1 00:00:24,300 --> 00:00:26,100 John Greenewald: That's right everybody. As always, thank you 2 00:00:26,100 --> 00:00:29,490 so much for tuning in and making this your live stream or your 3 00:00:29,490 --> 00:00:32,880 podcast of choice. My name is John Greenewald, Jr, owner, and 4 00:00:32,880 --> 00:00:36,480 creator of the black vault.com. And this is a pretty fun story, 5 00:00:36,480 --> 00:00:41,130 one of which that I broke today. And that is all about how the 6 00:00:41,130 --> 00:00:45,990 Department of Defense is denying what I believe are key records 7 00:00:45,990 --> 00:00:50,910 on the creation of their UFO office, I'm using that as a 8 00:00:50,910 --> 00:00:53,640 nickname. Let me pull up some visuals for you guys and kind of 9 00:00:53,640 --> 00:00:57,120 go over the story itself. For those of you who are watching on 10 00:00:57,120 --> 00:01:01,080 social media. This is a story that I dropped early this 11 00:01:01,080 --> 00:01:05,430 morning. And essentially, this is going into great detail about 12 00:01:05,430 --> 00:01:08,340 what I just got through the Freedom of Information Act. Now 13 00:01:08,340 --> 00:01:13,140 some of you who are either new to this channel, or you think 14 00:01:13,140 --> 00:01:16,620 you've heard this story, it does sound very familiar to something 15 00:01:16,620 --> 00:01:19,800 I wrote about a week, week and a half ago, that got mainstream 16 00:01:19,800 --> 00:01:23,550 coverage around the globe, I was very excited to see that, 17 00:01:23,730 --> 00:01:28,800 because it's a very important topic UAP as a whole UFOs as a 18 00:01:28,800 --> 00:01:32,760 whole, but also the secrecy surrounding it. That was a 19 00:01:32,760 --> 00:01:35,970 different story. However, that was all about the Navy admitting 20 00:01:36,360 --> 00:01:40,320 that there are UFO videos, in addition to what we've seen 21 00:01:40,320 --> 00:01:46,530 publicly, but they are denying all of us access to it. So what 22 00:01:46,560 --> 00:01:53,070 what this story is all about was me going after documents on the 23 00:01:53,100 --> 00:01:58,830 original, and I will say original, prior to what's called 24 00:01:58,830 --> 00:02:03,930 the aeoi MSG, or let me make sure I get this acronym right 25 00:02:03,930 --> 00:02:06,450 the airborne object identification and management 26 00:02:06,450 --> 00:02:11,430 synchronization group, a handful, mouthful. Prior to that 27 00:02:11,430 --> 00:02:16,260 there was the UAP Task Force, you may have re heard that 28 00:02:16,260 --> 00:02:20,670 referred to as the UAP TF. But it seemed like that was a very 29 00:02:20,670 --> 00:02:25,710 informal, very unstructured effort to look into UAP that has 30 00:02:25,710 --> 00:02:29,940 kind of exploded with public interest here in the last five 31 00:02:29,940 --> 00:02:33,240 years or so. So the UAP ATF kind of came together they were 32 00:02:33,240 --> 00:02:38,400 looking into these things. But in November of 2021, a much more 33 00:02:38,400 --> 00:02:43,650 structured effort called the aeoi MSG, or how they pronounced 34 00:02:43,650 --> 00:02:48,180 it phonetically ame SOG. Don't ask me why, during the UA P 35 00:02:48,180 --> 00:02:51,870 hearings, they refer to it as ame SOG. That essentially was a 36 00:02:51,870 --> 00:02:56,490 much more structured effort to look into UAP the potential 37 00:02:56,490 --> 00:03:01,200 threats that they posed, and try to understand exactly what it 38 00:03:01,200 --> 00:03:06,090 was. Now, it seems like as soon as that was created, and 39 00:03:06,090 --> 00:03:13,410 seemingly like not even off the ground, the aim SOG was renamed. 40 00:03:13,500 --> 00:03:16,200 So before I go into the story, let me preface it with some of 41 00:03:16,200 --> 00:03:19,740 you who may be thinking, hey, this is old. Well, keep in mind 42 00:03:19,740 --> 00:03:22,980 when I filed this Freedom of Information Act request, it was 43 00:03:22,980 --> 00:03:27,540 actually the day after they issued the announcement, this 44 00:03:27,540 --> 00:03:30,930 memo here signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Kathleen 45 00:03:30,930 --> 00:03:36,090 Hicks, that established ame SOG. So I had filed the next day. So 46 00:03:36,120 --> 00:03:41,160 arrow, which is the new one. Acronyms are getting insane, 47 00:03:41,190 --> 00:03:45,930 trust me, you're spot on by thinking that it was that didn't 48 00:03:45,930 --> 00:03:51,330 even exist yet. So the FOIA request was all about ame SOG, 49 00:03:51,360 --> 00:03:53,880 because that was the only thing that existed at the time. But 50 00:03:53,880 --> 00:03:57,870 then also, they searched for records about the creation of 51 00:03:57,870 --> 00:04:03,600 it. My request and let me read it specifically to you scroll to 52 00:04:03,600 --> 00:04:11,910 exactly what it said. I sought after all records pertaining to 53 00:04:11,940 --> 00:04:14,130 