270 --> 00:20:54,270 through the thugs? Through the from the from the your fellow 291 00:20:54,270 --> 00:20:57,630 thugs? Were you able to get people to be interested? Or what 292 00:20:57,630 --> 00:20:58,440 happened with that? 293 00:20:58,710 --> 00:21:00,870 John Ramirez: Well, I think they were like, already interested. 294 00:21:00,870 --> 00:21:04,590 And I met some of them for lunch. And we talked about it 295 00:21:04,620 --> 00:21:09,240 like at lunch, going to the cafeteria. And we could talk 296 00:21:09,240 --> 00:21:12,510 about it because it was personal, like experiences. Now. 297 00:21:12,660 --> 00:21:16,380 There is no classified discussion at any cafeteria. 298 00:21:16,530 --> 00:21:21,300 Sure. In the intelligence community, it's unclassified. So 299 00:21:21,300 --> 00:21:25,410 we can't get into details about, you know, the professional side 300 00:21:25,950 --> 00:21:31,980 of what we might have worked on. But it's all personal anecdotes 301 00:21:32,010 --> 00:21:37,290 of what we experienced ourselves. So at that level, 302 00:21:37,290 --> 00:21:42,510 yes, I was able to like, have a group of people just getting 303 00:21:42,510 --> 00:21:46,470 together at lunch on our own time, because lunch is our own 304 00:21:46,470 --> 00:21:51,300 time. And not doing it doing it this during government hours, 305 00:21:51,330 --> 00:21:53,070 the eight hours were were working. 306 00:21:54,690 --> 00:21:56,910 John Greenewald: Is that what you refer to as the semi 307 00:21:56,910 --> 00:21:59,220 official aspect of it? Right? 308 00:21:59,400 --> 00:22:01,860 John Ramirez: The semi official came from those discussions. 309 00:22:01,860 --> 00:22:04,530 Plus when I got on the green phone, I gotcha. 310 00:22:04,800 --> 00:22:09,150 John Greenewald: Yeah. Which is fascinating. And I took notes 311 00:22:09,150 --> 00:22:14,370 about the USS Boston and Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin. But are 312 00:22:14,370 --> 00:22:19,230 there any other incidents that you received through the green 313 00:22:19,230 --> 00:22:22,440 phone or elsewhere that stick out to you as being something 314 00:22:22,440 --> 00:22:26,880 that is not very well known or known at all in the UFO field, 315 00:22:26,880 --> 00:22:29,670 but something that on an official level? Or excuse me, 316 00:22:29,670 --> 00:22:35,340 from your time in the CIA, that you heard about? Anything that 317 00:22:35,340 --> 00:22:36,750 sticks out to you? Well, I've 318 00:22:36,750 --> 00:22:39,210 John Ramirez: already talked about this and my previous 319 00:22:39,540 --> 00:22:42,330 appearances about the or working group. 320 00:22:43,200 --> 00:22:45,840 John Greenewald: And I want to get into that. Yeah. So that's a 321 00:22:45,840 --> 00:22:48,990 perfect transition. So what exactly is this orb Working 322 00:22:48,990 --> 00:22:49,470 Group? 323 00:22:50,070 --> 00:22:55,470 John Ramirez: Well, let's say that before any huge program is 324 00:22:55,470 --> 00:22:59,850 launched. And a program is something that requires dollars 325 00:22:59,850 --> 00:23:04,080 and cents to fund it requires a facility requires contractor 326 00:23:04,080 --> 00:23:08,040 support, administrative support, logistics, support, all of that, 327 00:23:08,070 --> 00:23:12,960 that that's real money. Before that occurs, there's always 328 00:23:12,960 --> 00:23:17,760 like, offline before that occurs, pre program, people 329 00:23:17,760 --> 00:23:21,270 getting together to kind of bound the problem, like what 330 00:23:21,390 --> 00:23:25,770 what are we looking at? What are we dealing with? And how do we 331 00:23:26,280 --> 00:23:31,020 approach this issue? So the world working group started 332 00:23:31,020 --> 00:23:35,880 when, and I can say this, because the existence of orbs 333 00:23:36,090 --> 00:23:40,380 was officially disclosed. And James SLoCaT skis skinwalkers, 334 00:23:40,380 --> 00:23:45,630 in the Pentagon book, but we did see orbs, much like what they 335 00:23:45,630 --> 00:23:50,760 saw associated with a lot of the anecdotes from eyewitnesses in 336 00:23:50,760 --> 00:23:53,820 that book, so we saw orbs, and these were, 337 00:23:53,850 --> 00:23:55,590 John Greenewald: if I can interject, and I don't mean to 338 00:23:55,590 --> 00:23:59,580 John, just can you give a very brief definition? I know what an 339 00:23:59,580 --> 00:24:03,840 orb is. And I'm sure my does other members. Yeah, in the 340 00:24:03,840 --> 00:24:06,510 context of how you're referring to it, what what is an orb? 341 00:24:06,810 --> 00:24:11,010 John Ramirez: Okay, so we have structural craft, the nuts and 342 00:24:11,010 --> 00:24:16,590 bolts metallic craft that people have seen throughout the history 343 00:24:16,590 --> 00:24:22,320 of Philology, and then we have what appears to be balls of 344 00:24:22,320 --> 00:24:26,460 energy. That's the best way I can describe it. That people 345 00:24:26,460 --> 00:24:29,790 have also seen those are the orbs I'm talking about. Okay. 346 00:24:29,850 --> 00:24:33,810 And so, he said, well, people have seen these all along, but 347 00:24:33,870 --> 00:24:41,460 from officially some of these orbs cannot be seen. Unless you 348 00:24:41,490 --> 00:24:45,390 look at a spectrum outside of light, or actually below light 349 00:24:45,390 --> 00:24:50,250 infrared is being below light below red. And when that we have 350 00:24:50,250 --> 00:24:54,660 these capabilities built into some of our spacecraft, and turn 351 00:24:54,660 --> 00:24:59,730 them on, we are looking for, like launch detection. That's 352 00:24:59,730 --> 00:25:04,080 That's it primary function, we're also looking for what's 353 00:25:04,080 --> 00:25:09,600 known as change detection, we might be looking at a field that 354 00:25:10,710 --> 00:25:14,580 might be used for narcotics production. And we want to know 355 00:25:14,610 --> 00:25:17,730 what changes may have occurred over a period of time over that 356 00:25:17,730 --> 00:25:21,330 field. And that gives them an idea of what might be going on. 357 00:25:22,470 --> 00:25:26,100 So that's, that's the day job, if you will, of those sensors. 358 00:25:27,090 --> 00:25:31,680 What happened was outside of that day job of doing just 359 00:25:32,130 --> 00:25:35,970 normal intelligence collection, all of a sudden, they saw these 360 00:25:35,970 --> 00:25:41,520 balls of light. And it wasn't like an anomaly. To sense that, 361 00:25:42,150 --> 00:25:47,130 what NASA explains as dust, you know, particles or whatever, 362 00:25:47,160 --> 00:25:52,860 NASA lens flare, it wasn't that. And so it was something that was 363 00:25:52,890 --> 00:26:02,280 a tangible phenomenon. But not the can't be explained. And so 364 00:26:02,460 --> 00:26:05,250 originally, you know, when you get something like that, you 365 00:26:05,250 --> 00:26:08,760 want to filter it out. Because it's noise based on like, what 366 00:26:08,760 --> 00:26:10,620 you're really looking at, you don't want any of the noise 367 00:26:10,620 --> 00:26:14,130 there. So you want to, like get rid of it, from the data, 368 00:26:14,460 --> 00:26:16,740 subtracted from the data, because you just want to look at 369 00:26:16,740 --> 00:26:22,380 your target. Well, this kept appearing over and over. And it 370 00:26:22,380 --> 00:26:25,380 wasn't over the United States, because we don't turn on the 371 00:26:25,380 --> 00:26:29,100 sensors. Over the United States, the National Technical mean, 372 00:26:29,100 --> 00:26:34,530 sensors are not collecting against the United States. It's 373 00:26:34,530 --> 00:26:39,330 an adversary. And so over adversary airspace in space, 374 00:26:39,630 --> 00:26:42,900 here comes these these anomalies, and they kept 375 00:26:42,900 --> 00:26:46,920 happening to the point where, okay, now we got to pay 376 00:26:46,920 --> 00:26:50,400 attention to this. We got to pay more attention to this because 377 00:26:50,400 --> 00:26:54,750 this isn't something that is just a random occurrence. This 378 00:26:54,750 --> 00:27:01,200 is something that is almost like a, a tangible manifestation of 379 00:27:01,200 --> 00:27:04,080 something we don't understand. So let's get the working group 380 00:27:04,080 --> 00:27:06,180 together. And so what 381 00:27:06,180 --> 00:27:07,830 John Greenewald: year What year was this going on? 382 00:27:09,630 --> 00:27:15,720 John Ramirez: The the best I can say is, if you look at 383 00:27:15,720 --> 00:27:20,910 Wikipedia, and you can now search for k h 11. They give you 384 00:27:20,910 --> 00:27:24,360 all the blocks, block one, block two, block three, block four, 385 00:27:24,360 --> 00:27:31,740 block five, block two, in the early 90s was when the KH 11. A 386 00:27:31,770 --> 00:27:37,320 optical sensor taking pictures also included an infrared 387 00:27:38,070 --> 00:27:44,820 payload is the KH 11 is an electro optical sensor. I can 388 00:27:44,820 --> 00:27:48,240 say that because in our role reveal that, yeah, Nick 60th 389 00:27:48,240 --> 00:27:51,030 anniversary brochure. So I'm saying I'm saying it's has 390 00:27:51,030 --> 00:27:56,100 electro optical capabilities. So around, the best way I can tell 391 00:27:56,100 --> 00:28:01,350 you without getting the trouble is, look, look at those blocks. 392 00:28:01,410 --> 00:28:05,460 And so the earliest would have been in the early 90s. But as 393 00:28:05,460 --> 00:28:11,160 these capabilities improved, when I first heard about this 394 00:28:11,190 --> 00:28:15,450 phenomenon occurring, it was more in the timeframe of when I 395 00:28:15,450 --> 00:28:18,540 became chief of Elan about 2003 2004. 396 00:28:19,800 --> 00:28:20,910 John Greenewald: And the working group 397 00:28:22,170 --> 00:28:24,660 John Ramirez: are starting by 2004 2005. 398 00:28:25,259 --> 00:28:28,949 John Greenewald: Gotcha. So what's the next step once a 399 00:28:28,949 --> 00:28:32,969 working group convenes? And I assume but I want to clarify 400 00:28:33,329 --> 00:28:38,939 that the working group would be an eighth a oficial CIA Working 401 00:28:38,939 --> 00:28:39,299 Group? 402 00:28:40,320 --> 00:28:43,290 John Ramirez: No, it wasn't, it was an official nga working 403 00:28:43,290 --> 00:28:51,120 group. Okay. Nga was the source of the data and whoever has the 404 00:28:51,120 --> 00:28:54,090 source of the data. They're in charge of the working group. So 405 00:28:54,120 --> 00:28:57,600 it was NGA. I see. Okay, National Geospatial Intelligence 406 00:28:57,600 --> 00:29:02,550 Agency. They they're the ones who analyze, optical and electro 407 00:29:02,550 --> 00:29:07,740 optical imagery. I see. So it was their data. And so our 408 00:29:07,740 --> 00:29:10,980 tasking at the CIA side, we were weapons intelligence, 409 00:29:10,980 --> 00:29:13,920 nonproliferation arms control the weapons intelligence part. 410 00:29:15,990 --> 00:29:20,880 The first thing we want to do is to rule out is it advanced 411 00:29:20,880 --> 00:29:27,270 technology from an adversary. And since we look at advanced 412 00:29:27,270 --> 00:29:31,950 technology from our adversaries, we can do that analysis. There 413 00:29:31,950 --> 00:29:37,500 are people looking at the actual craft that could potentially be 414 00:29:37,500 --> 00:29:41,190 this and we're looking at the sensors or packages like 415 00:29:41,190 --> 00:29:45,150 countermeasures, electronic countermeasures, that could be 416 00:29:45,180 --> 00:29:51,570 providing this this kind of or like, manifestation. And so what 417 00:29:51,570 --> 00:29:58,440 we looked at was US platforms in the Russian inventory, that 418 00:29:58,440 --> 00:30:03,450 could have some kind of capability like that. And plasma 419 00:30:03,450 --> 00:30:07,380 Stealth is that type of capability. Whereas we built 420 00:30:07,380 --> 00:30:13,080 faceted kind of shaped aircraft, like the F 117 Nighthawk. With 421 00:30:13,080 --> 00:30:20,160 facets and with radar absorbing materials, the Russians went the 422 00:30:20,160 --> 00:30:24,960 opposite way they built devices that can be hung on to some of 423 00:30:24,960 --> 00:30:30,150 their aircraft and produce a plasma field. So, okay, that's, 424 00:30:30,180 --> 00:30:32,580 that's our comms razor. You know, that's the simplest 425 00:30:32,580 --> 00:30:37,200 explanation. Uh huh. That's what it is. But these orbs started 426 00:30:37,200 --> 00:30:41,610 appearing like way beyond the highest flying Russian aircraft, 427 00:30:41,640 --> 00:30:50,790 which is the MC 31. It, it flew higher than the FOXHOUND. And so 428 00:30:51,630 --> 00:30:57,540 123,000 feet is its maximum ceiling, it did, like, briefly, 429 00:30:57,870 --> 00:31:03,390 in a test, it usually flies between like 85 to 100,000, in 430 00:31:03,450 --> 00:31:07,260 what we call wartime mode, they don't fly that all the time. But 431 00:31:07,260 --> 00:31:10,560 if they need to, they can sustain some flight because it's 432 00:31:10,560 --> 00:31:20,460 basically designed to shoot down a ASR 71 It would look down, the 433 00:31:20,460 --> 00:31:23,730 radar is capable of looking down the missiles capable of firing 434 00:31:23,730 --> 00:31:26,430 down, we call it look down, shoot down, it had that 435 00:31:26,430 --> 00:31:29,940 capability for that purpose. And if you're wondering why we don't 436 00:31:29,940 --> 00:31:33,870 fly, ASR 70 ones anymore? Why do we take them off the inventory? 