1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:03,271 John Greenewald: For the past few years, the world has heard 2 00:00:03,348 --> 00:00:08,065 about America's involvement with UFOs. And how even today, the 3 00:00:08,141 --> 00:00:12,783 United States is studying the phenomena to finally figure out 4 00:00:12,859 --> 00:00:17,120 what is haunting US military aviators. But the US is not 5 00:00:17,196 --> 00:00:21,914 alone and being confronted by unidentified flying objects. Its 6 00:00:21,990 --> 00:00:26,708 neighbor to the north Canada has encountered them for decades. 7 00:00:26,784 --> 00:00:31,425 And although the Black Vault has received a small sampling of 8 00:00:31,502 --> 00:00:35,915 those reports in the past from the Canadian government, my 9 00:00:35,991 --> 00:00:39,720 guest today has now taken it to a whole new level 10 00:00:39,750 --> 00:00:42,180 Daniel Otis: when something's moving faster than any fighter 11 00:00:42,180 --> 00:00:44,910 jet they've ever seen. And then it makes a right angle turn. 12 00:00:45,660 --> 00:00:47,160 Like what is that 13 00:00:47,190 --> 00:00:50,370 John Greenewald: Daniel Otis, a Toronto based journalist who has 14 00:00:50,370 --> 00:00:53,370 written for more than two dozen publications over the past 15 00:00:53,370 --> 00:00:57,600 decade, has access more than 20 years of Canadian UFO 16 00:00:57,600 --> 00:01:00,960 encounters, and released them into the public domain for the 17 00:01:00,960 --> 00:01:05,640 first time ever. Daniel is about to step into the vault to break 18 00:01:05,640 --> 00:01:09,930 down the most important discoveries. Stay tuned, you're 19 00:01:09,930 --> 00:01:12,690 about to journey inside the black vault. 20 00:01:39,060 --> 00:01:41,850 That's right, everybody. As always, thank you so much for 21 00:01:41,850 --> 00:01:45,540 tuning in and making this your podcast or your live stream of 22 00:01:45,540 --> 00:01:49,410 choice. I'm your host, John Greenwald, Jr, owner and founder 23 00:01:49,410 --> 00:01:52,470 and creator of the black vault calm and factor. Looking at the 24 00:01:52,470 --> 00:01:56,130 whole team. I do everything over here. So forgive me if I don't 25 00:01:56,130 --> 00:01:59,700 get videos up as much as I want. But I'm excited about today's 26 00:01:59,700 --> 00:02:05,070 show. I am inviting. Let me get him in here. Canadian journalist 27 00:02:05,070 --> 00:02:11,010 Daniel Otis who just published a great article that has dissected 28 00:02:11,010 --> 00:02:15,690 20 years of UFO reports from Canada. Daniel, thank you so 29 00:02:15,690 --> 00:02:18,240 much for taking the time out of your day. I know you've done 30 00:02:18,240 --> 00:02:20,910 some interviews already about this, but taking some time to 31 00:02:20,910 --> 00:02:22,020 share it with my audience. 32 00:02:22,290 --> 00:02:24,300 Daniel Otis: John, thanks so much for having me. I'm a fan of 33 00:02:24,300 --> 00:02:26,610 the show. And it's an honor to be on. Well, it's 34 00:02:26,610 --> 00:02:28,710 John Greenewald: an honor to have you here and my kudos to 35 00:02:28,710 --> 00:02:32,670 you. You have been covering the UFO topic. You're obviously an 36 00:02:32,670 --> 00:02:36,000 accomplished journalist, you've done extensive work over the 37 00:02:36,000 --> 00:02:38,940 last decade, you've been covering the UFO topic, and 38 00:02:38,940 --> 00:02:43,620 correct me if I'm wrong, but from April of 2020 To date, or 39 00:02:43,620 --> 00:02:48,030 2021. Now I'm messing up the year. What was it 2020 or 2021, 40 00:02:48,060 --> 00:02:52,020 Daniel Otis: from April 2021 was when my story on the subject was 41 00:02:52,020 --> 00:02:56,130 published. And I guess my first Canadian FOIA request went out 42 00:02:56,160 --> 00:02:57,750 in February of 43 00:02:58,079 --> 00:03:01,979 John Greenewald: 2021 2021. COVID has messed up my brain so 44 00:03:02,189 --> 00:03:06,119 everything just kind of mashes together. So 2020 2021 I see is 45 00:03:06,119 --> 00:03:09,659 the same year regardless, though, uh, you know, a long 46 00:03:09,659 --> 00:03:13,019 enough time to really dive into the topic. You've done some 47 00:03:13,019 --> 00:03:16,349 excellent work already. And and, you know, I think this is 48 00:03:16,349 --> 00:03:19,769 arguably your best work in triumph at this point, because 49 00:03:19,769 --> 00:03:24,449 you've brought out 20 years worth of UFO UAP reports from 50 00:03:24,449 --> 00:03:28,199 the Canadian government. And let's just kind of start there. 51 00:03:28,199 --> 00:03:31,859 I mean, what exactly was the headline that you just put out 52 00:03:31,859 --> 00:03:35,189 there through vice? And what exactly did you find? 53 00:03:35,579 --> 00:03:38,729 Daniel Otis: Yeah, so through Canada's Freedom of Information 54 00:03:38,729 --> 00:03:41,609 System, which we call, they're called Access to Information 55 00:03:41,609 --> 00:03:46,949 requests here, I was able to obtain 20 years of UFO reports 56 00:03:46,949 --> 00:03:50,669 that were filed with Transport Canada, Transport Canada is a 57 00:03:50,669 --> 00:03:53,609 federal government department, similar to I guess, the 58 00:03:53,609 --> 00:03:56,849 Department of Transportation in the United States. And they 59 00:03:56,849 --> 00:04:01,349 basically regulate aviation, as part of their operations. They, 60 00:04:01,769 --> 00:04:06,029 they maintain something called caters, which is an online 61 00:04:06,059 --> 00:04:09,929 aviation Incident Database, where incidents you know, big 62 00:04:09,929 --> 00:04:13,979 and small get entered. You know, a bird hits a plane mechanical 63 00:04:13,979 --> 00:04:18,059 failure, and drunken, unruly passengers. And, you know, so 64 00:04:18,059 --> 00:04:21,809 called UFO sightings get factored into that. So what I 65 00:04:21,809 --> 00:04:25,439 wanted to do, you know, there are some public facing reports 66 00:04:25,589 --> 00:04:28,649 from Transport Canada, but what I wanted to do is try to get 67 00:04:28,649 --> 00:04:32,249 more of the source data, whenever these reports come in. 68 00:04:32,849 --> 00:04:35,909 The first point of contact are air traffic controllers, if it's 69 00:04:35,909 --> 00:04:40,529 an aviation report, and in Canada, all air traffic control 70 00:04:40,529 --> 00:04:44,369 is operated by a private company called nav Canada, I believe in 71 00:04:44,369 --> 00:04:48,659 the United States. That's all fulfilled by the FAA, which is 72 00:04:48,689 --> 00:04:50,819 a, you know, a federal administration that's not a 73 00:04:50,819 --> 00:04:54,509 private company. So you can't actually, you know, sit write a 74 00:04:54,509 --> 00:04:57,599 FOIA request to NAV Canada itself, but what I was trying to 75 00:04:57,599 --> 00:05:01,619 do is targeting to target their community And the reports that 76 00:05:01,619 --> 00:05:06,029 they were sending to Transport Canada about these aviation 77 00:05:06,029 --> 00:05:09,359 incidents. In addition to that, you know, by filing these 78 00:05:09,359 --> 00:05:14,489 requests, we also got reports in from military personnel, police 79 00:05:14,489 --> 00:05:18,239 officers, a lot of civilians, and the you know, the release 80 00:05:18,239 --> 00:05:23,819 totaled about almost 300 pages, 290 pages to be exact. It was 81 00:05:23,819 --> 00:05:27,599 came in through two separate information requests. And 82 00:05:27,599 --> 00:05:30,689 there's about 500 reports in there. Some of them, you know, 83 00:05:30,689 --> 00:05:34,169 are drone sightings, balloon sightings, etc. But then there's 84 00:05:34,169 --> 00:05:38,669 a whole bunch that are, you know, we're unusual lights and 85 00:05:38,669 --> 00:05:43,199 objects behaving sometimes in odd ways, reported by, for the 86 00:05:43,199 --> 00:05:45,629 most part, professional airline pilots. 87 00:05:46,080 --> 00:05:48,870 John Greenewald: So with your coverage before and your time 88 00:05:48,870 --> 00:05:52,950 getting into the UFO phenomena, I use plural because I think 89 00:05:52,950 --> 00:05:58,020 there's multiple facets to this. Were you surprised at what you 90 00:05:58,020 --> 00:06:02,520 got? Were you? Were you expecting it? Or were you just 91 00:06:02,520 --> 00:06:03,660 completely surprised? 92 00:06:04,560 --> 00:06:06,810 Daniel Otis: I think I was expecting it. Because I had 93 00:06:06,810 --> 00:06:11,250 found many of the reports contained in the release, I had 94 00:06:11,250 --> 00:06:14,130 found by looking through transport Canada's public facing 95 00:06:14,160 --> 00:06:17,460 aviation Incident Database. But there were reports that came in 96 00:06:17,460 --> 00:06:21,810 that I'd never seen before. Probably the single longest 97 00:06:21,840 --> 00:06:25,530 report in the release, it's about four pages long and 98 00:06:25,560 --> 00:06:29,070 details, a pair of civilian seeing something over the 99 00:06:29,070 --> 00:06:33,930 Atlantic Ocean, reporting that and then Canadian Air Force 100 00:06:33,960 --> 00:06:37,710 officials checking NORAD radar, and you know, picking up 101 00:06:37,710 --> 00:06:40,350 something at, you know, the exact time and location these 102 00:06:40,350 --> 00:06:43,860 people were calling it in. So, you know, the reports like that, 103 00:06:43,860 --> 00:06:47,580 that were new to me, I think overall, it was expected. I 104 00:06:47,580 --> 00:06:51,150 think what wasn't expected it was how much of it was retained. 105 00:06:52,080 --> 00:06:55,440 back about a year ago was the first time I filed requests for 106 00:06:55,440 --> 00:06:58,920 this information. And Transport Canada got back to me and said 107 00:06:58,920 --> 00:07:03,120 that those records were unavailable, go try defense, you 108 00:07:03,120 --> 00:07:05,220 know, so for me, it was just a matter of doing a little more 109 00:07:05,220 --> 00:07:08,400 homework and asking the questions in different ways, and 110 00:07:08,400 --> 00:07:11,340 targeting more specific departments. In this case, I 111 00:07:11,340 --> 00:07:14,310 targeted the team that's responsible for putting together 112 00:07:14,520 --> 00:07:18,600 the online aviation database that I mentioned. And in 113 00:07:18,600 --> 00:07:22,410 addition to that, I also targeted the aviation operations 114 00:07:22,410 --> 00:07:25,860 center at Transport Canada. So they're the sort of frontline 115 00:07:25,890 --> 00:07:29,970 aviation emergency staff, and that's where from them, that's 116 00:07:29,970 --> 00:07:32,280 where, you know, some of the reports I've never seen before 117 00:07:32,280 --> 00:07:35,460 came in, because that particular department was also getting 118 00:07:36,270 --> 00:07:39,150 communications instructions for reporting vital intelligence 119 00:07:39,150 --> 00:07:42,810 sightings or service reports. That department and Transport 120 00:07:42,810 --> 00:07:45,150 Canada was getting these UFO reports, right, from the 121 00:07:45,150 --> 00:07:48,990 Canadian military, you know, things with the Air Force 122 00:07:48,990 --> 00:07:52,410 emblems, things like that. So a lot of that was new to me. So it 123 00:07:52,410 --> 00:07:55,170 was a mixed bag to answer your question, some some things. For 124 00:07:55,170 --> 00:07:57,780 the most part, it was expected, but there were a few surprises 125 00:07:57,780 --> 00:07:58,710 in there for me as well. 126 00:07:59,039 --> 00:08:00,659 John Greenewald: One thing I didn't point out, yeah, but I 127 00:08:00,659 --> 00:08:04,469 want to point out is that you're not a quote unquote, UFO 128 00:08:04,469 --> 00:08:08,159 journalist, you're a journalist who covers all sorts of topics. 129 00:08:08,699 --> 00:08:11,519 UFOs just happens to be something you've covered quite a 130 00:08:11,519 --> 00:08:15,209 few times now. But with all that experience, covering all the 131 00:08:15,209 --> 00:08:18,719 things that you have going to when they told you that material 132 00:08:18,719 --> 00:08:22,949 was unavailable. Did you feel that was? Are you kind of 133 00:08:22,949 --> 00:08:26,219 hinting that the cover the Canadian government was covering 134 00:08:26,219 --> 00:08:30,869 this up or attempting to shield you from the truth? Or was it 135 00:08:30,869 --> 00:08:33,719 just a simple, you needed to learn the ropes of where things 136 00:08:33,719 --> 00:08:34,139 were? 137 00:08:34,620 --> 00:08:39,120 Daniel Otis: I think it was a ladder. You know, Transport 138 00:08:39,120 --> 00:08:42,570 Canada as a whole tends to be very dismissive of the subject, 139 00:08:42,780 --> 00:08:47,310 you know, in their statements to me, they, they're just very 140 00:08:47,310 --> 00:08:52,200 dismissive about any of this. But I think it was, you know, 141 00:08:52,260 --> 00:08:56,160 just not asking the right question and the right way, an 142 00:08:56,160 --> 00:08:59,670 important lesson in journalism is, don't take no for an answer. 143 00:08:59,670 --> 00:09:02,940 And don't be afraid of asking the same question again, and 144 00:09:02,940 --> 00:09:05,190 again, and again, because every time you ask, it might get a 145 00:09:05,190 --> 00:09:08,520 different answer. And I think the same holds very true for 146 00:09:08,520 --> 00:09:11,670 when you're operating in the Freedom of Information world, I 147 00:09:11,670 --> 00:09:14,370 think you can attest to that. You know, you can put two 148 00:09:14,370 --> 00:09:17,100 differently worded requests out there and different things come 149 00:09:17,100 --> 00:09:17,490 back. 150 00:09:18,600 --> 00:09:22,080 John Greenewald: Absolutely. And it's a good mindset to have so 151 00:09:22,110 --> 00:09:24,900 my sincere compliments because a lot of times people will hear 152 00:09:24,900 --> 00:09:28,530 that No, turn around, and then just go okay, that thanks, and 153 00:09:28,530 --> 00:09:35,790 then just move on. And so kudos for not doing that. So, if I can 154 00:09:35,790 --> 00:09:39,450 before we dive into the documents, when you first I want 155 00:09:39,450 --> 00:09:42,510 to take you back a little bit now before this, when you first 156 00:09:42,510 --> 00:09:47,190 started covering the UFO topic, has your mind changed at all on 157 00:09:47,190 --> 00:09:47,790 the topic? 