the airborne object identification management 54 00:04:14,130 --> 00:04:16,950 synchronization group or aim SOG and the airborne object 55 00:04:16,950 --> 00:04:21,780 identification and management executive council. I have no 56 00:04:21,780 --> 00:04:25,500 idea how they pronounce that acronym. That was essentially a 57 00:04:25,500 --> 00:04:30,330 group in addition to ame SOG that offered some oversight and 58 00:04:30,360 --> 00:04:36,120 some direction for ame SOG. The request I also stipulated to 59 00:04:36,120 --> 00:04:41,010 include, but not be limited to all letters, memos, emails sent 60 00:04:41,010 --> 00:04:44,070 to and from related parties. I also put in the in the FOIA 61 00:04:44,070 --> 00:04:47,400 request that I that I agreed to have the FOIA officer 62 00:04:47,400 --> 00:04:50,520 essentially use their best judgment on who to search 63 00:04:50,640 --> 00:04:53,700 because I wouldn't know that unless I worked within the DOD 64 00:04:53,700 --> 00:04:57,510 so I kind of let their their FOIA officer decide that it's a 65 00:04:57,510 --> 00:05:01,650 little risky, obviously, but you know, The A lot of times FOIA 66 00:05:01,650 --> 00:05:05,970 officers will help you and do their best efforts. So I thought 67 00:05:05,970 --> 00:05:09,480 that that was okay in this, in this case, also asked for 68 00:05:09,480 --> 00:05:12,660 mission statements, PowerPoint presentations, draft documents 69 00:05:12,660 --> 00:05:16,500 about the creation of those two groups, etc. Now, 70 00:05:17,310 --> 00:05:23,100 what was the response was that they found, according to them 50 71 00:05:23,100 --> 00:05:28,620 pages total. So everything that I named up here, they found 50 72 00:05:28,620 --> 00:05:33,360 pages responsive to that. The question mark is what was 73 00:05:33,360 --> 00:05:38,730 withheld because they were withholding 23 of those 50 pages 74 00:05:38,730 --> 00:05:42,780 in full. And according to their letter, they were currently 75 00:05:42,780 --> 00:05:46,410 improperly classified in the interest of national security. 76 00:05:46,410 --> 00:05:51,240 So here we go, again, with that national security, that they did 77 00:05:51,240 --> 00:05:54,690 not want to tell you or I or show your eye any of this 78 00:05:54,690 --> 00:05:58,560 material, or excuse me, about half of the material that they 79 00:05:58,560 --> 00:06:02,280 denied because of national security reasons. What's 80 00:06:02,280 --> 00:06:05,160 interesting is they also broke down the part of the executive 81 00:06:05,160 --> 00:06:09,270 order 135 to six again, in plain English, that essentially means 82 00:06:10,590 --> 00:06:14,580 the it defined secrecy, it defines classification levels. 83 00:06:15,090 --> 00:06:19,200 And they break it down by saying what applies from that are 84 00:06:19,380 --> 00:06:23,790 sections 1.4 A, which are military plans, weapons systems 85 00:06:23,790 --> 00:06:27,750 and operations. 1.4 see intelligence activities, 86 00:06:27,750 --> 00:06:31,260 including special activities, intelligence sources, or 87 00:06:31,260 --> 00:06:36,390 methods, and 1.4 G, vulnerabilities or capabilities 88 00:06:36,600 --> 00:06:40,500 of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans 89 00:06:40,500 --> 00:06:45,420 or protection services relating to national security. So that is 90 00:06:46,320 --> 00:06:50,460 their reasoning for denying those 23 pages in full. So we 91 00:06:50,460 --> 00:06:52,980 won't see those. Now I have appealed, I'll just jump ahead 92 00:06:52,980 --> 00:06:56,190 to that part of the story. So I am fighting for them. But 93 00:06:56,190 --> 00:06:59,580 essentially, for national security reasons, they did not 94 00:06:59,580 --> 00:07:03,150 want to tell me, they did release 27 pages, I'll kind of 95 00:07:03,150 --> 00:07:06,570 quickly go over some of them. But first, I want to talk to the 96 00:07:06,600 --> 00:07:11,700 key parts of this. And in those 27 pages, I can tell you that 97 00:07:11,700 --> 00:07:15,990 the meat of what was there, what I call the main core of it, were 98 00:07:16,020 --> 00:07:19,740 emails that were sent back and forth, essentially about the 99 00:07:19,740 --> 00:07:25,020 creation of AIM SOG and trying to determine the scope and the 100 00:07:25,020 --> 00:07:29,880 mission. That's obviously what goes into the pre planning for 101 00:07:29,880 --> 00:07:32,130 them that led to that memo that I already showed you 102 00:07:32,130 --> 00:07:36,930 establishing the group problem was that the majority of it was 103 00:07:36,930 --> 00:07:41,100 all blacked out. So even though they withheld the 23 pages in 104 00:07:41,100 --> 00:07:43,380 full, they didn't even Black it out, they just withheld them. 105 00:07:43,740 --> 00:07:47,520 Now we've got 27 other pages to look at. But sadly, the stuff 106 00:07:47,520 --> 00:07:51,150 that actually would be