437 00:31:34,440 --> 00:31:37,950 That's one of the reasons, as well as improvements in Soviet 438 00:31:37,950 --> 00:31:41,850 Air Defense, Russian air defenses. So we rule that out 439 00:31:42,330 --> 00:31:45,660 completely. And so other components of the intelligence 440 00:31:45,660 --> 00:31:49,950 community will bring their expertise to rule out their 441 00:31:49,950 --> 00:31:53,640 areas of expertise that they have knowledge of. And once that 442 00:31:53,640 --> 00:31:57,420 happens, subject matter experts, and each intelligence agency 443 00:31:58,830 --> 00:32:04,740 will be called together and meet to share information that they 444 00:32:04,740 --> 00:32:08,640 have gathered to rule out everything. And then it was an 445 00:32:08,640 --> 00:32:13,800 opportunity for Nga, and in our role, after they checked that it 446 00:32:13,800 --> 00:32:16,830 wasn't a software glitch. And it wasn't our hardware glitch on 447 00:32:16,830 --> 00:32:21,000 the satellite. They brought their expertise in. And at some 448 00:32:21,000 --> 00:32:27,960 point, in that working group, they were informed about more of 449 00:32:27,960 --> 00:32:32,040 the history of the intelligence community and US government's 450 00:32:32,130 --> 00:32:39,690 dealings with you followed you. At a very deep, classified 451 00:32:39,690 --> 00:32:44,130 level, I refuse to be briefed into that. I didn't want to be 452 00:32:44,130 --> 00:32:47,250 briefed into that at all. I didn't need actually to know 453 00:32:47,250 --> 00:32:52,260 that. But I didn't need for them to share why they wanted to have 454 00:32:52,260 --> 00:32:56,730 my engineers to go to this working group. And so my job was 455 00:32:56,790 --> 00:32:59,010 to write performance appraisal reports, I just need to know 456 00:32:59,010 --> 00:33:01,830 what they're doing. So I can evaluate what they're doing, and 457 00:33:01,830 --> 00:33:03,840 account for their time and pay for their trips. 458 00:33:05,220 --> 00:33:07,740 John Greenewald: So I've got like 12,000 questions is popped 459 00:33:07,740 --> 00:33:10,950 in here in the last 90 seconds of what you were saying. So let 460 00:33:10,950 --> 00:33:14,460 me first start with the involvement with the field of 461 00:33:14,520 --> 00:33:19,260 ufology. Is there any type of elaboration you can offer on 462 00:33:19,260 --> 00:33:21,210 that? I know, you said you weren't brief. So I got that. 463 00:33:21,510 --> 00:33:24,300 But I mean, do you know what they were referring to? Are you 464 00:33:24,300 --> 00:33:28,380 talking about just They're, they're, in my opinion, not 465 00:33:28,380 --> 00:33:32,430 really an investigative effort, but in essence, trying to skew 466 00:33:32,430 --> 00:33:35,670 the storyline during the project Bluebook era? Are you are you 467 00:33:35,670 --> 00:33:39,090 talking about that or something post Bluebook and something more 468 00:33:39,090 --> 00:33:39,750 sinister, 469 00:33:40,440 --> 00:33:42,600 John Ramirez: nothing sinister. But we're talking about the 470 00:33:42,600 --> 00:33:53,790 actual technical exploitation of the UFO craft that flew during 471 00:33:53,790 --> 00:34:00,120 the classic era 50 6070s During that project Bluebook time the 472 00:34:00,120 --> 00:34:03,540 data that was collected that by the government, that's what 473 00:34:03,540 --> 00:34:06,510 we're talking about. And they okay, I believe they got briefed 474 00:34:06,510 --> 00:34:07,290 into that 475 00:34:08,040 --> 00:34:11,970 John Greenewald: data or physical objects slash craft, as 476 00:34:11,970 --> 00:34:14,820 John Ramirez: far as I know, data. I don't know if they saw 477 00:34:15,180 --> 00:34:18,510 physical objects. I don't know if they saw anything about crash 478 00:34:18,510 --> 00:34:21,930 retrievals metamaterials, I don't know because I didn't have 479 00:34:21,930 --> 00:34:23,490 access to that kind of Meishan. 480 00:34:24,270 --> 00:34:26,430 John Greenewald: Really quickly, why did you turn it down with 481 00:34:26,430 --> 00:34:30,210 your, with your background and personal interest? Was there a 482 00:34:30,210 --> 00:34:31,800 reason that you don't mind sharing? 483 00:34:32,489 --> 00:34:36,659 John Ramirez: Well, basically, you know, this wasn't my day 484 00:34:36,659 --> 00:34:40,229 job. My day job was much more involved and just sending two 485 00:34:40,229 --> 00:34:45,449 engineers to this. And the thing about CIA is that we don't hire 486 00:34:45,449 --> 00:34:49,499 people with curiosity. You know, I mean, if you're, you're going 487 00:34:49,499 --> 00:34:52,079 to get a job at CIA because you're curious about UFOs you 488 00:34:52,079 --> 00:34:54,029 want to get a job there. You're not going to get a job there. 489 00:34:54,089 --> 00:34:57,839 Yeah, we have just cific missions to do we have specific 490 00:34:57,839 --> 00:35:03,329 jobs to accomplish. And so that was my focus. And my plate was 491 00:35:03,329 --> 00:35:06,869 full with many, many other things not to mention a budget. 492 00:35:07,469 --> 00:35:12,539 Gotcha. So my life was like, too much cheats. Gotcha. Excel 493 00:35:12,539 --> 00:35:16,649 spreadsheets was the was my job as a branch chief. That's all I 494 00:35:16,649 --> 00:35:21,059 looked at, it seems like and managing programs and leading 495 00:35:21,059 --> 00:35:27,119 people, the Career Service of these people, what's my 496 00:35:27,119 --> 00:35:31,289 responsibility, that I make sure that they're challenged, that 497 00:35:31,289 --> 00:35:35,879 just trained that they're accomplishing the mission that 498 00:35:35,879 --> 00:35:41,609 we need to accomplish? That was my focus. So just this is just 499 00:35:41,609 --> 00:35:46,559 being like an interest of mine. I knew what I needed to know, to 500 00:35:46,559 --> 00:35:50,429 do my job. And that's all I needed to know. Gotcha. But I 501 00:35:50,429 --> 00:35:53,519 would say this, when they came back, my two engineers came 502 00:35:53,519 --> 00:35:58,769 back. I used to have a little alien doll, a gray, except it 503 00:35:58,769 --> 00:36:03,629 was colored green. And it was like a stuffed stuffed all that 504 00:36:03,629 --> 00:36:08,279 I could bend and put it on my old 17 inch Dale CRT monitor. 505 00:36:08,309 --> 00:36:12,659 Yeah, yeah, top of the line at the top of the line, and that 506 00:36:12,719 --> 00:36:16,679 everyone knew I was interested in it. In in UFOs, and ETs, 507 00:36:16,709 --> 00:36:19,979 right. And so when they came back, they didn't say anything. 508 00:36:20,009 --> 00:36:24,959 They sounded like not a to my doll. And they basically said, 509 00:36:24,959 --> 00:36:31,349 you know, everything you think about that all makes sense now. 510 00:36:32,669 --> 00:36:36,389 Wow. So okay, I don't need to know more. Yeah, they didn't 511 00:36:36,389 --> 00:36:40,409 tell me anymore. So that's the closest I got to knowing what 512 00:36:40,409 --> 00:36:41,969 they what they knew. But 513 00:36:42,720 --> 00:36:45,510 John Greenewald: so let me with with that being said, if that 514 00:36:45,510 --> 00:36:48,000 was the closest you got, let me take you back to the working 515 00:36:48,000 --> 00:36:51,180 group. And it sounds like you guys worked really hard on 516 00:36:51,180 --> 00:36:54,750 trying to figure out, you know, is there a Soviet explanation 517 00:36:54,750 --> 00:36:58,260 for this, and essentially ruled a lot of that out or all of that 518 00:36:58,260 --> 00:37:01,860 out? Was there a conclusion? I mean, what were you guys leaning 519 00:37:01,860 --> 00:37:05,130 towards at that point, when the intelligence and the data showed 520 00:37:05,130 --> 00:37:08,130 you? It was not the Soviets? It was not this MIG it was not? 521 00:37:08,340 --> 00:37:12,870 Whatever you were looking at? What was the working? Theory? 522 00:37:13,110 --> 00:37:15,630 John Ramirez: Yeah, I would preface that with it was during 523 00:37:15,630 --> 00:37:20,850 the Russian era, because in the early 90s, the Soviet Union 524 00:37:20,910 --> 00:37:22,860 John Greenewald: have, gotcha. Sorry, 525 00:37:22,890 --> 00:37:26,010 John Ramirez: I was rushing back a little too far. Um, but I 526 00:37:26,010 --> 00:37:26,340 wasn't 527 00:37:26,340 --> 00:37:27,960 John Greenewald: privy to Tech was probably the same. It's 528 00:37:27,960 --> 00:37:29,670 fine. Yeah, I wasn't privy 529 00:37:29,670 --> 00:37:31,830 John Ramirez: to any of the results of what the working 530 00:37:31,830 --> 00:37:36,090 group did. I did not know, I just know, there was a working 531 00:37:36,090 --> 00:37:42,330 group, it dealt with this unusual orb anomaly. I'm I knew 532 00:37:42,330 --> 00:37:47,070 that it was in the 600 nanometre range, which is orange, which 533 00:37:47,070 --> 00:37:51,180 kind of fits what people see themselves now. I witnesses, 534 00:37:51,510 --> 00:37:58,830 orange orbs, that they were not just random specks. But they 535 00:37:58,830 --> 00:38:03,810 were flying in some kind of grouping. I say formation. But 536 00:38:04,350 --> 00:38:07,230 when I say formation, people think of a, you know, a V shape 537 00:38:07,230 --> 00:38:11,820 or something like that. It was just flying together. Okay. At a 538 00:38:11,820 --> 00:38:19,200 very fast rate coming over the the Arctic Circle region, over 539 00:38:19,200 --> 00:38:24,540 the Russian landmass with intent to go somewhere, you know, it's 540 00:38:24,540 --> 00:38:26,730 not like there's a scattering everywhere. There's a whole 541 00:38:26,730 --> 00:38:31,770 group flying together as a group. And so that's, that's 542 00:38:31,770 --> 00:38:32,310 what I knew. 543 00:38:32,520 --> 00:38:35,040 John Greenewald: So you've Okay, so you found out about all of 544 00:38:35,040 --> 00:38:38,790 that, but you but never, nope. Whomever shared with you this 545 00:38:38,790 --> 00:38:44,850 information? Never said, John, this is what we think it is, or 546 00:38:44,880 --> 00:38:46,050 no, no, 547 00:38:46,080 --> 00:38:48,870 John Ramirez: no, that was a compartment, they were read into 548 00:38:48,870 --> 00:38:51,600 a compartment that was created for that purpose for the working 549 00:38:51,600 --> 00:38:52,320 group purpose, 550 00:38:52,560 --> 00:38:55,650 John Greenewald: from what you did learn and your experience, 551 00:38:55,830 --> 00:39:00,660 extensive experience with all of this through 25 years. Looking 552 00:39:00,660 --> 00:39:04,260 back, what do you feel and I know it's an opinion and you're 553 00:39:04,260 --> 00:39:07,470 not sharing classified info here. But if I were to just ask 554 00:39:07,470 --> 00:39:11,160 you, based on your personal opinion and your intelligence on 555 00:39:11,160 --> 00:39:12,780 the matter, what would you say? 556 00:39:13,500 --> 00:39:16,530 John Ramirez: Well, I, I believe that these orbs are some 557 00:39:16,530 --> 00:39:20,850 manifestations of the phenomenon that is not metallic craft, it 558 00:39:20,850 --> 00:39:29,970 could be Okay, so with my interest in more of the esoteric 559 00:39:32,550 --> 00:39:37,020 features of ufology that is more like what we call the 560 00:39:37,020 --> 00:39:41,310 metaphysical side of ufology. I believe that they're like, 561 00:39:42,240 --> 00:39:46,350 manifestations of higher consciousness, that they're not 562 00:39:46,350 --> 00:39:52,170 like craft. They're not like, like Tic Tac, or a gimbal or go 563 00:39:52,170 --> 00:39:56,610 fast. But they're like manifestations of some other 564 00:39:56,970 --> 00:40:01,110 parts of the phenomenon that we don't quite fully understand. 565 00:40:01,860 --> 00:40:04,710 But when you talk to experiencers, they fully 566 00:40:04,710 --> 00:40:07,680 understand it. If you talk to people who have seen these orbs, 567 00:40:08,730 --> 00:40:11,010 they fully understand what they're looking at that there's 568 00:40:11,010 --> 00:40:16,260 some consciousness behind what they're seeing. To the point 569 00:40:16,260 --> 00:40:22,950 when I saw my orb in 2020, I got a message from it, to do what 570 00:40:22,950 --> 00:40:25,620 I'm doing right now that you have information The world needs 571 00:40:25,620 --> 00:40:29,940 to know. You need to share this information. You need to work 572 00:40:29,940 --> 00:40:34,770 with someone who's looking to, to have answers to their 573 00:40:34,770 --> 00:40:38,670 questions, and I found that person. So that's my 574 00:40:38,670 --> 00:40:39,600 interpretation. 575 00:40:39,870 --> 00:40:42,690 John Greenewald: Who can ask who is that? No, I can't, I can't. 576 00:40:43,350 --> 00:40:46,050 Under understood I wasn't sure if there was a maybe a public 577 00:40:46,050 --> 00:40:49,740 program project that you were doing that you can know. But no 578 00:40:49,740 --> 00:40:52,590 problem is private. Sorry. Yeah. I didn't mean to I didn't mean 579 00:40:52,590 --> 00:40:57,900 to pry too much there. But so your experience, obviously was 580 00:40:58,830 --> 00:41:03,180 kind of reminiscent to what the cage 11 and the NGA data that 581 00:41:03,180 --> 00:41:06,090 was being shared with the CIA and that working group? Do you 582 00:41:06,090 --> 00:41:08,790 feel it was the same phenomena phenomenon? 