1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:00,270 Unknown: So 2 00:00:06,870 --> 00:00:08,670 John Greenewald: what you are about to watch is something that 3 00:00:08,670 --> 00:00:13,290 is no doubt diving into a very controversial topic. In fact, 4 00:00:13,290 --> 00:00:16,230 I've pursued information on much of what you were about to watch 5 00:00:16,410 --> 00:00:19,140 for more than five and a half years throughout numerous 6 00:00:19,140 --> 00:00:22,950 federal agencies after filing a number of Freedom of Information 7 00:00:22,950 --> 00:00:26,850 Act requests. And I know that sometimes, the findings have 8 00:00:26,850 --> 00:00:30,570 triggered many people who don't care about all of the pieces of 9 00:00:30,570 --> 00:00:36,180 evidence. Ever since October of 2017. When Mr. Luis Elizondo 10 00:00:36,180 --> 00:00:39,750 began making claims about his time directing a program, 11 00:00:39,900 --> 00:00:43,890 researching anomalous aerial threats, and declared UFOs were 12 00:00:43,890 --> 00:00:49,350 indeed real. I was fascinated. But it's no secret as time went 13 00:00:49,350 --> 00:00:53,100 on that I had my doubts. Over the course of the past five and 14 00:00:53,100 --> 00:00:57,060 a half years, I've taken great care to find out what is fact. 15 00:00:57,210 --> 00:01:01,470 And what is fiction throughout an ever evolving saga that will 16 00:01:01,470 --> 00:01:06,120 no doubt not go away anytime soon. So here's my friendly 17 00:01:06,120 --> 00:01:09,780 warning, before we get going to some of you, I know you won't 18 00:01:09,780 --> 00:01:13,680 like the story I'm about to tell. Some don't care about what 19 00:01:13,680 --> 00:01:18,000 happened in the halls of the Pentagon back in 2017. Because 20 00:01:18,000 --> 00:01:22,470 in the end, we got UAP videos, and people are talking about 21 00:01:22,470 --> 00:01:27,180 UFOs in the halls of Congress years later. And although all of 22 00:01:27,180 --> 00:01:31,830 that is great, I want to know how we got here. And when I say 23 00:01:31,830 --> 00:01:36,930 I want to know, I mean, I want to know, everything, every 24 00:01:36,930 --> 00:01:41,970 little piece. But I do know that not everybody is the same way. I 25 00:01:41,970 --> 00:01:44,790 bring with the story only verified official documents 26 00:01:44,820 --> 00:01:47,670 obtained through official means. And I've tried to string 27 00:01:47,670 --> 00:01:51,060 together firsthand testimony given in different ways from 28 00:01:51,060 --> 00:01:55,110 different people over the course of years. Official documents 29 00:01:55,110 --> 00:01:59,520 don't equate to the truth. But it is part of the story. I tried 30 00:01:59,520 --> 00:02:03,000 to backup everything I can and put the puzzle pieces scattered 31 00:02:03,000 --> 00:02:07,200 on a large table closer together, so we can finally see 32 00:02:07,200 --> 00:02:12,540 what the picture is, or at least get a glimpse. Since day one, 33 00:02:12,570 --> 00:02:16,740 none of this has been personal against any one person. What it 34 00:02:16,740 --> 00:02:20,640 is about is discovering the truth behind a story that has 35 00:02:20,640 --> 00:02:25,140 huge implications, and a huge payoff for humanity, if what we 36 00:02:25,140 --> 00:02:30,270 want to believe turns out to be true. But in order to get there, 37 00:02:30,300 --> 00:02:34,890 we have to separate the wheat from the chaff. And to do that, 38 00:02:35,220 --> 00:02:39,960 we have to ask some tough questions, and sometimes deal 39 00:02:39,960 --> 00:02:44,430 with some uncomfortable realities along the way. So with 40 00:02:44,430 --> 00:02:48,480 that said, buckle up, because you're about to journey inside 41 00:02:48,480 --> 00:02:49,410 the black vault. 42 00:03:13,980 --> 00:03:16,470 That's right, everybody. As always, thank you so much for 43 00:03:16,470 --> 00:03:20,280 tuning in and taking this journey inside the black vault 44 00:03:20,310 --> 00:03:23,910 with me. I'm your host, John Greenwald, Jr. and today we're 45 00:03:23,910 --> 00:03:27,120 diving into as I just went over there, in the top of the video, 46 00:03:27,360 --> 00:03:30,690 a pretty controversial story, or at least a gets into territory 47 00:03:30,930 --> 00:03:34,500 that I know some people are really not going to be happy 48 00:03:34,530 --> 00:03:39,690 about. And they will just by default, deny any type of 49 00:03:39,840 --> 00:03:44,370 accuracy to these memos. Now, as I just stated, I want to state 50 00:03:44,370 --> 00:03:48,090 again, just because things come from official documents does not 51 00:03:48,090 --> 00:03:52,230 automatically make everything gospel, but they are pieces of 52 00:03:52,230 --> 00:03:56,760 the puzzle. And that is why I have always aimed to get this 53 00:03:56,760 --> 00:03:59,820 type of material because it tells the other part of the 54 00:03:59,820 --> 00:04:03,690 story. For years now, we have heard various aspects of the 55 00:04:03,690 --> 00:04:08,400 story of Luis Elizondo and how he came out of the Pentagon and 56 00:04:08,400 --> 00:04:12,270 why he came out of the Pentagon. And his resignation letter 57 00:04:12,270 --> 00:04:15,810 stated that the DoD wasn't essentially taking UAP serious 58 00:04:15,810 --> 00:04:19,350 enough and it needed more action. All of those types of 59 00:04:19,350 --> 00:04:22,140 stories are great, and they could absolutely very well be 60 00:04:22,140 --> 00:04:25,740 100% True. But now we're starting to see the other side 61 00:04:25,740 --> 00:04:28,920 of it. And this is what this video is about. This is what was 62 00:04:28,920 --> 00:04:35,250 going on within the halls of the Pentagon in late 2017 after the 63 00:04:35,250 --> 00:04:39,450 New York Times published their article. Now hopefully you have 64 00:04:39,450 --> 00:04:43,500 all had a chance to see the article that I published earlier 65 00:04:43,500 --> 00:04:47,640 this morning. This breaks down with great detail admittedly 66 00:04:47,640 --> 00:04:52,380 it's long but it had to be great detail about what this is all 67 00:04:52,380 --> 00:04:57,840 about. Why it's important, why it's a essentially inside look 68 00:04:57,840 --> 00:05:01,440 and what why we need that inside look To decipher what was really 69 00:05:01,440 --> 00:05:04,440 going on, because when you only have one side of the story, even 70 00:05:04,440 --> 00:05:07,860 though it may be right, it's still not the whole picture. And 71 00:05:07,860 --> 00:05:12,150 this gives us a little bit of a sneak peek into the other side 72 00:05:12,150 --> 00:05:17,160 into into the Pentagon, and the confusion that was going on 73 00:05:17,190 --> 00:05:21,240 around Luis Elizondo his resignation and the security 74 00:05:21,240 --> 00:05:27,030 concerns, not only over his resignation, but also the 75 00:05:27,300 --> 00:05:31,890 actions that he was taking outside, and also how those 76 00:05:31,890 --> 00:05:35,850 videos popping up the FLIR ONE the gimbal. And later, the go 77 00:05:35,850 --> 00:05:40,020 fast, how those popping up in the New York Times was not 78 00:05:40,020 --> 00:05:44,460 necessarily a good thing, and very much welcomed by the DOD, 79 00:05:44,640 --> 00:05:49,260 less about them being about UAP, although I'm sure that played 80 00:05:49,260 --> 00:05:53,310 into it, but more so and we'll get into this, but more so the 81 00:05:53,310 --> 00:05:57,480 fact that they were potentially classified. So put yourself into 82 00:05:57,480 --> 00:06:00,990 that mindset. This was days after the New York Times 83 00:06:01,020 --> 00:06:05,490 article, we know now that the videos were were deemed 84 00:06:05,490 --> 00:06:09,780 unclassified. And we'll get into that as well. So before anybody 85 00:06:09,780 --> 00:06:12,870 reacts to that, like, Oh, this is who cares? It was later 86 00:06:12,870 --> 00:06:16,200 determined unclassified note, let's forget about that for a 87 00:06:16,200 --> 00:06:19,320 second, because this is chronologically chronologically, 88 00:06:19,410 --> 00:06:24,240 days after the New York Times article. So it creates a very 89 00:06:24,240 --> 00:06:29,550 interesting look inside what was really, really going on with all 90 00:06:29,550 --> 00:06:33,420 of this. So let me go ahead and pull up the documents 91 00:06:33,420 --> 00:06:37,350 themselves. And this was not in the article. What I want to do 92 00:06:37,350 --> 00:06:42,300 here is kind of give you guys a little bit of an idea of how I 93 00:06:42,300 --> 00:06:45,450 came to know that my freedom of information act request was 94 00:06:45,450 --> 00:06:48,870 responded to because you will note, people that actually read 95 00:06:48,870 --> 00:06:52,230 the letter that it was sent on October excuse me on August 96 00:06:52,230 --> 00:06:58,680 17 2022. Now, here's the weird thing, why am I right? What Why 97 00:06:58,680 --> 00:07:03,570 am I writing about it in June of 2023, that I would not sit on 98 00:07:03,570 --> 00:07:07,320 something like this unless there was like more to the story that 99 