interesting, is heavily blacked 107 00:07:51,150 --> 00:07:54,540 out. But here's some of the key points that you can determine 108 00:07:54,540 --> 00:07:58,590 from this that I thought was kind of interesting, a new name 109 00:07:58,590 --> 00:08:02,610 got got put into the mix. And for all the FOIA people out 110 00:08:02,610 --> 00:08:05,040 there, I always like to add these little tips and tricks. If 111 00:08:05,040 --> 00:08:08,820 this is your your first type of video, you always look for the 112 00:08:08,820 --> 00:08:13,350 very smallest of nugget in these FOIA requests. Because on the 113 00:08:13,350 --> 00:08:16,260 surface, you look at it and they're all blacked out and you 114 00:08:16,260 --> 00:08:18,660 know, or the majority is blacked out and go Well that's really 115 00:08:18,660 --> 00:08:21,660 useless. That sucks. And you throw it behind you into the end 116 00:08:21,660 --> 00:08:26,280 of the paper shredder and and forget about it. I always urge 117 00:08:26,280 --> 00:08:31,140 you don't read every single line, look at every single 118 00:08:31,170 --> 00:08:34,890 character because in this particular case, a name was 119 00:08:34,890 --> 00:08:39,270 revealed. Mark Elliott. And when you look into his background, 120 00:08:39,270 --> 00:08:43,260 he's the director for technical collection within the Office of 121 00:08:43,260 --> 00:08:46,020 the Undersecretary of Defense for intelligence. Now why does 122 00:08:46,020 --> 00:08:48,330 this matter? It's just a new name a new government official, 123 00:08:48,330 --> 00:08:53,490 who cares. But this now opens up new avenues to explore through 124 00:08:53,490 --> 00:08:57,600 FOIA. It's a new email box to put requests on. It's a new 125 00:08:57,600 --> 00:09:01,380 person to watch out for. So that's where this kind of 126 00:09:01,380 --> 00:09:05,310 becomes interesting, because this guy seemingly was very 127 00:09:05,310 --> 00:09:10,830 involved in the creation of AIM SOG prior to this, I don't 128 00:09:10,830 --> 00:09:15,420 believe that was known. So that's something that you look 129 00:09:15,420 --> 00:09:18,750 out for that you could easily miss. And let me prove that 130 00:09:18,750 --> 00:09:23,850 point because the next person is this gentleman here, Matthew 131 00:09:23,850 --> 00:09:29,220 Cummings. Now Matthew Cummings, you can see from the documents, 132 00:09:29,250 --> 00:09:34,110 if you look closely, is the Deputy Director technical 133 00:09:34,110 --> 00:09:37,230 collection. That means that he works with this man here and is 134 00:09:37,230 --> 00:09:40,680 his deputy. And it appears that both of those gentlemen played a 135 00:09:40,680 --> 00:09:43,890 role in the creation of AIM SOG yet again, why is that 136 00:09:43,890 --> 00:09:45,450 important? Sounds pretty dry. Some 137 00:09:45,450 --> 00:09:49,650 of you like this. John is really boring. But that's why that's 138 00:09:49,650 --> 00:09:53,100 why you look at this because now this is completely opened up. 139 00:09:53,100 --> 00:09:57,060 But let me prove my point where this guy has shown up in my FOIA 140 00:09:57,060 --> 00:10:01,080 requests before, but he's easily overlooked. In a Department of 141 00:10:01,080 --> 00:10:05,640 Defense Office of the Inspector General, actually two requests, 142 00:10:05,910 --> 00:10:10,290 it yielded a bunch of emails, same instance as like this only 143 00:10:10,290 --> 00:10:14,040 problem was that the majority of it was blacked out. However, one 144 00:10:14,040 --> 00:10:17,970 name was not Matthew Cummings, this gentleman here, but there 145 00:10:17,970 --> 00:10:22,170 was no context whatsoever, we had no idea who he was, he could 146 00:10:22,170 --> 00:10:25,950 just be anybody that was see seed on those Office of the 147 00:10:25,950 --> 00:10:30,330 Inspector General emails, so kind of overlooked it. Not 148 00:10:30,330 --> 00:10:32,490 necessarily overlooked it, but there's nothing you can do with 149 00:10:32,490 --> 00:10:36,750 that. With this, we now know his title, we now know he works 150 00:10:36,750 --> 00:10:41,250 under him, we now know he creates or created or helped 151 00:10:41,250 --> 00:10:45,000 create or something with aim sock. So these are people that 152 00:10:45,000 --> 00:10:48,660 we definitely look into. So again, kind of dry, I totally 153 00:10:48,660 --> 00:10:51,450 get it. I'm not reading the comments, but I'm sure during 154 00:10:51,450 --> 00:10:54,090 this, behind the scenes, if you're if you're joining those, 155 00:10:54,780 --> 00:10:57,600 the comments are like you know, who cares. But that's why you 156 00:10:57,600 --> 00:11:00,690 look for these little avenues to explore, because these new 157 00:11:00,690 --> 00:11:05,640 people appear. And then these are all avenues to research. But 158 00:11:05,640 --> 00:11:10,380 here for me was the more I would say, interesting document that 159 00:11:10,380 --> 00:11:12,810 came out of the release, let me switch screens here, make sure 160 00:11:12,810 --> 00:11:18,090 it comes up. This is the staff summary sheet that was released 161 00:11:18,090 --> 00:11:22,560 with that Kathleen Hicks establishment memo that I that I 162 00:11:22,590 --> 00:11:26,250 again, already showed you in this video. This was attached to 163 00:11:26,250 --> 00:11:30,990 the to that memo in the foyer release. And why I'm saying that 164 00:11:30,990 --> 00:11:35,430 is this was this was never public. From what I understand. 