583 00:41:08,970 --> 00:41:12,960 John Ramirez: Well, the orb phenomenon was more of the 584 00:41:12,960 --> 00:41:19,800 electro optical variety IR previously, that the Soviet 585 00:41:19,800 --> 00:41:25,170 Union, during the Soviet era, with their radar systems did 586 00:41:25,170 --> 00:41:33,000 detect unusual events in the sky. And we call those the domes 587 00:41:33,000 --> 00:41:38,640 of light. So that's another type of a light kind of manifestation 588 00:41:38,640 --> 00:41:43,740 of the phenomenon. And I first heard about the domes of light, 589 00:41:43,740 --> 00:41:47,730 not through any kind of intelligence source, but a quasi 590 00:41:47,730 --> 00:41:51,060 intelligence source, the Aviation Week journal, which we 591 00:41:51,060 --> 00:41:55,320 used to call aviation leak yet, because there's so much good 592 00:41:55,320 --> 00:41:58,680 information in there that we actually circulated around the 593 00:41:58,680 --> 00:42:04,170 office for and we put a routing slip on it to make sure we check 594 00:42:04,170 --> 00:42:06,810 our names off because there was so much information out there, 595 00:42:06,960 --> 00:42:12,180 that actually triggered a lot of professional investigations into 596 00:42:12,180 --> 00:42:14,610 what they were reporting, and one of them was the domes of 597 00:42:14,610 --> 00:42:22,020 light, which FTD knew about. And then they, the FTD wanted to 598 00:42:22,020 --> 00:42:25,980 cast this as a type of Soviet ballistic missile 599 00:42:25,980 --> 00:42:32,550 countermeasures that they were seeing. But these domes of light 600 00:42:32,580 --> 00:42:39,240 occurred absent of any missile test. And the missile that was 601 00:42:39,240 --> 00:42:44,940 most prevalent with these domes alive was the SS 20 Sable, which 602 00:42:44,940 --> 00:42:49,230 was an intercontinental no intermediate range ballistic 603 00:42:49,230 --> 00:42:54,030 missile IRBM, which was politically destabilizing and 604 00:42:54,030 --> 00:42:57,270 militarily destabilizing during the day because they would like 605 00:42:58,440 --> 00:43:04,080 stationed these Ss 20s, close to NATO. And that was its purpose. 606 00:43:04,260 --> 00:43:08,610 The target was NATO. And that prompted us to then deploy the 607 00:43:08,610 --> 00:43:14,250 Pershing to IRBM. So you have nuclear missiles that can land 608 00:43:14,250 --> 00:43:18,180 on our targets within minutes, because they're so close. And 609 00:43:18,180 --> 00:43:21,570 that was highly politically destabilizing. And so the 610 00:43:21,570 --> 00:43:26,340 phenomenon probably my opinion is the phenomenon knowing that 611 00:43:26,340 --> 00:43:29,520 we know now that that they're associated with like ballistic 612 00:43:29,520 --> 00:43:32,760 missiles, nuclear tipped ballistic missiles, phenomenon 613 00:43:32,760 --> 00:43:36,510 had an interest in the testing of the SS 20. And so when they 614 00:43:36,510 --> 00:43:40,380 launch SS 20, this phenomenon were occur, which was 615 00:43:40,380 --> 00:43:44,160 interpreted by FTD in the most mundane way. It's just ballistic 616 00:43:44,160 --> 00:43:46,860 missile countermeasures. But how do you describe this phenomenon 617 00:43:47,610 --> 00:43:52,140 being seen by people on the ground, we're not associated 618 00:43:52,140 --> 00:43:55,470 with a Soviet military. They're just eyewitnesses, citizens on 619 00:43:55,470 --> 00:44:00,210 the ground seeing this. So it's not like totally related to 620 00:44:00,480 --> 00:44:06,630 ballistic missile testing. And that was detected by radars by 621 00:44:06,660 --> 00:44:11,910 the Russian radar, the Soviet radars at the time. So in that 622 00:44:11,910 --> 00:44:14,730 sense, my very first encounter with anything of high 623 00:44:14,730 --> 00:44:18,270 strangeness was not these this or working group, but this 624 00:44:18,270 --> 00:44:23,400 phenomenon known as the domes of light, where we actually 625 00:44:23,400 --> 00:44:29,670 deployed sensors to look for these unusual types of anomalous 626 00:44:29,700 --> 00:44:35,070 lights. And where we deployed that sensor was on the periphery 627 00:44:35,100 --> 00:44:40,650 of the Soviet Union. Because we wanted to get a good look at as 628 00:44:40,650 --> 00:44:45,120 the missiles were flying their trajectories, and re entering 629 00:44:45,270 --> 00:44:49,560 the warheads were reinter. We wanted to be able to detect if 630 00:44:49,560 --> 00:44:50,970 there are any of these domains of light. 631 00:44:52,500 --> 00:44:54,570 John Greenewald: Let me ask you a hypothetical question and this 632 00:44:54,570 --> 00:44:59,820 is more towards the orb working group versus the domains of 633 00:44:59,820 --> 00:45:03,090 life. But let's, let's say and I know you don't know the 634 00:45:03,090 --> 00:45:06,150 conclusion, but that but they were leading to some kind of 635 00:45:06,150 --> 00:45:11,790 manifestation of a phenomenon of some kind. That was not related 636 00:45:11,790 --> 00:45:13,920 to a missile launcher countermeasures or anything like 637 00:45:13,920 --> 00:45:17,880 that. Is that something that either the NGA would take the 638 00:45:17,880 --> 00:45:22,680 next step in trying to figure out, or in my opinion for many, 639 00:45:22,680 --> 00:45:26,370 many years, and arguably decades, some of these 640 00:45:26,370 --> 00:45:29,460 intelligence agencies just kind of turned a blind eye to the 641 00:45:29,730 --> 00:45:34,290 more nuts and bolts of UFO phenomenon. With this, do you 642 00:45:34,290 --> 00:45:36,900 think the CIA would have said, Hey, we need to figure this out 643 00:45:36,900 --> 00:45:40,440 we as the CIA? Or would the NGA do that? Or do you think that 644 00:45:40,440 --> 00:45:44,730 they would just say, You know what, we're gonna leave this 645 00:45:44,820 --> 00:45:48,090 well enough alone, like, Who do you think would be taking the 646 00:45:48,090 --> 00:45:51,120 lead on trying to then take the next step to understand it? 647 00:45:51,480 --> 00:45:53,610 John Ramirez: Well, it's a working group on the product of 648 00:45:53,610 --> 00:45:59,310 the working group would be a report of their best estimate, 649 00:45:59,550 --> 00:46:05,010 assessment or judgment of what we detected. And that report 650 00:46:05,010 --> 00:46:10,290 will go to the Director of National Intelligence. And the 651 00:46:10,290 --> 00:46:12,780 director of national intelligence can then brief the 652 00:46:12,780 --> 00:46:18,960 policymaker. That is the president united states and the 653 00:46:20,580 --> 00:46:26,250 appointed policymakers like the Secretary of Defense. And once 654 00:46:26,250 --> 00:46:30,480 that report is written, the title 50 side and for your 655 00:46:30,480 --> 00:46:35,670 audience, the title 50 is the non DoD side of the intelligence 656 00:46:35,670 --> 00:46:39,960 community. So it's basically CIA, and actually parts of the 657 00:46:39,960 --> 00:46:51,570 NSA, which are non military. They would then just produce the 658 00:46:51,570 --> 00:46:56,040 working group produce the report from a title 50 perspective of 659 00:46:56,100 --> 00:46:59,490 the civilian side of all of these intelligence agencies. And 660 00:46:59,490 --> 00:47:03,300 there's the report. Now, the Secretary of Defense, being 661 00:47:03,300 --> 00:47:08,310 briefed on this, maybe Usdi being briefed on this. It's up 662 00:47:08,310 --> 00:47:13,770 to them to decide you know what to do. And they may then take 663 00:47:13,800 --> 00:47:17,760 the DoD perspective on just about everything like that it's 664 00:47:17,760 --> 00:47:21,090 a threat, or could it be a threat? And if it is a threat, 665 00:47:21,120 --> 00:47:26,130 or could be a threat? First of all, how do we protect our own 666 00:47:26,130 --> 00:47:29,850 forces? What is the nature of this threat? What are our 667 00:47:29,850 --> 00:47:33,150 vulnerabilities versus this threat? And how do we do force 668 00:47:33,150 --> 00:47:38,310 protection? So that's their focus, and incomes all set? So 669 00:47:38,910 --> 00:47:45,270 2004 2005 When I left for NCPC, and return in 2009, that working 670 00:47:45,270 --> 00:47:50,100 group was done. My understanding was that was done like 2007, 671 00:47:50,100 --> 00:47:53,220 there abouts. It was a short lived working group. It wasn't 672 00:47:53,220 --> 00:47:55,830 like something that lasted years and years and years. 673 00:47:56,070 --> 00:48:00,330 John Greenewald: Are you aware of that report? That they 674 00:48:00,360 --> 00:48:02,910 potentially I know that that's a standard procedure that you're 675 00:48:02,910 --> 00:48:05,970 going over? But in direct relation to that or working 676 00:48:05,970 --> 00:48:08,250 group? Are you familiar that they created a report? 677 00:48:08,880 --> 00:48:12,120 John Ramirez: I can say that a report was a product of the 678 00:48:12,120 --> 00:48:17,010 working group. So there was so big there was a report? I don't 679 00:48:17,010 --> 00:48:18,420 say that so classified. 680 00:48:18,450 --> 00:48:20,490 John Greenewald: Is this a classified? Absolutely. It's 681 00:48:20,490 --> 00:48:22,590 John Ramirez: going to be classified? Because in that 682 00:48:22,590 --> 00:48:26,310 report that we use sources, the methods that were used exactly 683 00:48:26,790 --> 00:48:29,100 what the sensors were able to detect 684 00:48:29,490 --> 00:48:31,170 John Greenewald: classified elements. I'm talking about the 685 00:48:31,170 --> 00:48:34,170 project or program or excuse me, working group, I want to make 686 00:48:34,170 --> 00:48:36,360 sure I'm accurate here. But the working group as a whole, was it 687 00:48:36,360 --> 00:48:38,070 a classified effort as a whole? 688 00:48:38,100 --> 00:48:42,450 John Ramirez: Absolutely. It was a top secret SCI working group 689 00:48:42,480 --> 00:48:45,330 with a compartment designed for that working group. 690 00:48:46,410 --> 00:48:49,740 John Greenewald: And all that makes sense. Can I ask just as 691 00:48:49,740 --> 00:48:53,310 myself being a layman? And not entirely sure about all of every 692 00:48:53,310 --> 00:48:58,020 facet of the classified world? How is it that you're able to 693 00:48:58,050 --> 00:49:01,650 talk about I know, you didn't give conclusions, and you didn't 694 00:49:01,650 --> 00:49:03,960 talk about technical capabilities of you know, top 695 00:49:03,960 --> 00:49:07,830 secret tech. But if the idea of the if the working group itself 696 00:49:07,830 --> 00:49:13,410 was a top secret sci fi environment, help me understand 697 00:49:13,410 --> 00:49:14,520 how can we talk about it? 698 00:49:14,790 --> 00:49:18,060 John Ramirez: Well, John, their their levels of understanding. 699 00:49:18,540 --> 00:49:22,950 And the first level of understanding is called fact of 700 00:49:23,700 --> 00:49:30,000 fact of that something occurred. So the fact of is not sensitive. 701 00:49:30,330 --> 00:49:35,190 Now, I mean, I learned this way back when, and I sat on it 702 00:49:35,250 --> 00:49:41,520 until, like, this year. You know, when I started doing these 703 00:49:41,520 --> 00:49:45,750 podcasts, and I put it together in a report for CIA's review, 704 00:49:46,740 --> 00:49:50,250 that, you know, working group happened, and this is what might 705 00:49:50,250 --> 00:49:55,920 have happened. And I couched it in terms that could be a 706 00:49:55,920 --> 00:49:59,010 hypothetical, but CIA knew that this working group occurred 707 00:49:59,550 --> 00:50:02,850 John Greenewald: and They just to clarify, because I've talked 708 00:50:02,850 --> 00:50:05,640 about the DoD side on this channel before, so my audience 709 00:50:05,640 --> 00:50:08,160 has seen a lot of the videos, that would be the Doppler 710 00:50:08,160 --> 00:50:12,150 process, the DD Form 1910, so on and so forth, that ties into the 711 00:50:12,600 --> 00:50:16,860 UAP videos. So CIA, I assume, would just have the same similar 712 00:50:16,860 --> 00:50:21,840 process where you take what you are going to either publish talk 713 00:50:21,840 --> 00:50:28,020 about verbally orally in a in a, like a conference or lecture, 714 00:50:28,080 --> 00:50:31,530 and they approve what you can come out with is that that's 715 00:50:31,530 --> 00:50:34,740 correct. Okay. So and they gave you approval to talk about this, 716 00:50:34,770 --> 00:50:35,580 right, the 717 00:50:35,610 --> 00:50:38,430 John Ramirez: pre publication classification review board, 718 00:50:38,970 --> 00:50:44,460 stated that my presentation was unclassified and can be publicly 719 00:50:44,460 --> 00:50:51,660 disseminated everything in it. And that they do not that the 720 00:50:51,660 --> 00:50:55,740 fact that they consider it unclassified, they do not say 721 00:50:55,770 --> 00:50:59,850 that they can endorse sure everything in it, whether it be 722 00:50:59,850 --> 00:51:05,160 factual, or not factual. So it's there, they're out the way the 723 00:51:05,160 --> 00:51:09,660 way they can like distance itself themselves. From anything 724 00:51:09,660 --> 00:51:14,100 we CIA officers might produce, even if it's factual, they will 725 00:51:14,100 --> 00:51:17,490 always say, well, we can stay say, officially, that is 726 00:51:17,490 --> 00:51:21,930 factual. So that was the situation that I follow. This is 727 00:51:21,930 --> 00:51:25,320 the front door situation, I just want to let everyone know, I am 728 00:51:25,320 --> 00:51:29,340 not a whistleblower. I went through the front door, and I 729 00:51:29,340 --> 00:51:32,040 will always go to the front door, because that's what I 730 00:51:32,040 --> 00:51:36,810 signed up to do when I left CIA to protect sources and methods 731 00:51:36,840 --> 00:51:41,520 over a lifetime. And so that was the process I followed, which 732 00:51:41,520 --> 00:51:46,050 allows me to be speaking with you. And I let CIA know that if 733 00:51:46,050 --> 00:51:50,160 there's anything I say, and you know, they're monitoring all of 734 00:51:50,160 --> 00:51:53,760 my appearances, they monitor Jim semi Vance appearances on Coast 735 00:51:53,760 --> 00:51:58,200 coasts, or any any appearances by former intelligence community 736 00:51:58,200 --> 00:52:02,100 officers, our home offices, believe me, they're monitoring 737 00:52:02,100 --> 00:52:05,280 what you say. And they know and because I told them, If there's 738 00:52:05,280 --> 00:52:11,940 anything I do, or say, that crosses a line, let me know. And 739 00:52:11,940 --> 00:52:18,390 I will stop. And so far, I've received no feedback about stop. 740 00:52:20,370 --> 00:52:22,980 John Greenewald: If you could sum up what your intention is by 741 00:52:22,980 --> 00:52:26,310 doing these types of shows and bringing this information 742 00:52:26,310 --> 00:52:29,820 forward. In summary, what are you wanting to accomplish? 