00:07:07,320 --> 00:07:14,130 I was pursuing and, and to essentially give give depends on 100 00:07:14,130 --> 00:07:16,950 the story. But but to give it the respect that a story 101 00:07:16,950 --> 00:07:19,620 deserves to ensure that I have all the pieces of the puzzle for 102 00:07:19,620 --> 00:07:22,770 that respective piece, something like this, all the pieces were 103 00:07:22,770 --> 00:07:26,490 kind of there for this, so I wouldn't sit on it. So why did 104 00:07:26,520 --> 00:07:29,670 why is there that big discrepancy? Well, here's the 105 00:07:29,670 --> 00:07:32,100 weird thing. And again, I did not get into this in the 106 00:07:32,100 --> 00:07:35,730 article. But I figured I would tell the story here. I had seen 107 00:07:35,730 --> 00:07:40,050 a post online, on Twitter, actually, from somebody who had 108 00:07:40,050 --> 00:07:44,190 posted the the resignation letter that I'm about to show 109 00:07:44,190 --> 00:07:47,160 you is very short. It was not the resignation letter that we 110 00:07:47,160 --> 00:07:50,100 all have come to know from Luis Elizondo. And I thought, Oh, 111 00:07:50,100 --> 00:07:53,550 come on this is this is fake, there's no way that this is 112 00:07:53,550 --> 00:07:55,620 real, because number one, we would have heard about it. But 113 00:07:55,620 --> 00:07:58,230 number two, that's not his resignation letter. So what's 114 00:07:58,230 --> 00:08:01,080 going on here, and then there was a snippet from another 115 00:08:01,080 --> 00:08:05,430 document. That was it turned out to be real, it was from this, 116 00:08:05,520 --> 00:08:08,640 but just a snippet. It was just a paragraph or two. So I wrote 117 00:08:08,640 --> 00:08:11,670 that person, because I do follow up on these types of things just 118 00:08:11,670 --> 00:08:14,010 to kind of, you know, feel it out and go, Hey, well, what's 119 00:08:14,010 --> 00:08:16,800 going on here? What are we talking about? That person 120 00:08:16,800 --> 00:08:21,990 privately messaged back. And so well, the documents are genuine. 121 00:08:22,020 --> 00:08:25,860 I thought you got them. And I was like, wait a minute, no. Why 122 00:08:25,860 --> 00:08:28,440 would I get them and not talk about this? It was really 123 00:08:28,440 --> 00:08:31,560 interesting. The little snippet and the fact that there was a 124 00:08:31,560 --> 00:08:35,310 second resignation letter. And I thought okay, this is weird. And 125 00:08:35,310 --> 00:08:39,210 so I chatted back and forth with this person, and I'm not not 126 00:08:39,210 --> 00:08:43,050 giving you their name. I don't know their name. And their I 127 00:08:43,050 --> 00:08:45,960 only knew that the Twitter handle. And it got really 128 00:08:45,960 --> 00:08:49,920 bizarre by the end. But in the beginning, as they're saying, 129 00:08:49,920 --> 00:08:52,410 Well, we think we got the documents from you. And they 130 00:08:52,410 --> 00:08:56,220 kept saying we they ended up sending me a heavily watermarked 131 00:08:56,220 --> 00:09:02,280 PDF file through a encrypted email. And I'll be honest with 132 00:09:02,280 --> 00:09:05,010 you, My first impression was like wow, if you guys fake that 133 00:09:05,010 --> 00:09:08,880 this is really well done because number one, it wasn't explosive. 134 00:09:08,880 --> 00:09:12,750 Like it wasn't, you know, saying alien bodies were in floor 135 00:09:12,750 --> 00:09:17,520 number two of area 50. One's underground facility. I mean, it 136 00:09:17,520 --> 00:09:20,970 was quite the opposite. It was just straightforward. DOD 137 00:09:20,970 --> 00:09:25,680 memorandums and with redactions, which were weird, because the 138 00:09:25,680 --> 00:09:28,800 redactions actually look legit. And I'm like, wow, this is 139 00:09:28,800 --> 00:09:34,080 really fascinating. So they, for whatever reason, didn't want me 140 00:09:34,080 --> 00:09:37,890 to just run to the Pentagon spokesperson. And I thought, 141 00:09:37,890 --> 00:09:44,310 well, that's what's weird, but I said, Okay, I won't, but I had 142 00:09:44,310 --> 00:09:47,250 to verify these things. But one thing that I noticed when they 143 00:09:47,250 --> 00:09:53,610 sent me, the PDF, my FOIA case number was in the title. And I 144 00:09:53,610 --> 00:09:56,790 thought how bizarre like, wow, not only if they fake these 145 00:09:56,790 --> 00:10:00,120 documents, they actually looked up my FOIA case number one I'll 146 00:10:00,120 --> 00:10:03,090 fast forward the story. I didn't go to the spokesperson, I went 147 00:10:03,090 --> 00:10:06,390 to the FOIA office. And I said, Hey, there's somebody out there 148 00:10:06,390 --> 00:10:10,170 touting this material from this case, I had an open Freedom of 149 00:10:10,170 --> 00:10:15,210 Information Act appeal on it from years ago. And, and in 150 00:10:15,210 --> 00:10:20,010 fact, you'll you'll see it was filed December 17 2017. So 151 00:10:20,010 --> 00:10:23,580 you're going way back when this case actually was routed to. 152 00:10:24,210 --> 00:10:26,400 somebody's out there touting this thing. So about a week 153 00:10:26,400 --> 00:10:31,440 later, I got the response sent to me via email. And sure 154 00:10:31,440 --> 00:10:35,340 enough, the documents were all legit. And sure enough, for 155 00:10:35,340 --> 00:10:39,900 whatever reason, the DoD never sent me the response. So I was 156 00:10:39,900 --> 00:10:43,380 floored by that. I don't have a answer for you. I'm still 157 00:10:43,380 --> 00:10:48,480 working on that, on why the DoD messed up. And with as many 158 00:10:48,480 --> 00:10:51,540 requests that I've had, and obviously, since I had filed 159 00:10:51,540 --> 00:10:57,390 this on December 17 2017, you know, that amount of weight is 160 00:10:57,390 --> 00:11:00,540 ridiculous. But to know that I could have had these, you know, 161 00:11:00,600 --> 00:11:04,020 months and months ago, makes it even more frustrating. So 162 00:11:04,020 --> 00:11:06,990 there's like this weird caveat that makes the story even more 163 00:11:06,990 --> 00:11:11,940 bizarre. That person, I don't know, just to kind of close the 164 00:11:11,940 --> 00:11:16,050 story where it got bizarre. Before I talked to the DoD at 165 00:11:16,050 --> 00:11:20,160 all. They I think, either misunderstood a direct message I 166 00:11:20,160 --> 00:11:24,120 sent to them or or I'm not really sure, started making 167 00:11:24,120 --> 00:11:27,450 silly accusations that I sent all this paperwork and their 168 00:11:27,450 --> 00:11:30,180 name to the Pentagon, which which wasn't true. Again, I had 169 00:11:30,180 --> 00:11:33,270 not even talked to the DOD, they ended up blocking me on Twitter. 170 00:11:33,270 --> 00:11:36,390 And that's the end of it. And I thought with that, I was like, 171 00:11:36,390 --> 00:11:40,560 Okay, well, there's, you know, the writing is on the wall that 172 00:11:40,560 --> 00:11:42,630 this is fake. And this is someone that's just, you know, 173 00:11:42,630 --> 00:11:45,960 fooling around. But when I went to the FOIA office and just 174 00:11:45,960 --> 00:11:48,240 said, Hey, you know, I'm probably getting my leg pulled 175 00:11:48,240 --> 00:11:52,110 here, but they're saying in my case number, and then a week 176 00:11:52,110 --> 00:11:56,610 later, I got the actual documents. And here we are. So 177 00:11:56,640 --> 00:12:00,720 that to me, was just a very one of the more bizarre things that 178 00:12:00,720 --> 00:12:05,280 has happened to me. And it turned out to be legit. So I 179 00:12:05,280 --> 00:12:08,220 have no idea I'm gonna keep pressing the DOD to figure out 180 00:12:08,220 --> 00:12:11,520 hey, how did someone I don't know who it is, how did they get 181 00:12:11,520 --> 00:12:16,110 my my FOIA request release? How did they get it and I didn't, 182 00:12:16,140 --> 00:12:17,580 because that that 183 00:12:18,840 --> 00:12:21,360 there's also kind of an ethical issue here, where, you know, 184 00:12:21,360 --> 00:12:23,910 you're, you're filing these legal cases. So if you're gonna 185 00:12:23,910 --> 00:12:26,550 leave the requester, in the dark, but somehow somebody else 186 00:12:26,550 --> 00:12:30,030 gets sent the records. Again, there's there's kind of huge 187 00:12:30,030 --> 00:12:32,610 implications behind that. So still trying to figure that part 188 00:12:32,610 --> 00:12:35,430 out super weird, I thought I would give you guys a little bit 189 00:12:35,430 --> 00:12:37,980 of behind the scenes of how that went down. But let's just go 190 00:12:37,980 --> 00:12:40,110 ahead and dive into the documents themselves. Because I 191 00:12:40,110 --> 00:12:44,850 do think these are definitely worth exploring. So as I 192 00:12:44,880 --> 00:12:48,450 mentioned, August 17, was the day but I did not get these till 193 00:12:48,450 --> 00:12:51,630 about a week and a half ago, I didn't go live or anything when 194 00:12:51,630 --> 00:12:54,390 I first got them. Because this was one of those stories that 195 00:12:54,390 --> 00:12:59,070 deserved a little bit more handling with care, making sure 196 00:12:59,070 --> 00:13:01,440 that those people that I was going to be talking about in the 197 00:13:01,440 --> 00:13:07,230 story had a chance to give their say, and I did I did just that 198 00:13:07,230 --> 00:13:10,830 we'll get into it. So I won't read the letter to you. Nobody 199 00:13:10,830 --> 00:13:13,890 really cares about that. Here are the documents themselves. 