165 00:11:35,700 --> 00:11:38,460 I checked with a couple other researchers that also go after 166 00:11:38,610 --> 00:11:42,120 documents like this. Hey, have you ever seen this attached to 167 00:11:42,330 --> 00:11:46,740 Kathleen Hicks memo? No, nobody that I had spoken with today had 168 00:11:46,770 --> 00:11:50,160 seen it. Now, why is this important? What I can deduce 169 00:11:50,160 --> 00:11:53,160 about these sheets that is essentially on the creation of 170 00:11:53,160 --> 00:11:58,890 an office like aim SOG there's coordinated efforts to to 171 00:11:58,890 --> 00:12:02,550 essentially create such an effort. And sometimes you have a 172 00:12:02,550 --> 00:12:05,130 lot of voices, which the government, it's the Department 173 00:12:05,130 --> 00:12:09,240 of Defense, there's a heck of a lot of cooks in the kitchen. So 174 00:12:09,240 --> 00:12:13,560 these types of sheets allow them to essentially keep track of 175 00:12:13,590 --> 00:12:18,780 those who are being coordinated with and what their feedback may 176 00:12:18,780 --> 00:12:24,840 be. Now be six exemption is privacy. So we don't know the 177 00:12:24,840 --> 00:12:31,320 names, but that's okay. Because these specific departments or I 178 00:12:31,320 --> 00:12:34,800 should say components within the Department of Defense, all 179 00:12:34,800 --> 00:12:39,480 played a role in the coordination for AIM SOG. And 180 00:12:39,510 --> 00:12:45,690 all of these put their input in. And what it shows is really the 181 00:12:45,690 --> 00:12:50,610 extent of how far aim SOG started to stretch throughout 182 00:12:50,820 --> 00:12:55,620 the inside of the DOD. And that's an important. That's an 183 00:12:55,620 --> 00:12:58,980 important distinction, because now we know within these 184 00:12:58,980 --> 00:13:03,870 offices, all these acronyms, they somehow have a hand in 185 00:13:03,900 --> 00:13:08,640 their UFO research effort. And what was true with ame SOG is 186 00:13:08,730 --> 00:13:12,780 likely going to be true with arrow. Now that's a totally 187 00:13:12,780 --> 00:13:16,320 different video, and subject in itself. But regardless, you can 188 00:13:16,320 --> 00:13:19,500 see where I'm going with this, because now we have a blueprint 189 00:13:19,830 --> 00:13:23,880 back to my FOIA people out there. Now we have a roadmap of 190 00:13:23,880 --> 00:13:28,380 what components to search, because you can't just file a 191 00:13:29,100 --> 00:13:33,810 request to the DOD and say I want all emails searched for 192 00:13:33,810 --> 00:13:37,200 this keyword or that keyword, because there are so many 193 00:13:37,200 --> 00:13:40,680 different components within the DOD. So they'll come back to you 194 00:13:40,680 --> 00:13:44,010 and say, Hey, this is too broad. The DoD has a very wide ranging 195 00:13:45,300 --> 00:13:50,340 department with many components and branches and offices, and so 196 00:13:50,340 --> 00:13:54,660 on and so forth. So this is the roadmap. And that's why pages 197 00:13:54,660 --> 00:13:57,000 like this are incredibly important. But when you scroll 198 00:13:57,000 --> 00:14:02,250 down, you'll see here the subject, aim SOG establishment. 199 00:14:02,850 --> 00:14:07,530 This is prior to that November memo memo, so you're obviously 200 00:14:07,530 --> 00:14:13,500 seeing the work to establish that that aim SOG effort because 201 00:14:13,500 --> 00:14:19,290 it had not been made public at this point. Here's the purpose 202 00:14:19,290 --> 00:14:21,840 to obtain the Deputy Secretary's approval to establish the 203 00:14:21,840 --> 00:14:24,540 airborne object identification and management synchronization 204 00:14:24,540 --> 00:14:28,530 group aim SOG as the successor to the unidentified aerial 205 00:14:28,530 --> 00:14:32,040 phenomena Task Force or UAP. ATF we already went over that 206 00:14:32,310 --> 00:14:35,640 background. The Department of the Navy has run the UAP ATF 207 00:14:35,640 --> 00:14:40,020 since August of 2020. However, the recent report on UAP by the 208 00:14:40,020 --> 00:14:41,910 Office of the Director of National Intelligence 209 00:14:42,060 --> 00:14:42,960 highlighted that the 210 00:14:42,960 --> 00:14:46,710 scope of the problem extends significantly beyond the purview 211 00:14:46,740 --> 00:14:51,960 of the Navy and warrants a broader approach. In June 2021. 