743 00:52:30,870 --> 00:52:33,540 John Ramirez: I want to accomplish that what we all 744 00:52:33,540 --> 00:52:37,860 know, as you follow just what you know, it is that the 745 00:52:37,860 --> 00:52:43,020 government, even project Bluebook was a limited program 746 00:52:43,170 --> 00:52:49,290 of gathering information from citizens gathering information 747 00:52:49,290 --> 00:52:53,790 from citizens maybe to debunk or maybe to collect these other 748 00:52:53,790 --> 00:52:59,250 incidents in their database. But there was an ongoing process 749 00:52:59,490 --> 00:53:05,250 since Roswell, to try to understand what we're seeing 750 00:53:05,550 --> 00:53:10,530 what we have collected, that process never stopped. And this 751 00:53:10,560 --> 00:53:16,020 orb working group was just a latest part of that long, 752 00:53:16,050 --> 00:53:21,600 ongoing process, to where we're not seeing metallic craft. Now 753 00:53:21,630 --> 00:53:26,040 we're seeing these entities of light appearing over the earth. 754 00:53:27,660 --> 00:53:33,210 And so I want people know that what your knowing what you known 755 00:53:33,240 --> 00:53:39,690 as all SAP and ATEP. That wasn't when it started. We informed I 756 00:53:39,690 --> 00:53:43,290 believe we informed the people who did all sappan ated, they 757 00:53:43,290 --> 00:53:47,520 must have known about this working group, because they were 758 00:53:47,550 --> 00:53:51,090 there were Defense Intelligence people associated with that 759 00:53:51,090 --> 00:53:54,750 working group of looking at orbs. So 760 00:53:55,350 --> 00:53:57,150 John Greenewald: it and that's an interesting lie. I mean, 761 00:53:57,180 --> 00:54:00,330 chronologically, you're talking about it sounds like a few years 762 00:54:00,330 --> 00:54:03,600 roughly, you know, the the concept of OS app, depending 763 00:54:03,600 --> 00:54:07,560 upon who you believe, was kind of born in 2007. Officially, it 764 00:54:07,560 --> 00:54:11,220 was, you know, towards the end of 2008 when it was contracted 765 00:54:11,220 --> 00:54:14,700 out. So you feel that that's there's a direct line there 766 00:54:14,700 --> 00:54:18,870 between or maybe not direct, but there's a line or connection 767 00:54:18,870 --> 00:54:22,680 between the work of a or working group like this, the discovery 768 00:54:22,680 --> 00:54:29,520 of that phenomenon, and then the OS app contract coming up, and 769 00:54:29,520 --> 00:54:32,940 the DIA focus, you feel that there's some kind of line there. 770 00:54:32,970 --> 00:54:35,910 John Ramirez: There's a lineage, there's a lineage, it's not a 771 00:54:35,910 --> 00:54:40,740 direct lineage, but when title 50 got done, title 10 took it 772 00:54:40,740 --> 00:54:45,000 up. Title 10 being the Department of Defense, and so 773 00:54:45,030 --> 00:54:49,350 many of the same people who are in the DIA and under Title 50 774 00:54:50,010 --> 00:54:56,370 under NSA in a row. They're also kind of under mostly under title 775 00:54:56,400 --> 00:55:02,130 title 10. They answer to the Secretary of Defense they nod to 776 00:55:02,130 --> 00:55:06,720 the DNI. We answered it a DNI, we're title 50. And people need 777 00:55:06,720 --> 00:55:09,630 to realize that the Intelligence Committee isn't this big 778 00:55:09,630 --> 00:55:16,680 monolith. There are different US Code laws that match that 779 00:55:16,680 --> 00:55:20,850 regulate what we can do. We have to follow these laws. We follow 780 00:55:20,850 --> 00:55:25,350 title 50, deal defaults, title 10. And so Lew said this 781 00:55:25,350 --> 00:55:29,280 himself, this was a title 10 effort. And he always mentioned 782 00:55:29,310 --> 00:55:32,850 this is a title 10 effort, because he knows that there was 783 00:55:32,850 --> 00:55:37,770 a title 50 effort. And so he just doesn't say, we just DOD, 784 00:55:37,800 --> 00:55:42,060 the Department of this, he says, this is a title 10 investigation 785 00:55:42,540 --> 00:55:49,200 into what we saw, and they went into even more high strangeness 786 00:55:50,040 --> 00:55:51,030 with Sam Walker. 787 00:55:51,150 --> 00:55:53,550 John Greenewald: Exactly. And that that leads me to my next 788 00:55:53,550 --> 00:55:56,370 question, because I've always been skeptical over what the 789 00:55:56,370 --> 00:56:04,110 official dia desire for OSS app was versus what contractor may 790 00:56:04,140 --> 00:56:09,210 have turned it into, or was he just he meaning Bigelow, Robert 791 00:56:09,210 --> 00:56:11,970 Bigelow, but through Bigelow Aerospace, when he was awarded 792 00:56:11,970 --> 00:56:16,500 this doing exactly what the DIA wanted, or was it skewed a bit 793 00:56:16,530 --> 00:56:20,490 and ended up backfiring, hence why it was defunded, a couple 794 00:56:20,490 --> 00:56:23,280 years later. I've always struggled with that, because 795 00:56:23,430 --> 00:56:28,560 dia, as you mentioned, is the military side of this, they're 796 00:56:28,830 --> 00:56:33,870 getting into, according to the story, the paranormal and 797 00:56:33,870 --> 00:56:37,920 looking at Skinwalker Ranch and orbs go along with a long list 798 00:56:37,920 --> 00:56:41,550 of other stuff, including, you know, weird creatures that they 799 00:56:41,550 --> 00:56:45,840 were investigating and so on. That also was in skinwalkers, in 800 00:56:45,840 --> 00:56:48,930 the Pentagon, and this is where my skepticism comes out. So 801 00:56:48,930 --> 00:56:54,420 maybe you can help me out here understand, why would that be in 802 00:56:54,420 --> 00:56:58,860 the purview of the DIA, I can see a couple other agencies, if 803 00:56:58,860 --> 00:57:01,830 you took the DIA out and put you know, a couple other different 804 00:57:01,830 --> 00:57:06,360 agencies in okay, then we could we can chat about that. But I 805 00:57:06,360 --> 00:57:10,200 don't see dia So from your experience and expertise from 806 00:57:10,200 --> 00:57:12,660 the icy side. Why dia? 807 00:57:13,500 --> 00:57:18,120 John Ramirez: Why DIA is because the director of DIA is the 808 00:57:18,120 --> 00:57:21,570 functional Mission Manager for an intelligence different 809 00:57:21,780 --> 00:57:25,860 discipline known as Masson measurement and signature 810 00:57:25,890 --> 00:57:30,000 intelligence. Sometimes people say signals intelligence, that's 811 00:57:30,000 --> 00:57:33,780 not correct. It's meant a measurement and signature 812 00:57:33,810 --> 00:57:38,460 intelligence. So they would deploy sensors that can collect 813 00:57:40,230 --> 00:57:44,970 this type this type of phenomenon. They would collect 814 00:57:45,270 --> 00:57:51,150 radio metric data, radiological data, infrared data, ultraviolet 815 00:57:51,150 --> 00:57:54,990 data, they will look at this phenomenon with the sensor 816 00:57:54,990 --> 00:57:58,500 capabilities that they can deploy. That doesn't just 817 00:57:58,500 --> 00:58:06,090 collect signals like NSA, or in CIA, there's really no humans 818 00:58:06,210 --> 00:58:11,040 involved, because there's no one to recruit as an as an agent to 819 00:58:11,040 --> 00:58:14,070 work for us. We're not going to recruit the phenomenon Hey, why 820 00:58:14,070 --> 00:58:17,070 don't you work for us and tell us what you're doing so this 821 00:58:17,070 --> 00:58:19,590 that those parts of the Intelligence Committee would not 822 00:58:19,590 --> 00:58:26,190 come into play. But that DIA is responsible for Masset. There is 823 00:58:26,220 --> 00:58:31,950 a part of the DIA called Dia slash Delta Tango dt, and that 824 00:58:31,950 --> 00:58:36,480 is the massive office at DIA. And so they have their complete 825 00:58:36,480 --> 00:58:41,520 responsibility for Masset. And since this phenomenon, is 826 00:58:41,520 --> 00:58:47,880 something that requires collection beyond our senses, 827 00:58:48,030 --> 00:58:55,080 beyond our other types of capabilities and signals 828 00:58:55,080 --> 00:58:58,950 document or open source, dia will come into play, that's why 829 00:58:58,950 --> 00:58:59,640 they're there. 830 00:59:00,960 --> 00:59:02,130 John Greenewald: But on US soil, 831 00:59:02,160 --> 00:59:04,890 John Ramirez: do they do that because Department of Defense, 832 00:59:05,940 --> 00:59:09,270 they're responsible for the national security of the United 833 00:59:09,270 --> 00:59:16,710 States of America in that very tangible form. So di as 834 00:59:16,740 --> 00:59:24,390 Department of Defense title 10 can operate on US soil for the 835 00:59:24,390 --> 00:59:28,770 intelligence mission, they can deploy. In that sense, CIA 836 00:59:28,770 --> 00:59:34,890 cannot deploy to collect intelligence on US soil. Now, if 837 00:59:34,890 --> 00:59:38,880 this phenomenon occurred in Russia, or China or some other 838 00:59:39,030 --> 00:59:41,640 foreign place, that's when CIA 839 00:59:41,640 --> 00:59:47,850 John Greenewald: CIA could, yeah. Gotcha. Okay. And some of 840 00:59:47,850 --> 00:59:50,040 this controversy, and I just want to get your input and then 841 00:59:50,040 --> 00:59:54,090 we can move on some of the controversy about this is what 842 00:59:54,090 --> 01:00:01,680 the public OS app objective list was And now without was public 843 01:00:01,680 --> 01:00:07,050 for many years, just even prior to December 2017, even though we 844 01:00:07,050 --> 01:00:10,680 never knew about OS app until the next year, but that was 845 01:00:10,680 --> 01:00:15,360 public for quite some time. Zero mention about any of that. If 846 01:00:15,420 --> 01:00:18,360 you worked in the top secret world, if they wanted a 847 01:00:18,360 --> 01:00:20,760 paranormal research study that they would keep highly 848 01:00:20,760 --> 01:00:24,480 classified. Why would they post anything in public? Why wouldn't 849 01:00:24,480 --> 01:00:28,050 they either do it themselves or contract in secret? 850 01:00:29,070 --> 01:00:30,180 John Ramirez: It is, 851 01:00:30,240 --> 01:00:31,830 John Greenewald: do you have thoughts on on that, because 852 01:00:31,830 --> 01:00:35,070 I've always been curious about what was publicly available 853 01:00:35,070 --> 01:00:38,310 versus what we've been told the program really was? 854 01:00:39,090 --> 01:00:47,070 John Ramirez: Well, first of all, when they hired bass, that 855 01:00:47,070 --> 01:00:53,760 had to be a detail known to the public through the RFP process. 856 01:00:54,810 --> 01:00:58,620 You can't just pick a company said work for us, they had to go 857 01:00:59,070 --> 01:01:02,760 and follow the federal acquisition regulations on how 858 01:01:02,760 --> 01:01:09,540 to hire an external contractor. And they did that. So in the 859 01:01:09,540 --> 01:01:16,500 Federal Register, you have to announce the fact that there is 860 01:01:16,500 --> 01:01:21,420 a contract, and you have to publish the request for proposal 861 01:01:21,450 --> 01:01:27,480 in the public domain. So the requirements for such a 862 01:01:27,480 --> 01:01:35,730 capability for this contract, and the requirements for the 863 01:01:35,730 --> 01:01:40,920 mission and what it needs to accomplish. It would have to be 864 01:01:40,920 --> 01:01:44,310 publicly known because how else can a company then leverage its 865 01:01:44,310 --> 01:01:49,860 resources and its capabilities? How can they do that? Unless 866 01:01:49,860 --> 01:01:51,630 they know what the government wants? So they are 867 01:01:51,630 --> 01:01:53,400 John Greenewald: claiming but well, there's classified 868 01:01:53,760 --> 01:01:57,600 contracts that are awarded to and you don't? And again, I'm, 869 01:01:57,630 --> 01:02:00,840 I'm more asking, not telling you. But But asking, you know, 870 01:02:00,840 --> 01:02:03,930 when you have a contract, like for a stealth drone, or 871 01:02:03,930 --> 01:02:07,350 something like that, that and correct me if I'm wrong, they 872 01:02:07,350 --> 01:02:12,930 don't put a an RFP out for that type of level of secrecy with 873 01:02:12,930 --> 01:02:15,480 the technology they want to create? Or do they? 874 01:02:16,200 --> 01:02:19,560 John Ramirez: Well, what, okay, so when, like, for example, when 875 01:02:19,560 --> 01:02:26,730 the when the F 117 was being developed, that would be just as 876 01:02:26,730 --> 01:02:34,830 part of another effort to advance. Aviation, military 877 01:02:34,830 --> 01:02:35,430 aviation, 878 01:02:35,459 --> 01:02:37,859 John Greenewald: right, but can't see in secret is where I'm 879 01:02:37,859 --> 01:02:38,759 going. That is, 880 01:02:39,629 --> 01:02:41,369 John Ramirez: well, once the program starts, it will be 881 01:02:41,369 --> 01:02:51,959 classified. But we don't announce all the details, the 882 01:02:51,959 --> 01:02:56,099 secret details of a program, we announced just enough to get to 883 01:02:56,099 --> 01:03:00,179 be able to do the market survey, and to do the technical 884 01:03:00,179 --> 01:03:03,839 evaluation of the responses coming back from these 885 01:03:03,839 --> 01:03:11,249 companies. And they can be classified. But the actual 886 01:03:11,249 --> 01:03:15,359 reading of the contract the the RFP process is not but to your 887 01:03:15,359 --> 01:03:20,789 point. Yeah, once once the RFPs come back, they can be 888 01:03:20,789 --> 01:03:21,449 classified, 889 01:03:22,080 --> 01:03:25,530 John