200 00:13:13,890 --> 00:13:15,780 And for the purpose of this deep dive, I'm going to go ahead and 201 00:13:15,780 --> 00:13:24,390 read it for you and through with you. Because essentially this 202 00:13:27,300 --> 00:13:30,630 this for the podcast version, I think is going to be much more 203 00:13:30,630 --> 00:13:33,930 worthwhile. So forgive me as I get queued up here on the actual 204 00:13:33,930 --> 00:13:37,110 graphic, the way that it was sent to me was reverse 205 00:13:37,110 --> 00:13:40,080 chronological. So that's why you just saw me scroll down through 206 00:13:40,080 --> 00:13:43,050 a bunch of stuff. And I'm going to start with the first memo. 207 00:13:43,170 --> 00:13:46,440 Chronologically easy to determine chronologically, it's 208 00:13:46,440 --> 00:13:50,850 the oldest because this is what started kind of chronicling the 209 00:13:50,880 --> 00:13:54,270 media attention that a tip was getting. And then as we go 210 00:13:54,270 --> 00:13:56,400 through this, we'll go through a couple other documents that they 211 00:13:56,400 --> 00:14:03,420 gave me, but let me go ahead and start with this. All right, so 212 00:14:03,420 --> 00:14:07,410 this is a memorandum for the record. This was from Gary Reed. 213 00:14:07,410 --> 00:14:10,200 I know some of you cringed don't worry we'll deal with Gary Reed 214 00:14:10,200 --> 00:14:13,530 later. Gary Reed director for defense intelligence office of 215 00:14:13,530 --> 00:14:16,950 the Undersecretary of Defense for intelligence update on media 216 00:14:16,950 --> 00:14:19,350 reporting related to the advanced aerospace threat 217 00:14:19,350 --> 00:14:23,130 identification program or a tip and actions of former DoD 218 00:14:23,130 --> 00:14:27,060 employee Luis Elizondo. This memorandum summarizes recent 219 00:14:27,060 --> 00:14:31,740 media interest in the a tip, which has been accentuated by 220 00:14:31,740 --> 00:14:35,790 the public statements of former DoD employee Luis Elizondo, who 221 00:14:35,790 --> 00:14:39,480 is aggrandized his role in the program. We are collecting facts 222 00:14:39,480 --> 00:14:43,110 regarding Mr Elizondo his actual role in the a tip, reviewing the 223 00:14:43,110 --> 00:14:47,340 program's history with dia, Navy and Air Force and pursuing 224 00:14:47,340 --> 00:14:51,210 options to investigate Mr. Elizondo is possible mishandling 225 00:14:51,240 --> 00:14:55,980 of sensitive information. Mr Elizondo was assigned to AU Usdi 226 00:14:55,980 --> 00:15:01,740 from September 28 2008 to October for two days. 1017 He 227 00:15:01,740 --> 00:15:05,070 served as an action officer in partner engagement and 228 00:15:05,070 --> 00:15:08,580 subsequently as a branch chief managing classified information 229 00:15:08,730 --> 00:15:12,180 to support the Office of Military Commissions. This is 230 00:15:12,180 --> 00:15:16,890 underlined by emphasis, by the way, from Gary Reed. This is not 231 00:15:16,890 --> 00:15:21,180 my underline, to the best of my knowledge. He had no job 232 00:15:21,180 --> 00:15:25,320 responsibilities related to the a tip. The a tip was terminated 233 00:15:25,320 --> 00:15:31,800 in 2012. And information paper on the program is at tab a. Now 234 00:15:31,800 --> 00:15:34,620 I'm going to stop right there. That emphasis like I said the 235 00:15:34,620 --> 00:15:39,480 underlined that sounds familiar, right in 2019. Pentagon 236 00:15:39,480 --> 00:15:43,050 spokesperson Christopher Sherwood, not Susan golf, like 237 00:15:43,050 --> 00:15:46,830 everybody says, and the reason I'm saying that is for accuracy 238 00:15:46,830 --> 00:15:51,060 here. A DoD IG complaint was submitted against her, but she 239 00:15:51,060 --> 00:15:53,790 did not come out with the original statement. All 240 00:15:53,790 --> 00:15:56,730 evidence, although I'm still digging, but all evidence shows 241 00:15:56,730 --> 00:16:00,360 she had nothing to do with the UAP portfolio until after that. 242 00:16:00,600 --> 00:16:04,320 So Christopher Sherwood was the root of that statement. He was 243 00:16:04,320 --> 00:16:08,100 never mentioned and Luis Elizondo his IG complaint. He's 244 00:16:08,100 --> 00:16:11,580 the one that issued it, but he was not the one that actually 245 00:16:11,580 --> 00:16:14,790 came up with it, as evidenced here. In fact, it wasn't even in 246 00:16:14,790 --> 00:16:19,380 2019 wasn't even in 2018. But in fact, it goes all the way back 247 00:16:19,500 --> 00:16:23,190 to the end of December, within about a week. And you'll see 248 00:16:23,190 --> 00:16:26,130 even though this is undated, how we can determine it was probably 249 00:16:26,130 --> 00:16:31,410 around December 20 22nd, somewhere around that timeframe. 250 00:16:31,860 --> 00:16:35,580 But regardless, it was the end of December of 2017, that this 251 00:16:35,580 --> 00:16:39,630 was written. And even then, they were already bantering within 252 00:16:39,630 --> 00:16:42,480 the Department of Defense and putting in a memorandum for the 253 00:16:42,480 --> 00:16:46,980 record. We do not believe that he had any job responsibilities 254 00:16:47,010 --> 00:16:51,600 on the a tip. We do know years later, they added the word in 255 00:16:51,630 --> 00:16:56,160 assigned responsibilities. The jury's still out on exactly why 256 00:16:56,160 --> 00:16:58,830 that is. There are some guesses I think I have a guess but 257 00:16:58,830 --> 00:17:02,640 doesn't matter. That was changed years later. But look, this is 258 00:17:02,640 --> 00:17:06,480 how early that statement was, but they did not release it. The 259 00:17:06,480 --> 00:17:10,260 DoD never addressed it. Until years later. I found that pretty 260 00:17:10,260 --> 00:17:13,230 interesting, especially with the accusation that they were trying 261 00:17:13,230 --> 00:17:17,010 to assassinate the character of Luis Elizondo, you'd think like 262 00:17:17,070 --> 00:17:19,050 boom, right off the bat, they would start throwing these 263 00:17:19,050 --> 00:17:22,230 statements out there, but they didn't they sat on it. For 264 00:17:22,230 --> 00:17:28,530 reasons unknown. Let's continue on. On October 3 2017, Mr 265 00:17:28,530 --> 00:17:32,460 Elizondo submitted a resignation letter tab be requesting 266 00:17:32,460 --> 00:17:36,150 immediate termination of his employment. He was cleared out 267 00:17:36,150 --> 00:17:40,620 of Usdi the next day, he provided no reason for the 268 00:17:40,620 --> 00:17:43,260 sudden departure. Now I'm going to start jumping around in the 269 00:17:43,260 --> 00:17:45,900 documents because it's for the sake of the storytelling. I will 270 00:17:45,900 --> 00:17:49,980 show you tab B, because the resignation letter that I know 271 00:17:49,980 --> 00:17:52,800 you guys have in your head, showed Luis Elizondo his 272 00:17:52,800 --> 00:17:56,580 reasoning for resigning right. It was all about the anomalous 273 00:17:56,580 --> 00:17:59,910 aerial threats. And in fact, there it is, that's the one that 274 00:17:59,910 --> 00:18:03,810 you saw on the History Channel website. That's the one that was 275 00:18:03,810 --> 00:18:08,520 stored on Christopher Mellon's web server. So that's the one 276 00:18:08,520 --> 00:18:11,730 that goes into more detail. So what's this one? This was a 277 00:18:11,730 --> 00:18:15,270 second resignation letter never before seen by the public. And 278 00:18:15,270 --> 00:18:18,390 you can see it as short and sweet. There are no letterhead, 279 00:18:18,570 --> 00:18:22,530 note no letterhead to it. It just says effective for October 280 00:18:22,530 --> 00:18:26,730 2017. I humbly submit my resignation as Director, 281 00:18:26,850 --> 00:18:30,000 National Programs special management staff office of the 282 00:18:30,000 --> 00:18:33,630 Undersecretary of Defense for intelligence. In this regard, I 283 00:18:33,630 --> 00:18:36,210 understand I will no longer be an employee of the US 284 00:18:36,210 --> 00:18:39,330 government. I respectfully request I receive a quote, 285 00:18:39,570 --> 00:18:44,790 deferred retirement very respectfully, Luis de Elizondo. 