212 00:14:52,170 --> 00:14:56,640 Deputy Deputy Secretary Hicks requested the Undersecretary of 213 00:14:56,640 --> 00:15:00,780 Defense for intelligence and security to Liver a plan to 214 00:15:00,780 --> 00:15:04,740 formalize the mission of the UAP TF into an enduring activity. 215 00:15:04,920 --> 00:15:10,500 Aim SOG was the result. When you get into the discussion heading, 216 00:15:10,740 --> 00:15:14,640 all of that is exempted from release B five is essentially 217 00:15:14,910 --> 00:15:19,080 internal deliberation. That's kind of the the nutshell 218 00:15:19,080 --> 00:15:21,480 explanation. And it goes much more in depth in the legal 219 00:15:21,480 --> 00:15:24,330 jargon, but I won't bore you to death. But essentially, they're 220 00:15:24,330 --> 00:15:27,210 saying that this is internal deliberation, they're still 221 00:15:27,240 --> 00:15:30,270 establishing ame songs, so they don't want to tell you what 222 00:15:30,270 --> 00:15:33,900 they're discussing. Same with the recommendations here, under 223 00:15:33,900 --> 00:15:38,100 B five, the acting director for technical collection, I believe 224 00:15:38,100 --> 00:15:41,880 that would be Elliott, but maybe somebody was acting director at 225 00:15:41,880 --> 00:15:45,420 this time, I don't know. But regardless, they redacted that 226 00:15:45,420 --> 00:15:48,840 for for privacy reasons. And then down here, the attachments, 227 00:15:49,020 --> 00:15:53,010 Action Memo for the DEP sec, def or Deputy Secretary of Defense. 228 00:15:53,790 --> 00:15:56,610 And it goes throughout the others, all of which, which I'll 229 00:15:56,610 --> 00:16:01,170 show you here in a minute, were released in the FOIA, the draft 230 00:16:01,200 --> 00:16:05,940 implementation guidance for reference only. That was not I 231 00:16:05,940 --> 00:16:11,850 believe that that is one of the documents withheld. So you can 232 00:16:11,850 --> 00:16:16,050 see that these little nuggets become very, very valuable to 233 00:16:16,560 --> 00:16:21,210 trying to figure out where to go next. Now I do have a nother 234 00:16:21,210 --> 00:16:24,840 case for Arrow, very similar to this, we'll see what that 235 00:16:24,840 --> 00:16:28,530 yields. And this specific request, which let me pull up 236 00:16:28,530 --> 00:16:32,190 the documents which are here. Let me zoom in so you can see 237 00:16:32,190 --> 00:16:39,000 it. So as the release letter, I have an update from the DoD that 238 00:16:39,000 --> 00:16:42,240 they searched for records on this case through December of 239 00:16:42,240 --> 00:16:49,500 2021. So the records that were created, after that, I created a 240 00:16:49,500 --> 00:16:53,880 case for those, then for the arrow material that will be at 241 00:16:53,880 --> 00:16:58,260 the end of AIM SOG through today will, you know to the date of 242 00:16:58,260 --> 00:17:01,230 processing the request. So you can see it gets a little 243 00:17:01,230 --> 00:17:04,380 complicated, you have to keep track of which request is going 244 00:17:04,380 --> 00:17:08,790 to which timeframe, because if you lose track of that, and you 245 00:17:08,790 --> 00:17:12,720 can lose information, because there's something really killer 246 00:17:12,720 --> 00:17:18,240 happened in January of 2022. About aim SOG, this request 247 00:17:18,480 --> 00:17:22,170 would not have yielded that really cool event, or document 248 00:17:22,170 --> 00:17:25,530 or PowerPoint presentation. So you have to continually follow 249 00:17:25,530 --> 00:17:29,310 up to see where that cut off date is. And then create new 250 00:17:29,310 --> 00:17:34,050 requests. So make sure that if you are filing FOIA request to 251 00:17:34,140 --> 00:17:39,240 do that. So here's some of the information that was released. 252 00:17:39,240 --> 00:17:42,450 This is again, that foyer release packet. This is 253 00:17:42,450 --> 00:17:46,440 everything. This is Kathleen Hicks memo, we don't have to go 254 00:17:46,440 --> 00:17:50,640 through it in detail, I invite you to read it. But this is 255 00:17:50,640 --> 00:17:53,700 where that staff summary sheet that I just went over was 256 00:17:53,700 --> 00:17:57,000 attached. So that's again, very cool, because that has never 257 00:17:57,000 --> 00:18:00,960 been in the public domain before. Here are the emails 258 00:18:00,990 --> 00:18:04,380 which then again become interesting, because a lot of it 259 00:18:04,680 --> 00:18:08,550 is redacted a lot of the information that would be key to 260 00:18:08,550 --> 00:18:13,380 understanding the scope of aeoi, MSG, and how it was created. Why 261 00:18:13,410 --> 00:18:16,650 exactly why it was created, what were they seeing on the inside, 262 00:18:16,920 --> 00:18:20,280 that led them up to the establishment of the office, all 263 00:18:20,280 --> 00:18:24,510 of that is likely bantered in here. But but