158 00:09:48,810 --> 00:09:52,560 Daniel Otis: Um, that's kind of a loaded question, John. Yeah. 159 00:09:53,430 --> 00:09:55,350 John Greenewald: That's what I'm about here at inside the black 160 00:09:55,350 --> 00:09:55,560 vault. 161 00:09:55,590 --> 00:09:57,840 Daniel Otis: I think if anything, I'm just more open 162 00:09:57,840 --> 00:10:02,100 minded than ever. I think as you said, referring to this in the 163 00:10:02,100 --> 00:10:05,820 plural is probably necessary necessary. There's, you know, 164 00:10:05,820 --> 00:10:09,300 1000 people seeing 1000 different things, very likely. 165 00:10:10,290 --> 00:10:13,320 But I think when I first dove into it, I was finding some, you 166 00:10:13,320 --> 00:10:16,710 know, unusual contemporary reports. But for me, when I 167 00:10:16,710 --> 00:10:20,040 started looking back into the historical archives of Canada, 168 00:10:20,280 --> 00:10:25,770 you know, and looking at reports from the 50s and 60s, that's 169 00:10:25,770 --> 00:10:28,890 when my you know, something really clicked for me that we 170 00:10:28,890 --> 00:10:31,890 might, at least certain reports might be dealing with something 171 00:10:31,890 --> 00:10:35,160 that, you know, science hasn't explained yet. You know, for 172 00:10:35,160 --> 00:10:39,870 example, in an earlier story, I did, I was documenting 70 years 173 00:10:39,870 --> 00:10:44,940 worth of UFO sightings by Canadian military personnel and 174 00:10:44,940 --> 00:10:49,710 I Canadian military bases. One of those bases CFB, North Bay, 175 00:10:49,740 --> 00:10:53,100 which is in Ontario, the province I'm and they had a kind 176 00:10:53,100 --> 00:10:59,610 of reports from both 2007 and from 1952. And the one from 55 177 00:10:59,610 --> 00:11:03,030 years earlier was genuinely the more unusual of the one that 178 00:11:03,030 --> 00:11:07,800 involves something moving in a kind of erratic way. And you 179 00:11:07,800 --> 00:11:10,920 know, these were both cases with multiple witnesses, etc. And I 180 00:11:10,920 --> 00:11:14,220 think for me was seeing that kind of historical continuity by 181 00:11:14,280 --> 00:11:17,610 delving further in time with my research, that it kind of really 182 00:11:17,610 --> 00:11:21,870 opened my mind up to possibilities of what people 183 00:11:21,870 --> 00:11:22,470 could be seeing. 184 00:11:23,130 --> 00:11:25,080 John Greenewald: You said, and I think it was attributed to 185 00:11:25,080 --> 00:11:28,440 Transport Canada that they're pretty dismissive of Transport 186 00:11:28,440 --> 00:11:30,240 Canada, you were talking about, right? Yeah, sure that they're 187 00:11:30,240 --> 00:11:33,420 pretty dismissive of the UFO topic, is the Canadian 188 00:11:33,420 --> 00:11:36,630 government and then equally the Department of National Defense? 189 00:11:37,080 --> 00:11:40,290 Are they all dismissive? Do you feel? Or do you feel that some 190 00:11:40,290 --> 00:11:43,710 are more open to the phenomena than others? 191 00:11:44,130 --> 00:11:46,590 Daniel Otis: I would say our Department of Defense isn't 192 00:11:46,590 --> 00:11:50,370 dismissive at all. In their statements, to me, they 193 00:11:50,370 --> 00:11:54,630 acknowledge that sightings like this occur that are of you know, 194 00:11:54,630 --> 00:11:59,340 that are unexplained objects, phenomenon, etc. They are, you 195 00:11:59,340 --> 00:12:02,910 know, they acknowledge the reality of that, but in their 196 00:12:02,910 --> 00:12:07,560 eyes, it's not a defense issue. So that's why, you know, in 197 00:12:07,560 --> 00:12:11,400 Canada, there are pretty robust mechanisms for how these things 198 00:12:11,400 --> 00:12:15,270 are documented. But nothing is really done with those reports 199 00:12:15,270 --> 00:12:18,420 themselves once they come in from pilots and soldiers and 200 00:12:18,420 --> 00:12:23,670 police officers, etc. Yeah, so I believe our defense department 201 00:12:24,720 --> 00:12:28,980 is not dismissive at all. And they don't see it as a defensive 202 00:12:29,040 --> 00:12:32,550 as a defense in a national security issue. And frankly, I 203 00:12:32,580 --> 00:12:35,100 think that's a good stance for them to have. Because, you know, 204 00:12:35,100 --> 00:12:38,100 the minute they start seeing this as a defense issue in 205 00:12:38,100 --> 00:12:41,550 Canada, then all the type of reports I'm you know, able to 206 00:12:41,550 --> 00:12:44,820 pool suddenly become inaccessible from the FOIA 207 00:12:44,820 --> 00:12:48,270 process on national security grounds. So, you know, there's a 208 00:12:48,270 --> 00:12:51,120 lot of people clamoring in Canada, oh, you know, our 209 00:12:51,270 --> 00:12:54,090 military needs to be investigating this just the way 210 00:12:54,090 --> 00:12:57,960 the US does. That's not something I want to see happen, 211 00:12:57,960 --> 00:13:01,140 because that means, you know, the tap of data is just going to 212 00:13:01,140 --> 00:13:05,100 completely run dry. My hope is that if the Canadian 213 00:13:05,100 --> 00:13:08,520 government's do want to have does want to have a more active 214 00:13:08,760 --> 00:13:12,390 participation in the subject, that they would do so and, you 215 00:13:12,390 --> 00:13:14,190 know, from a more scientific perspective, 216 00:13:15,120 --> 00:13:16,920 John Greenewald: if you juxtapose that position where 217 00:13:16,920 --> 00:13:20,310 it's not a, as you said, they don't feel it's a defense issue. 218 00:13:20,580 --> 00:13:25,560 juxtapose that with America, who says it absolutely is, and and a 219 00:13:25,560 --> 00:13:29,550 potential threat, and they talk about that threat. Why do you 220 00:13:29,550 --> 00:13:32,370 think that there's that completely different stance 221 00:13:32,370 --> 00:13:36,240 between two neighboring countries about a phenomena that 222 00:13:36,240 --> 00:13:40,110 obviously is plaguing both sides, but one sees that as a 223 00:13:40,140 --> 00:13:43,350 not a national security threat or defense issue? The other one 224 00:13:43,350 --> 00:13:46,830 now, after all these years is finally saying, yes, it is. We 225 00:13:46,830 --> 00:13:49,200 have to figure this out, investigate it, they have Task 226 00:13:49,200 --> 00:13:52,770 Force, the task forces groups and everything. And they they do 227 00:13:52,770 --> 00:13:55,740 have that trout of secrecy. Why do you think there's such a 228 00:13:55,740 --> 00:13:56,220 difference? 229 00:13:56,849 --> 00:13:58,799 Daniel Otis: Actually, I just want to clarify one thing before 230 00:13:58,799 --> 00:14:01,799 I answer that question. In statements to me, the Canadian 231 00:14:01,799 --> 00:14:06,389 military has said that they do not investigate the these types 232 00:14:06,389 --> 00:14:10,589 of sightings outside the context of, you know, threats, credible 233 00:14:10,589 --> 00:14:13,859 threats, search and rescue operations, you know, things of 234 00:14:13,859 --> 00:14:16,769 that nature. And there have been cases, for example, there was a 235 00:14:16,769 --> 00:14:20,429 case where somebody reported something going into the ocean, 236 00:14:20,669 --> 00:14:23,459 and that they sent search and rescue helicopters to inspect 237 00:14:23,669 --> 00:14:26,189 there. There have been cases where things have been detected 238 00:14:26,189 --> 00:14:29,789 on NORAD radar, and they have deployed Air Force assets to 239 00:14:29,789 --> 00:14:32,279 investigate. You know, it's not like they're just dismissing 240 00:14:32,279 --> 00:14:35,069 anything that's remotely UFO, like if they think there's 241 00:14:35,069 --> 00:14:38,999 something worth, you know, clinging on to and that does 242 00:14:38,999 --> 00:14:42,749 fall within their purview. They will deploy assets. But you 243 00:14:42,749 --> 00:14:44,879 know, you also have to understand the Canadian military 244 00:14:44,879 --> 00:14:48,179 and the US military are two very, very different 245 00:14:48,179 --> 00:14:51,899 organizations. You know, that Canada's military is relatively 246 00:14:51,899 --> 00:14:55,229 small, you know, we don't invest a large amount of our GDP into 247 00:14:55,229 --> 00:14:59,639 the armed forces or armed forces or using you know, old equipment 248 00:15:00,419 --> 00:15:03,899 Some of the CF 18 fighter jets that were flying are, you know, 249 00:15:03,899 --> 00:15:06,899 the same age if not older than me. And those, you know, that's 250 00:15:06,929 --> 00:15:10,709 those are our most contemporary, you know, fighter jets, it's 251 00:15:10,709 --> 00:15:13,829 just a different kind of thing. You know, it's a military that's 252 00:15:13,979 --> 00:15:19,529 operating on shoestring budgets. You know, they don't have the 253 00:15:19,529 --> 00:15:22,889 money to sort of, you know, pump, like, unlike the US, you 254 00:15:22,889 --> 00:15:25,469 can't just suddenly, you know, come up with millions of dollars 255 00:15:25,469 --> 00:15:27,029 of black money to 256 00:15:28,350 --> 00:15:29,310 John Greenewald: just throw it out there. 257 00:15:29,760 --> 00:15:31,920 Daniel Otis: It just, it just, it just doesn't work like that 258 00:15:31,920 --> 00:15:35,700 in Canada. You know, the Canadian military when it's 259 00:15:35,700 --> 00:15:40,620 deployed. You know, it's usually limited deployments. There was a 260 00:15:40,680 --> 00:15:42,960 presence in Afghanistan, for example, you know, we're 261 00:15:42,960 --> 00:15:47,640 deploying to Eastern Europe right now. But it's a small army 262 00:15:47,640 --> 00:15:51,480 that isn't trying to be on the cutting edge of technology, the 263 00:15:51,480 --> 00:15:54,900 way the US is, you know, we're buying our technologies, often 264 00:15:54,900 --> 00:15:58,410 from other countries when it comes to military hardware. So 265 00:15:58,440 --> 00:16:01,440 in your interest, there is some domestic research and 266 00:16:01,440 --> 00:16:03,990 development like, don't get me wrong, but it's just, it's just 267 00:16:03,990 --> 00:16:05,340 a different kind of machine. 268 00:16:05,670 --> 00:16:08,910 John Greenewald: I gotcha. And in your track to unravel all of 269 00:16:08,910 --> 00:16:14,280 this, I assume Canada has some type of procedure to either 270 00:16:14,280 --> 00:16:18,750 document or if there is a potential threat to go out, did 271 00:16:18,750 --> 00:16:21,270 you find those procedures? Are they pretty black and white? 272 00:16:21,570 --> 00:16:23,760 Daniel Otis: So that stuff they don't release to me, right? 273 00:16:23,760 --> 00:16:28,740 Because when it comes to, you know, what the responses are to 274 00:16:28,740 --> 00:16:32,850 credible threats, then that sort of information can be withheld, 275 00:16:32,910 --> 00:16:35,580 you know, on national security grounds from the Freedom of 276 00:16:35,580 --> 00:16:38,940 Information process. That being said, one can read between the 277 00:16:38,940 --> 00:16:43,380 lines. So for example, there was a case that was covered, not in 278 00:16:43,380 --> 00:16:48,840 this story, my one previous, and it involves NORAD and the 279 00:16:48,840 --> 00:16:52,350 Canadian Air Force detecting something moving pretty quickly 280 00:16:52,350 --> 00:16:56,910 towards North America, from the direction of Greenland. In that 281 00:16:56,910 --> 00:17:01,260 case, Air Force assets were deployed of CF 18, fighter jets, 282 00:17:01,470 --> 00:17:05,130 they weren't able to find anything. And a report I found 283 00:17:05,130 --> 00:17:09,990 later blames it on faulty Raider equipments and Labrador, which 284 00:17:09,990 --> 00:17:15,300 is Canada's North Atlantic coast. So you know, that in that 285 00:17:15,300 --> 00:17:18,750 case, for example, I wasn't it doesn't say CFA teams were 286 00:17:18,750 --> 00:17:23,430 deployed. It says that, you know, there was some code word 287 00:17:23,430 --> 00:17:28,320 and then the code letters for the Air Force base that it was 288 00:17:28,320 --> 00:17:32,400 launched from, I think it was YPG Bagotville, the CFB 289 00:17:32,400 --> 00:17:35,040 Bagotville, which is an Air Force base in Quebec, you know, 290 00:17:35,040 --> 00:17:38,190 and I just did the research, the only aircraft that are there 291 00:17:38,190 --> 00:17:41,880 that could be deployed that far, were the CF 18, fighter jets, 292 00:17:41,880 --> 00:17:44,490 which, you know, then I asked him, they could neither confirm 293 00:17:44,550 --> 00:17:48,570 or deny all of this stories just meant to illustrate that when it 294 00:17:48,570 --> 00:17:52,260 comes to how they respond to credible threats, you know, 295 00:17:52,260 --> 00:17:54,750 there's documents like that, that sort of spelled it out, but 296 00:17:54,750 --> 00:17:57,900 you have to do a lot of digging in between the lines and, you 297 00:17:57,900 --> 00:18:00,240 know, break down all the acronyms and code words to sort 298 00:18:00,240 --> 00:18:03,210 of get a sense. But you know, the full picture wasn't 299 00:18:03,210 --> 00:18:05,310 presented to me in those documents. There were still 300 00:18:05,310 --> 00:18:08,760 plenty of redactions. But I was able to glean enough to tell 301 00:18:08,760 --> 00:18:11,910 that story. Which, you know, they confirmed as being true 302 00:18:11,940 --> 00:18:13,290 that all that happened that day. 303 00:18:14,100 --> 00:18:17,010 John Greenewald: Yeah, the acronyms are always fun to to 304 00:18:17,010 --> 00:18:19,920 try and unravel. That's a puzzle and mystery all in itself, but 305 00:18:20,790 --> 00:18:25,020 away from then what what could obviously be a defense threat of 306 00:18:25,020 --> 00:18:29,220 an incoming ICBM or something else in a situation like that? 307 00:18:29,760 --> 00:18:33,720 Were there any other types of procedures that you were able to 308 00:18:33,720 --> 00:18:36,600 find, with, let's say, a commercial pilot who's just 309 00:18:36,600 --> 00:18:39,840 flying around and see something out of his, you know, right side 310 00:18:39,840 --> 00:18:42,570 or something? And it's not necessarily like a, you know, an 311 00:18:42,570 --> 00:18:45,660 incoming missile or something like that? Were there more 312 00:18:45,660 --> 00:18:49,170 commercial guidelines for them to report? Are those accessible? 