286 00:18:45,870 --> 00:18:49,860 Now let's jump back on and going back to the memo on or about 287 00:18:49,860 --> 00:18:53,550 October for after Mr. Elizondo had departed the organization. A 288 00:18:53,550 --> 00:18:58,020 second resignation letter tabs see was delivered to the USDA 289 00:18:58,020 --> 00:19:01,620 chief of staff office in this letter, which is formatted as a 290 00:19:01,620 --> 00:19:06,330 memorandum for record, but uses the salutation. Mr. Secretary, 291 00:19:06,570 --> 00:19:10,800 Mr. Elizondo cites concerns over anomalous aerospace threats as 292 00:19:10,800 --> 00:19:14,400 the basis for his resignation. Given the uncertain provenance 293 00:19:14,430 --> 00:19:19,080 of the second letter, oh Usdi retained a copy, but did not 294 00:19:19,080 --> 00:19:24,180 provide it to the SecDef office. The uncertain provenance stuck 295 00:19:24,180 --> 00:19:27,990 out to me what uncertain provenance the first resignation 296 00:19:27,990 --> 00:19:31,770 letter didn't have that tag to it. And then this one on or 297 00:19:31,770 --> 00:19:34,710 about October 4. Well, why didn't he know that we knew this 298 00:19:34,710 --> 00:19:38,310 one. Is it because it was dated maybe, but who dropped it off? 299 00:19:38,610 --> 00:19:42,930 You'll see later it was Mr. Elizondo who submitted that that 300 00:19:42,930 --> 00:19:47,040 resignation letter to his boss John Garrity, look at the 301 00:19:47,040 --> 00:19:51,060 signature here. initialed John Garrity written out three 302 00:19:51,060 --> 00:19:56,130 October 2017. This stipulates that he had received it from 303 00:19:56,130 --> 00:19:59,280 Elizondo personally and again that's in these documents as 304 00:19:59,280 --> 00:20:03,510 well. But when it comes to the second now we know second 305 00:20:03,510 --> 00:20:06,210 resignation letter, the one that we all know about and have for 306 00:20:06,210 --> 00:20:09,270 quite some time. That was technically the second that had 307 00:20:09,270 --> 00:20:14,850 this uncertain provenance to it. What that was, is your is your 308 00:20:14,850 --> 00:20:19,800 best guess is best guesses? Same as mine. I have no idea. Yes, I 309 00:20:19,800 --> 00:20:23,250 did ask Mr. Elizondo. We'll get to those statements later in the 310 00:20:23,250 --> 00:20:30,900 video, or the lack thereof. Back to the letter or memo I should 311 00:20:30,900 --> 00:20:34,740 say in a phone call on October 5. When asked about the second 312 00:20:34,770 --> 00:20:38,670 letter, Mr. Elizondo told me that for many years, he had been 313 00:20:38,670 --> 00:20:41,730 secretly tasked by the Secretary of Defense as the program 314 00:20:41,730 --> 00:20:46,050 manager for investigating UFOs and other aerial threats. He 315 00:20:46,050 --> 00:20:49,650 said nobody in Usdi was cleared for this program and would not 316 00:20:49,650 --> 00:20:53,430 discuss it further. I discussed his claims with senior officials 317 00:20:53,430 --> 00:20:57,120 who would likely have known of such an arrangement but but was 318 00:20:57,120 --> 00:21:01,020 unable to substantiate them. Keep in mind Gary Reed has now 319 00:21:01,020 --> 00:21:04,260 for the last year or so been the guy that people are pointing 320 00:21:04,260 --> 00:21:07,530 their fingers to in some circles that say he's the one that's the 321 00:21:07,530 --> 00:21:10,980 root of all of this. This is showing that he checked with 322 00:21:11,130 --> 00:21:15,780 senior officials to try and substantiate the claims of Luis 323 00:21:15,780 --> 00:21:21,180 Elizondo. Moving on in the memo. On October 12, I learned a video 324 00:21:21,180 --> 00:21:24,930 featuring Mr. Elizondo that was posted on YouTube by the to the 325 00:21:24,930 --> 00:21:27,930 stars Academy of Arts and Sciences, which appears to be 326 00:21:27,930 --> 00:21:32,820 his current employer, he asserts for nearly the last decade, and 327 00:21:32,820 --> 00:21:36,150 this is a quote he asserts, quote, for nearly the last 328 00:21:36,150 --> 00:21:39,180 decade, I ran a sensitive aerospace threat identification 329 00:21:39,180 --> 00:21:43,080 program focusing on unidentified aerial technologies, that's 330 00:21:43,080 --> 00:21:46,890 unquote from Elizondo back to the memo and later says, We are 331 00:21:46,890 --> 00:21:50,190 also planning to provide never before released footage from 332 00:21:50,190 --> 00:21:51,840 real US government systems. 333 00:21:54,180 --> 00:21:57,660 So again, that last part quote being from Mr. Elizondo, we are 334 00:21:57,660 --> 00:22:00,420 also planning to provide never before released footage from 335 00:22:00,420 --> 00:22:03,930 real US government systems, put yourself into the timeframe late 336 00:22:03,930 --> 00:22:10,770 December, and in as this was written, but in October before 337 00:22:10,770 --> 00:22:14,370 the videos came out, he started to see Elizondo say publicly, 338 00:22:14,490 --> 00:22:18,450 they were going to release never before released footage from the 339 00:22:18,450 --> 00:22:21,300 US government systems. You can imagine that might be a red 340 00:22:21,300 --> 00:22:25,050 flag, put a pin in that because that's absolutely a red flag and 341 00:22:25,050 --> 00:22:29,400 plays a role later. Back to the memo. Following discovery of the 342 00:22:29,400 --> 00:22:33,630 YouTube video, I requested an informal review of Mr. Elizondo 343 00:22:33,630 --> 00:22:36,150 is conduct by the Air Force Office of Special 344 00:22:36,150 --> 00:22:41,550 Investigations, or AF OSI, which is responsible for providing 345 00:22:41,580 --> 00:22:44,760 investigative support to the Office of the Secretary of 346 00:22:44,760 --> 00:22:49,380 Defense, including investigation of assigned personnel. In late 347 00:22:49,380 --> 00:22:53,430 November, FOS, I advised that absent more tangible indicators 348 00:22:53,430 --> 00:22:57,450 of possible misconduct, they did not have enough information to 349 00:22:57,450 --> 00:23:01,860 open a case on Mr. Elizondo. Now remember, another thing that we 350 00:23:01,860 --> 00:23:05,610 keep hearing about in from some circles in the last year was 351 00:23:05,610 --> 00:23:09,420 that Reid was using his kind of all powerful arm in office to 352 00:23:09,420 --> 00:23:14,700 push for these investigations, and that he was the sole we'll 353 00:23:14,700 --> 00:23:18,990 call it puppeteer to make Elizondo his life miserable. 354 00:23:19,740 --> 00:23:25,080 However, this shows that he didn't have that power afosr At 355 00:23:25,080 --> 00:23:30,330 that time, in October through to November of 2017, before those 356 00:23:30,330 --> 00:23:34,230 videos were published in the New York Times, that's key. Before 357 00:23:34,230 --> 00:23:38,460 that, afosr I pushed back and essentially said no, the 358 00:23:38,460 --> 00:23:41,880 evidence there does not justify a investigation into Mr. 359 00:23:41,880 --> 00:23:44,940 Elizondo. So despite what you may think about Reid, and I 360 00:23:44,940 --> 00:23:48,630 could care less about the man, myself, I mean, I don't know 361 00:23:48,630 --> 00:23:51,450 him. I've never talked to him. I know nothing about him. But 362 00:23:51,450 --> 00:23:54,180 regardless of what you think about him, the claims that he 363 00:23:54,180 --> 00:23:58,020 had this all powerful like, oh, investigate this guy, and then a 364 00:23:58,020 --> 00:24:02,280 fo fo is I goes, Okay, let's investigate the guy. That's not 365 00:24:02,280 --> 00:24:05,190 true. And the there was not enough there. So they pushed 366 00:24:05,190 --> 00:24:09,090 back and said, No, we will not open a case. Back to the memo on 367 00:24:09,090 --> 00:24:13,440 December 7, DOD was contacted by the New York Times seeking 368 00:24:13,440 --> 00:24:17,430 information regarding the a tip and noting that Mr. Elizondo, 369 00:24:17,430 --> 00:24:21,420 his recent resignation was submitted to protest what he 370 00:24:21,420 --> 00:24:25,980 characterized as internal opposition and lack of resources 371 00:24:25,980 --> 00:24:28,860 for continued research. So now we're getting into the New York 372 00:24:28,860 --> 00:24:33,780 Times playing a role in this on December 15, based on 373 00:24:33,780 --> 00:24:37,650 information contained in the New York Times inquiry, I notified 374 00:24:37,650 --> 00:24:42,030 the O Usdi. Security Officer, that Mr. Elizondo may have 375 00:24:42,030 --> 00:24:46,260 misused government systems and may intend to release US 376 00:24:46,260 --> 00:24:49,530 government footage or information that he obtained 377 00:24:49,530 --> 00:24:52,950 during his employment with Oh Usdi. I don't know what was in 378 00:24:52,950 --> 00:24:56,220 that initial New York Times inquiry, but this shows you that 379 00:24:56,220 --> 00:25:00,660 they likely had knowledge of some kind or We're asking 380 00:25:00,660 --> 00:25:04,620 questions about something that may have encroached into 381 00:25:04,620 --> 00:25:08,580 classified territory or was potential, potentially a 382 00:25:08,580 --> 00:25:12,150 classified territory. And that's going to pique any senior 383 00:25:12,150 --> 00:25:18,450 defense officials ears right up, because clearly for years, leaks 384 00:25:18,450 --> 00:25:21,210 are a concern to the Department of Defense. So now you've got a 385 00:25:21,210 --> 00:25:25,350 mainstream media outlet and a major one pushing for answers 386 00:25:25,350 --> 00:25:28,740 about a program that may or may not even exist at this point. 