the majority of it 264 00:18:24,510 --> 00:18:28,680 is redacted. We can also determine that the effort was 265 00:18:28,680 --> 00:18:32,670 created in a secret environment. That is, again, the 266 00:18:32,670 --> 00:18:38,970 classification secret. So it is at that level. Let me see if you 267 00:18:38,970 --> 00:18:42,750 could see this on your screen, they likely printed this out 268 00:18:42,750 --> 00:18:47,280 used black marker then scanned it in, it's not any secret that 269 00:18:47,280 --> 00:18:51,210 we can see the secret designation. But again, you can 270 00:18:51,270 --> 00:18:54,960 at least verify the security classification level of this 271 00:18:54,960 --> 00:18:58,500 entire effort. You can see here no foreign that's no foreign 272 00:18:58,500 --> 00:19:01,050 intelligence. So they want to make sure that no one outside 273 00:19:01,050 --> 00:19:04,710 the United States gets us this information. So I'm not going to 274 00:19:04,710 --> 00:19:08,220 go make this a deep dive and go through every email. Because you 275 00:19:08,220 --> 00:19:12,330 can see a lot of it is you know, some banter back and forth and 276 00:19:12,990 --> 00:19:16,860 stuff that you know, will be kind of pointless to go over. 277 00:19:17,400 --> 00:19:20,850 But one of the big things I would say that was interesting 278 00:19:20,850 --> 00:19:26,100 to me anyway. And I'll go back to the article itself to show 279 00:19:26,100 --> 00:19:26,460 you 280 00:19:30,660 --> 00:19:35,160 was this here, this is called a classification block. And this 281 00:19:35,190 --> 00:19:38,400 accompanies a lot of emails generally at the top bottom or 282 00:19:38,400 --> 00:19:41,220 both. It shows you the classification of what you're 283 00:19:41,220 --> 00:19:45,330 dealing with, who classified it and under what authority. So if 284 00:19:45,330 --> 00:19:48,840 you're communicating within the Pentagon, on a secure server, 285 00:19:48,960 --> 00:19:52,110 you get something that is secret. Generally you will see a 286 00:19:52,110 --> 00:19:57,000 classification block on who classified it and what authority 287 00:19:57,000 --> 00:20:00,450 or where it was derived from. You can see here Matthew 288 00:20:00,450 --> 00:20:05,190 Cummings was the one classifying the some of this material, it 289 00:20:05,190 --> 00:20:07,980 shows that again, he's got a hand in it, he's not just see 290 00:20:07,980 --> 00:20:11,610 seed, because he's in whatever office that essentially, I think 291 00:20:11,610 --> 00:20:15,330 that he probably has a bigger role in this than just being on 292 00:20:15,330 --> 00:20:19,860 a cc list. The classification was derived from the Defense 293 00:20:19,860 --> 00:20:24,900 Intelligence Agency security classification guide, data 2007. 294 00:20:25,020 --> 00:20:28,020 Yes, I'm going after that. I don't think that's been released 295 00:20:28,020 --> 00:20:30,810 before. So you always, you know, essentially look for those 296 00:20:30,810 --> 00:20:33,990 little nuggets. And you can see here that the classified 297 00:20:33,990 --> 00:20:42,210 material, they aim to keep it all classified until 2046. I 298 00:20:42,210 --> 00:20:46,800 always aim to change that with the FOIA. And yes, I have many 299 00:20:46,800 --> 00:20:49,770 success stories, when it comes to that a lot of people think 300 00:20:49,770 --> 00:20:52,890 that you can't do that, that once it says that it's not going 301 00:20:52,890 --> 00:20:56,580 to be declassified for decades, that they stick with it. That's 302 00:20:56,580 --> 00:21:00,120 not true, I've got quite a few examples of that, I also have a 303 00:21:00,120 --> 00:21:05,400 lot of failures. So that happens as well. So if you're going to 304 00:21:05,400 --> 00:21:08,040 go after a document, declassification mandatory 305 00:21:08,040 --> 00:21:12,060 declassification reviews, that is something to be prepared for 306 00:21:12,060 --> 00:21:15,960 it because it happens, you get shot down, they don't want to 307 00:21:15,960 --> 00:21:20,340 give it to you, and it's quite the fight. Last thing that I'll 308 00:21:20,340 --> 00:21:24,870 go over before I end this, this update to you is what didn't 309 00:21:24,870 --> 00:21:27,930 they include, and how many documents were then Well, we 310 00:21:27,930 --> 00:21:30,600 know that the page count, we know that 23 pages were 311 00:21:30,600 --> 00:21:33,990 withholding withheld and full. What does that mean? You know, 312 00:21:33,990 --> 00:21:37,110 how many documents is that is it could that be something else, 313 00:21:37,560 --> 00:21:41,070 I'm not really sure I do have a message into the DOD to try and 314 00:21:41,070 --> 00:21:44,610 break that down. I have appealed this case, as I said, that way, 315 00:21:44,610 --> 00:21:49,260 we can try and get some kind of additional release, we'll see 316 00:21:49,260 --> 00:21:52,650 how that goes. But