313 00:18:49,530 --> 00:18:52,980 Daniel Otis: 100% Absolutely. And this is something I know you 314 00:18:52,980 --> 00:18:57,510 know, personally about these. These procedures are called 315 00:18:57,990 --> 00:19:02,640 service procedures. See, IR vi S stands for communications 316 00:19:02,640 --> 00:19:05,790 instructions for reporting vital intelligence sightings, 317 00:19:05,880 --> 00:19:07,050 John Greenewald: so that three times fast. 318 00:19:09,120 --> 00:19:13,020 Daniel Otis: So this, this was first developed during the early 319 00:19:13,020 --> 00:19:15,510 part of the Cold War by the United States. I think I'm 320 00:19:15,510 --> 00:19:17,550 probably reading things that you've written because this is 321 00:19:17,550 --> 00:19:18,090 where I learned 322 00:19:18,090 --> 00:19:20,130 John Greenewald: about this. It's all good. It's about you. 323 00:19:20,130 --> 00:19:21,480 Don't worry. I learned 324 00:19:21,510 --> 00:19:23,610 Daniel Otis: I first learned about these on the black fault. 325 00:19:23,670 --> 00:19:28,080 True story. Developed in the United States quickly adopted by 326 00:19:28,080 --> 00:19:33,060 Canada as a Cold War era threat detecting mechanism. You see a 327 00:19:33,060 --> 00:19:36,210 missile file a service report, you see something that looks 328 00:19:36,210 --> 00:19:40,350 like a foreign warship, file a service report, you see, quote 329 00:19:40,350 --> 00:19:44,460 an unidentified flying object file the Service report. So this 330 00:19:44,460 --> 00:19:50,370 mechanism has been adapted by both the Canadian Air Force and 331 00:19:50,940 --> 00:19:54,690 nav Canada, the private company that operates Canadian air 332 00:19:54,690 --> 00:19:59,100 traffic control. So these procedures, you know, many, many 333 00:19:59,100 --> 00:20:03,990 decades later are alive and well in Canada. And in both the Air 334 00:20:03,990 --> 00:20:09,030 Force and the civilian air traffic control iterations of 335 00:20:09,030 --> 00:20:12,270 these procedures, they both explicitly explicitly say that 336 00:20:12,300 --> 00:20:16,320 Unidentified Flying Objects ought to be reported. And when 337 00:20:16,470 --> 00:20:19,830 those objects are reported, it serves as a sort of flurry of 338 00:20:19,830 --> 00:20:24,240 notifications and reporting that involves the Canadian Air Force 339 00:20:24,270 --> 00:20:27,300 as well as NORAD affiliated squadrons within the Air Force. 340 00:20:27,870 --> 00:20:31,140 It also involves Transport Canada, the federal departments, 341 00:20:31,320 --> 00:20:34,260 and nav Canada, sometimes there's police involvement, 342 00:20:34,440 --> 00:20:37,290 there's evidence of some of the details from these reports being 343 00:20:37,290 --> 00:20:41,730 forwarded to the US Air Force as well as NORAD headquarters in 344 00:20:41,730 --> 00:20:46,320 Colorado. So, you know, there are mechanisms to document these 345 00:20:46,320 --> 00:20:50,130 things. But I'd say in 99% of the cases, there's little to no 346 00:20:50,130 --> 00:20:53,100 follow up, things get documented, they get shared 347 00:20:53,100 --> 00:20:57,900 around, and then they get put in drawers to collect dust. Here in 348 00:20:57,900 --> 00:20:59,430 John Greenewald: America, obviously, you follow the news, 349 00:20:59,430 --> 00:21:03,390 but so this isn't new to you. But obviously politicians here 350 00:21:03,390 --> 00:21:05,880 are getting more interested in the last couple of years. 351 00:21:05,880 --> 00:21:10,800 They're, you know, writing legislation. Just in the last 352 00:21:10,830 --> 00:21:14,070 couple of days, they're in Canada, it sounds like some 353 00:21:14,070 --> 00:21:17,970 politicians there are getting interested, is that new? Or are 354 00:21:17,970 --> 00:21:20,220 you guys seeing the same thing? And have you seen that in the 355 00:21:20,220 --> 00:21:21,150 last couple of years? 356 00:21:21,960 --> 00:21:25,260 Daniel Otis: Um, in Canada, it's been crickets. I know, you have 357 00:21:25,260 --> 00:21:29,250 folks like Senator Marco Rubio, who has been very outspoken on 358 00:21:29,250 --> 00:21:32,820 the issue and very candid, you know, about the US military 359 00:21:32,820 --> 00:21:37,320 dealing with genuine unknowns. It's been absolute silence in 360 00:21:37,320 --> 00:21:42,870 Canada. And on, on, when is this airing, it would have been on 361 00:21:43,110 --> 00:21:47,280 yesterday, Wednesday, on Wednesday, a for the first time 362 00:21:47,280 --> 00:21:52,590 in decades, a Canadian Member of Parliament spoke publicly about 363 00:21:52,620 --> 00:21:56,940 unidentified aerial phenomena. He was in a committee meeting 364 00:21:57,180 --> 00:22:01,650 for natural the Natural Resources Committee in the House 365 00:22:01,650 --> 00:22:04,080 of Commons in Parliament. So this is like our Congress. 366 00:22:04,110 --> 00:22:07,050 Right? This is like a congressional committee. And 367 00:22:07,980 --> 00:22:13,800 there were reviewing budgetary items. And it came up that a 368 00:22:13,830 --> 00:22:17,340 nuclear agency within the Canadian government was 369 00:22:17,340 --> 00:22:20,280 receiving money from the Department of Defense for 370 00:22:20,280 --> 00:22:25,860 security related matters. So you know, Mr. Larry McGuire, who is 371 00:22:25,860 --> 00:22:30,240 a member of Parliament from Manitoba, you know, after like 372 00:22:30,240 --> 00:22:36,270 seeing this budget line, he brought up recent drone reports 373 00:22:36,300 --> 00:22:39,630 in Sweden over nuclear facilities, I think Sweden has 374 00:22:39,630 --> 00:22:42,960 been encountering some, you know, conventional looking, 375 00:22:43,050 --> 00:22:46,440 perhaps military drones, he brought that up. And then he 376 00:22:46,440 --> 00:22:51,360 also brought up the new UAV office that was, you know, 377 00:22:51,360 --> 00:22:55,860 embedded in the recent Defense Authorization Act in the United 378 00:22:55,860 --> 00:23:00,990 States. And he said, Hey, you know, you know, we're putting 379 00:23:00,990 --> 00:23:05,880 money towards nuclear security, Have we had any reports of UAPs, 380 00:23:06,060 --> 00:23:10,230 at our nuclear facilities, the Deputy Minister of natural 381 00:23:10,230 --> 00:23:14,010 resources, said he wasn't aware, this is like the top bureaucrat 382 00:23:14,010 --> 00:23:19,260 in that department. And, basically, and then Mr. McGuire 383 00:23:19,260 --> 00:23:23,460 continue to ask if they if they would be willing, if that 384 00:23:23,460 --> 00:23:25,560 information came to light, if they would be willing to share 385 00:23:25,560 --> 00:23:29,370 that with their US counterparts, because I believe the language 386 00:23:29,400 --> 00:23:34,920 in, in that in the in, in the legislation, putting it as such 387 00:23:34,920 --> 00:23:38,310 that, you know, nuclear agencies should be reporting in to this 388 00:23:38,310 --> 00:23:42,240 new, this new US body. So he asked if the Canadians would be 389 00:23:42,240 --> 00:23:44,190 willing to share as well, as part of, you know, the 390 00:23:44,190 --> 00:23:49,380 international partnerships, all of that to say, the big focus 391 00:23:49,380 --> 00:23:51,930 John Greenewald: and not to step on here, but focusing in on only 392 00:23:52,380 --> 00:23:55,290 nuclear installations. That's the what they're talking about. 393 00:23:55,530 --> 00:24:00,600 Daniel Otis: This is a natural resources committee. Canada, is 394 00:24:00,600 --> 00:24:03,390 a huge supplier to the international market. For 395 00:24:03,390 --> 00:24:07,200 uranium, we do a lot of uranium mining here. So this would be 396 00:24:07,200 --> 00:24:12,840 limited in scope to nuclear facility. So they don't he he 397 00:24:12,840 --> 00:24:17,220 asked them questions about this, and they are obligated to 398 00:24:17,220 --> 00:24:20,490 provide a written response. And as I said, the questions were 399 00:24:20,490 --> 00:24:24,330 just to put it more clearly. The questions were one, are you 400 00:24:24,330 --> 00:24:28,470 aware of any, you know, UAP or unknown drone incidents that 401 00:24:28,470 --> 00:24:32,820 Canadian nuclear facilities and to if you get that data, would 402 00:24:32,820 --> 00:24:37,980 you be willing to share that with the United States? So I'm, 403 00:24:38,010 --> 00:24:41,370 it's my understanding that the next steps of this is that this 404 00:24:41,370 --> 00:24:45,660 member of Parliament's will be presenting a letter explaining 405 00:24:45,930 --> 00:24:52,020 this in within a month, I imagine. And that letter will 406 00:24:52,020 --> 00:24:56,550 necessitate a response, a written response from Canada's 407 00:24:56,550 --> 00:24:59,640 Department of Natural Resources. I'm so sorry to go deep into the 408 00:24:59,640 --> 00:25:03,120 weeds know, it's like super nitty gritty procedural stuff 409 00:25:03,120 --> 00:25:06,900 for Canadian Parliament. But all of this is to say, a current 410 00:25:06,900 --> 00:25:10,980 member of Canadian Parliament asked questions about UAPs and 411 00:25:10,980 --> 00:25:14,310 nuclear sites while on the job. And that just hasn't happened 412 00:25:14,340 --> 00:25:14,670 that just 413 00:25:14,670 --> 00:25:17,220 John Greenewald: has so so that and that was kind of the point I 414 00:25:17,220 --> 00:25:19,890 wanted to stress too is that's unprecedented for you guys up 415 00:25:19,890 --> 00:25:20,160 there. 416 00:25:20,370 --> 00:25:22,320 Daniel Otis: Absolutely. Yeah. And but it was a legitimate 417 00:25:22,320 --> 00:25:25,710 question, you know, yeah, this is a person who has some 418 00:25:25,710 --> 00:25:28,560 interest in the subject. And he's on a committee that's 419 00:25:28,560 --> 00:25:34,110 dealing with allocating funding, you know, to nuclear facilities 420 00:25:34,110 --> 00:25:37,500 for security. And that that is certainly a legitimate questions 421 00:25:37,500 --> 00:25:40,950 to ask, if any UAP have been spotted at Canadian nuclear 422 00:25:40,950 --> 00:25:41,730 facilities. 423 00:25:42,390 --> 00:25:44,490 John Greenewald: I want to talk about something that that is 424 00:25:44,490 --> 00:25:50,490 kind of a hot button issue when it comes to the UAP topic. And 425 00:25:50,490 --> 00:25:53,880 that is really, really shown itself here in the last week. 426 00:25:54,150 --> 00:25:57,690 For those who watched social media. On the black vault, I 427 00:25:57,690 --> 00:26:01,680 published a Freedom of Information Act response about 428 00:26:01,680 --> 00:26:07,710 what they had, what I believe anyway, labeled A UAP. And the 429 00:26:07,710 --> 00:26:12,060 reason I say that is I came up with a UAP related request. It 430 00:26:12,060 --> 00:26:15,900 is actually stored online right now at the US Navy online, what 431 00:26:15,900 --> 00:26:21,660 they call reading room in a folder called UFOs, or UFO docs. 432 00:26:22,530 --> 00:26:26,520 And then the sub folder is labeled UAP. So it's obviously 433 00:26:26,520 --> 00:26:30,300 connected. My question is, when you pull up these, this one 434 00:26:30,300 --> 00:26:33,180 particular incident had never been out before, there were 435 00:26:33,180 --> 00:26:36,330 photographs that I got, I published those, it is clearly a 436 00:26:36,330 --> 00:26:42,870 drone, and a quadcopter type device, right? It's not an alien 437 00:26:43,140 --> 00:26:47,310 potential spaceship, nothing like that. It is a drone, but 438 00:26:47,310 --> 00:26:52,020 labeled as a UAP. The D word seems to upset some people, but 439 00:26:52,020 --> 00:26:55,470 it's definitely part of the conversation. I don't feel this 440 00:26:55,470 --> 00:26:59,790 phenomena is explained solely by drones. But as a journalist, can 441 00:26:59,790 --> 00:27:04,650 I ask you, what role does that D word do drones play in this 442 00:27:04,650 --> 00:27:09,420 whole conversation? Because if you look at the clip, from that 443 00:27:09,420 --> 00:27:12,870 you were just talking about, they're referencing drones? Do 444 00:27:12,870 --> 00:27:16,860 you get the impression that drones is kind of a secret way 445 00:27:16,860 --> 00:27:21,150 of saying, Okay, it's it's something else? Or do you think 446 00:27:21,150 --> 00:27:23,880 that this is more about drones than some people want to 447 00:27:23,880 --> 00:27:24,300 believe? 