387 00:25:28,740 --> 00:25:33,000 But obviously was was potentially tied to somebody who 388 00:25:33,000 --> 00:25:37,830 was irrefutably, Luis Elizondo was highly cleared and had 389 00:25:37,830 --> 00:25:42,090 access to many government secrets. So put all of that 390 00:25:42,090 --> 00:25:45,570 together. Any senior defense official anybody doesn't matter 391 00:25:45,570 --> 00:25:49,560 if it's Gary Reed or not, who sees that is going to start 392 00:25:49,560 --> 00:25:51,900 perking their ears up going, Hey, wait a minute, what is 393 00:25:51,900 --> 00:25:55,800 potentially going to be leaking out to the general public? Back 394 00:25:55,800 --> 00:26:00,510 to the memo. On December 17, Mr. Elizondo appeared on national 395 00:26:00,540 --> 00:26:04,080 news programs providing commentary on a video that 396 00:26:04,080 --> 00:26:08,070 appears to be camera footage taken by a US military aircraft 397 00:26:08,070 --> 00:26:12,360 showing what he claims is an unidentified flying object. In 398 00:26:12,360 --> 00:26:16,860 the TV interview, Mr. Li. Mr. Elizondo affirms his alleged 399 00:26:16,860 --> 00:26:21,540 role in leading the a tip program and says, quote, We are 400 00:26:21,540 --> 00:26:26,280 not alone. Now, I did look up that quote, that is not exactly 401 00:26:26,280 --> 00:26:29,040 what he said. It's there's quite a kind of a twist. He has said 402 00:26:29,040 --> 00:26:34,170 we may not be alone, so I want to be clear there. Regardless, 403 00:26:34,260 --> 00:26:38,730 that tone that claim was a concern to the DOD. So despite 404 00:26:38,730 --> 00:26:43,020 the slight misquote there by Reid Elizondo was essentially 405 00:26:43,020 --> 00:26:47,580 alluding to that very thing that humanity may not be alone. 406 00:26:49,020 --> 00:26:54,990 Moving on, on December 18, oh, USDA, I located a classified 407 00:26:55,020 --> 00:27:01,170 email generated by Mr. Elizondo in August of 2017, in which he 408 00:27:01,170 --> 00:27:05,610 requested assistance from a navy civilian, a navy civilian 409 00:27:05,610 --> 00:27:11,010 employee to declassify one or more videos. The video attached 410 00:27:11,010 --> 00:27:15,090 to the email is the same footage broadcast on national news on 411 00:27:15,090 --> 00:27:19,950 December 17. The email chain is incomplete. So we have yet to 412 00:27:19,950 --> 00:27:24,300 determine if the video was properly declassified, what 413 00:27:24,300 --> 00:27:27,570 process was followed and how it ended up in the possession of 414 00:27:27,570 --> 00:27:31,140 the national media. We continue to research these email 415 00:27:31,140 --> 00:27:35,940 transactions. This is one of the key parts of this memo again, 416 00:27:35,940 --> 00:27:39,900 despite what you think about Gary Reed, take that name out of 417 00:27:39,900 --> 00:27:44,220 the equation and look at the reality of the facts. The DoD 418 00:27:44,220 --> 00:27:49,860 was, was encountering a classified email written by Luis 419 00:27:49,860 --> 00:27:54,990 Elizondo with attachments that were the same videos that were 420 00:27:54,990 --> 00:28:00,600 now broadcast worldwide. So I'll say that again, a classified 421 00:28:00,600 --> 00:28:05,640 email written by Luis Elizondo, talking about declassifying 422 00:28:05,640 --> 00:28:10,410 them. So the declassification word is declassifying is key, 423 00:28:10,650 --> 00:28:14,400 because that indicates potentially they were classified 424 00:28:14,580 --> 00:28:19,830 and they are all over the world. That is a concern for any senior 425 00:28:19,860 --> 00:28:23,100 defense official doesn't matter how you slice it or dice it. 426 00:28:23,340 --> 00:28:27,780 That would be a concern to try and figure out did classified 427 00:28:27,780 --> 00:28:32,250 information just spill out into the open, or is this something 428 00:28:32,280 --> 00:28:39,210 else? The last paragraph in this memo on December 21, I met with 429 00:28:39,210 --> 00:28:43,770 afosr agents to initiate a formal inquiry into Mr. Elizondo 430 00:28:43,770 --> 00:28:46,980 as possible mishandling of classified materials. 431 00:28:47,310 --> 00:28:50,610 Attachments, as stated that's the end of the first memo. Now 432 00:28:50,610 --> 00:28:56,790 to go back to that classified email. I am not sure if the 433 00:28:57,660 --> 00:29:00,990 email there's a there's an email or two that was released to me 434 00:29:00,990 --> 00:29:05,070 years ago through a Freedom of Information Act request in 435 00:29:05,070 --> 00:29:10,770 relation to the Doppler process. Now, that was potentially what 436 00:29:10,770 --> 00:29:15,210 is being referred to here. I can't confirm that at this 437 00:29:15,210 --> 00:29:18,330 point. I have filed other requests to get that specific 438 00:29:18,330 --> 00:29:22,020 email and may ultimately be the same. But the point here is the 439 00:29:22,020 --> 00:29:25,560 same regardless of it is the same email or not. It was 440 00:29:25,560 --> 00:29:29,370 classified. The attachments were technically classified because 441 00:29:29,370 --> 00:29:31,800 they were on a classified system. And they were talking 442 00:29:31,800 --> 00:29:35,880 about declassifying the videos. So that that's every indicator 443 00:29:35,880 --> 00:29:39,150 that potentially there was a security problem and a security 444 00:29:39,150 --> 00:29:43,260 leak. So now let me go to the second memo, which is 445 00:29:43,260 --> 00:29:46,350 interesting, because this is essentially what I just read to 446 00:29:46,350 --> 00:29:49,410 you with one exception, see all these scribbles? Those are not 447 00:29:49,410 --> 00:29:58,620 mine. Those are made by someone who I believe I figured out and 448 00:29:58,620 --> 00:30:01,860 I will show show you the handwriting analysis before we 449 00:30:01,860 --> 00:30:04,920 go through the hand writing itself and what was scribbled. 450 00:30:05,820 --> 00:30:12,600 But you see up here, these initials. And we know at the 451 00:30:12,600 --> 00:30:17,400 time the Secretary of Defense was James Mattis. His middle 452 00:30:17,400 --> 00:30:23,580 initial was n. So when I saw this, I thought, Okay, could do. 453 00:30:23,850 --> 00:30:27,600 Essentially what this indicates is Mattis got this memorandum 454 00:30:27,600 --> 00:30:33,510 for the record initial receipt on the 23rd. This is Gary reads, 455 00:30:33,870 --> 00:30:38,490 GER. So that would be Gary Reed's initials. And then you 456 00:30:38,490 --> 00:30:40,770 see these handwritten notes. 457 00:30:42,300 --> 00:30:45,150 So I'm going to change how I'm going to do this. I'll go 458 00:30:45,150 --> 00:30:47,640 through the notes first, then I'll tell you why I think it's 459 00:30:47,640 --> 00:30:52,680 Mattis. So I'm not going to reread the entire memo again to 460 00:30:52,680 --> 00:30:57,270 you. But you can see what what what I believe is Mattis so I'm 461 00:30:57,270 --> 00:30:59,610 just gonna give that friendly caveat again, I couldn't confirm 462 00:30:59,610 --> 00:31:03,780 it. 100%. I wrote James Mattis, he read the email did not reply. 463 00:31:04,050 --> 00:31:06,690 And I have followed up with the Pentagon numerous times to try 464 00:31:06,690 --> 00:31:10,260 and confirm it. They they say they are researching it, but 465 00:31:10,260 --> 00:31:13,410 have not gotten back to me by the recording of this video. But 466 00:31:13,440 --> 00:31:16,140 there's a lot of indicators that it is. So that's my friendly 467 00:31:16,140 --> 00:31:19,650 caveat. There's a slight possibility it's not him. I 468 00:31:19,650 --> 00:31:22,260 considered a very small possibility. But if it isn't, 469 00:31:22,350 --> 00:31:26,430 doesn't matter. It's clearly a senior official above read, who 470 00:31:26,430 --> 00:31:29,880 saw this, analyzed what read was writing and then issued some 471 00:31:29,880 --> 00:31:32,940 follow up questions which we'll go over as well. But here's what 472 00:31:32,940 --> 00:31:35,670 piqued their interest, underlining who was aggrandized 473 00:31:35,670 --> 00:31:39,510 his role into the program. Obviously, him going out there 474 00:31:39,630 --> 00:31:43,290 telling tall tales in the eyes of the DoD was something that 475 00:31:43,320 --> 00:31:47,070 that kind of piqued his interest there. Here's some exclamation 476 00:31:47,070 --> 00:31:50,370 points with another underlying brand. He was a branch chief 477 00:31:50,370 --> 00:31:53,880 managing classified information to support the Office of 478 00:31:53,880 --> 00:31:57,510 Military Commissions. That obviously piqued his interest as 479 00:31:57,510 --> 00:32:02,160 well got a couple of exclamation exclamation points. Likely 480 00:32:02,370 --> 00:32:06,300 because it tied in with, there was no reason for his sudden 481 00:32:06,300 --> 00:32:10,770 departure. Look how he boxed that in exclamation point at 482 00:32:10,800 --> 00:32:15,780 that one. And then hand wrote in C, Intel alarm, that's the 483 00:32:15,780 --> 00:32:18,720 letter C for those listening to the podcast that essentially 484 00:32:18,720 --> 00:32:23,520 stands for Counter Intelligence alarm with a question mark. Now 485 00:32:23,520 --> 00:32:27,270 why would he write that? And to me, I think the answer is easy. 486 00:32:28,470 --> 