Greenewald: coming. So and I'm always fascinated by this 890 01:03:25,530 --> 01:03:29,550 and how it works, because I've tried to figure it out. So I'm 891 01:03:29,850 --> 01:03:32,220 glad that I have you on just simply to be able to ask you 892 01:03:32,220 --> 01:03:35,580 this. But when you get into like the f1 17, I think that was 893 01:03:35,580 --> 01:03:39,900 senior trend was the was the classified program name. 894 01:03:39,990 --> 01:03:43,050 Obviously, they're not going to publish senior trend. But there 895 01:03:43,050 --> 01:03:46,320 was an RFP for a program like that that ultimately turned into 896 01:03:46,320 --> 01:03:50,730 senior trend in the F 117. There was also a half blue. It was 897 01:03:50,730 --> 01:03:54,150 good to have blue, there's tastes of blue, right? SR Spark, 898 01:03:54,240 --> 01:03:57,600 right? SR Spark, I think was a CIA one. But the look back, 899 01:03:57,630 --> 01:04:03,090 John Ramirez: yeah, well, it if you look at remove the labels, 900 01:04:03,420 --> 01:04:08,460 and the intent of that development, was to study radar 901 01:04:08,460 --> 01:04:13,650 absorbing materials, and not associated with a craft, or just 902 01:04:13,650 --> 01:04:16,920 giving you an example. If we're going to do something, we're not 903 01:04:16,920 --> 01:04:20,190 going to say we're doing it for this purpose. Because we have 904 01:04:20,190 --> 01:04:23,430 this mission and we want to target this adversary, we'll 905 01:04:23,460 --> 01:04:27,390 look step back and say what technical capabilities are we 906 01:04:27,390 --> 01:04:30,570 looking for, and we'll publish what we're looking for in 907 01:04:30,570 --> 01:04:35,340 technical capabilities, and not link that to a specific program 908 01:04:35,580 --> 01:04:39,180 until we hire the contractor with those technical technical 909 01:04:39,180 --> 01:04:43,560 capabilities. Once a contractor has been hired, once they go 910 01:04:43,560 --> 01:04:47,520 through the whole process of acquisition and they're awarded 911 01:04:47,520 --> 01:04:51,690 the contract, then we make sure that they have the clear people 912 01:04:51,720 --> 01:04:54,030 because we stipulate in our RFP what the clearance level should 913 01:04:54,030 --> 01:04:59,940 be. And then if they have clear people, we can then introduce 914 01:05:00,000 --> 01:05:07,080 These contractors to the program. So we don't have an RFP 915 01:05:07,080 --> 01:05:13,050 for programs necessarily. We have RFPs to gather information 916 01:05:13,050 --> 01:05:17,640 on what companies can do a capability. That's the best way 917 01:05:17,640 --> 01:05:22,320 I can explain it. Because I used to write RFPs for CIA. And so 918 01:05:22,320 --> 01:05:27,330 we're not saying that, you know, we want to we want to study this 919 01:05:27,330 --> 01:05:31,110 particular target. And the Soviet Union, was saying, Well, 920 01:05:31,110 --> 01:05:34,800 what capabilities are needed to bring to bear by this company in 921 01:05:34,800 --> 01:05:38,730 order to do that mission? So do you have injured electrical 922 01:05:38,730 --> 01:05:42,570 engineers with microwave backgrounds? Do you have, you 923 01:05:42,570 --> 01:05:46,620 know, things like that? You have physicists, you have things like 924 01:05:46,620 --> 01:05:48,570 that? So do you have these people that have that 925 01:05:48,570 --> 01:05:54,210 background? And this in this broader field, and we pick a 926 01:05:54,210 --> 01:06:01,020 company that answers all that. And then when we award the 927 01:06:01,020 --> 01:06:04,800 contract, we bring them to CIA? And then you say, Okay, this is 928 01:06:04,800 --> 01:06:05,730 a program you're working on. 929 01:06:05,790 --> 01:06:08,490 John Greenewald: And there's a classified aspects. So just to 930 01:06:08,490 --> 01:06:11,340 kind of button that, and I want to move on to the the present 931 01:06:11,340 --> 01:06:18,450 day stuff. Excuse me. So the potential contractor who sees 932 01:06:18,480 --> 01:06:22,950 the requirements in the public realm, they're not aware of the 933 01:06:22,980 --> 01:06:26,430 the classified aspects while they apply, right? I mean, 934 01:06:26,430 --> 01:06:30,660 they're not fed. He both prior to being accepted as the 935 01:06:30,660 --> 01:06:35,190 contractor, they're not fed what the classified aspects are, or 936 01:06:35,190 --> 01:06:39,360 are they so they go off of the public stuff you need, you know, 937 01:06:39,360 --> 01:06:41,580 this type of expert, this type of expert, this type of 938 01:06:41,580 --> 01:06:46,740 facility, this type of clearance, but they're not fed 939 01:06:46,740 --> 01:06:52,140 the nonpublic classified portion of that contract until they are 940 01:06:52,140 --> 01:06:52,710 chosen 941 01:06:53,550 --> 01:06:56,220 John Ramirez: specific targets, we're not going to put that in 942 01:06:56,220 --> 01:07:03,210 an RFP, we're not going to put specific specific tools that we 943 01:07:03,210 --> 01:07:07,200 have that then we it's called government furnished equipment, 944 01:07:07,200 --> 01:07:10,380 GFP, we're not going to publish that. We just say, yeah, there's 945 01:07:10,410 --> 01:07:14,850 GFP available, which was the contractor saying, okay, they're 946 01:07:14,850 --> 01:07:18,000 gonna give me information or give me tools, that they're not 947 01:07:18,000 --> 01:07:21,270 stipulating things of that nature. So you're right, in the 948 01:07:21,270 --> 01:07:27,660 sense that we're not going to publish the target, gotcha. A 949 01:07:27,690 --> 01:07:33,570 RFP, I will also say that CIA does not need to publish any of 950 01:07:33,570 --> 01:07:39,600 its RFPs. There is a cut up, carve out for CIA, that we are 951 01:07:39,600 --> 01:07:43,920 not required as part of the Federal Acquisition Regulations 952 01:07:44,220 --> 01:07:48,420 to actually let out RFPs in the federal register in the public. 953 01:07:49,650 --> 01:07:53,370 John Greenewald: Gotcha. Okay. I think that answered my question 954 01:07:53,370 --> 01:07:56,550 where I was going that with that, attributing it to aos app 955 01:07:56,550 --> 01:08:00,000 is something I've talked about for quite a few years. On if the 956 01:08:00,030 --> 01:08:04,830 paranormal and and UFO aspect was classified, which I can buy, 957 01:08:05,310 --> 01:08:09,150 and it wouldn't be in the public announcement, which we've 958 01:08:09,150 --> 01:08:14,670 established is true. How would Bigelow know to to hit the 959 01:08:14,670 --> 01:08:21,990 jackpot by looking for a secret UFO program to take part of, 960 01:08:22,200 --> 01:08:25,380 without knowing it was a UFO secret program, and he was the 961 01:08:25,380 --> 01:08:28,230 only bidder. And I'm not trying to put you in a weird corner. So 962 01:08:28,230 --> 01:08:31,680 if you don't want to comment on it, not a problem. I think that 963 01:08:31,680 --> 01:08:33,900 was where I was going with it. Cuz I've never had somebody in 964 01:08:33,900 --> 01:08:37,620 your position to give me that side of it. You wrote the RFPs 965 01:08:37,620 --> 01:08:40,740 and stuff like that. So that's why I wanted to ask, but do you 966 01:08:40,740 --> 01:08:41,730 see where I'm going with that? 967 01:08:41,730 --> 01:08:45,120 John Ramirez: I do. I do see where you're going. I can't 968 01:08:45,120 --> 01:08:49,590 answer for bass or Robert Bigelow, specifically, because I 969 01:08:49,590 --> 01:08:52,560 wasn't part of that acquisition. But I can give you the general 970 01:08:52,560 --> 01:08:59,850 case. That it's not a secret that there there is a corps of 971 01:08:59,850 --> 01:09:04,320 contractors who work with the Defense Department and work with 972 01:09:04,560 --> 01:09:08,490 the intelligence community and CIA. There's just a corps of 973 01:09:08,580 --> 01:09:14,430 contractor companies that we go to all the time. So it's, it's 974 01:09:14,430 --> 01:09:20,340 like this close knit group of competitors. And so with 975 01:09:21,180 --> 01:09:26,970 Bigelow, I mean, he's done previous work at Skinwalker. So 976 01:09:26,970 --> 01:09:32,040 he has a lot of knowledge from the previous work at Skinwalker. 977 01:09:32,280 --> 01:09:36,900 So he has a leg up on anything that might come out as an RFP. 978 01:09:38,790 --> 01:09:42,030 My understanding is that Lockheed Martin was interested 979 01:09:42,060 --> 01:09:44,190 in the RFP but dropped it 980 01:09:45,419 --> 01:09:48,779 John Greenewald: Yeah, there was a rumor it was reported that 981 01:09:48,779 --> 01:09:53,489 they actually submitted a proposal and then that was never 982 01:09:53,489 --> 01:09:56,849 officially retracted but found out not to be true. When I'd 983 01:09:56,849 --> 01:10:00,629 spoken to the DIA and they said sold bitter. I'm And I triple 984 01:10:00,629 --> 01:10:03,329 checked that and pressed him and said, Hey, wait a minute, you 985 01:10:03,329 --> 01:10:06,479 know, and I think I even brought up Lockheed at the time. But 986 01:10:06,839 --> 01:10:07,649 yeah, it was, 987 01:10:08,130 --> 01:10:12,300 John Ramirez: they may have been interested. But I think a lot of 988 01:10:12,300 --> 01:10:16,380 companies like Lockheed Martin, they hire people to do nothing 989 01:10:16,380 --> 01:10:19,590 but contract work. Yeah, they hire armies of people who know 990 01:10:19,590 --> 01:10:24,000 how to write RFPs. Yeah, and I mean, these RFPs are so specific 991 01:10:24,000 --> 01:10:27,270 that I used to eliminate, we used to put in language to see 992 01:10:27,270 --> 01:10:30,750 how compliant a contractor would be by stipulating the type of 993 01:10:30,750 --> 01:10:36,750 paper, the weight of the paper, the font, the font used, and the 994 01:10:36,750 --> 01:10:41,040 font size. And we put in every third page shall be pink, we 995 01:10:41,040 --> 01:10:44,400 make sure that every third page is pink. Because if the third 996 01:10:44,400 --> 01:10:49,620 page is white, we say you're not compliant. Tossed I mean, that's 997 01:10:49,620 --> 01:10:53,250 how specific we can be. So these people who know how to write 998 01:10:53,250 --> 01:10:56,400 this, understand the rules of the game, look for the fine 999 01:10:56,400 --> 01:10:59,670 print, look for the fine print, because they will answer that 1000 01:10:59,670 --> 01:11:04,980 RFP that specifically and so will your specific question i 1001 01:11:04,980 --> 01:11:08,010 Bigelow understanding that I wasn't part of the acquisition. 1002 01:11:08,040 --> 01:11:12,930 Sure. He's cute in to the intelligence community. We all 1003 01:11:12,930 --> 01:11:18,510 know that. And he may have got wind that such an effort was 1004 01:11:18,510 --> 01:11:22,440 going to start and he had an RFP go, ready. 1005 01:11:23,880 --> 01:11:26,010 John Greenewald: Ready? Yeah, it was only up for a couple weeks. 1006 01:11:26,010 --> 01:11:29,130 And he was the only bidder. And yeah, and again, you know, a lot 1007 01:11:29,130 --> 01:11:31,620 of people make a big deal that I bring up the sweetheart deal 1008 01:11:31,620 --> 01:11:36,120 thing for me, it puts it into perspective of what OS app was. 1009 01:11:37,170 --> 01:11:40,230 But but again, those are entire shows in itself. And I 1010 01:11:40,230 --> 01:11:42,720 appreciate you entertaining those questions. And yeah, and 1011 01:11:42,720 --> 01:11:46,350 helping me understand some of that. I'm at the hour mark with 1012 01:11:46,350 --> 01:11:50,400 you. And I don't want to take you take up your entire day with 1013 01:11:50,400 --> 01:11:53,610 this. So let me kind of fast forward from the onset days, 1014 01:11:54,000 --> 01:11:56,880 that regardless of what was official or not, here we are in 1015 01:11:56,880 --> 01:12:03,150 2022. Last year, June, the UAP report was published to the 1016 01:12:03,150 --> 01:12:07,140 public big letdown to many people. I found some gems in it. 1017 01:12:07,140 --> 01:12:10,620 But obviously there was a big letdown. There are two 1018 01:12:10,620 --> 01:12:16,470 observations that I had, I was surprised at so many agencies 1019 01:12:16,500 --> 01:12:19,920 taking part and I put air quotes because we don't know how much 1020 01:12:19,920 --> 01:12:23,760 parts some of these took in the report is about 13 or 14, you 1021 01:12:23,760 --> 01:12:26,970 know, named here. I've got it on my screen. The second 1022 01:12:26,970 --> 01:12:31,440 observation I want to bring up to you is the CIA is absent. So 1023 01:12:31,440 --> 01:12:33,750 just looking at the sheet, there's the Army, the Navy, the 1024 01:12:33,750 --> 01:12:37,800 Air Force, so obviously the the obvious ones, but the NSA, the 1025 01:12:37,800 --> 01:12:43,230 NGA, the NRO, the FBI, the DIA, NOAA, FAA, mg. Nga was 1026 01:12:43,230 --> 01:12:47,700 duplicated twice in the report. And so on ODNI. So there's quite 1027 01:12:47,700 --> 01:12:51,000 a few different offices and agencies that took part but not 1028 01:12:51,030 --> 01:12:55,740 the CIA. What are your thoughts about this public report, and 1029 01:12:55,920 --> 01:12:59,580 specifically the lack of any CIA involvement, at least from what 1030 01:12:59,580 --> 01:13:00,180 we're told? 1031 01:13:01,140 --> 01:13:07,440 John Ramirez: Well, the department knew that the Senate 1032 01:13:07,560 --> 01:13:12,540 Select Committee on Intelligence had queued up language for the 1033 01:13:12,900 --> 01:13:20,190 intelligence Authorization Act, FY 21, about this UAP study, the 1034 01:13:20,190 --> 01:13:25,200 department knew that ahead of time. And in order to get ahead 1035 01:13:25,200 --> 01:13:32,790 of the narrative. The Department announced that from its 1036 01:13:32,790 --> 01:13:38,910 understanding, in June, when the IAEA language became public, the 1037 01:13:38,910 --> 01:13:42,150 department got ahead of the narrative, and said, Well, we're 1038 01:13:42,150 --> 01:13:45,540 not going to wait for this IAEA to be signed, because then 1039 01:13:45,540 --> 01:13:49,860 Congress would drive US Congress would be in charge, we're going 1040 01:13:49,860 --> 01:13:53,490 to get ahead of the narrative, and create this UAP Task Force 1041 01:13:53,520 --> 01:13:59,460 and announce it and put the Navy in charge. And so then we can 1042 01:13:59,460 --> 01:14:04,830 then stipulate what the scope of this investigation is going to 1043 01:14:04,830 --> 01:14:10,470 be not Congress. And so that's what happened. In my opinion. 