448 00:27:25,050 --> 00:27:27,720 Daniel Otis: I think there's a lot to do with drones in this. I 449 00:27:27,720 --> 00:27:32,100 mean, in this, these 290 pages of reports that I received from 450 00:27:32,100 --> 00:27:35,190 Transport Canada, there are objects that are clearly drones, 451 00:27:35,250 --> 00:27:38,700 you know, some are labeled as such, some are ambiguous, you 452 00:27:38,700 --> 00:27:42,510 know, a pilot says they saw a drone or a balloon. But there's 453 00:27:42,510 --> 00:27:44,490 definitely drone reports in there as just as there's 454 00:27:44,490 --> 00:27:49,230 definitely Starlink satellite reports, you know, for now, it's 455 00:27:49,230 --> 00:27:52,860 quite common. Anyone who follows the UAP topic knows what a 456 00:27:52,860 --> 00:27:56,190 Starlink satellite train it is, right? Like, when you see a 457 00:27:56,190 --> 00:27:59,610 whole bunch of dots, a double line? You know, if you see a 458 00:27:59,610 --> 00:28:04,200 whole line of dots moving, like, you know, together in a straight 459 00:28:04,200 --> 00:28:07,230 line, it's not that's what it probably is. Yeah, but back in 460 00:28:07,230 --> 00:28:12,150 2019, you know, pilots flying over Canada, back when this 461 00:28:12,150 --> 00:28:15,150 technology, you know, was just starting to be launched, they 462 00:28:15,150 --> 00:28:17,880 have no idea what that was. And, you know, it wasn't, it wasn't 463 00:28:17,880 --> 00:28:20,790 common knowledge back then. So, you know, there's reports that 464 00:28:20,820 --> 00:28:23,940 that are clearly that there's reports that are clearly drones, 465 00:28:24,240 --> 00:28:28,170 there's reports describing unknowns that seem to be very 466 00:28:28,170 --> 00:28:32,160 drone like in this in this release, and there's reports in 467 00:28:32,160 --> 00:28:35,790 there that don't seem drone like at all, you know, I think that's 468 00:28:35,790 --> 00:28:41,280 definitely part of it. Also, floating paper lanterns. I've 469 00:28:41,280 --> 00:28:45,090 been camping and heard someone screaming, you know, in the 470 00:28:45,090 --> 00:28:49,470 campground about UFOs there's UFOs over us, and it was a 471 00:28:49,470 --> 00:28:52,740 Lancer, you know, and had I not been there to sort of explain 472 00:28:52,740 --> 00:28:55,620 it, this person probably would have spent the rest of their 473 00:28:55,620 --> 00:29:01,260 life telling this phenomenal, you know, UFO story. A lot of 474 00:29:01,260 --> 00:29:03,690 people are seeing a lot of different things. But you know, 475 00:29:03,690 --> 00:29:07,050 at the same time, I feel like, you know, there are there are 476 00:29:07,050 --> 00:29:12,540 enough reports contained within the release, to least nourish me 477 00:29:12,570 --> 00:29:16,920 and make me you know, still make me believe that, you know, some 478 00:29:16,920 --> 00:29:20,430 of these things are unexplained. Yes, drones, drones play a part 479 00:29:20,580 --> 00:29:24,900 of the picture. And you have to admit that there's lots of 480 00:29:24,900 --> 00:29:27,930 people seeing different things, and not everybody knows what 481 00:29:27,930 --> 00:29:29,370 every type of drone looks like. 482 00:29:30,570 --> 00:29:32,220 John Greenewald: And I appreciate your perspective on 483 00:29:32,220 --> 00:29:34,620 that I just wanted to ask simply because and I've said it a 484 00:29:34,620 --> 00:29:37,470 million times on this channel, but my biggest haters never 485 00:29:37,470 --> 00:29:40,230 listened. I don't believe that's the explanation for all this. 486 00:29:40,500 --> 00:29:44,340 But it's very interesting to see the reaction when drones come 487 00:29:44,340 --> 00:29:47,520 up. And that's why I wanted to kind of get your perspective 488 00:29:47,550 --> 00:29:50,790 researching it for as long as you have, and especially coming 489 00:29:50,790 --> 00:29:55,080 from the Canadian angle, looking at how they treat it. So that 490 00:29:55,080 --> 00:29:57,690 being your answer is as I'm sorry, good. 491 00:29:58,020 --> 00:29:59,820 Daniel Otis: No, but I would just want to answer that I 492 00:29:59,820 --> 00:30:02,970 guess. You know, perhaps, even if some of the, you know, more 493 00:30:03,000 --> 00:30:09,300 exotic sightings turned out to be drones with advanced 494 00:30:09,300 --> 00:30:12,960 propulsion technologies. I mean, even if that were the case, that 495 00:30:12,960 --> 00:30:15,990 would be significant, it would mean that somewhere on Earth, a 496 00:30:15,990 --> 00:30:19,410 group of people or a government has perhaps harnessed a new 497 00:30:19,410 --> 00:30:23,250 energy source and has created a new method of propulsion, that 498 00:30:23,250 --> 00:30:28,320 could be, you know, completely change humanity, perhaps make 499 00:30:28,380 --> 00:30:32,850 fossil fuels obsolete, etc. You know, if that is earthly 500 00:30:32,850 --> 00:30:36,360 technology, I think that's still huge and has huge implications. 501 00:30:36,510 --> 00:30:40,500 And if it is earthly technology, shame on them for not changing 502 00:30:40,500 --> 00:30:44,310 the world and getting rid of all this fossil fuel. Yeah, and 503 00:30:44,310 --> 00:30:47,070 John Greenewald: I'm awesome perspective. I'm glad I asked 504 00:30:47,070 --> 00:30:50,190 you the question. And I want to ask you one part before we dive 505 00:30:50,190 --> 00:30:53,400 deeper into the documents themselves, essentially the same 506 00:30:53,400 --> 00:30:58,170 question. But in the eyes of the Canadian government. Do you feel 507 00:30:58,170 --> 00:31:01,380 that what the people that you have talked to? Obviously not 508 00:31:01,380 --> 00:31:04,530 every call you do is on the record? But when you reach out 509 00:31:04,530 --> 00:31:07,980 to these agencies, and maybe politicians, I'm not sure, 510 00:31:08,010 --> 00:31:11,160 exactly. You know, who everybody you've interviewed? Do you get 511 00:31:11,160 --> 00:31:15,390 the feeling that they see this as? Yeah, there may be some kind 512 00:31:15,390 --> 00:31:19,320 of earthly drone, whatever explanation to a percentage, but 513 00:31:19,320 --> 00:31:22,410 they feel that it's actually bigger? How would you answer 514 00:31:22,410 --> 00:31:25,530 that, with what you view from the government side? And 515 00:31:25,530 --> 00:31:27,390 potentially politicians, if you've talked to them? 516 00:31:29,220 --> 00:31:30,750 Daniel Otis: I guess my answer to that would be sort of 517 00:31:30,750 --> 00:31:35,070 twofold. There's no, there's no institutional acknowledgement of 518 00:31:35,160 --> 00:31:41,280 history. Right. You know, the ODNI report that came out in 519 00:31:41,280 --> 00:31:45,870 June, you know, was an official acknowledgement of a mystery to 520 00:31:45,870 --> 00:31:50,460 a certain sense, if anything, that hasn't happened in Canada. 521 00:31:50,730 --> 00:31:54,810 But there are individuals within governments, within governments 522 00:31:54,810 --> 00:31:58,620 within opposition and Parliament's in the bureaucracy. 523 00:31:58,890 --> 00:32:03,210 There are individuals who are interested and individuals who 524 00:32:03,570 --> 00:32:08,280 are, have open minds to the possibilities of what the 525 00:32:08,280 --> 00:32:13,290 sightings could represent. I can say that with certainty, you 526 00:32:13,290 --> 00:32:15,570 know, but there's no institutional reflection of 527 00:32:17,310 --> 00:32:20,700 John Greenewald: this. Next question may involve some of the 528 00:32:20,700 --> 00:32:24,030 new documents you got, but out of everything you've seen thus 529 00:32:24,030 --> 00:32:27,810 far researching the topic? Is there one thing that stands out 530 00:32:27,810 --> 00:32:30,000 to you that made you go? Wow, 531 00:32:32,160 --> 00:32:33,810 Daniel Otis: I think there's been a few reports, I think, 532 00:32:33,810 --> 00:32:37,050 earlier, I mentioned, particularly some of the 533 00:32:37,080 --> 00:32:41,010 military reports, I was pulling from Canadian bases, in the 534 00:32:41,010 --> 00:32:45,960 1950s. And 60s, when you have multiple Air Force officers 535 00:32:46,050 --> 00:32:49,380 standing outside and then writing their own individual 536 00:32:49,380 --> 00:32:52,770 witness testimonies that all line up, and they're seeing 537 00:32:52,770 --> 00:32:56,910 things that are, you know, just moving in ways that are hard for 538 00:32:56,910 --> 00:33:00,630 us to explain, you know, it's 1952, and something's moving 539 00:33:00,630 --> 00:33:03,630 faster than any fighter jet they've ever seen. And then it 540 00:33:03,630 --> 00:33:08,610 makes a right angle turn. Like, what is that? I don't have the 541 00:33:08,610 --> 00:33:13,770 answer for that. It's reports like those, are there any single 542 00:33:13,770 --> 00:33:17,820 one? I don't know, I, for me, it's sort of been, you know, as 543 00:33:17,820 --> 00:33:21,870 you know, anyone who's really dives into the data and the 544 00:33:21,870 --> 00:33:24,780 documents knows that, you know, a lot of times it's pretty 545 00:33:24,780 --> 00:33:28,290 sparse. Like, if you look at these 290 pages that we 546 00:33:28,290 --> 00:33:31,500 released, most of these reports are just a sentence or two, 547 00:33:31,530 --> 00:33:36,420 right? Like they are, there's not a lot of description, and 548 00:33:36,420 --> 00:33:39,990 there's not a lot of detail. But I think it's sort of, for me, 549 00:33:39,990 --> 00:33:43,800 it's been the cumulative effect, you know, going from, you know, 550 00:33:43,860 --> 00:33:47,430 just this past year, looking back in history, 70 years to the 551 00:33:47,430 --> 00:33:52,530 1950s Seeing a degree of continuity. And you know, that's 552 00:33:52,530 --> 00:33:56,700 just genuinely impressed upon me that there's an unanswered 553 00:33:56,700 --> 00:33:57,150 mystery. 554 00:33:58,200 --> 00:34:00,180 John Greenewald: If we haven't covered it already, would you 555 00:34:00,180 --> 00:34:04,110 have an idea why they are so small, and only a sentence or 556 00:34:04,110 --> 00:34:04,410 two? 557 00:34:05,760 --> 00:34:08,430 Daniel Otis: I think I think it's particularly with the ones 558 00:34:08,430 --> 00:34:12,780 that are coming from pilots. It, it just has to do with the 559 00:34:12,780 --> 00:34:15,930 nature of it, you know, they're, they're flying the radio into 560 00:34:15,930 --> 00:34:19,740 the tower, they, you know, say a sentence or two, the tower 561 00:34:19,770 --> 00:34:22,650 checks to see if they have traffic in the area, then the 562 00:34:22,650 --> 00:34:26,250 tower calls the Air Force to see if they're picking up anything 563 00:34:26,250 --> 00:34:30,330 on radar. And you know, that's it in terms of the actual 564 00:34:30,360 --> 00:34:34,620 dialogue, that transpires between the pilots in the tower. 565 00:34:34,650 --> 00:34:37,110 That's what gets, you know, reported in these reports, and 566 00:34:37,110 --> 00:34:40,290 it's minimal, you know, they're not having lengthy conversations 567 00:34:40,290 --> 00:34:44,010 on their airplane radios. Unfortunately, years ago, 568 00:34:44,010 --> 00:34:47,370 John Greenewald: I had Chris Rutkoski. On the show, he's a 569 00:34:47,370 --> 00:34:50,370 great guy, great researcher, known him a long time. I want to 570 00:34:50,370 --> 00:34:54,480 bring him back. So I don't know the answer to this. But back 571 00:34:54,480 --> 00:34:57,900 then the last time I talked to him, there was kind of a share. 572 00:34:57,900 --> 00:35:01,560 It seemed like there was a sharing of data that He in the 573 00:35:01,560 --> 00:35:05,490 in the private sector would get these reports and get them 574 00:35:05,490 --> 00:35:08,760 forwarded over from the Canadian government. Is that still going 575 00:35:08,760 --> 00:35:11,340 on? Do they share this data with the private sector? 576 00:35:11,759 --> 00:35:16,379 Daniel Otis: Yeah, this is interesting. So Chris had 577 00:35:16,589 --> 00:35:20,909 Chris's Winnipeg based EU ufologist. very respected in the 578 00:35:20,909 --> 00:35:24,959 field. He's, for the past 30 odd years, he's done an annual 579 00:35:24,959 --> 00:35:28,529 survey of Canadian UFO sightings that's in compass, something 580 00:35:28,529 --> 00:35:33,629 like 20,000 reports. It's quite a quite an interesting body of 581 00:35:33,629 --> 00:35:38,759 research. And for about the past 20 years, Chris had a 582 00:35:38,759 --> 00:35:42,239 relationship with both Transport Canada and the Canadian Air 583 00:35:42,239 --> 00:35:45,239 Force, whereby when they were getting, you know, some of these 584 00:35:45,239 --> 00:35:49,469 UFO reports from civilians, as well as from, you know, aviation 585 00:35:49,559 --> 00:35:53,999 professionals, that they were forwarding them to him. That 586 00:35:53,999 --> 00:35:58,049 relationship appears to have ended without notice this past 587 00:35:58,049 --> 00:36:02,069 year. I asked Chris about it. And he said, You know, one of 588 00:36:02,069 --> 00:36:05,249 the things perhaps, growing public interest and growing 589 00:36:05,249 --> 00:36:09,059 public scrutiny on the topic has, perhaps me the government a 590 00:36:09,059 --> 00:36:13,199 little more cagey about sharing that information. But yeah, I 591 00:36:13,199 --> 00:36:17,009 mean, there's even Canadian Air Force and NORAD procedural 592 00:36:17,009 --> 00:36:21,719 documents that include Chris's name and contact details. In the 593 00:36:21,719 --> 00:36:26,189 release the 290 pages that we released, there were several 594 00:36:26,189 --> 00:36:30,149 reports from an Air Force base in Quebec, Canada, and they 595 00:36:30,149 --> 00:36:34,439 included Chris's name and his fax number on the bottom of the 596 00:36:34,439 --> 00:36:38,459 reports as the intended recipient. So you know, there 597 00:36:38,459 --> 00:36:42,359 was pretty much for the past 20 years, in, obviously, in an 598 00:36:42,359 --> 00:36:45,989 unofficial capacity, Chris was really the closest thing Canada 599 00:36:45,989 --> 00:36:50,249 had to a UFO office. So these reports were coming in, he was 600 00:36:50,249 --> 00:36:53,939 using the data for most of them in his annual survey, but the 601 00:36:53,939 --> 00:36:58,079 reports themselves were not being released. And, you know, I 602 00:36:58,079 --> 00:37:01,079 asked Chris about that. And his explanation makes sense, you 603 00:37:01,079 --> 00:37:06,329 know, he wasn't in a position to show you know, things like air 604 00:37:06,329 --> 00:37:10,079 force reports. And, you know, these intelligence reports that 605 00:37:10,079 --> 00:37:14,309 were coming in, some of them contain private information, you 606 00:37:14,309 --> 00:37:16,679 know, the copies I received through access information 607 00:37:16,679 --> 00:37:19,319 requests, the private information gets redacted 608 00:37:19,319 --> 00:37:22,319 people's names and phone numbers, for the most part. But 609 00:37:22,319 --> 00:37:25,349 he wasn't in the position to be putting this material out there. 