00:32:32,040 He had access and managed classified information to 487 00:32:32,040 --> 00:32:35,520 support the Office of Military Commissions. We know from 488 00:32:35,520 --> 00:32:39,150 Elizondo his background he was working with or through Gitmo on 489 00:32:39,150 --> 00:32:43,500 some of those law enforcement proceedings when it came to the 490 00:32:43,500 --> 00:32:48,510 terrorists. I was able to show that his position likely was 491 00:32:48,630 --> 00:32:52,830 farming out SAP access meaning Elizondo has position farming 492 00:32:52,830 --> 00:32:57,030 out SAP access to the attorneys of Collete, Sheikh Muhammad, and 493 00:32:57,030 --> 00:33:00,120 an unknown number of other terrorists. I've done a video on 494 00:33:00,120 --> 00:33:02,640 this channel. It's been a couple of years. But I was always 495 00:33:02,640 --> 00:33:05,940 fascinated by what Elizondo was confirmed to have been doing 496 00:33:06,180 --> 00:33:08,940 this kind of supports that with the office of the military 497 00:33:09,180 --> 00:33:12,420 commissions managing classified information, but back to the 498 00:33:12,420 --> 00:33:16,320 counterintelligence alarm, his sudden departure to any senior 499 00:33:16,320 --> 00:33:19,920 defense official, if you are just immediately leaving your 500 00:33:19,920 --> 00:33:24,600 position. Why, where are you going? Is somebody threatening 501 00:33:24,600 --> 00:33:27,570 you? Is there a problem? Are you taking your secrets with you? 502 00:33:27,810 --> 00:33:31,020 And potentially selling them? All of that, again, is just 503 00:33:31,020 --> 00:33:34,740 conjecture. So I want to stress that, but that justifies putting 504 00:33:34,740 --> 00:33:39,990 in there, Hey, are we concerned here for any type of, you know, 505 00:33:39,990 --> 00:33:44,220 potential threat here with his knowledge, sudden departure, and 506 00:33:44,220 --> 00:33:48,300 obviously, where he in what he worked on? So let me stress 507 00:33:48,300 --> 00:33:51,270 that's just speculation, but it's kind of obvious speculation 508 00:33:51,270 --> 00:33:56,100 because of combining what piqued his interest, why this stuff was 509 00:33:56,100 --> 00:33:59,550 underlined, and then the sudden departure you can also see here, 510 00:33:59,550 --> 00:34:04,950 he circled uncertain provenance. So that was in relation to that 511 00:34:04,950 --> 00:34:08,430 second resignation letter, you'll see that a question goes 512 00:34:08,460 --> 00:34:11,970 directed. What does that mean? And we'll get to that question 513 00:34:11,970 --> 00:34:15,720 in the next memo. Scrolling down here he kind of has some check 514 00:34:15,720 --> 00:34:18,330 marks so it's probably you know, he's just going through it my 515 00:34:18,330 --> 00:34:21,630 guess is Mattis may have been a little old school and and you 516 00:34:21,630 --> 00:34:24,690 know wasn't in the right and emails but would grab a paper 517 00:34:24,690 --> 00:34:29,190 copy of something and and and do that type of you know, okay, 518 00:34:29,190 --> 00:34:32,340 read this or read this or this goes down the line underlying 519 00:34:32,340 --> 00:34:35,640 Navy civilian so the Navy civilian that was on the other 520 00:34:35,640 --> 00:34:39,000 side of that classified email that Luis Elizondo wrote, which 521 00:34:39,000 --> 00:34:43,080 was obviously a big concern, because it's in there quite a 522 00:34:43,080 --> 00:34:46,410 bit and referencing these that classified email. It was 523 00:34:46,410 --> 00:34:50,580 starred, it was underlined. And then you can see here, the 524 00:34:50,580 --> 00:34:57,030 handwritten note who is investigating AF LSI. If so, are 525 00:34:57,030 --> 00:35:03,690 they looking into all Excuse me all. That's the word I couldn't 526 00:35:03,690 --> 00:35:10,020 read. I think it's all aspects surrounding the situation. I 527 00:35:10,020 --> 00:35:13,590 don't know what this word is. It's kind of hard to read. And I 528 00:35:13,590 --> 00:35:16,410 might figure it out like after zooming in, but it's kind of 529 00:35:16,410 --> 00:35:25,560 hard into all aspects. All aspects or assistance maybe 530 00:35:26,040 --> 00:35:28,650 Regardless though, you can you can kind of see that he was 531 00:35:28,650 --> 00:35:32,280 worried about this navy civilian and asking who was who was 532 00:35:32,280 --> 00:35:34,920 writing, I thought it was a little bit clearer of a copy, 533 00:35:34,920 --> 00:35:39,720 but I guess it's a little bit a little bit bad there to see on 534 00:35:39,720 --> 00:35:42,990 screen. Regardless, though, that was the the handwritten note in 535 00:35:42,990 --> 00:35:46,260 the margin. And so that was it. That was the second document 536 00:35:46,260 --> 00:35:48,570 that was released. Now let's get to why I think that this is 537 00:35:48,570 --> 00:35:52,050 Mattis. Okay, so now you see what was important to what I 538 00:35:52,050 --> 00:35:54,780 believe is who I believe is Mattis, but potentially a senior 539 00:35:54,780 --> 00:36:01,260 defensive official above. Read. Obviously, I already went over 540 00:36:01,260 --> 00:36:06,030 the initials. But take a look at this. This is what I just read 541 00:36:06,030 --> 00:36:09,930 to you. Again, that word or two is kind of hard to read. But 542 00:36:09,930 --> 00:36:12,480 look at the writing style. Number one, though, it sticks 543 00:36:12,480 --> 00:36:16,800 out. It's all capital letters. Number two, you look at 544 00:36:16,800 --> 00:36:21,450 matching. You look at matching letters throughout the these two 545 00:36:21,450 --> 00:36:25,650 are confirmed. Mattis Okay, so those are those are confirmed, 546 00:36:25,650 --> 00:36:31,020 written by Secretary of Defense Mattis. So this is like what 547 00:36:31,020 --> 00:36:34,230 we're what we're questioning. So when you look at stuff, you look 548 00:36:34,230 --> 00:36:36,750 at the different letters. And when you look at, let's say, the 549 00:36:36,780 --> 00:36:40,350 N, you look at the end, so you see an n here, and you go over 550 00:36:40,350 --> 00:36:44,400 and try and find an N, look at how he writes this n kind of 551 00:36:44,400 --> 00:36:48,630 hooks, the end there a little bit has kind of a weird way to 552 00:36:48,630 --> 00:36:51,090 start it, you're never gonna find exact matches, but you'll 553 00:36:51,090 --> 00:36:55,350 find huge similarities. Now look at the ends over here, same way 554 00:36:55,350 --> 00:36:59,940 hooks at the end, same kind of short on the top part of it or 555 00:36:59,940 --> 00:37:04,620 the front end of it. He also has these kind of bubble, you know, 556 00:37:04,620 --> 00:37:06,930 kind of the only way I could describe is more of a bubble 557 00:37:06,930 --> 00:37:10,440 writing to where he really kind of like you could see the W 558 00:37:10,440 --> 00:37:14,700 there on how he does this. On the RS, you can see he trails 559 00:37:14,700 --> 00:37:19,650 the tail of letters, RS is a big one, see how he tails he trails 560 00:37:19,650 --> 00:37:24,180 on the tail. So he writes the R but it trails down. Look over 561 00:37:24,180 --> 00:37:27,720 here, he does the same thing in all the letters that he does. 562 00:37:28,020 --> 00:37:32,640 The SS also you look at the hooks that the SS have the hooks 563 00:37:32,640 --> 00:37:35,040 are the same, the way that he does them are very, very 564 00:37:35,040 --> 00:37:39,330 similar. So you see that and a lot of it. So I invite you to 565 00:37:39,330 --> 00:37:44,430 stare at that image and look and see the similarities there. On 566 00:37:44,970 --> 00:37:49,110 on his on his different writing. But then let me get to the third 567 00:37:49,110 --> 00:37:52,560 document, which again reinforces that it was the Secretary of 568 00:37:52,560 --> 00:37:55,320 Defense's writing, because that first one I had mentioned was a 569 00:37:55,320 --> 00:37:58,080 memorandum for the record. Right. So it wasn't to anybody 570 00:37:58,080 --> 00:38:01,230 directly, but it was for the record. So read was outlining 571 00:38:01,230 --> 00:38:05,190 everything that was going on within the media. The response 572 00:38:05,190 --> 00:38:09,240 here to different questions was for the Secretary of Defense, so 573 00:38:09,240 --> 00:38:12,780 not record anymore, but directly to the Secretary of Defense. 