1044 01:14:10,530 --> 01:14:14,640 Now, you might talk to other analysts who may disagree with 1045 01:14:14,640 --> 01:14:18,690 that. But I've seen that happen before, where the government 1046 01:14:18,690 --> 01:14:21,870 will get ahead of the narrative by saying, oh, we'll do it. 1047 01:14:22,200 --> 01:14:25,050 We'll do it. Don't legislate it. You can put the language in the 1048 01:14:25,050 --> 01:14:28,470 legislation. But don't worry, you'll get what you need. So 1049 01:14:28,470 --> 01:14:31,680 that's what the department did, I believe, to get ahead of the 1050 01:14:31,680 --> 01:14:35,520 narrative. So if you look at the announcement in August, and you 1051 01:14:35,520 --> 01:14:40,020 look at the report release in late June, they had more than 1052 01:14:40,020 --> 01:14:45,630 180 days to do this. They had a better part of a full year to do 1053 01:14:45,630 --> 01:14:51,330 this, because they wanted to control the narrative. And so I 1054 01:14:51,330 --> 01:14:52,500 believe that's what happened. 1055 01:14:52,860 --> 01:14:54,570 John Greenewald: It looks like they only took like three hours 1056 01:14:54,570 --> 01:14:55,800 to put it together, though. 1057 01:14:56,189 --> 01:14:59,099 John Ramirez: Let me I'll address that. CIA was not 1058 01:14:59,099 --> 01:15:02,999 involved because This effort was Department of Defense title 10. 1059 01:15:03,479 --> 01:15:07,799 CIA is not part of title 10, the Secretary defense cannot order 1060 01:15:07,829 --> 01:15:11,999 the CIA to do anything, or participate in anything. If 1061 01:15:11,999 --> 01:15:14,969 anything, it's going to be a request to the director of CIA, 1062 01:15:15,329 --> 01:15:19,049 you know, we invite you to this to this report. They did not do 1063 01:15:19,049 --> 01:15:22,349 that, because the department wanted to limit the scope of the 1064 01:15:22,349 --> 01:15:27,569 report to just what was publicly released in 2017. That is, 1065 01:15:29,159 --> 01:15:36,239 November, I think it was 1227 2000 for the first tic tac 1066 01:15:36,779 --> 01:15:39,959 and the Nimitz battle group. Mm hmm. That's the start. And we're 1067 01:15:39,959 --> 01:15:45,119 gonna end it like, sometime in 2021. Yeah, that's it. That's 1068 01:15:45,119 --> 01:15:48,899 the scope of the report. We don't want CIA to bring in its 1069 01:15:48,899 --> 01:15:51,629 historical knowledge of everything to happen since 1070 01:15:51,629 --> 01:15:55,349 Roswell. That's not going to be part of the report. We want to 1071 01:15:55,349 --> 01:15:56,909 just it the military. 1072 01:15:57,570 --> 01:16:00,330 John Greenewald: So you think it was strategic to not include 1073 01:16:00,330 --> 01:16:04,590 CIA, not just because it was a limitation of SecDef? And his, 1074 01:16:04,740 --> 01:16:08,220 you know, mandate? Because I mean, the FAA is in their SEC, 1075 01:16:08,220 --> 01:16:10,170 that doesn't have any, you know, exactly. 1076 01:16:10,560 --> 01:16:14,370 John Ramirez: That's a good point. Because, you know, if 1077 01:16:14,370 --> 01:16:19,740 they added CIA, Will, CIA wasn't invited. And CIA had no way of 1078 01:16:19,740 --> 01:16:23,160 legally inserting itself into the report. It was Secretary 1079 01:16:23,160 --> 01:16:24,570 defense title 10. So 1080 01:16:24,570 --> 01:16:27,540 John Greenewald: can I ask, do you know, for 100% fact that 1081 01:16:27,540 --> 01:16:27,900 they weren't 1082 01:16:27,900 --> 01:16:30,060 John Ramirez: invited? They were not invited? 1083 01:16:31,590 --> 01:16:33,210 John Greenewald: They were no, put your call in? I'm only 1084 01:16:33,210 --> 01:16:37,650 asking because I don't know. But so you don't think there was a 1085 01:16:38,250 --> 01:16:41,400 any type of requests? And it was the CIA that said, hey, no, I 1086 01:16:41,400 --> 01:16:45,510 don't want we're not SecDef got no jurisdiction over us. So 1087 01:16:45,510 --> 01:16:48,240 we're not going to contribute. So you know, for a fact that 1088 01:16:48,270 --> 01:16:50,760 there was never a line extended to CIA. 1089 01:16:53,250 --> 01:16:56,430 John Ramirez: I can't reveal why I know that. Okay. I do know 1090 01:16:56,430 --> 01:17:01,980 that they were not formally invited to participate in the 1091 01:17:02,010 --> 01:17:06,090 Navy UAP Task Force at all. 1092 01:17:06,960 --> 01:17:10,350 John Greenewald: Now about the the new effort the aeoi, MSG 1093 01:17:12,660 --> 01:17:17,040 UAP, tf is going away. aeoi MSG is coming aboard. Do you feel 1094 01:17:17,040 --> 01:17:20,310 that there will be coordination there? Or do you think CIA still 1095 01:17:20,310 --> 01:17:20,820 going to be 1096 01:17:21,720 --> 01:17:24,030 John Ramirez: the law states that needs to be coordination 1097 01:17:24,030 --> 01:17:27,960 between the Secretary of Defense in coordination with the 1098 01:17:27,960 --> 01:17:31,320 Director of National Intelligence. And so that's a 1099 01:17:31,530 --> 01:17:38,820 way for CIA to participate in a OSI MSG. And also, there is the 1100 01:17:39,030 --> 01:17:44,280 intelligence Authorization Act, FY 22, where I'm not sure where 1101 01:17:44,280 --> 01:17:47,100 that went, but there was language in there that was 1102 01:17:47,310 --> 01:17:54,270 somewhat different. The NDAA tends to say, Okay, secretary of 1103 01:17:54,270 --> 01:17:59,640 defense, you need to have the coordination of DNI to do this 1104 01:17:59,640 --> 01:18:12,870 group aeoi MSG. But in the IAEA, its tells the DNI Okay, April 1105 01:18:12,870 --> 01:18:19,140 Haynes, you need to get the cooperation of the Department of 1106 01:18:19,140 --> 01:18:24,660 Defense, the Secretary of Defense to do this legislation 1107 01:18:25,920 --> 01:18:32,130 stipulated program. So on the, on the NDA side, It's 180 day 1108 01:18:32,130 --> 01:18:37,590 interval report. On the ISI, it's a 90 day interval report. 1109 01:18:38,610 --> 01:18:41,730 So it's like two different pieces of legislation. And I 1110 01:18:41,730 --> 01:18:46,080 don't know if the IA language for UAPs is still in there. It's 1111 01:18:46,080 --> 01:18:52,350 much shorter. The NDA is much broader, much in depth, and so 1112 01:18:52,380 --> 01:18:55,890 I'm not sure what happened to it. But there's two pieces of 1113 01:18:55,890 --> 01:18:58,320 legislation. And I don't know how they're going to resolve 1114 01:18:58,320 --> 01:19:03,300 who's in charge, because on the Senate side, IAEA, it's the DNI 1115 01:19:03,360 --> 01:19:06,840 getting the cooperation, Secretary of Defense on the NDAA 1116 01:19:06,840 --> 01:19:09,720 side, which came out of the House Armed Services Committee. 1117 01:19:10,080 --> 01:19:15,720 It is then the or, yeah, I think I'm right. It's the it's the 1118 01:19:15,720 --> 01:19:19,080 cooperation of DNI underneath the Secretary of Defense. 1119 01:19:19,170 --> 01:19:21,630 John Greenewald: Yeah, I'm glad it's not confusing at all, John, 1120 01:19:21,660 --> 01:19:22,200 because, 1121 01:19:22,860 --> 01:19:27,300 John Ramirez: well, I mean, I'm upset at the aeoi. The MSG part. 1122 01:19:27,510 --> 01:19:32,970 Yeah. Because that's management synchronization. Me implies. 1123 01:19:33,300 --> 01:19:37,980 Okay, department. Let's get our story straight of what we tell 1124 01:19:37,980 --> 01:19:41,280 Congress. Why is it called management, synchronization? 1125 01:19:41,610 --> 01:19:47,220 Management synchronizing? What? Yeah, you know, object. Airborne 1126 01:19:47,250 --> 01:19:49,980 object identification, that sounds great, but when you 1127 01:19:49,980 --> 01:19:54,060 manage the identification, and synchronized in a vacation, 1128 01:19:54,180 --> 01:19:58,080 according to what the department wants, that tends to tell me 1129 01:19:58,080 --> 01:20:01,830 that we're not going to get it A lot of what we really want, 1130 01:20:03,389 --> 01:20:05,429 John Greenewald: you know, I'm at the tail end of the time that 1131 01:20:05,429 --> 01:20:09,989 I have with you, and I really appreciate your time. If I can 1132 01:20:10,019 --> 01:20:12,569 just ask you one one last question with your time in the 1133 01:20:12,569 --> 01:20:15,779 in the CIA and, and it sounds like you've had a lot of 1134 01:20:15,779 --> 01:20:19,589 knowledge over the years that now you're being able to, to 1135 01:20:19,589 --> 01:20:24,029 come out with, do you have any regrets over the last, you know, 1136 01:20:24,059 --> 01:20:29,789 25 years with your career of the CIA or, or, you know, even post 1137 01:20:29,789 --> 01:20:32,489 retirement, anything that you look back and wanted to do 1138 01:20:32,489 --> 01:20:33,659 different with your time? 1139 01:20:34,019 --> 01:20:37,109 John Ramirez: Well, knowing that the working group started in 1140 01:20:37,499 --> 01:20:41,399 around late 2004, and went through 2005, I was chief of the 1141 01:20:41,399 --> 01:20:45,929 Elan Analysis Branch. My regret was not hiring Eric W. Davis, 1142 01:20:45,929 --> 01:20:49,649 when he applied for a job at CIA. And that was my deepest 1143 01:20:49,649 --> 01:20:52,379 regret, knowing what his capabilities are, and knowing 1144 01:20:52,499 --> 01:20:55,739 participation in the study of this phenomenon. I wish I would 1145 01:20:55,739 --> 01:20:57,959 have hired him, because I would have sent him to the working 1146 01:20:57,959 --> 01:20:58,199 group. 1147 01:20:58,320 --> 01:21:02,430 John Greenewald: So Dr. Eric Davis had applied for the CIA in 1148 01:21:02,580 --> 01:21:06,600 your, in the 11th. To the major I have it, electronic 1149 01:21:06,600 --> 01:21:08,220 intelligence analysis branch, 1150 01:21:08,249 --> 01:21:12,329 John Ramirez: he actually apply for broader Japp job category 1151 01:21:12,449 --> 01:21:17,099 known as St. W. That's scientific, technical and 1152 01:21:17,099 --> 01:21:24,179 weapons. And so that is usually the place where scientists, 1153 01:21:24,179 --> 01:21:27,689 physicists, chemists, biologists, you name it, 1154 01:21:27,809 --> 01:21:31,319 electrical engineers, mechanical engineers, that's the job 1155 01:21:31,319 --> 01:21:35,309 category that they would check off when they apply for job. So 1156 01:21:35,309 --> 01:21:43,019 he was St. W. And so his resume in his application package, went 1157 01:21:43,019 --> 01:21:47,249 to hiring advisors in the weapons intelligence 1158 01:21:47,249 --> 01:21:51,419 nonproliferation Arms Control Center, my parent office. So 1159 01:21:51,449 --> 01:21:54,929 it's logical that it went to knowing the structure of wind 1160 01:21:54,929 --> 01:21:59,039 pack, it would have gone to the missile and space group, and 1161 01:21:59,039 --> 01:22:02,699 particularly in the space group, because of his background, and 1162 01:22:02,699 --> 01:22:06,269 it also perhaps, and the missile group, missile part of the MSG. 1163 01:22:08,069 --> 01:22:12,749 And I believe he had interviews because I learned about his 1164 01:22:12,809 --> 01:22:19,139 application from my colleague, branch chief, who was chief of 1165 01:22:19,889 --> 01:22:25,649 mass sent in CIA. And he interviewed Eric W. Davis, after 1166 01:22:25,679 --> 01:22:30,689 he came downstairs and escorted downstairs to this signature. 1167 01:22:32,129 --> 01:22:34,589 Branch. And he was interviewed there. 1168 01:22:35,430 --> 01:22:37,530 John Greenewald: It have you I'm just curious, have you talked 1169 01:22:37,530 --> 01:22:40,410 about that before? publicly? 1170 01:22:40,590 --> 01:22:44,580 John Ramirez: No, no. But if you ask me, like, what's my deepest 1171 01:22:44,580 --> 01:22:48,450 regret? I deeply regret that, because he would have just been 1172 01:22:48,450 --> 01:22:52,500 saying individual talk to and because I looked at his it's 1173 01:22:52,500 --> 01:22:56,160 more than a resume is more like a CV. I mean, he listed a lot of 1174 01:22:56,160 --> 01:23:02,220 detail. And it's an a CV, and knowing his background. I wish I 1175 01:23:02,220 --> 01:23:04,710 would have hired them. In hindsight, knowing that there 1176 01:23:04,710 --> 01:23:09,660 was a OHRP Working Group starting up. Yeah. But the 1177 01:23:09,720 --> 01:23:15,480 signature, Branch Chief signatures Branch Chief had it 1178 01:23:15,480 --> 01:23:21,150 me his application package for me to review. And I noticed that 1179 01:23:21,150 --> 01:23:23,730 you know, this is a brilliant guy. I mean, no doubt about it. 1180 01:23:23,730 --> 01:23:28,770 He is brilliant. Beyond Belief, I mean, outstanding guy. And I 1181 01:23:28,770 --> 01:23:31,920 looked at the projects he worked for, for the Air Force Research 1182 01:23:31,920 --> 01:23:40,350 Lab. I read his paper, CIA has a requirement to submit writing 1183 01:23:40,350 --> 01:23:43,350 samples, particularly in the director of intelligence, it's 1184 01:23:43,350 --> 01:23:48,420 all about writing. Yeah. And He submitted his paper on 1185 01:23:48,750 --> 01:23:55,470 teleportation physics, which I read. And it was data 2004. And 1186 01:23:55,470 --> 01:23:58,710 I remember oh, this is a recent paper, because it was the same 1187 01:23:58,710 --> 01:24:02,010 calendar year later, after we published that paper for AF 1188 01:24:02,850 --> 01:24:09,270 AFRL. But he, he was in the building on escorted, escorted, 1189 01:24:09,270 --> 01:24:13,710 he had to have an escort. And that means that he did not have 1190 01:24:13,710 --> 01:24:18,720 a top secret SCI clearance that he passed to us. He didn't pass 1191 01:24:18,720 --> 01:24:22,830 clearances to us to get a different kind of badge instead 1192 01:24:22,830 --> 01:24:26,550 of a visitor's badge that required an escort. Okay, all 1193 01:24:26,550 --> 01:24:34,560 times even going to the bathroom. He he that's the batch 1194 01:24:34,560 --> 01:24:39,120 he had, and he did not have the no escort required batch. Which 1195 01:24:39,120 --> 01:24:42,300 means that you passed your clearances at the SEI level. 