610 00:37:25,619 --> 00:37:28,259 I believe a lot of the material that was in the release in my 611 00:37:28,259 --> 00:37:32,009 most recent story, a lot of it, not all of it, but a lot of it 612 00:37:32,009 --> 00:37:33,929 was stuff he probably would have received over the years, I 613 00:37:33,929 --> 00:37:38,849 wouldn't be surprised. But, you know, the body of his work is is 614 00:37:38,849 --> 00:37:41,459 impressive, you know, I think he's had something of admission 615 00:37:41,459 --> 00:37:45,899 to try and, you know, documents in point form pretty much every 616 00:37:45,899 --> 00:37:51,839 UFO sighting that need in Canada, it's quite an impressive 617 00:37:51,839 --> 00:37:52,679 volume of work. 618 00:37:53,070 --> 00:37:54,930 John Greenewald: Yeah, he's always struck me as a straight 619 00:37:54,930 --> 00:37:57,750 shooter. And that's why I've always respected him because 620 00:37:57,750 --> 00:38:02,700 he's just kind of a an actual investigator, while others you 621 00:38:02,700 --> 00:38:05,790 know, more speculate and so on. He just is kind of a straight 622 00:38:05,790 --> 00:38:10,200 shooter and goes for it. So I didn't know that about the, the 623 00:38:10,500 --> 00:38:13,860 potential breaking of that, that sharing of information. So I'm, 624 00:38:13,890 --> 00:38:14,520 I'm so 625 00:38:15,030 --> 00:38:17,310 Daniel Otis: when I, when I asked Transport Canada about it. 626 00:38:17,820 --> 00:38:21,060 They told me this is how I told you before they were dismissive. 627 00:38:21,300 --> 00:38:24,960 They told me that they were giving reports to Chris for as 628 00:38:24,960 --> 00:38:29,700 research for his fiction novels. You know, like, that's, that's 629 00:38:29,730 --> 00:38:33,000 the sort of stance they took. And they basically said that 630 00:38:33,000 --> 00:38:36,600 they've reevaluated their position and decided to stop 631 00:38:36,600 --> 00:38:39,990 that. But the Canadian military and comments to me have said 632 00:38:39,990 --> 00:38:43,440 that as far as they're concerned, you know, it's they 633 00:38:43,440 --> 00:38:48,750 still go to Chris, I have the current procedures from Canadian 634 00:38:49,710 --> 00:38:53,700 from Canadian NORAD headquarters and the Air Force, operational 635 00:38:53,700 --> 00:38:58,290 command center and Winnipeg, Manitoba. UFO service reports. 636 00:38:58,290 --> 00:39:02,520 CRV is unidentified flying objects is the first thing on 637 00:39:02,520 --> 00:39:05,760 the list of examples. And then you go to the next page, I'll 638 00:39:05,760 --> 00:39:10,920 cover up his email address. But Mr. Chris Rakowski, you know, so 639 00:39:10,950 --> 00:39:13,950 they say, Oh, he's still on there. They say this is still 640 00:39:13,950 --> 00:39:17,340 valid, and this has not been altered. So he's still on there. 641 00:39:17,550 --> 00:39:21,330 I hope Chris keeps getting stuff. I hope he keeps sharing 642 00:39:21,330 --> 00:39:24,600 it with the world. Because if they stopped sending stuff to 643 00:39:24,600 --> 00:39:27,510 him, the only way to get this is through the access to 644 00:39:27,510 --> 00:39:29,730 information system. Now, it's not like they sent him 645 00:39:29,730 --> 00:39:32,850 everything. Over the years. There's been some I mentioned 646 00:39:32,850 --> 00:39:36,180 some reports that had a more defense Nexus, for example, 647 00:39:36,180 --> 00:39:39,420 something detected fast on NORAD radar, like things like that 648 00:39:39,420 --> 00:39:42,510 they weren't sending but the aviation reports, the weird 649 00:39:42,510 --> 00:39:45,390 ones, civilian reports, stuff like that. He was getting a lot 650 00:39:45,390 --> 00:39:46,320 of it over the years. 651 00:39:46,380 --> 00:39:50,040 John Greenewald: Mike, my gut immediately went to the and 652 00:39:50,040 --> 00:39:54,300 maybe I'm just conspiracy minded, that the DoD spearheaded 653 00:39:54,300 --> 00:39:58,170 this, the American Department of Defense saying, hey, look, we 654 00:39:58,170 --> 00:40:00,000 need to squash this. You know if we're going to be sharing 655 00:40:00,000 --> 00:40:02,610 Information, you can't be giving it to the private sector. 656 00:40:02,610 --> 00:40:06,990 Because here, I mean, I've I've, with ample evidence at this 657 00:40:06,990 --> 00:40:10,980 point, have shown that whatever UAPs whether they be connected 658 00:40:10,980 --> 00:40:15,900 to drones, and that drone report that I brought up a little bit 659 00:40:15,900 --> 00:40:21,390 ago, was was still redacted. One of the photos of what is clearly 660 00:40:21,390 --> 00:40:25,110 a quadcopter is redacted. So there's a lot of secrecy around 661 00:40:25,110 --> 00:40:28,470 all of this. So I just kind of go towards it's the Americans 662 00:40:28,470 --> 00:40:31,200 again, they're getting into, you know, they're they're 663 00:40:31,200 --> 00:40:34,680 classifying everything. Have you heard rumors of that? Is there a 664 00:40:34,680 --> 00:40:36,750 potentially that sharing of information? 665 00:40:36,810 --> 00:40:40,500 Daniel Otis: I I've heard rumors of information being shared 666 00:40:40,530 --> 00:40:44,520 between Canada and the US to a certain extent, but not like, 667 00:40:44,550 --> 00:40:47,910 I've heard rumors about, you know, UAP information being 668 00:40:47,910 --> 00:40:54,150 shared, I found full on evidence of UAP case data being shared 669 00:40:54,180 --> 00:40:58,740 with NORAD and American Air Force. And American Air Force 670 00:40:58,740 --> 00:41:02,520 bases, like there's reports that include, you know, service 671 00:41:02,520 --> 00:41:06,180 reports of UAP sightings, then that information is being shared 672 00:41:06,180 --> 00:41:09,600 with the US, but that's being shared with NORAD, as part of, 673 00:41:09,630 --> 00:41:12,900 you know, an operational update. It's not being shared to the 674 00:41:12,930 --> 00:41:17,790 specific UFO people within the US, US Defense apparatus. Right. 675 00:41:18,120 --> 00:41:23,400 So, you know, the language in the American legislation is that 676 00:41:23,430 --> 00:41:26,790 they want to be sharing data with international partners, you 677 00:41:26,790 --> 00:41:31,110 know, correct me if I'm wrong. I'm, I've heard rumors of that 678 00:41:31,110 --> 00:41:34,770 kind of thing happening with government. But I don't have 679 00:41:34,860 --> 00:41:39,180 anything in hand to show you and say, Hey, Canada and the US are 680 00:41:39,240 --> 00:41:42,330 letting each other peek at their UFO reports. I can't prove that 681 00:41:42,330 --> 00:41:42,570 yet. 682 00:41:42,600 --> 00:41:45,450 John Greenewald: Sure. Sure. Yeah. And I'm curious to see 683 00:41:45,450 --> 00:41:49,800 because and it kind of gives me a new angle to approach because, 684 00:41:49,860 --> 00:41:52,770 you know, going back many years, and you likely have heard, I 685 00:41:52,770 --> 00:41:56,190 think you and I chatted on the phone about this. But when I had 686 00:41:56,670 --> 00:42:00,540 gone to NORAD with a FOIA and this was many years ago, before 687 00:42:00,540 --> 00:42:04,590 I knew that they weren't subject to FOIA. And then they did their 688 00:42:04,620 --> 00:42:07,710 whatever internal procedure, I forget what the number is, where 689 00:42:07,710 --> 00:42:10,560 they try and honor the spirit of the FOIA. But since they're 690 00:42:10,560 --> 00:42:14,070 under Canadian control, American law doesn't apply. But they have 691 00:42:14,070 --> 00:42:18,930 a records processing procedure that they follow. Long story 692 00:42:18,930 --> 00:42:22,620 short, they said they found no type of service reports, UFO, 693 00:42:22,620 --> 00:42:25,620 nothing. And when I called the Department of National Defense 694 00:42:25,620 --> 00:42:29,520 on the phone, the guy at that time who answered who had no 695 00:42:29,520 --> 00:42:33,000 idea who I was or why I was calling, I asked him about this 696 00:42:33,000 --> 00:42:36,780 and he had a stack of the UFO service reports on his desk. And 697 00:42:36,780 --> 00:42:41,250 I was always surprised at that, but it's solidified how the 698 00:42:41,250 --> 00:42:46,440 American side of NORAD will lie about it, because when I got the 699 00:42:46,440 --> 00:42:51,030 DMD to send them to me, NORAD letterhead was all over it, 700 00:42:51,390 --> 00:42:55,020 meaning NORAD telling me from the American side, no, no, we 701 00:42:55,020 --> 00:42:58,260 don't, we don't collect that. And then the Canadian side said, 702 00:42:58,770 --> 00:43:02,340 Here you go, and gave me a big stack of them. And it proved, in 703 00:43:02,340 --> 00:43:07,290 my opinion, a complete fabrication on the side of, of 704 00:43:07,290 --> 00:43:10,410 NORAD. So to go back to your point about the sharing, I would 705 00:43:10,410 --> 00:43:13,170 imagine that the government, the American government would try 706 00:43:13,170 --> 00:43:16,830 and reach out and tell the Canadian side All right, you 707 00:43:16,830 --> 00:43:20,340 know, let's stop the private sector sharing. We can 708 00:43:20,340 --> 00:43:23,370 investigate these. So when it comes to sharing, the American 709 00:43:23,370 --> 00:43:26,280 government will share going this way, but I don't think they'll 710 00:43:26,280 --> 00:43:30,810 share going that way. And again, that's just speculation. But I'm 711 00:43:30,840 --> 00:43:34,290 now I'm fascinated to try and drill in to see if there's any 712 00:43:34,290 --> 00:43:39,570 communication between what was the taskforce, but now the aeoi 713 00:43:39,570 --> 00:43:44,040 MSG and the Canadian government. But anyway, I, as I digress 714 00:43:44,040 --> 00:43:44,310 there, 715 00:43:44,730 --> 00:43:46,830 Daniel Otis: further to that release, you know, I read your 716 00:43:46,830 --> 00:43:51,240 piece on that. And I think there's a two fold reason why 717 00:43:51,540 --> 00:43:55,260 that comes so easily. I think one, because Canada doesn't, 718 00:43:55,320 --> 00:43:57,720 again, doesn't really see this as a defense or national 719 00:43:57,720 --> 00:44:02,040 security thing. They there, they don't they have no reason to sit 720 00:44:02,040 --> 00:44:05,310 on this stuff. But at the same time, you know, while it seems 721 00:44:05,310 --> 00:44:09,930 to be a little bit easier to get data in Canada, you know, we 722 00:44:09,960 --> 00:44:13,950 can't get comments on it. Like you can get statements very 723 00:44:13,950 --> 00:44:16,890 clearly talking about unidentified objects, you know, 724 00:44:16,890 --> 00:44:21,420 from from Pentagon spokespeople, like that sort of openness 725 00:44:21,420 --> 00:44:24,750 doesn't happen here. But I think the other reason it worked for 726 00:44:24,750 --> 00:44:29,130 you as well is just the nature of the how NORAD is constructed 727 00:44:29,130 --> 00:44:32,580 in Canada. We could get a little nerdy on this. The Canadian 728 00:44:32,580 --> 00:44:37,530 NORAD headquarters is called a Combined Air Operation Center. 729 00:44:37,740 --> 00:44:41,280 So it's a combined center that includes, you know, search and 730 00:44:41,280 --> 00:44:45,300 rescue personnel, Air Force personnel, NORAD personnel, etc. 731 00:44:45,570 --> 00:44:50,880 And, you know, there are us there are, you know, US military 732 00:44:50,880 --> 00:44:54,600 personnel stationed in Canada the same way Canadians are 733 00:44:54,600 --> 00:44:58,620 stationed in you know, nor on facilities in the US, but you 734 00:44:58,620 --> 00:45:02,520 know, the The staffing of it, they're all Canadian Air Force. 735 00:45:02,550 --> 00:45:06,240 So through our access to information system, well, NORAD 736 00:45:06,240 --> 00:45:09,750 itself may be immune from, you know, access to information 737 00:45:09,750 --> 00:45:14,940 laws, the squadrons and the individuals who report into it 738 00:45:14,970 --> 00:45:19,290 in Canada or not, right. So if you're working on in NORAD, you 739 00:45:19,290 --> 00:45:22,500 know, in NORAD affiliated unit, it's still a Canadian Air Force 740 00:45:22,500 --> 00:45:26,250 Squadron at a Canadian Air Force Base, and it's just has, you 741 00:45:26,250 --> 00:45:30,120 know, it reports into this Combined Air Operation Center. 742 00:45:30,360 --> 00:45:35,340 So it just the structure of how NORAD is here allows us to, to 743 00:45:35,370 --> 00:45:37,860 get information about our operations. 