you can see these were the files that were 317 00:21:52,680 --> 00:21:56,790 that were sent to me, as part of that release packet, I'm showing 318 00:21:56,790 --> 00:21:59,940 you six that were actually seven. The seventh was just my 319 00:21:59,940 --> 00:22:03,330 request, I nobody really cares about that. So I deleted that 320 00:22:03,330 --> 00:22:06,420 PDF on the screenshot. But you'll see here the final 321 00:22:06,420 --> 00:22:10,050 response letter, and then all of the attached documents, which I 322 00:22:10,050 --> 00:22:12,540 just kind of quickly went over in brief, I'll go back and go 323 00:22:12,540 --> 00:22:18,150 through the end. But you'll see the document numbers 1235, and 324 00:22:18,150 --> 00:22:21,330 10, you note the missing numbers. So that gives you an 325 00:22:21,330 --> 00:22:25,650 idea of how many are missing, which would be 4678. And nine, 326 00:22:26,220 --> 00:22:28,800 that gives us a again, an indication of what they're 327 00:22:28,800 --> 00:22:32,850 withholding. And that plays a role in the appeal. So that that 328 00:22:32,850 --> 00:22:37,800 gives you some kind of indicator of how they've they've withheld 329 00:22:37,830 --> 00:22:42,780 material. As I kind of again, went over those were the emails, 330 00:22:42,810 --> 00:22:45,810 I invite you to download all of those that's in the show notes 331 00:22:45,810 --> 00:22:49,170 below that that'll link over to my article, you'll have much 332 00:22:49,170 --> 00:22:52,200 more detail, including the documents themselves. You'll see 333 00:22:52,200 --> 00:22:55,650 some of the other memos. This was Kathleen Hicks, memo that 334 00:22:55,650 --> 00:23:00,150 she had sent out to she didn't say aim SOG. But she was 335 00:23:00,150 --> 00:23:04,320 essentially telling them to create something like aim SOG. 336 00:23:04,530 --> 00:23:07,080 And then you fast forward to November, that's when it was 337 00:23:07,080 --> 00:23:10,320 established. So this was that memorandum that came out in 338 00:23:10,320 --> 00:23:15,990 June, when the UAP report was was released to the public. This 339 00:23:15,990 --> 00:23:19,770 to me was more interesting than the UAP report itself, even 340 00:23:19,770 --> 00:23:23,040 though that was valuable for other reasons. This I found 341 00:23:23,040 --> 00:23:29,280 fascinating because this led to aim SOG. And now arrow. Last is 342 00:23:29,280 --> 00:23:32,940 the congressional language. So internally at the DOD, they were 343 00:23:32,940 --> 00:23:38,880 circulating a document that included all of the UAP related 344 00:23:38,880 --> 00:23:41,700 language again, I won't go through it and make this a deep 345 00:23:41,700 --> 00:23:45,720 dive. But you can see they they were watching all of this, the 346 00:23:45,720 --> 00:23:50,520 highlight was, I don't think relevant to this, if I remember, 347 00:23:50,640 --> 00:23:55,590 this was all about just something unrelated to UAP. But 348 00:23:55,590 --> 00:24:00,360 it came up in my request. And then later, you'll see the UAP 349 00:24:00,360 --> 00:24:05,520 Task Force, language and so on. So a lot of different bills and 350 00:24:05,520 --> 00:24:08,640 verbiage that was combined into this packet. So it all came up 351 00:24:08,640 --> 00:24:12,090 into my request, which all led to aim SOG. 352 00:24:13,590 --> 00:24:17,400 So that's the update a lot of fun to write these stories. I 353 00:24:17,400 --> 00:24:20,130 know sometimes they're not always international breaking 354 00:24:20,130 --> 00:24:23,160 news gonna go viral type stories. But these are 355 00:24:23,160 --> 00:24:29,130 incredibly important to showcase the ever increasing secrecy, 356 00:24:29,640 --> 00:24:34,140 about UAP and UFOs. I have another video on this channel. 357 00:24:34,140 --> 00:24:37,800 If this is your first time here. Make sure that you go to to the 358 00:24:37,800 --> 00:24:41,220 YouTube listing of all the videos. And something that I 359 00:24:41,400 --> 00:24:45,300 published in just the last week or so was all about the secrecy 360 00:24:45,690 --> 00:24:49,470 and how even though some people think we're in this era of 361 00:24:49,470 --> 00:24:54,660 transparency, quite the contrary. We're not and you can 362 00:24:54,660 --> 00:24:57,570 see that from the Navy decisions. You can see that from 363 00:24:57,600 --> 00:25:01,320 from what I just went over with you now and And as we continue 364 00:25:01,320 --> 00:25:05,340 to chisel away as much as we can, and we find these little 365 00:25:05,340 --> 00:25:10,320 nuggets, we're also seeing that increasing layer of secrecy that 366 00:25:10,320 --> 00:25:15,510 just, in my opinion is clamping down harder and harder on this 367 00:25:15,510 --> 00:25:20,490 topic, despite hearing Congress say the words, unidentified 368 00:25:20,490 --> 00:25:23,910 aerial phenomena and, and people are seeing it in