1196 01:24:42,600 --> 01:24:44,910 John Greenewald: Do you remember what year this was? If I may ask 1197 01:24:44,970 --> 01:24:45,690 2004 1198 01:24:45,690 --> 01:24:47,670 John Ramirez: Because when I looked at his paper, 1199 01:24:48,390 --> 01:24:51,660 teleportation physics, I remarked Oh, this is a very 1200 01:24:51,660 --> 01:24:53,310 recent paper. He just he just 1201 01:24:53,369 --> 01:24:56,039 John Greenewald: published it. So that means he didn't have any 1202 01:24:56,039 --> 01:24:58,169 clearance or didn't have a top secret. He didn't have a top 1203 01:24:58,170 --> 01:25:01,800 John Ramirez: secret SCI clearance when he Okay. And when 1204 01:25:01,860 --> 01:25:03,870 to CIA for those interviews? 1205 01:25:05,339 --> 01:25:08,009 John Greenewald: I have to if you don't mind, can I take you 1206 01:25:08,009 --> 01:25:13,319 for a couple more minutes? Are you okay? So with that, the two 1207 01:25:13,319 --> 01:25:16,079 questions I have and one you may not be able to answer, but very 1208 01:25:16,079 --> 01:25:18,809 quickly was he hired but I know you said you didn't hire him, 1209 01:25:18,809 --> 01:25:20,309 but did somebody else at CIA. 1210 01:25:22,710 --> 01:25:25,500 John Ramirez: My partner Webpack did not hire the signature 1211 01:25:26,070 --> 01:25:31,320 branch, the event branch. We didn't hire him. And he wasn't. 1212 01:25:32,520 --> 01:25:36,180 I did not see him in Webpack spaces. And the places that I 1213 01:25:36,180 --> 01:25:40,080 should see him at the missile and space group Park. He wasn't 1214 01:25:40,080 --> 01:25:45,420 in there. So not to say that somebody might have seen his his 1215 01:25:45,450 --> 01:25:49,020 application package and may say, Hey, this is a great guy that we 1216 01:25:49,020 --> 01:25:51,630 can consult, bring him over here. Yeah, gotcha. Yeah, but 1217 01:25:51,630 --> 01:25:55,350 you guys die. But we, we didn't we didn't hire him as a blue 1218 01:25:55,350 --> 01:25:59,190 badge employee, not to say that he may have, he may have 1219 01:25:59,190 --> 01:26:02,760 attracted enough interest to be introduced to other people in 1220 01:26:02,760 --> 01:26:06,810 the IC saying, Hey, this guy, you know, he's very interesting. 1221 01:26:06,840 --> 01:26:10,080 We didn't hire him as a blue badge staffer, but you might be 1222 01:26:10,080 --> 01:26:12,630 interested in it. I don't know if he served as in a 1223 01:26:12,630 --> 01:26:16,200 consultative capacity at all. As an independent contractor. I 1224 01:26:16,200 --> 01:26:19,170 don't have that knowledge. I do know he was escorted because my 1225 01:26:19,170 --> 01:26:26,040 engineer escorted him down the hall to a snack stand. And CIA 1226 01:26:26,040 --> 01:26:29,460 officers are no, it's Ron and Sally snacks down on the ground 1227 01:26:29,460 --> 01:26:32,910 floor where my branch was located. Yeah, Ron and Sally. 1228 01:26:33,300 --> 01:26:37,530 Ron was blind. And he was very affectionately liked by all CIA 1229 01:26:37,530 --> 01:26:40,740 officers who served during when they had snacks. So that 1230 01:26:40,740 --> 01:26:45,810 validates, okay. Yeah, Ron and Sally snacks and my, my engineer 1231 01:26:45,810 --> 01:26:48,690 that I did send it off, or working group, one of them was 1232 01:26:48,690 --> 01:26:51,630 escorting him. And he was introduced to a colleague of 1233 01:26:51,630 --> 01:26:56,070 mine, and another branch, who I witness the fact that oh, yeah, 1234 01:26:56,070 --> 01:26:57,660 he just had a visitor's badge. 1235 01:26:58,320 --> 01:27:02,160 John Greenewald: Wow. So this was 2004. He said, and yeah, I 1236 01:27:02,160 --> 01:27:04,920 always like to put everything in chronological order, because 1237 01:27:04,920 --> 01:27:07,830 that's the best way to put together a puzzle. But I, I, 1238 01:27:07,890 --> 01:27:10,860 you're familiar with the Eric Davis, Thomas Wilson notes, 1239 01:27:10,890 --> 01:27:13,980 whatever you want to call them. I've done quite a few different 1240 01:27:13,980 --> 01:27:17,070 videos on it. I'm a huge skeptic when it comes to these notes. 1241 01:27:18,000 --> 01:27:20,850 But since you have this kind of knowledge around the timeframe, 1242 01:27:20,850 --> 01:27:26,310 it was allegedly October of 2002, when Eric Davis met with 1243 01:27:26,610 --> 01:27:31,740 allegedly Admiral Thomas Wilson and Wilson, as a J. Two decided 1244 01:27:31,740 --> 01:27:36,000 to spill all these, you know, highly classified secrets in Las 1245 01:27:36,000 --> 01:27:39,690 Vegas. Based on what you've seen, do you have an opinion on 1246 01:27:39,690 --> 01:27:44,040 those notes? And if he's not cleared? Why would Wilson and 1247 01:27:44,040 --> 01:27:46,650 then I really want to ask the question, why would Wilson do 1248 01:27:46,650 --> 01:27:47,010 that? 1249 01:27:48,000 --> 01:27:51,750 John Ramirez: Well, Eric Davis was a member of an organization. 1250 01:27:51,750 --> 01:27:54,990 I'm a member of the association, former intelligence officers. 1251 01:27:55,410 --> 01:27:58,560 And you don't have to be an intelligence officer to be a 1252 01:27:58,560 --> 01:28:06,060 member of the AFI Oh, you just have to be a person who has 1253 01:28:06,060 --> 01:28:09,270 worked with intelligence, or worked with a military 1254 01:28:09,660 --> 01:28:14,340 intelligence side. And so he knew people who were in the Las 1255 01:28:14,340 --> 01:28:18,360 Vegas chapter because he was a member. And the last Vegas 1256 01:28:18,360 --> 01:28:24,330 chapter members about vouched for Eric Davis to Admiral 1257 01:28:24,330 --> 01:28:28,230 Wilson. So that was one of the ways that Admiral Wilson you 1258 01:28:28,230 --> 01:28:31,380 that Eric gave us was real deal in terms of, you know, the fact 1259 01:28:31,380 --> 01:28:34,290 that he is associated in some way with the intelligence 1260 01:28:34,290 --> 01:28:35,730 community or with military, 1261 01:28:36,059 --> 01:28:38,759 John Greenewald: according to the story or you have knowledge 1262 01:28:38,759 --> 01:28:42,029 of that. He's a member of the AFI. Oh, yeah. No, no, I 1263 01:28:42,029 --> 01:28:44,999 understand that I'm talking about the vouching to Admiral 1264 01:28:44,999 --> 01:28:48,599 Wilson. Is that a story you've heard? Or you have direct 1265 01:28:48,599 --> 01:28:49,229 knowledge? No, 1266 01:28:49,230 --> 01:28:52,110 John Ramirez: that's, that's based on a good point that you 1267 01:28:52,110 --> 01:28:54,750 have John, that was based on reading the notes. 1268 01:28:55,439 --> 01:28:57,839 John Greenewald: Oh, okay. I got I got so so we're going out. 1269 01:28:57,929 --> 01:28:58,829 Gotcha. 1270 01:28:59,909 --> 01:29:02,639 John Ramirez: The other thing that I have knowledge of is that 1271 01:29:05,009 --> 01:29:09,899 E and G is the we call the operations operations and 1272 01:29:09,899 --> 01:29:14,789 maintenance contractor for area 51. They run the security, they 1273 01:29:14,789 --> 01:29:19,379 provide all of the services, just the logistical support of 1274 01:29:19,379 --> 01:29:23,849 running that facility. And it may provide some analytics 1275 01:29:23,849 --> 01:29:28,169 support as well. That's interesting that I went to E and 1276 01:29:28,169 --> 01:29:35,429 G. When I was at a facility next to area 51. I went to the DOE 1277 01:29:37,349 --> 01:29:41,789 facility to get batched Mm hmm. So I was surprised that occurred 1278 01:29:41,789 --> 01:29:45,869 an E Geez. Parking lot. According to the notes, I didn't 1279 01:29:45,869 --> 01:29:48,929 know why that would be but maybe Mr. Wilson had some business 1280 01:29:48,929 --> 01:29:50,759 there to do. Do you feel 1281 01:29:50,760 --> 01:29:53,250 John Greenewald: that happened? Just out of curiosity based on? 1282 01:29:54,689 --> 01:29:57,569 John Ramirez: Well, as you know, I say embrace widely hold 1283 01:29:57,569 --> 01:30:01,919 lightly. And since I don't have any and knowledge, I hold that 1284 01:30:01,919 --> 01:30:05,399 lightly. But I embraced it widely that it's possible that 1285 01:30:05,399 --> 01:30:08,489 could have occurred. What I don't believe occurred was 1286 01:30:08,489 --> 01:30:11,699 Admiral Wilson saw that memorandum allegedly from the 1287 01:30:11,729 --> 01:30:14,999 NRO and said, by golly, I need to get to the bottom of this. 1288 01:30:15,119 --> 01:30:16,739 That is complete nonsense. 1289 01:30:17,279 --> 01:30:20,099 John Greenewald: I did a pretty big breakdown of that, the that 1290 01:30:20,099 --> 01:30:25,979 memo and and how that anchored the whole story. And that that, 1291 01:30:25,979 --> 01:30:28,889 to me is one of the biggest tells, in my opinion. Again, 1292 01:30:28,889 --> 01:30:33,089 this is just my opinion on why there's not a whole lot of truth 1293 01:30:33,089 --> 01:30:37,709 to this, because the entire story hinges on that memo. And 1294 01:30:37,709 --> 01:30:40,529 in my opinion, the memos bunk, you brought up the memo, if 1295 01:30:40,529 --> 01:30:43,259 you're familiar with a Do you feel that the memo is bunk yet 1296 01:30:43,259 --> 01:30:47,039 is completely bunk? So you So you agree that that memo was 1297 01:30:47,039 --> 01:30:47,459 just 1298 01:30:47,580 --> 01:30:49,980 John Ramirez: that wasn't the that was an impetus for Admiral 1299 01:30:49,980 --> 01:30:50,820 Wilson to 1300 01:30:51,810 --> 01:30:53,640 John Greenewald: talk, but according to the notes, it was, 1301 01:30:53,640 --> 01:30:58,380 and according to Greer, it was because there was. Yeah, I mean, 1302 01:30:58,380 --> 01:31:02,310 that's the legend anyway. And that's, that's the story. So for 1303 01:31:02,310 --> 01:31:04,950 me, it falls apart from there. But again, going back to what 1304 01:31:04,950 --> 01:31:08,850 you feel, I mean, do you feel there's any truth to that story? 1305 01:31:11,550 --> 01:31:19,380 John Ramirez: I would give some possibility that Eric Davis was 1306 01:31:19,380 --> 01:31:26,220 known to Admiral Wilson in some capacity. That's me being very 1307 01:31:26,220 --> 01:31:29,910 generous. I don't think they were like 100% complete 1308 01:31:29,910 --> 01:31:34,050 strangers. I don't think Admiral Wilson would look at our air 1309 01:31:34,050 --> 01:31:37,530 gave us it Who is this guy? Because Eric Davis worked 1310 01:31:37,530 --> 01:31:42,000 closely with the Air Force Research Lab. And so I would 1311 01:31:42,030 --> 01:31:46,260 imagine that someone in the capacity of j to the joint 1312 01:31:46,260 --> 01:31:52,200 chiefs of staff would know about the work of the AF RL. And so in 1313 01:31:52,200 --> 01:31:56,280 that capacity, there might be some linkage there. But to say 1314 01:31:56,280 --> 01:32:01,710 that emerald Wilson wanted to speak with Eric Davis because he 1315 01:32:01,710 --> 01:32:06,150 saw this memorandum. Admiral Wilson was look at that and no, 1316 01:32:06,150 --> 01:32:11,640 it was completely faked. Yeah, I was eland and it listed eland 1317 01:32:11,670 --> 01:32:15,840 What is it Elan ops. There's no such thing as Elan ops. I was 1318 01:32:15,870 --> 01:32:20,160 eland I know people at NSA eland. I know the Elan community 1319 01:32:20,160 --> 01:32:24,330 threw out the military, military intelligence side and the 1320 01:32:24,600 --> 01:32:28,350 civilian icy side. There's no such thing as eland offs or you 1321 01:32:28,350 --> 01:32:33,270 know all these other they put us address fees in the format was 1322 01:32:33,270 --> 01:32:37,290 the complete wrong. Central Security Service is the uniform 1323 01:32:37,320 --> 01:32:41,070 cryptologic service elements at NSA. They're the people wearing 1324 01:32:41,070 --> 01:32:45,090 uniforms, members of the military who work at NSA in the 1325 01:32:45,090 --> 01:32:51,810 second field, in our role in our roles. organization chart would 1326 01:32:51,810 --> 01:32:55,020 not have central security services there. Yeah. And in a 1327 01:32:55,020 --> 01:32:58,620 row is not part of the Air Force folks. Yeah. You know, there's 1328 01:32:58,619 --> 01:33:00,359 John Greenewald: a lot of problems. I mean, so yeah, a lot 1329 01:33:00,359 --> 01:33:00,779 of problems. 1330 01:33:00,779 --> 01:33:02,909 John Ramirez: And plus all of the units that are listed down, 1331 01:33:03,269 --> 01:33:07,409 I have a list of where every unit was stationed. And you 1332 01:33:07,409 --> 01:33:11,219 know, I find it strange that one of the wings fighter wings was 1333 01:33:11,219 --> 01:33:18,089 stationed at Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma. And so why 1334 01:33:18,089 --> 01:33:22,829 would you know, this, the entire intent was of the memo was, oh, 1335 01:33:22,859 --> 01:33:26,579 you know, we found out that these UFO researchers are going 1336 01:33:26,579 --> 01:33:30,209 to be at the little alien N and Rachel LaMotta. And we want to 1337 01:33:30,209 --> 01:33:34,559 shut down all operations. Right? And they listed like some of 1338 01:33:34,559 --> 01:33:37,619 these units in the Air Force. They're real units, somebody did 1339 01:33:37,619 --> 01:33:41,579 their homework, but they just pick and chose pick and choose, 1340 01:33:41,579 --> 01:33:46,169 like, cafeteria style, or what sounds good. You know, what, 1341 01:33:46,169 --> 01:33:51,479 what can we find that may have had some associated area 51? 