744 00:45:38,100 --> 00:45:40,320 John Greenewald: And see that's what's nice, because the this 745 00:45:40,320 --> 00:45:44,280 side of NORAD the differences it sounds like you have other and 746 00:45:44,280 --> 00:45:47,280 correct me if I misheard that but other avenues to access 747 00:45:47,280 --> 00:45:51,000 something to where our side, the minute even touches NORAD, they 748 00:45:51,000 --> 00:45:54,900 go, sorry, nothing applies, and there's no way to get it. And so 749 00:45:54,900 --> 00:45:58,680 the way that that was written, which was Jana 140 60, which was 750 00:45:58,680 --> 00:46:01,830 the joint Army Navy Air Force publication, the one that I 751 00:46:01,830 --> 00:46:05,100 believe you were referencing earlier, that applied to both 752 00:46:05,100 --> 00:46:09,270 Canada and America, the US Air Force had their own specific 753 00:46:09,270 --> 00:46:14,550 internal regulation or instruction is more accurate, 754 00:46:14,730 --> 00:46:18,990 called 10 Dash 206. And with them, the Air Force is 755 00:46:18,990 --> 00:46:22,290 absolutely subject to the FOIA. But those service reports went 756 00:46:22,290 --> 00:46:24,390 all the way to NORAD. And that was it, that was the only copy 757 00:46:24,390 --> 00:46:26,640 couldn't touch them. So according to them, they never 758 00:46:26,640 --> 00:46:31,500 took a single one under this 10 Dash 206, which I know, is a 759 00:46:31,890 --> 00:46:35,820 complete fabrication. But regardless, it went there. So 760 00:46:35,820 --> 00:46:38,670 that that's nice to hear that on your side, there were other 761 00:46:38,670 --> 00:46:43,290 avenues to approach it. versus our side, the moment it got 762 00:46:43,290 --> 00:46:47,760 forwarded to NORAD from our side from the American FOIA it was 763 00:46:47,790 --> 00:46:51,720 shut down. So anyway, just a note for me 764 00:46:51,720 --> 00:46:54,630 Daniel Otis: that you know, when I do request to Canadian or add 765 00:46:54,630 --> 00:46:59,610 the request code to the go to the, you know, the units, the 766 00:46:59,610 --> 00:47:04,260 units that are reporting in into NORAD. We got to get something 767 00:47:04,260 --> 00:47:07,800 straight here. servies service, I keep hearing people use so 768 00:47:07,800 --> 00:47:09,990 many. So, anyways, 769 00:47:10,020 --> 00:47:11,550 John Greenewald: yeah, I was trying to split the difference 770 00:47:11,550 --> 00:47:15,930 because you had said service. So service is how I was told many, 771 00:47:15,930 --> 00:47:17,850 many moons ago is the pronunciation. 772 00:47:18,180 --> 00:47:22,020 Daniel Otis: I see. I hear I hear service. And I've heard 773 00:47:22,020 --> 00:47:26,310 that being said from some Canadian service service. Yeah. 774 00:47:26,460 --> 00:47:27,420 Should we stick to one? 775 00:47:30,300 --> 00:47:32,640 John Greenewald: Like the UFO phenomena, I believe there are 776 00:47:32,640 --> 00:47:35,580 multiple ways to say it. So we can go with that. To be honest 777 00:47:35,580 --> 00:47:38,670 with you. I don't know. I remember. When I, when I first 778 00:47:38,670 --> 00:47:43,260 wrote about it, many, many moons ago, I was told, forget what 779 00:47:43,260 --> 00:47:46,200 office I was talking to. It was a Air Force Base. But they were 780 00:47:46,200 --> 00:47:48,780 they were saying it was it was service. And I remember actually 781 00:47:48,780 --> 00:47:52,080 asked, was it really its service? And they said yeah, and 782 00:47:52,080 --> 00:47:57,180 I remember in an email to a member of the Air Force had 783 00:47:57,180 --> 00:48:01,770 spelled it out phonetically. And they did like v e. S. O, you 784 00:48:01,770 --> 00:48:04,350 know, they're just kind of set. Again, they could have been 785 00:48:04,350 --> 00:48:07,560 wrong, too. So I was trying to find the difference between 786 00:48:07,560 --> 00:48:09,990 service service and yeah, they, 787 00:48:10,530 --> 00:48:13,560 Daniel Otis: it could be Tomato, tomato, but if anyone out there 788 00:48:13,650 --> 00:48:18,120 who's writing that Jan app, whatever in the 1950s. And you 789 00:48:18,420 --> 00:48:20,070 give us a call, we'd love to. 790 00:48:20,820 --> 00:48:24,210 John Greenewald: Yeah, there's a proper pronunciation. I'd love 791 00:48:24,210 --> 00:48:27,180 to and it's probably neither. So we're both wrong. And it's 792 00:48:27,180 --> 00:48:30,300 something you know, completely different. See 793 00:48:30,300 --> 00:48:33,390 Daniel Otis: Irv servies. Like, I'm trying to think I have a six 794 00:48:33,390 --> 00:48:35,700 year old who's learning how to read and I wouldn't be able to 795 00:48:35,700 --> 00:48:38,160 explain to her why those eyes all have different 796 00:48:38,160 --> 00:48:39,150 pronunciations. 797 00:48:39,600 --> 00:48:42,420 John Greenewald: Yeah, it's so communication instructions for 798 00:48:42,420 --> 00:48:46,920 reporting vital intelligence sightings? I can't, I can't 799 00:48:46,920 --> 00:48:49,170 really figure out why they always said that. It just always 800 00:48:49,170 --> 00:48:54,420 stuck with me. So yeah. So what I want to do here now is just if 801 00:48:54,420 --> 00:48:57,990 you want dive a little bit deeper into your newest article, 802 00:48:57,990 --> 00:49:02,040 and again, Mike, my congratulations for you digging, 803 00:49:02,070 --> 00:49:07,530 I have so much respect for your work, and you actually taking 804 00:49:07,530 --> 00:49:10,140 the time to do something original, you know, I mean, 805 00:49:10,140 --> 00:49:13,410 you're not what I call copy and paste journalism, you are out 806 00:49:13,410 --> 00:49:17,340 there, doing the work, digging in and getting things that no 807 00:49:17,340 --> 00:49:20,700 one else has. So I want to take that time. And I know my 808 00:49:20,760 --> 00:49:24,750 audience likely recognizes it as well. Thank you for doing that. 809 00:49:24,750 --> 00:49:29,310 Because there's not a whole lot of people that do so. So my way 810 00:49:29,310 --> 00:49:30,330 of saying thank you, 811 00:49:30,360 --> 00:49:33,420 Daniel Otis: I appreciate that. And thank you for recognizing 812 00:49:33,420 --> 00:49:37,290 that. Listen, I was reading and researching and learning 813 00:49:37,290 --> 00:49:40,740 everything I could about this for a long time before I started 814 00:49:40,740 --> 00:49:44,670 writing about it. And it was really only when I was starting 815 00:49:44,670 --> 00:49:47,700 to pull in information through our FOIA system, that I felt 816 00:49:47,700 --> 00:49:51,090 that I could have, you know, a meaningful contribution to the 817 00:49:51,090 --> 00:49:53,370 conversation that you know, that's when I started writing 818 00:49:53,370 --> 00:49:56,070 about the subject. You know, when this Canadian data started 819 00:49:56,070 --> 00:49:58,740 coming in, and I saw that it wasn't it wasn't appearing 820 00:49:58,740 --> 00:50:03,120 anywhere else right. But thank you. It's been you know, I've 821 00:50:03,120 --> 00:50:06,660 been working as a journalist for about a decade, written for over 822 00:50:06,660 --> 00:50:11,520 two dozen publications. And certainly this, this uapb that 823 00:50:11,520 --> 00:50:15,510 I've given myself over the past almost years has been one of the 824 00:50:15,900 --> 00:50:19,320 more exciting and fulfilling chapters and I journalism 825 00:50:19,320 --> 00:50:19,710 career. 826 00:50:20,129 --> 00:50:22,979 John Greenewald: Exciting is a good word for it. So and, but 827 00:50:22,979 --> 00:50:24,929 But yeah, that the regulations, 828 00:50:24,959 --> 00:50:27,449 Daniel Otis: it takes a special kinds of call sifting through, 829 00:50:27,479 --> 00:50:31,349 you know, piles of papers, exciting and fun. But I think 830 00:50:31,349 --> 00:50:32,219 you know what I mean, 831 00:50:32,249 --> 00:50:34,619 John Greenewald: speaking of getting nerdy, that's my cup of 832 00:50:34,619 --> 00:50:39,149 tea, I will take a stack of documents any day. And speaking 833 00:50:39,149 --> 00:50:42,389 of a stack of documents you had sent me and we don't have to do 834 00:50:42,389 --> 00:50:45,149 this. But I can bring it up here. I think you said that 835 00:50:45,149 --> 00:50:50,189 these were some of the the best of your newest batch. Yeah. Do 836 00:50:50,189 --> 00:50:51,629 you want to go through any of them? Yeah, 837 00:50:51,629 --> 00:50:53,339 Daniel Otis: well, I mean, we can just flip through, you know, 838 00:50:53,339 --> 00:50:56,729 this, if you were doing an interview about my story, and I 839 00:50:56,729 --> 00:51:01,349 mean, these are the documents. These are a sample of 10 reports 840 00:51:01,499 --> 00:51:04,589 out of, you know, the hundreds that were contained in the 290 841 00:51:04,589 --> 00:51:08,069 pages. This first one I think I mentioned earlier in this 842 00:51:08,069 --> 00:51:12,059 interview, I mentioned the case where two civilians both saw 843 00:51:12,269 --> 00:51:15,509 lights hovering over the Atlantic Ocean, they were in how 844 00:51:16,109 --> 00:51:19,079 they were in Nova Scotia, which is an Atlantic province here. 845 00:51:19,829 --> 00:51:23,699 They called in a search and rescue center located in 846 00:51:23,699 --> 00:51:28,799 Halifax, Nova Scotia, the search and rescue center notified a 847 00:51:28,799 --> 00:51:33,419 NORAD affiliated Canadian Air Force squadron. That squadron in 848 00:51:33,419 --> 00:51:36,629 particular is responsible for identifying all air traffic 849 00:51:36,629 --> 00:51:39,599 approaching North America. Once they got this report, they 850 00:51:39,599 --> 00:51:44,609 reviewed NORAD radar data, and you know, they got hits, they 851 00:51:44,609 --> 00:51:50,579 got hits, that correlated almost exactly to the time and location 852 00:51:50,849 --> 00:51:53,879 of the sighting. So the first couple pages here, this would be 853 00:51:53,909 --> 00:51:57,269 a copy of the report that the Air Force would have sent to 854 00:51:57,269 --> 00:52:00,479 Transport Canada. And what's unique about this one is there's 855 00:52:00,479 --> 00:52:04,769 a supplementary page right after these, and you don't really see 856 00:52:04,769 --> 00:52:08,639 this, yeah, usually there's just like one or two lines of detail. 857 00:52:08,879 --> 00:52:12,029 But in this particular case, they gave us a little more 858 00:52:12,029 --> 00:52:17,909 detail because they you know, picked up something on radar. In 859 00:52:17,939 --> 00:52:21,869 the last paragraph explains, this is an area that has good 860 00:52:21,869 --> 00:52:24,599 low level radar coverage, there's no explanation why there 861 00:52:24,599 --> 00:52:28,379 are only three points all at exactly 12,800 feet, with no 862 00:52:28,379 --> 00:52:31,259 points leading up to or continuing. Basically, they 863 00:52:31,259 --> 00:52:34,559 picked up something that suddenly appeared at one 864 00:52:34,559 --> 00:52:40,589 location, just over 12,000 feet, and sort of slowly moved around 865 00:52:40,589 --> 00:52:44,789 in the general vicinity, and then disappeared. And here's the 866 00:52:44,789 --> 00:52:46,499 report, and it. 867 00:52:47,279 --> 00:52:49,889 John Greenewald: And this particular just so we kind of 868 00:52:49,889 --> 00:52:53,669 zooming out here, so we can kind of see, I'm looking at a couple 869 00:52:53,669 --> 00:52:55,829 screens here to make sure my audience can see it too. But 870 00:52:56,039 --> 00:53:00,989 this particular form, safe to say created by Transport Canada 871 00:53:00,989 --> 00:53:02,009 is DND. 872 00:53:02,190 --> 00:53:04,170 Daniel Otis: This would have been this would have been 873 00:53:04,170 --> 00:53:09,030 created by personnel at the 21 Aerospace control and Warning 874 00:53:09,030 --> 00:53:13,830 Squadron, which is located at CFB. North Bay in Ontario. It's 875 00:53:13,830 --> 00:53:19,860 part of the Canadian air defense sector, which is a NORAD task 876 00:53:19,860 --> 00:53:23,340 group that deals with identifying air traffic. So what 877 00:53:23,340 --> 00:53:29,640 would have happened in this case, was the search and rescue 878 00:53:29,640 --> 00:53:34,020 officials in in Halifax would have notified this Air Force 879 00:53:34,020 --> 00:53:37,110 Squadron, and then the Air Force squadron would have filled out 880 00:53:37,110 --> 00:53:41,550 this report, and then they fax this report to transport the 881 00:53:41,550 --> 00:53:45,450 fastest report to Transport Canada. Does that make sense? 882 00:53:45,450 --> 00:53:45,660 It's 883 00:53:45,990 --> 00:53:48,060 John Greenewald: Oh, yeah. No, no, 884 00:53:48,390 --> 00:53:51,870 Daniel Otis: it could be a game of broken telephone. But usually 885 00:53:51,870 --> 00:53:55,020 in most of the reports contained in this release, the reports 886 00:53:55,020 --> 00:53:58,440 themselves come from air traffic controllers, with the private 887 00:53:58,440 --> 00:54:02,280 company nav Canada, they call the Air Force, the Air Force 888 00:54:02,280 --> 00:54:05,490 fills out a form and then faxes it to Transport Canada. But nav 889 00:54:05,490 --> 00:54:09,180 Canada also communicates directly to Transport Canada, 890 00:54:09,270 --> 00:54:11,400 and those types of reports are contained in the release as 891 00:54:11,400 --> 00:54:11,670 well. 892 00:54:12,330 --> 00:54:14,580 John Greenewald: I know you briefly covered this in the 893 00:54:14,580 --> 00:54:20,940 beginning, but was your AIA request, specifically for these 894 00:54:20,970 --> 00:54:26,460 these types of reports? Or like how if I may ask, Did you word 895 00:54:26,460 --> 00:54:28,890 it all UFO related reports all 896 00:54:29,069 --> 00:54:32,069 Daniel Otis: so you know the release the 290 pages were from 897 00:54:32,399 --> 00:54:36,269 two requests. I asked for all let's go with service. This 898 00:54:36,269 --> 00:54:40,199 time. I asked for all service reports. held by Transport 899 00:54:40,199 --> 00:54:43,499 Canada The first time I asked them that question. They told me 900 00:54:43,499 --> 00:54:46,499 to go SDN D because they don't deal with this. I probably 901 00:54:46,499 --> 00:54:50,459 pronounced it wrong. Yeah, there you go. But I kept asking and I 902 00:54:50,459 --> 00:54:54,149 asked more specifically. So these reports come from the 903 00:54:54,179 --> 00:54:58,199 aviation operations departments at Transport Canada. That's the 904 00:54:58,199 --> 00:55:05,729 first 104 pages And then the next 186 pages come from the 905 00:55:05,729 --> 00:55:10,799 Transport Canada department that's responsible for creating 906 00:55:10,979 --> 00:55:13,979 public facing aviation incident reports. 907 00:55:15,330 --> 00:55:17,160 John Greenewald: One other question, where did I see oh, 908 00:55:17,160 --> 00:55:21,450 here it is. I always look at least in on the American side, I 909 00:55:21,450 --> 00:55:24,840 find it interesting on on classification and original 910 00:55:24,840 --> 00:55:28,170 classification. What was it? What is it? So on and so forth? 