574 00:38:13,200 --> 00:38:17,610 That's further, that's a further indicator that all that writing 575 00:38:17,640 --> 00:38:21,120 and provenance, uncertain provenance and all that which 576 00:38:21,120 --> 00:38:24,390 are in these questions came from the Secretary of Defense 577 00:38:24,420 --> 00:38:28,080 himself. So memorandum for the Secretary of Defense. So this is 578 00:38:28,080 --> 00:38:31,170 a new memo looks kind of similar, but this is a new one 579 00:38:31,320 --> 00:38:33,870 from Gary Reed, Director of Defense Intelligence Officer, 580 00:38:33,870 --> 00:38:38,490 the Undersecretary of Defense. The subject response to your 581 00:38:38,490 --> 00:38:40,980 questions on the advanced aerospace threat Identification 582 00:38:40,980 --> 00:38:44,460 Program are ative and actions of former DoD employee Luis 583 00:38:44,460 --> 00:38:49,650 Elizondo. So obviously this was in response to the questions for 584 00:38:49,650 --> 00:38:52,200 the secretary of defense Okay, so I'll leave the handwriting 585 00:38:52,200 --> 00:38:55,050 thing alone now but obviously wanted to stress that that all 586 00:38:55,050 --> 00:38:58,320 indicators point that was Mattis All right. So let's read this 587 00:38:58,320 --> 00:39:03,090 memorandum provides response while there's a sick there, he 588 00:39:03,360 --> 00:39:07,650 grammatically was wrong, provides responses to your sick 589 00:39:07,740 --> 00:39:11,760 six questions. Regarding the actions of former DoD employee 590 00:39:11,760 --> 00:39:15,390 Luis Elizondo, responses to your questions on the eighth tip are 591 00:39:15,390 --> 00:39:19,260 in the classified enclosure. The US Air Force Office of Special 592 00:39:19,260 --> 00:39:22,560 Investigations or aft OSI is conducting an inquiry to 593 00:39:22,560 --> 00:39:25,830 determine if Mr Elizondo mishandled classified 594 00:39:25,860 --> 00:39:30,360 information. Now, the classified enclosure I have filed an appeal 595 00:39:30,360 --> 00:39:33,120 for that it was not referenced in the release letter, nor was 596 00:39:33,120 --> 00:39:36,900 it included in the release. So I am going after that. Question 597 00:39:36,900 --> 00:39:39,930 number one, quote, I want to know more about his abrupt 598 00:39:39,930 --> 00:39:44,880 resignation. Why? The response? Mr. Elizondo has provided three 599 00:39:44,880 --> 00:39:49,260 different explanations for his sudden resignation. On October 600 00:39:49,260 --> 00:39:52,950 3, he told his direct supervisor he was resigning because he had 601 00:39:52,950 --> 00:39:56,700 a fleeting job opportunity that required his immediate 602 00:39:56,700 --> 00:40:01,110 availability, and a memorandum dated October 1 worth, he cited 603 00:40:01,110 --> 00:40:04,920 his concern over inaction within the department over quote, 604 00:40:04,950 --> 00:40:08,760 anomalous aerospace threats, unquote as the reason for his 605 00:40:08,760 --> 00:40:13,860 resignation on October 6, via a phone call, he told me he 606 00:40:13,860 --> 00:40:17,910 resigned because his job was too stressful on his family. So 607 00:40:17,910 --> 00:40:20,490 those were three different explanations all given by 608 00:40:20,490 --> 00:40:25,740 Elizondo to different people in different ways. Obviously, that 609 00:40:25,740 --> 00:40:29,430 was a red flag. That was something that was tying into 610 00:40:29,430 --> 00:40:33,150 that uncertain provenance. Question too. Did 611 00:40:33,150 --> 00:40:35,910 CIA immediately review or counterintelligence response? 612 00:40:35,940 --> 00:40:40,530 Yes, we referred the timing and circumstances to Mr. Elizondo 613 00:40:40,530 --> 00:40:44,910 his resignation to the AFL OSI. Their informal assessment did 614 00:40:44,910 --> 00:40:49,380 not find any wrongdoing by Mr. Elizondo, and absent any 615 00:40:49,380 --> 00:40:54,300 indicators of misconduct, they were unable to open a formal 616 00:40:54,450 --> 00:40:55,440 investigation. 617 00:41:02,820 --> 00:41:03,450 Unknown: Now, one quick 618 00:41:03,450 --> 00:41:06,780 John Greenewald: note on that, that is obviously towards the 619 00:41:06,780 --> 00:41:11,610 concern over the multiple explanations given. So 620 00:41:11,610 --> 00:41:14,010 obviously, there was a concern there and the director, the 621 00:41:14,010 --> 00:41:17,820 Secretary of Defense, wanted to ensure that there was a review 622 00:41:17,820 --> 00:41:21,960 to see if there were any red flags. And obviously, everybody 623 00:41:21,960 --> 00:41:26,700 followed protocol. So if this was questions that were by the 624 00:41:26,700 --> 00:41:30,480 Secretary of Defense, again, I'm not defending the man here, but 625 00:41:30,480 --> 00:41:32,850 this is kind of going against what we have heard now for more 626 00:41:32,850 --> 00:41:36,930 than a year that Reid was doing all of this maliciously with a 627 00:41:36,930 --> 00:41:40,440 vendetta against Elizondo. But as you can see here, the 628 00:41:40,440 --> 00:41:45,360 circumstances warranted it, and even likely up to the Secretary 629 00:41:45,360 --> 00:41:49,380 of Defense himself, wanting to ensure that it was being 630 00:41:49,380 --> 00:41:53,760 reviewed. And oh, Usdi, at that time, had obviously followed 631 00:41:53,760 --> 00:41:58,320 whatever protocol that is, or saw the same concern and refer 632 00:41:58,320 --> 00:42:02,490 to it over but they did not do any afosr did not do any 633 00:42:02,490 --> 00:42:05,910 investigation beyond that. So again, I'm just trying to clear 634 00:42:05,910 --> 00:42:10,260 up the things that we've been told in the last year from one 635 00:42:10,260 --> 00:42:13,800 side of the story. I mean, hey, now we've got it in potentially 636 00:42:13,800 --> 00:42:17,580 the Secretary of Defense's own writing, that there was a 637 00:42:17,580 --> 00:42:21,630 security review here. So unless we want to say that Secretary 638 00:42:21,630 --> 00:42:26,070 Mattis was involved in this big character assassination plot 639 00:42:26,910 --> 00:42:31,650 that was aimed towards Luis Elizondo, we may want to just 640 00:42:31,650 --> 00:42:34,770 kind of resign from pushing that angle and just say okay, well 641 00:42:34,830 --> 00:42:40,560 there's some pretty obvious reasons here why you know, why, 642 00:42:40,590 --> 00:42:44,760 why, why we should look into this. Question Three was 643 00:42:44,760 --> 00:42:47,430 subjected read out of all classified responsibilities 644 00:42:47,430 --> 00:42:50,070 between his October three notifications last resignation 645 00:42:50,070 --> 00:42:53,520 letter and his departure 24 hours later response Yes, Mr. 646 00:42:53,520 --> 00:42:56,190 Elizondo completed all administrative and security 647 00:42:56,190 --> 00:43:00,660 related out processing including formal debriefs of all saps, Sei 648 00:43:00,660 --> 00:43:03,210 and compartmented. Programs. Alright, self explanatory. 649 00:43:03,360 --> 00:43:06,600 Question Four. What was the uncertain provenance you refer 650 00:43:06,600 --> 00:43:12,870 to? Regarding subjects second letter? response, the letter was 651 00:43:12,870 --> 00:43:17,040 hand delivered to the USDA chief of staff office by someone other 652 00:43:17,040 --> 00:43:20,700 than Mr. Elizondo. The letter is not consistent with the first 653 00:43:20,700 --> 00:43:23,370 resignation letter, Mr. Elizondo personally handled his 654 00:43:23,370 --> 00:43:27,030 supervisor after my phone call with Mr. Elizondo in which he 655 00:43:27,030 --> 00:43:30,060 said he had been secretly working for the secretary. I 656 00:43:30,060 --> 00:43:32,880 checked with two senior officials that have knowledge of 657 00:43:32,880 --> 00:43:35,850 special programs. Our collective assessment was that Mr. 658 00:43:35,850 --> 00:43:39,750 Elizondo, His claims were not credible, and the letter was not 659 00:43:39,750 --> 00:43:44,850 worthy of the Secretary's personal attention. Also self 660 00:43:44,850 --> 00:43:48,240 explanatory but pretty big. You now have read not making the 661 00:43:48,240 --> 00:43:51,690 decision on his own but checking with two other senior officials. 662 00:43:51,690 --> 00:43:54,030 At least two we don't know if there were more than that. But 663 00:43:54,030 --> 00:43:57,570 as of late December 2017, multiple senior officials above 664 00:43:57,570 --> 00:44:01,590 him who were they we could venture to guess maybe one of 665 00:44:01,590 --> 00:44:05,070 them was the third individual on Luis Elizondo his complaint by 666 00:44:05,070 --> 00:44:10,410 the name he goes by the name of Neil Tipton in Elizondo is 667 00:44:10,410 --> 00:44:13,650 complaint, nothing is alleged against Tipton, which is really 668 00:44:13,650 --> 00:44:17,190 bizarre. So he filed a complaint against the guy, unless I missed 669 00:44:17,190 --> 00:44:20,340 it, I did that big deep dive on it. I have no idea what he was 670 00:44:20,940 --> 00:44:23,610 issuing the complaint about tipped in about. So let's just 671 00:44:23,610 --> 00:44:27,960 say one of the two is tipped and who's the other one. And why 672 00:44:27,960 --> 00:44:31,590 aren't they backing anything up? If if Reid is in a high position 673 00:44:31,590 --> 00:44:34,440 himself, again, doesn't matter who you like him? That's where 674 00:44:34,440 --> 00:44:38,370 he was. But if he goes to other people that who would know 675 00:44:38,820 --> 00:44:43,260 things that he doesn't? Who are those people? That That to me 676 00:44:43,260 --> 00:44:45,330 was was really interesting, because it shows that this 677 00:44:45,330 --> 00:44:49,470 branched out well beyond Reid's office to try and figure out and 678 00:44:49,470 --> 00:44:52,350 substantiate Elizondo his claims and nobody could substantiate 679 00:44:52,350 --> 00:44:56,220 them. And of course, that second resignation letter that we were 680 00:44:56,220 --> 00:45:00,720 all shown to the public wasn't even sent to the Secretary of 681 00:45:00,720 --> 00:45:03,480 Defense, because of all of those reasons, giving an uncertain 682 00:45:03,480 --> 00:45:06,990 provenance. And then the last thing I'll point out, you can 683 00:45:06,990 --> 00:45:10,500 see here it was noted that first one was personally hand 684 00:45:10,500 --> 00:45:15,150 delivered by Mr Elizondo to his boss, but this other one was 685 00:45:15,180 --> 00:45:20,460 delivered by someone other than Mr. Elizondo. So who was that? I 686 00:45:20,460 --> 00:45:24,090 did, as I mentioned, asked Mr. Elizondo, and we'll get to that. 687 00:45:25,080 --> 00:45:27,870 Question five, has the Navy civilian been interviewed about 688 00:45:27,870 --> 00:45:32,610 the declassification response? Yes. Usdi staff contacted him 689 00:45:33,030 --> 00:45:36,870 upon discovery of the supranet email sent to him by Mr. 690 00:45:36,870 --> 00:45:41,040 Elizondo. He informed us that he told Mr. Elizondo that he was 691 00:45:41,040 --> 00:45:44,820 not the declassification release authority and took no further 692 00:45:44,820 --> 00:45:48,600 action. So that's a pretty interesting development. 