1342 01:33:51,479 --> 01:33:55,259 Just throw it in the report. So I mean, I have a lot of problems 1343 01:33:55,259 --> 01:33:58,139 with that mission operations. Moc, by the way stands for 1344 01:33:58,139 --> 01:34:01,889 Mission Operations Center. That's what I stand for. And a 1345 01:34:01,889 --> 01:34:03,749 note like that it was legitimate. We're not going to 1346 01:34:03,749 --> 01:34:08,759 the LCS of these organizations, or these fighter wings, every 1347 01:34:09,359 --> 01:34:16,319 every unit involved in intelligence would have a SSL, 1348 01:34:16,769 --> 01:34:19,499 every Pentagon unit, every department of defense unit will 1349 01:34:19,499 --> 01:34:22,949 have an SSL, a special security office, and that's the 1350 01:34:22,949 --> 01:34:27,509 recipient. And for the top part, it wouldn't go to eland Mo. Even 1351 01:34:27,539 --> 01:34:32,219 UPS Yeah, it would have said NSA s to SSL. 1352 01:34:33,659 --> 01:34:36,869 John Greenewald: Yeah, it was, it was definitely a mess. Let me 1353 01:34:36,899 --> 01:34:41,189 the final question. Bottom line real quick, beyond the memo, 1354 01:34:41,219 --> 01:34:46,379 because then the biggest supporters of this story, have 1355 01:34:46,379 --> 01:34:50,309 kind of dismissed my critique of the memo saying, Oh, well, then 1356 01:34:50,339 --> 01:34:53,579 the memo is not a big deal anymore to the story, even 1357 01:34:53,579 --> 01:34:56,129 though it's been bantered about since day one. But now we take 1358 01:34:56,129 --> 01:34:58,469 that out and it's like, oh, well, it's not a big deal. So 1359 01:34:58,469 --> 01:35:00,779 let's take the memo out of the equation. You look at the notes, 1360 01:35:00,779 --> 01:35:04,889 you look at the idea and concept that Wilson would would spill 1361 01:35:04,889 --> 01:35:07,379 the secrets. I know you said that it's a possibility that he 1362 01:35:07,379 --> 01:35:11,939 would know him and or know of him, right, with your experience 1363 01:35:11,939 --> 01:35:17,009 being top secret sei cleared working for the CIA. And, again, 1364 01:35:17,009 --> 01:35:20,639 this bio is amazing. So it kind of speaks for itself with your 1365 01:35:20,639 --> 01:35:24,539 intelligence, background and clearances. Do you see that 1366 01:35:24,539 --> 01:35:28,979 happening. But with a j two 1367 01:35:33,180 --> 01:35:37,860 John Ramirez: with a J. Two, at his position in the Joint Chiefs 1368 01:35:37,860 --> 01:35:43,590 of Staff, the possibility that he may not be aware of the 1369 01:35:43,980 --> 01:35:49,920 programmatic details, I find that to be credible. But he 1370 01:35:49,920 --> 01:35:55,050 would know the fact of that they might be an effort to reverse 1371 01:35:55,050 --> 01:35:59,910 engineer some of these crap. So that's one level, but to know 1372 01:35:59,940 --> 01:36:04,530 where it's being done, to know how much money is being placed 1373 01:36:04,560 --> 01:36:10,470 in these programs, to know like results of these programs to 1374 01:36:10,470 --> 01:36:14,880 actually go to the these these facilities and see these craft 1375 01:36:17,520 --> 01:36:22,950 that go either way, depending on how sensitive that program 1376 01:36:23,130 --> 01:36:28,050 really is, and what I can bring from personal experience that I 1377 01:36:28,050 --> 01:36:33,540 was involved in a controlled access program at CIA. And I had 1378 01:36:33,540 --> 01:36:38,220 the biggest list for that program. And as the program was 1379 01:36:38,220 --> 01:36:42,000 winding down, I was given the biggest list, I was made the 1380 01:36:42,030 --> 01:36:46,140 control officer for the program. With a job I did not relish and 1381 01:36:46,140 --> 01:36:51,060 I got rid of as fast as I could. But I was given a bucket list. 1382 01:36:51,090 --> 01:36:56,040 And on the bucket list were the names, birth dates and social 1383 01:36:56,040 --> 01:37:01,350 security numbers of the current president and former presidents. 1384 01:37:02,160 --> 01:37:07,110 So I know that you know, that bucket list is everything. And 1385 01:37:07,110 --> 01:37:11,580 but you know, I didn't see this program was something that James 1386 01:37:11,580 --> 01:37:17,400 McCaskey would have interested because it was part of his job 1387 01:37:17,550 --> 01:37:20,580 to look at ballistic missiles and ballistic missile defense. 1388 01:37:20,850 --> 01:37:26,100 So we were collecting at a covert facility, this data, and 1389 01:37:26,100 --> 01:37:32,490 I did not see any very many dia people on it. In fact, the DIA 1390 01:37:32,490 --> 01:37:35,040 people would have been at missile and space Intelligence 1391 01:37:35,040 --> 01:37:39,420 Center in Huntsville, Alabama. And they were not on it. In 1392 01:37:39,420 --> 01:37:43,920 fact, Neysa Air National Air and Space Intelligence Center, they 1393 01:37:43,920 --> 01:37:48,510 were not on it. It was just CIA, State Department because we need 1394 01:37:48,510 --> 01:37:54,060 an entry into that country. And the President, national security 1395 01:37:54,060 --> 01:37:58,620 adviser, Secretary of Defense was on it. Secretary of State at 1396 01:37:58,620 --> 01:38:01,680 that level. But I didn't see like Joint Chiefs of Staff. I 1397 01:38:01,680 --> 01:38:05,580 saw Secretary of the Air Force. But I didn't see Secretary of 1398 01:38:05,580 --> 01:38:05,910 the Navy 1399 01:38:05,939 --> 01:38:08,309 John Greenewald: and the former president, I assume was the they 1400 01:38:08,309 --> 01:38:10,799 were being read through the Presidential Daily briefs, which 1401 01:38:10,799 --> 01:38:13,319 they still get off of that 1402 01:38:13,319 --> 01:38:17,849 John Ramirez: program. After they leave office. 1403 01:38:18,029 --> 01:38:19,949 John Greenewald: Yeah, you were saying former? Were you 1404 01:38:19,949 --> 01:38:23,549 referencing president at the time but former right. Yeah, I 1405 01:38:23,549 --> 01:38:23,909 gotcha. 1406 01:38:23,909 --> 01:38:26,549 John Ramirez: Okay. Biggest list included everyone who has ever 1407 01:38:26,549 --> 01:38:29,609 read into the program? Gotcha. Okay. So you know, I saw 1408 01:38:29,669 --> 01:38:32,699 Secretary of State current Secretary of State former 1409 01:38:32,999 --> 01:38:35,399 anybody was read into the program and I short bigger 1410 01:38:35,399 --> 01:38:38,669 lists, my name is on it. Gotcha. With my Social Security 1411 01:38:38,819 --> 01:38:39,389 birthday, 1412 01:38:39,810 --> 01:38:41,400 John Greenewald: what was the program name? John. 1413 01:38:41,850 --> 01:38:44,130 John Ramirez: I can say this now because it didn't get redacted. 1414 01:38:44,250 --> 01:38:47,280 Okay, I can't say the program name. But the Central 1415 01:38:47,280 --> 01:38:49,830 Intelligence Agency in the People's Liberation Army of the 1416 01:38:49,830 --> 01:38:52,860 People's Republic of China had an intelligence sharing 1417 01:38:53,520 --> 01:38:59,880 agreement, to the point where the CIA built SIGINT collection 1418 01:39:00,300 --> 01:39:04,200 facilities in China and trained Chinese officers on how to 1419 01:39:04,200 --> 01:39:10,590 operate our equipment to collect against Soviet and then later 1420 01:39:10,590 --> 01:39:15,090 Russian ballistic missile tests. So we were sitting side by side 1421 01:39:15,480 --> 01:39:20,040 with our counterparts in Chinese intelligence, we provided them 1422 01:39:20,040 --> 01:39:23,070 with a lot of intelligence that you as an American system now 1423 01:39:23,070 --> 01:39:27,750 can't see. But there are folks in China, our erstwhile 1424 01:39:27,750 --> 01:39:30,930 adversary that saw this intelligence where we couldn't 1425 01:39:30,930 --> 01:39:34,050 even share it with our own American people. Yeah. So 1426 01:39:34,050 --> 01:39:38,430 that's, that's how like some of these programs get so deep that 1427 01:39:38,430 --> 01:39:45,630 very few people can be apprised of it. And even people who would 1428 01:39:45,630 --> 01:39:50,010 have an equity in analyzing that data, were never given that 1429 01:39:50,010 --> 01:39:54,390 data. And a say had it in a say was apprised of it because they 1430 01:39:54,390 --> 01:39:58,020 are the sikat mission mission manager and the functional 1431 01:39:58,020 --> 01:40:02,490 Mission Manager for second is Director of NSA turns up, so in 1432 01:40:02,490 --> 01:40:08,580 a say was read into it. And when I went out there to travel to be 1433 01:40:08,580 --> 01:40:12,630 Chief of Operations at one of the sites that we built, my 1434 01:40:12,630 --> 01:40:17,100 counterpart was NSA. But he didn't go us NSA, he went to 1435 01:40:17,100 --> 01:40:23,190 CIA, he had to leave CIA, NSA temporarily, and get bashed, 1436 01:40:23,460 --> 01:40:27,900 you're now in CIA, go out there, do your thing, and then come 1437 01:40:27,900 --> 01:40:32,130 back. And then we'll make use NSA again, also kind of like, 1438 01:40:32,670 --> 01:40:35,640 can't share too many operational details. But those are the kinds 1439 01:40:35,640 --> 01:40:41,190 of things that we have to do, because. But I didn't see a lot 1440 01:40:41,190 --> 01:40:45,750 of Dia people on it. So using that, as an extension, it's 1441 01:40:45,750 --> 01:40:49,680 conceivable that a program, they may have fact of knowledge that 1442 01:40:49,680 --> 01:40:54,390 we're exploiting these vehicles, alien reproduction vehicles, or 1443 01:40:54,390 --> 01:40:57,960 whatever you want to call them. The fact of is one thing, but 1444 01:40:57,960 --> 01:41:01,500 knowledge of the programmatics the funding the logistics, 1445 01:41:02,220 --> 01:41:05,550 that's another whole nother level. And in our program, we 1446 01:41:05,550 --> 01:41:11,220 use trees. So if you are briefed on a certain tree, you know, so 1447 01:41:11,220 --> 01:41:15,570 much, if you brief on another tree, you know, so much more. We 1448 01:41:15,570 --> 01:41:20,310 had a whole bunch of trees. So you know, if if you owe your 1449 01:41:20,310 --> 01:41:23,730 brief that the Elm level, the old tree level, or you know, 1450 01:41:23,730 --> 01:41:27,720 this much, I need to brief you at the oak tree level, you know, 1451 01:41:28,950 --> 01:41:32,910 it's, that's the kind of thing you know, so. So that was not 1452 01:41:32,910 --> 01:41:38,850 redacted at all. And I was surprised that CIA, let me say 1453 01:41:38,850 --> 01:41:41,730 that we had our intelligence relationship with pizza pub with 1454 01:41:41,730 --> 01:41:42,120 China. 1455 01:41:42,629 --> 01:41:46,529 John Greenewald: Yeah, I was not expecting that when you started 1456 01:41:46,529 --> 01:41:49,859 talking about that. So I'm surprised. John, I can talk to 1457 01:41:49,859 --> 01:41:54,059 you all day, I hope that you enjoyed your experience here. 1458 01:41:54,359 --> 01:41:58,739 And, and I really do appreciate on behalf of my audience, your 1459 01:41:58,739 --> 01:42:01,529 time just coming aboard and fielding all these questions. 1460 01:42:01,529 --> 01:42:04,379 And let me pick your brain here for the last 90 minutes or so. 1461 01:42:04,379 --> 01:42:07,109 So thank you for that. And I hope you'll come back, because 1462 01:42:07,109 --> 01:42:09,989 it sounds like we would have quite a few more things to talk 1463 01:42:09,989 --> 01:42:10,379 about. 1464 01:42:11,279 --> 01:42:15,209 John Ramirez: Thank you, John. And you actually, you helped us 1465 01:42:15,959 --> 01:42:19,649 kind of close the loop on our very first meeting together. And 1466 01:42:19,649 --> 01:42:22,979 I think that's one of the charming stories of my time at 1467 01:42:22,979 --> 01:42:26,909 CIA is that I actually met you. And now I'm meeting you in 1468 01:42:26,909 --> 01:42:32,459 providing and sharing some of my experiences at CIA when I 1469 01:42:32,459 --> 01:42:35,429 couldn't do that when I first met you. Yeah, I'm happy to 1470 01:42:35,459 --> 01:42:36,899 appear again with you. Thank you. 1471 01:42:36,899 --> 01:42:39,419 John Greenewald: Yeah. And I appreciate that. And thank you 1472 01:42:39,419 --> 01:42:42,809 all for listening and watching. Make sure if you are on Youtube, 1473 01:42:42,809 --> 01:42:45,989 just go ahead and click that thumbs up button. It really does 1474 01:42:45,989 --> 01:42:48,359 help the channel a lot and make sure you're subscribed to the 1475 01:42:48,359 --> 01:42:51,269 channel as well. If you're listening on the audio podcast 1476 01:42:51,269 --> 01:42:54,329 platforms, or if you're not aware, these types of interviews 1477 01:42:54,329 --> 01:42:58,709 get forwarded to every platform, including Spotify, iTunes, 1478 01:42:58,709 --> 01:43:02,129 wherever your podcast aggregator of choices, make sure you look 1479 01:43:02,159 --> 01:43:05,489 under the black vault radio. I shoot for five stars, but 1480 01:43:05,489 --> 01:43:08,729 reviews very much help. I won't tell you what to put but again, 1481 01:43:08,789 --> 01:43:11,549 that five star Mark is what we shoot for. Thank you again, 1482 01:43:11,549 --> 01:43:14,219 John. Thank you all for listening and watching. This is 1483 01:43:14,219 --> 01:43:16,979 John Greenewald, Jr signing off, and we'll see you next time.