911 00:55:28,830 --> 00:55:32,610 Do you see a lot of these all of these as unclassified, like this 912 00:55:32,610 --> 00:55:32,820 one? 913 00:55:33,390 --> 00:55:37,050 Daniel Otis: This one is Yeah, I think what's also interesting 914 00:55:37,050 --> 00:55:40,710 here, this was faxed to Transport Canada, the fax 915 00:55:40,710 --> 00:55:44,250 machine is alive and well, in official Canadian institutions. 916 00:55:44,550 --> 00:55:48,480 You can see the fax numbers up at the top. Most of them, the 917 00:55:48,480 --> 00:55:51,600 reports contained in this release are unclassified 918 00:55:51,600 --> 00:55:55,620 reports. That being said, if you pick up my vice contributor 919 00:55:55,620 --> 00:55:59,820 page, there's other stories I've written that are based on 920 00:55:59,970 --> 00:56:03,270 classified military reports. So there's, you know, there's 921 00:56:03,300 --> 00:56:05,820 reports like these that are these are because these are 922 00:56:05,820 --> 00:56:09,180 usually coming from civilian groups like air traffic 923 00:56:09,180 --> 00:56:12,000 controllers, they're not classified, but there are 924 00:56:12,000 --> 00:56:16,230 incidents and other reports on other incidents, etc, involving 925 00:56:16,290 --> 00:56:19,590 involving things with secret classifications, etc. My 926 00:56:19,590 --> 00:56:24,180 previous story was dealt with a lot of secret, classified stuff, 927 00:56:24,180 --> 00:56:29,190 it was particularly I had targeted the logbook entries for 928 00:56:29,190 --> 00:56:34,140 that one particular Canadian Air Force squadron that receives the 929 00:56:34,140 --> 00:56:37,170 reports, and then does the radar checks. So I wanted to see what 930 00:56:37,350 --> 00:56:42,030 the internal mechanisms are within that Air Force squadron 931 00:56:42,120 --> 00:56:45,810 when they receive these reports, and I was able to obtain daily 932 00:56:45,810 --> 00:56:48,300 logbook entries actually think of some sitting on my desk right 933 00:56:48,300 --> 00:56:51,990 here. Yeah, they're basically highly, very, you know, 934 00:56:51,990 --> 00:56:55,710 classified secret. And it basically shows in real time, 935 00:56:56,340 --> 00:57:00,990 the day to day operations of this unit. So, you know, that's, 936 00:57:01,530 --> 00:57:05,610 yeah, I recommend if people like looking at Air Force documents 937 00:57:05,610 --> 00:57:08,220 and things like that, recommend having a look at that story, 938 00:57:08,220 --> 00:57:10,020 because there's some cool details in there. 939 00:57:10,470 --> 00:57:13,050 John Greenewald: Did when you say that they were, you know, 940 00:57:13,050 --> 00:57:17,040 formally classified or secret. In that instance, is the 941 00:57:17,040 --> 00:57:19,080 Canadian government just blacking out a bunch of stuff? 942 00:57:19,080 --> 00:57:22,320 And that's why you got it? Or are they actually declassifying 943 00:57:22,320 --> 00:57:25,350 it for you? And you're seeing what was secret? Maybe five 944 00:57:25,350 --> 00:57:26,700 years ago, or 10 years ago? 945 00:57:26,880 --> 00:57:30,660 Daniel Otis: It's hard to say unlike the United States, 946 00:57:31,350 --> 00:57:35,670 Canada, Redax in whites? Yes. You know what I mean? So when 947 00:57:36,300 --> 00:57:38,070 John Greenewald: the US has adopted that over the last 948 00:57:38,070 --> 00:57:39,870 couple of decades to sad oh, really? 949 00:57:39,900 --> 00:57:41,910 Daniel Otis: Oh, that's unfortunate. Because although 950 00:57:41,910 --> 00:57:44,340 it's harsh on the eye, and it kills all the ink in your 951 00:57:44,340 --> 00:57:47,790 printer, at least when something's redacted in gray or 952 00:57:47,790 --> 00:57:50,940 black, you know, where that things redact? Sure, but when 953 00:57:50,940 --> 00:57:53,760 it's in light, you have no idea if some if there had been data 954 00:57:53,760 --> 00:57:56,700 there, or if something's been scrubbed off a page, like if it 955 00:57:56,700 --> 00:58:00,120 becomes really hard to determine what you're being told, and 956 00:58:00,120 --> 00:58:02,280 what's not being told, especially in a log entry like 957 00:58:02,280 --> 00:58:05,310 this, you know, because all the entries before a UFO sighting 958 00:58:05,310 --> 00:58:08,610 are blanked out all of them after so in this case, you can't 959 00:58:08,610 --> 00:58:11,100 really tell what the response was. But there's been other 960 00:58:11,100 --> 00:58:13,500 instances I found where you can see the response. 961 00:58:14,760 --> 00:58:17,580 John Greenewald: In I talked about, obviously, the FOIA on 962 00:58:17,580 --> 00:58:20,940 this channel a lot and one thing that I look for with FOIA 963 00:58:20,940 --> 00:58:25,230 documents is the citation of why something is either whited out 964 00:58:25,230 --> 00:58:27,900 because they do white out. And you can kind of tell sometimes 965 00:58:27,900 --> 00:58:30,600 there's a black border around it or so on. But they put a 966 00:58:30,600 --> 00:58:35,280 citation there what exemption authorizes them to redact it. 967 00:58:35,280 --> 00:58:38,910 Does Canada do the same? Do you have any indicator on? Oh, yeah, 968 00:58:38,910 --> 00:58:41,880 Daniel Otis: absolutely. So in the letter when they released 969 00:58:41,880 --> 00:58:46,620 the documents to you, it explains which part of the 970 00:58:46,620 --> 00:58:50,580 Access to Information Act they were employing to redact stuff. 971 00:58:50,610 --> 00:58:55,020 The most common one is, I believe it's 19. A, I hope I'm 972 00:58:55,020 --> 00:58:57,450 not wrong. It has to do with personal information and 973 00:58:57,450 --> 00:59:01,860 privacy. Yeah, games, personal phone numbers. There's other you 974 00:59:01,860 --> 00:59:03,660 know, there's been I've seen exemptions for national 975 00:59:03,660 --> 00:59:07,890 security. For you know, confidential third party 976 00:59:07,890 --> 00:59:11,160 information is one they like to use. Sometimes that one annoys 977 00:59:11,160 --> 00:59:17,880 me a little bit. Yep. But yeah. Well, I'll give you an example 978 00:59:17,880 --> 00:59:21,570 of a case like that. We were looking through these actually, 979 00:59:21,570 --> 00:59:24,060 maybe we'll get to it when it involves one of the reports 980 00:59:24,060 --> 00:59:28,860 that's in here. Basically, I was able to determine the file name 981 00:59:29,250 --> 00:59:33,540 of air traffic control tower audio for one of these UFO 982 00:59:33,540 --> 00:59:37,560 reports. And they won't give it to me because they say it's 983 00:59:37,890 --> 00:59:40,140 confidential third party information 984 00:59:45,390 --> 00:59:48,510 John Greenewald: is there a way to appeal that meaning? All 985 00:59:48,510 --> 00:59:48,660 these 986 00:59:48,690 --> 00:59:51,540 Daniel Otis: don't worry. All the appeals are filed. I react 987 00:59:51,570 --> 00:59:55,050 in different ways. I'm on it. I don't I don't give up at the 988 00:59:55,050 --> 01:00:01,590 first No. You know, like Yeah, To be a little more tenacious 989 01:00:01,590 --> 01:00:04,980 than that, right? You can't accept no for an answer. If I 990 01:00:04,980 --> 01:00:10,080 know something's out there, I'm gonna try it. from every angle I 991 01:00:10,080 --> 01:00:15,030 can, you know, and in this case, this is a, you know, tower audio 992 01:00:15,030 --> 01:00:20,280 with a pilot describing a UFO encounter. So yeah, that's 993 01:00:20,280 --> 01:00:23,520 pretty cool. And I'm gonna keep going after that one. 994 01:00:23,790 --> 01:00:27,570 John Greenewald: I love those types of finds that you look at 995 01:00:27,570 --> 01:00:30,060 a document and sometimes are easily overlooked. But those 996 01:00:30,060 --> 01:00:32,880 file names, what I go after emails, you look for 997 01:00:32,880 --> 01:00:37,080 attachments. And even though my FOIA for the most part, will 998 01:00:37,080 --> 01:00:40,320 always say all emails with certain keywords, including 999 01:00:40,320 --> 01:00:44,010 attachments, a lot of FOIA agencies won't do it. And so you 1000 01:00:44,010 --> 01:00:47,220 look for it. And it kind of essentially tattles on them, 1001 01:00:47,460 --> 01:00:50,340 that there was an attachment in the email, but you don't see it. 1002 01:00:50,340 --> 01:00:52,830 But now you have a file name, and you can file another FOIA 1003 01:00:52,830 --> 01:00:56,010 request or appeal and say, Hey, wait a minute, I asked for this, 1004 01:00:56,010 --> 01:00:58,980 and you didn't get it. But I love those little fines, because 1005 01:00:59,220 --> 01:01:02,880 I often often liken this whole process to a tree branch, you 1006 01:01:02,880 --> 01:01:06,360 know, and your trunk is that first FOIA and it just branches 1007 01:01:06,360 --> 01:01:10,830 off into 5 million other you know, things and I absolutely 1008 01:01:10,830 --> 01:01:13,740 geek out over stuff like that. You had mentioned that maybe 1009 01:01:13,740 --> 01:01:15,960 we'll get to it. Is it in this release that you want to look? 1010 01:01:15,960 --> 01:01:16,320 Yeah, 1011 01:01:16,320 --> 01:01:18,570 Daniel Otis: I mean, we could just so these past three pages 1012 01:01:18,570 --> 01:01:22,290 you've gone through here, these are reports from NAV Canada. 1013 01:01:22,560 --> 01:01:25,920 Again, nav Canada is the private company that operates air 1014 01:01:25,920 --> 01:01:30,090 traffic control. These are all aviation incident reports that 1015 01:01:30,210 --> 01:01:33,240 nav Canada air traffic controllers would have received. 1016 01:01:33,240 --> 01:01:36,570 So the first one that you pulled up there involved, actually, 1017 01:01:36,570 --> 01:01:39,210 that one was from NAV Canada employees themselves. That was 1018 01:01:39,750 --> 01:01:45,720 air traffic control staff in, in Alberta. So a bright, very fast 1019 01:01:45,720 --> 01:01:50,040 moving object. There was another citizen one in here, I don't 1020 01:01:50,040 --> 01:01:51,330 know which one you're on now. I think we're on 1021 01:01:51,690 --> 01:01:53,610 John Greenewald: looks like Winnipeg, let me see if I can 1022 01:01:53,610 --> 01:01:56,340 zoom in a little bit. I actually have a question this one before 1023 01:01:56,340 --> 01:01:59,670 I lose it. Yeah. And it may actually be in here. I just 1024 01:01:59,670 --> 01:02:03,570 didn't see it. So in this particular instance, on on the 1025 01:02:03,570 --> 01:02:06,060 same point that you and I were chatting about, you have this 1026 01:02:06,060 --> 01:02:10,230 nav Canada report, and then it says that a service report was 1027 01:02:10,230 --> 01:02:13,590 filed, right get those or is that 1028 01:02:13,650 --> 01:02:16,680 Daniel Otis: I have some of those, not all of them. I have 1029 01:02:16,680 --> 01:02:20,370 pending requests for a lot of that kind of material. But 1030 01:02:20,370 --> 01:02:23,400 that's what that's kind of when they see a report was filed. 1031 01:02:23,910 --> 01:02:27,030 They're not really that's when they're calling the Air Force. 1032 01:02:27,090 --> 01:02:31,290 And that's a verbal report. And that verbal report turns into 1033 01:02:31,320 --> 01:02:34,500 this with the emblem, and then the forms that get filled out 1034 01:02:34,500 --> 01:02:34,950 like you saw 1035 01:02:34,950 --> 01:02:37,080 John Greenewald: Gotcha. There's some chicken scratch writing on 1036 01:02:37,080 --> 01:02:41,160 it. Gotcha. Okay. Here's another one risk of collision. 1037 01:02:41,760 --> 01:02:45,480 Daniel Otis: This one's interesting. Yeah, this one, I 1038 01:02:45,480 --> 01:02:48,510 was a staff writer at the Toronto Star at the time, which 1039 01:02:48,510 --> 01:02:51,060 is one of our biggest newspapers here in Canada. And I remember 1040 01:02:51,060 --> 01:02:54,270 this happening because it made the news but not on the UFO 1041 01:02:54,270 --> 01:02:59,100 angle. This involves a case from Ottawa or capital to Toronto, 1042 01:02:59,130 --> 01:03:05,670 where I live by Porter Airlines, it saw some sort of large donut 1043 01:03:05,670 --> 01:03:09,780 shaped object directly ahead in its flight path. It took an 1044 01:03:09,780 --> 01:03:14,430 evasive maneuver. And when it took a sort of, you know, dive 1045 01:03:14,430 --> 01:03:18,120 to avoid this thing. Two of the flight attendants got thrown 1046 01:03:18,120 --> 01:03:21,480 into the cabin structure of the plane and God injuries. This is 1047 01:03:21,480 --> 01:03:25,590 a unique report, it's longer than most. And it's specifically 1048 01:03:25,590 --> 01:03:29,880 because the workplace injuries that these flight attendants got 1049 01:03:29,880 --> 01:03:32,850 when they One of them hit the wall, I believe in one hit the 1050 01:03:32,850 --> 01:03:39,300 ceiling. The injuries made it necessary to conduct a federal 1051 01:03:39,300 --> 01:03:43,350 transportation safety probe. So while usually the reports are 1052 01:03:43,350 --> 01:03:47,220 just a sentence or two, in this case, they dug a little deeper. 1053 01:03:47,250 --> 01:03:49,470 That's why you see about a paragraph and material there. 1054 01:03:49,740 --> 01:03:52,500 Because this this, this one comes from the Transportation 1055 01:03:52,500 --> 01:03:55,770 Safety Board of Canada. It's a bit of a unique one. It's the 1056 01:03:55,950 --> 01:03:59,430 one of the only ones I found that had a little more fulsome 1057 01:03:59,430 --> 01:04:02,550 investigation. And it's particularly because there was 1058 01:04:02,550 --> 01:04:03,060 an injury. 