congressional 369 00:25:23,910 --> 00:25:29,850 language. This is the result. And it's a lot of secrecy. I'm 370 00:25:29,850 --> 00:25:33,120 going to end you with this. A lot of people will think a lot 371 00:25:33,120 --> 00:25:38,040 of what a lot of people think that throw we'll call them shots 372 00:25:38,040 --> 00:25:41,550 at me my biggest haters. They think FOIA is a waste of time. 373 00:25:42,000 --> 00:25:45,270 And they think that stories like this are just, you know, Biden, 374 00:25:45,270 --> 00:25:49,020 the time until the congressional language hall passes, and 375 00:25:49,020 --> 00:25:50,640 there's immunity, and everybody's going to come 376 00:25:50,640 --> 00:25:53,310 forward. And there's just going to be this new era of 377 00:25:53,310 --> 00:25:56,970 transparency. Here's the the response that I have that I 378 00:25:56,970 --> 00:26:00,300 think a lot of people don't recognize, and I just saw a clip 379 00:26:00,300 --> 00:26:06,480 the other day, it was between Rand Paul and Anthony Fauci 380 00:26:06,600 --> 00:26:10,650 unrelated to UAP, obviously, but it was about the Senate 381 00:26:10,680 --> 00:26:15,240 requesting information from the NIH and getting denied that 382 00:26:15,240 --> 00:26:18,510 information. Do you know what they did? They filed FOIA 383 00:26:18,510 --> 00:26:23,070 requests. And in that congressional hearing, Rand Paul 384 00:26:23,070 --> 00:26:27,540 talked about the FOIA requests that he filed, and or his 385 00:26:27,540 --> 00:26:31,170 office, whoever, you know, signed it, but the senators file 386 00:26:31,170 --> 00:26:35,400 FOIA requests to. So so many think that the Senate just has 387 00:26:35,400 --> 00:26:39,390 this wielding power to say, alright, DOD, I want you to give 388 00:26:39,390 --> 00:26:42,180 me those videos, and we're gonna release them to the public. They 389 00:26:42,180 --> 00:26:46,500 don't, they fall back on the FOIA just as much. And Paul 390 00:26:46,500 --> 00:26:49,800 actually had said to Fauci, therefore, your requests were 391 00:26:49,800 --> 00:26:53,280 being denied. So it does not matter if you're a senator or 392 00:26:53,280 --> 00:26:57,420 congressman, or some guy who lives in a black vault, you're 393 00:26:57,420 --> 00:27:01,410 all treated the same. And it is the FOIA that defines what is 394 00:27:01,410 --> 00:27:06,450 going to be declassified. Or at least it's routed to the the 395 00:27:07,380 --> 00:27:11,310 executive orders and security classification guides on what 396 00:27:11,310 --> 00:27:16,440 determines a public release of information versus secrecy and 397 00:27:16,440 --> 00:27:21,000 more secrecy and more secrecy. So I know we want to hang on to 398 00:27:21,000 --> 00:27:26,130 come on Senator, whomever, to start demanding answers. But as 399 00:27:26,130 --> 00:27:29,940 proven time and time again, it doesn't matter if they're a 400 00:27:29,940 --> 00:27:33,690 senator, a lot of that will happen behind closed doors. And 401 00:27:33,690 --> 00:27:36,570 if they do want public transparency or answers, and 402 00:27:36,570 --> 00:27:40,680 agencies can still push back and they still fall back to FOIA. So 403 00:27:40,680 --> 00:27:44,250 all the haters out there that want to keep trashing FOIA. You 404 00:27:44,250 --> 00:27:46,980 can wait for the senators if you'd like but listen to them 405 00:27:46,980 --> 00:27:50,880 because they use the FOIA as a tool as well. And I recommend 406 00:27:50,880 --> 00:27:53,700 all of you to do the same. I'm always interested in your 407 00:27:53,700 --> 00:27:56,160 comments. If you're watching here on YouTube, make sure you 408 00:27:56,160 --> 00:27:58,740 look below, give a thumbs up, subscribe to the channel if 409 00:27:58,740 --> 00:28:02,430 you're not already. And post your views, your questions. Even 410 00:28:02,430 --> 00:28:04,770 your disagreement with me, it's all good. Just keep it 411 00:28:04,770 --> 00:28:07,410 respectful. I'm always interested in that. And if you 412 00:28:07,410 --> 00:28:12,030 aren't aware, I also drop a lot of these presentations to audio 413 00:28:12,030 --> 00:28:16,320 podcast versions as well. It's under the black vault radio on 414 00:28:16,350 --> 00:28:21,930 any podcast network out there, including iTunes, Spotify, 415 00:28:21,960 --> 00:28:26,940 wherever you listen to make sure that you that you subscribe to 416 00:28:26,940 --> 00:28:30,420 that and vice versa to the YouTube channel. If you're 417 00:28:30,450 --> 00:28:34,680 listening and didn't know I had a YouTube channel, go to www dot 418 00:28:34,680 --> 00:28:39,330 the black vault.com/live and it will forward you right to it. 419 00:28:39,600 --> 00:28:43,500 That said thank you guys so much for listening and watching. This 420 00:28:43,500 --> 00:28:46,080 is John Greenewald Jr signing off, and we'll see you next 421 00:28:46,080 --> 00:28:46,320 time.