1059 01:04:03,780 --> 01:04:06,540 John Greenewald: So five to eight feet in diameter, an 1060 01:04:06,570 --> 01:04:10,320 upright donut or inner tube. Now granted, I'm kind of seeing this 1061 01:04:10,320 --> 01:04:12,780 for the first time. I know you just sent it over to me, so 1062 01:04:12,780 --> 01:04:16,320 forgive me. It wasn't solved. Do we know what that thing is? 1063 01:04:16,350 --> 01:04:20,760 Daniel Otis: No. I tracked down the investigator sent him some 1064 01:04:20,760 --> 01:04:24,570 emails, took a few emails before he replied, but he eventually 1065 01:04:24,570 --> 01:04:29,700 did and said, No, it was never positively identified. One 1066 01:04:29,700 --> 01:04:33,900 interesting thing about this case was had they positively 1067 01:04:33,900 --> 01:04:38,100 identified it as a drone, for example, if they would have 1068 01:04:38,100 --> 01:04:40,560 continued the investigation, there would have been an even 1069 01:04:40,560 --> 01:04:45,300 more detailed investigation. So because in this case that they 1070 01:04:45,300 --> 01:04:49,050 couldn't figure out what it was. This is where the investigation 1071 01:04:49,080 --> 01:04:51,630 ended, because there was nothing actionable, you know what I 1072 01:04:51,630 --> 01:04:55,710 mean? There's no one to give a ticket to or to penalize or a 1073 01:04:55,710 --> 01:04:57,720 regulatory thing that needs to be changed because of the 1074 01:04:57,720 --> 01:05:01,230 incident. Right? So because there was no couldn't identify 1075 01:05:01,230 --> 01:05:04,230 it. And then they couldn't do anything actionable with this 1076 01:05:04,230 --> 01:05:08,010 report. So it got left as a mystery forever and ever and 1077 01:05:08,010 --> 01:05:08,340 ever. 1078 01:05:08,669 --> 01:05:11,789 John Greenewald: I just loved that all of the UFO type reports 1079 01:05:11,789 --> 01:05:16,079 are now using food as descriptors. Like we got 1080 01:05:16,079 --> 01:05:21,179 doughnuts, which in my opinion is much more than a tic tac. But 1081 01:05:21,389 --> 01:05:25,949 anyway, moving on. So here's another this Transport Canada 1082 01:05:25,949 --> 01:05:26,609 report. 1083 01:05:26,790 --> 01:05:29,430 Daniel Otis: Yeah, so these these again, so here, this would 1084 01:05:29,430 --> 01:05:33,000 be the information that's being sent from the private air 1085 01:05:33,000 --> 01:05:35,760 traffic control company to Transport Canada, the federal 1086 01:05:35,760 --> 01:05:38,880 department. So these now we're seeing emails, and these are 1087 01:05:38,880 --> 01:05:43,650 emails that are being used to create public facing aviation 1088 01:05:43,650 --> 01:05:44,790 incident reports. 1089 01:05:44,880 --> 01:05:46,500 John Greenewald: And those are published online. Those are the 1090 01:05:46,500 --> 01:05:47,550 ones that you can 1091 01:05:48,120 --> 01:05:51,600 Daniel Otis: call that the it's called CAD systems called 1092 01:05:51,630 --> 01:05:55,200 caterers. But it's spelt differently than it sounds just 1093 01:05:55,200 --> 01:06:00,930 like our surveys that go on around C A, D, o r s, and it 1094 01:06:00,930 --> 01:06:06,450 stands for I had a written in front of me real fast. It stands 1095 01:06:06,450 --> 01:06:10,710 for civil aviation daily occurrence report system, this 1096 01:06:10,710 --> 01:06:16,080 is a totally publicly accessible database, you can find a version 1097 01:06:16,080 --> 01:06:19,170 of this report in there. So these get edited changed. 1098 01:06:19,830 --> 01:06:22,530 Usually, they just get sort of shortened a little bit even 1099 01:06:22,530 --> 01:06:25,980 more, believe it or not, and then they get published online. 1100 01:06:26,250 --> 01:06:28,170 Most of them not all of them, but most of 1101 01:06:28,170 --> 01:06:30,720 John Greenewald: them. And that kind of leads into my next 1102 01:06:30,720 --> 01:06:34,380 question, did you find evidence that everything really does go 1103 01:06:34,380 --> 01:06:38,520 into the system? Or do you feel that there is a separate other 1104 01:06:38,520 --> 01:06:42,750 occurrence database that maybe have some more interesting? 1105 01:06:43,170 --> 01:06:43,410 Okay, 1106 01:06:43,410 --> 01:06:47,550 Daniel Otis: I would, I can say with certainty, again, and any 1107 01:06:47,550 --> 01:06:52,320 of the sort of defense related reports that have a defense 1108 01:06:52,320 --> 01:06:56,820 Nexus or search and rescue where there's something actionable 1109 01:06:56,820 --> 01:06:59,730 that the military has participated in, that will not 1110 01:06:59,730 --> 01:07:04,470 go into this system. This system is the UFO reports that are in 1111 01:07:04,470 --> 01:07:08,790 here are for the most part, aviation related. You know, 1112 01:07:08,790 --> 01:07:12,120 we're talking major Canadian airlines like Air Canada 1113 01:07:12,150 --> 01:07:16,350 WestJet. I believe there's a Delta case in there. And that's 1114 01:07:16,350 --> 01:07:19,770 pretty recent. There's a bunch of different US airlines, 1115 01:07:19,980 --> 01:07:22,650 there's international airlines, and they're just seeing things 1116 01:07:22,950 --> 01:07:25,950 weird. This one here that you have on the page right now, this 1117 01:07:25,950 --> 01:07:30,660 one was from July 2021. This involves the Canadian military 1118 01:07:30,660 --> 01:07:34,890 transport plane on its way to evacuate vulnerable people out 1119 01:07:34,890 --> 01:07:39,660 of Afghanistan, as well as a Dutch KLM flight from Boston to 1120 01:07:39,660 --> 01:07:42,270 Amsterdam, if I recall correctly, they're flying 1121 01:07:42,270 --> 01:07:45,660 parallel, sort of over the North Atlantic, and they both report 1122 01:07:45,660 --> 01:07:50,250 seeing a luminous object that disappears into a cloud. 1123 01:07:50,790 --> 01:07:57,480 John Greenewald: Wow. That's fascinating to see these. Yep. 1124 01:07:58,350 --> 01:08:00,780 And then the difference with this whole wing operation center 1125 01:08:00,780 --> 01:08:01,260 instructions, 1126 01:08:01,290 --> 01:08:03,030 Daniel Otis: this one was contained in the release as 1127 01:08:03,030 --> 01:08:07,950 well. This is a UFO report form that's specific to CFB 1128 01:08:07,950 --> 01:08:10,770 Bagotville. It was the that's the Air Force Base I mentioned 1129 01:08:10,770 --> 01:08:14,220 in Quebec. That's one of the main stations for f 18 fighter 1130 01:08:14,220 --> 01:08:17,400 jets. So their wing operation center, you know, like their 1131 01:08:17,400 --> 01:08:23,250 main operation center, had a UFO report form. And most of the 1132 01:08:23,250 --> 01:08:26,430 release contains a handful of these. Most of them are 1133 01:08:26,430 --> 01:08:31,170 civilian, written in English and French. And they contain a fax 1134 01:08:31,170 --> 01:08:34,740 number for Mr. Chris Rakowski, as well as contact information 1135 01:08:34,740 --> 01:08:37,680 for Transport Canada. So again, just showing this I found this 1136 01:08:37,680 --> 01:08:40,860 pretty interesting, because again, it shows that there are, 1137 01:08:40,980 --> 01:08:44,040 you know, procedural guidelines for what to do with these 1138 01:08:44,040 --> 01:08:47,670 reports in Canada. You know, and they go to transportation 1139 01:08:47,670 --> 01:08:52,140 officials and for and they go to go to Chris, are you ufologists 1140 01:08:52,140 --> 01:08:53,550 in Winnipeg? Yeah, I'm 1141 01:08:53,550 --> 01:08:56,130 John Greenewald: just happy faxes are still alive. Old 1142 01:08:56,130 --> 01:08:58,860 school guys that just wants a fax periodically. So 1143 01:08:59,010 --> 01:09:02,670 Daniel Otis: it's amazing. Yeah, I the fax machine is alive and 1144 01:09:02,670 --> 01:09:04,380 well with the Canadian Forces. 1145 01:09:04,620 --> 01:09:07,620 John Greenewald: Fantastic. Well, what is I can talk to you 1146 01:09:07,620 --> 01:09:10,440 all day. And honestly, I think we should do this on a daily we 1147 01:09:10,440 --> 01:09:12,600 should just pull up documents and go through them together, 1148 01:09:12,600 --> 01:09:15,810 because I love that kind of stuff. So I appreciate you doing 1149 01:09:15,810 --> 01:09:18,660 that with me. What's next for you? You're working on another 1150 01:09:18,660 --> 01:09:21,780 story, are you can you talk about it? What's going on? 1151 01:09:22,440 --> 01:09:26,310 Daniel Otis: Ah, yes. I'm always working on stuff. I'm always 1152 01:09:26,310 --> 01:09:27,900 working on more than one thing. 1153 01:09:28,650 --> 01:09:29,940 John Greenewald: share all the secrets right now. 1154 01:09:30,419 --> 01:09:32,759 Daniel Otis: You can expect I guess you can expect stories 1155 01:09:32,759 --> 01:09:37,469 from me upcoming involving? Well, I guess what we'd like to 1156 01:09:37,469 --> 01:09:41,159 call are credible witnesses, Not to disparage witnesses or who 1157 01:09:41,159 --> 01:09:44,759 were but you know, there's that sort of class of police 1158 01:09:44,759 --> 01:09:49,229 officers, soldiers, pilots. Expect the story for me involved 1159 01:09:49,229 --> 01:09:53,519 in on the Record interview with someone like that. As well as 1160 01:09:53,519 --> 01:09:57,989 I'm digging hard to you know, find out what Canada knows and 1161 01:09:57,989 --> 01:10:02,129 particularly what sort of you information is being shared 1162 01:10:02,399 --> 01:10:06,689 between Canada and the US. So I always pull in threads. More 1163 01:10:06,689 --> 01:10:10,829 stories are always they're always coming. And plus I think 1164 01:10:10,829 --> 01:10:15,989 I have about at least 80 pending access to information requests. 1165 01:10:15,989 --> 01:10:20,129 So I you know more who knows what surprises will come in down 1166 01:10:20,129 --> 01:10:21,989 the road? I'm excited to find 1167 01:10:21,990 --> 01:10:24,450 John Greenewald: a that's what I love to hear at. You said eight, 1168 01:10:24,450 --> 01:10:24,870 zero. 1169 01:10:25,170 --> 01:10:27,240 Daniel Otis: I need a list for you because I know you like this 1170 01:10:27,240 --> 01:10:28,260 kind of stuff. Yeah, let's 1171 01:10:28,260 --> 01:10:29,070 John Greenewald: start from number one. 1172 01:10:30,330 --> 01:10:36,330 Daniel Otis: No, I since in the past year, I filed 133 I've 1173 01:10:36,330 --> 01:10:40,710 received results for 41 no responses for 47. There's at 1174 01:10:40,710 --> 01:10:44,670 least 40 Sorry, there's 88 completed 45 still in progress. 1175 01:10:45,090 --> 01:10:47,970 That's awesome. There's still there's still stuff coming. And 1176 01:10:47,970 --> 01:10:49,890 I hope some of it's good because some of those are pretty 1177 01:10:49,890 --> 01:10:51,150 specific requests. 1178 01:10:51,360 --> 01:10:53,550 John Greenewald: Double those numbers by Monday and we'll be 1179 01:10:53,550 --> 01:10:55,680 in good shape. No, I can't keep 1180 01:10:55,680 --> 01:10:59,370 Daniel Otis: up to you, sir. Anyway, you're a FOIA machine. 1181 01:10:59,460 --> 01:11:01,530 John Greenewald: Well, I appreciate that. But hey, I 1182 01:11:01,530 --> 01:11:05,130 can't thank you enough for taking the time to talk about 1183 01:11:05,130 --> 01:11:07,950 this. Congratulations again on the article. For those that are 1184 01:11:07,950 --> 01:11:10,560 watching the YouTube channel just check down below I've got 1185 01:11:10,560 --> 01:11:13,620 everything linked. Daniel, what is the best way you'd like 1186 01:11:13,620 --> 01:11:17,610 people to? To reach out to you I know you got your Twitter handle 1187 01:11:17,610 --> 01:11:23,250 there, which is d s. O T I 's that the best way any website 1188 01:11:23,250 --> 01:11:24,360 did you'd like to throw out there? 1189 01:11:24,360 --> 01:11:27,120 Daniel Otis: You can find me on Twitter at d s odus. I'm pretty 1190 01:11:27,120 --> 01:11:30,330 active on there. And often, you know, if I let's say I get some 1191 01:11:30,360 --> 01:11:33,840 documents, additional documents that come in on a story I've 1192 01:11:33,840 --> 01:11:36,180 already written about, and I'm not gonna write a new article, 1193 01:11:36,180 --> 01:11:38,820 Twitter's where they end up. I'm always sharing what I have. I 1194 01:11:38,820 --> 01:11:42,360 think people should be transparent with data. You know, 1195 01:11:42,390 --> 01:11:44,880 governments have been hiding so much from us for so long. Let's 1196 01:11:44,880 --> 01:11:48,210 not hide stuff from each other. Right? So find me on Twitter at 1197 01:11:48,210 --> 01:11:54,330 Dr. Sodus my personal website is Daniel oldest.ca.ca. That's 1198 01:11:54,330 --> 01:11:57,990 Daniel lotus.ca. Contact informations there if anyone 1199 01:11:57,990 --> 01:12:00,570 wants to reach out and yeah, thanks so much for having me. 1200 01:12:00,570 --> 01:12:01,380 This was a lot of fun. 1201 01:12:01,740 --> 01:12:03,780 John Greenewald: Anytime you're welcome back anytime you get 1202 01:12:03,780 --> 01:12:06,300 anything you want to share it please feel free to let me know. 1203 01:12:06,480 --> 01:12:09,600 But thank you again for taking the time. Thanks so much. My 1204 01:12:09,600 --> 01:12:12,930 pleasure. And thank you all for listening and watching if you 1205 01:12:12,930 --> 01:12:15,330 are listening to the audio podcast version, just know that 1206 01:12:15,330 --> 01:12:18,660 I broadcast most of these if not all of these interviews in a 1207 01:12:18,660 --> 01:12:22,620 video format on the YouTube channel to get there go to www 1208 01:12:22,620 --> 01:12:26,790 dot the black vault comm slash live that will bounce you to the 1209 01:12:26,790 --> 01:12:30,240 channel. Subscribe, see this interview? See all sorts. And 1210 01:12:30,240 --> 01:12:33,480 please, if you could YouTube watchers hit the thumbs up audio 1211 01:12:33,480 --> 01:12:37,050 watchers. I aim for five star reviews. So please help me out 1212 01:12:37,050 --> 01:12:41,370 by giving a honest review on any podcast platform. This show is 1213 01:12:41,370 --> 01:12:45,030 listed under the black vault Radio. Thank you again Daniel. 1214 01:12:45,060 --> 01:12:47,610 Thank you all for listening and watching. This is John 1215 01:12:47,610 --> 01:12:50,040 Greenewald Jr signing off. And we'll see you next time.