693 00:45:48,630 --> 00:45:52,440 Obviously, this was stretching far beyond, again, just those 694 00:45:52,440 --> 00:45:54,900 those emails, but they were investigating, they talked to 695 00:45:54,900 --> 00:45:57,870 that Navy civilian, I have an idea of who that is, but the 696 00:45:57,870 --> 00:46:01,590 name, I'm not, I'm not ready to put the claim yet. But I think I 697 00:46:01,590 --> 00:46:04,590 have an idea of who that was. So there was a lot of weirdness 698 00:46:04,590 --> 00:46:08,460 about that declassification exchange, that obviously was it 699 00:46:08,460 --> 00:46:12,690 was a red flag, and it wound up with that Navy civilian being 700 00:46:12,690 --> 00:46:16,830 interviewed during this whole process to question six. What is 701 00:46:16,830 --> 00:46:20,190 a deferred retirement response? deferred retirement refers to 702 00:46:20,190 --> 00:46:23,910 delayed payment of benefits until certain criteria are met. 703 00:46:24,210 --> 00:46:27,000 deferred retirement applies to those with at least five years 704 00:46:27,000 --> 00:46:29,640 of federal service, who depart before reaching their minimum 705 00:46:29,640 --> 00:46:34,260 retirement age, which is between ages 55 to 57. Depending on your 706 00:46:34,260 --> 00:46:36,990 birth, those with five years can opt to collect retirement 707 00:46:36,990 --> 00:46:40,770 benefits as early as 62. Those with 10 years can collect at 708 00:46:40,770 --> 00:46:44,610 their MRA but will sacrifice 5% for each year they are under 62. 709 00:46:47,250 --> 00:46:50,520 That's great, wonderful. I'm not really concerned about his his 710 00:46:50,520 --> 00:46:53,340 retirement. So I wish him all the best. I hope he gets a great 711 00:46:53,340 --> 00:46:58,530 pension in regards to Mr. Elizondo. So that that is now 712 00:46:58,530 --> 00:47:03,090 all of the documents themselves. That is what was released to me. 713 00:47:03,270 --> 00:47:06,810 We've gone over all of those. Now, obviously, the article 714 00:47:06,810 --> 00:47:09,900 itself went into a lot more detail. Here's that article. I'm 715 00:47:09,900 --> 00:47:13,110 not going to read this to you. But if you haven't already, I 716 00:47:13,110 --> 00:47:16,890 hope you do. Because there's a lot here. Admittedly, it's long, 717 00:47:16,890 --> 00:47:19,770 but as I mentioned, it deserves it. There's a lot of anchor 718 00:47:19,770 --> 00:47:22,950 links there. That's the blue links you can click on that 719 00:47:22,950 --> 00:47:26,220 backs up the bigger points that I made, making sure that you had 720 00:47:26,220 --> 00:47:30,240 access to all of that information. And obviously links 721 00:47:30,240 --> 00:47:33,840 to other the recorded interviews that I've that I've done or that 722 00:47:33,840 --> 00:47:38,460 I reference, and give a lot more detail there. Now a couple of 723 00:47:38,460 --> 00:47:40,500 big notes that I want to deal with this video, and then I'm 724 00:47:40,500 --> 00:47:43,950 going to end it here for you. One thing that I tried to 725 00:47:43,950 --> 00:47:48,780 explore with Mr. Elizondo, and Christopher Mellon, was the 726 00:47:48,780 --> 00:47:51,810 videos, the videos obviously, were a big security concern 727 00:47:52,560 --> 00:47:57,750 inside the Pentagon, that they all indicators were just based 728 00:47:57,750 --> 00:48:00,180 on how people were acting and writing and emails like Mr. 729 00:48:00,180 --> 00:48:03,120 Elizondo was classified email, that potentially those videos 730 00:48:03,120 --> 00:48:08,670 were classified. That was a big concern. I also feel that the AF 731 00:48:08,670 --> 00:48:14,100 OSI investigation, now that you see all the information was very 732 00:48:14,100 --> 00:48:17,160 much justified, that's not me defending the government in any 733 00:48:17,160 --> 00:48:21,420 way. But look at how this played out. You have somebody saying 734 00:48:21,420 --> 00:48:24,450 that they're going to say they're going to release never 735 00:48:24,450 --> 00:48:28,740 before seen videos to the public. And then a couple months 736 00:48:28,740 --> 00:48:33,210 later, videos are released to the public. And a classified 737 00:48:33,210 --> 00:48:36,900 email with those same videos is found internally at the 738 00:48:36,900 --> 00:48:39,510 Pentagon. I mean, I'm sorry, that's a security concern, no 739 00:48:39,510 --> 00:48:42,810 matter what anybody who knows anything about classification 740 00:48:42,810 --> 00:48:47,490 can see those are numerous red flags all lined up, that needed 741 00:48:47,490 --> 00:48:50,850 to be dealt with. So it's no surprise that that happened. 742 00:48:50,850 --> 00:48:54,810 Well, one of the things that I wanted to tackle was the huge 743 00:48:54,810 --> 00:48:59,280 discrepancy between Mr. Elizondo his claims to me directly, and I 744 00:48:59,280 --> 00:49:02,370 link to that video, but essentially, he said he did not 745 00:49:02,370 --> 00:49:07,500 know that TTSA had the videos, nor did he know that the New 746 00:49:07,500 --> 00:49:11,190 York Times was going to be publishing the FLIR and gimbal 747 00:49:11,190 --> 00:49:16,260 video, and he said that he was quote, very surprised. And I was 748 00:49:16,260 --> 00:49:19,410 always really intrigued by that because I'm like, how do you 749 00:49:19,410 --> 00:49:23,820 work for an organization and stand up in October of 2017 750 00:49:23,850 --> 00:49:27,930 Elizondo said it he says, We are planning to release these never 751 00:49:27,930 --> 00:49:33,150 before seen US government videos. How do you not know like 752 00:49:33,150 --> 00:49:36,510 what they have and it just so happens that they came across 753 00:49:36,780 --> 00:49:40,200 the same videos that you said you wanted for internal use 754 00:49:40,200 --> 00:49:42,720 only. And that was another revelation that came out of this 755 00:49:42,720 --> 00:49:47,070 interview was the fact that Elizondo stated he did not want 756 00:49:47,070 --> 00:49:50,430 those videos for any other reason other than internal use 757 00:49:50,430 --> 00:49:54,480 only for a database that was essentially tracking drones, and 758 00:49:54,480 --> 00:49:59,880 that was it and balloons and so when you couple all that, you 759 00:49:59,880 --> 00:50:03,360 know together, combine it all together. You have some really 760 00:50:03,390 --> 00:50:07,290 big weirdness there. But then when Christopher Mellon says to 761 00:50:07,290 --> 00:50:11,850 James Fox, I received the videos in the Pentagon parking lot from 762 00:50:11,850 --> 00:50:15,690 a Defense Department official, and I still have the packaging 763 00:50:15,990 --> 00:50:21,450 in Barcelona. Mellon had said that it was let me see if I find 764 00:50:21,450 --> 00:50:25,620 the quote here. It's been from troublemakers and activists like 765 00:50:25,620 --> 00:50:29,220 Lewin me. We snuck these videos out and I took them to the New 766 00:50:29,220 --> 00:50:34,560 York Times, to quote well, that to me is every indicator that 767 00:50:35,340 --> 00:50:37,650 Louise Elizondo, and him snuck it out whether we liked the 768 00:50:37,650 --> 00:50:40,620 result or not, obviously, someone was bending the rules 769 00:50:40,620 --> 00:50:44,940 enough. And here we go. The last point was the packaging that 770 00:50:44,940 --> 00:50:48,600 Elizondo had, excuse me that melon had referenced to James 771 00:50:48,600 --> 00:50:53,220 fox that was on the documentary and that's in video as well. Had 772 00:50:53,250 --> 00:50:57,330 Luis Elizondo his name on it. So how do you say that you 773 00:50:57,330 --> 00:50:59,940 had no idea that these things were out in the open? I don't 774 00:50:59,940 --> 00:51:03,900 get it. So I did ask Mr. Mellon about all of that and to try and 775 00:51:03,900 --> 00:51:07,290 clarify, because that plays a role in these documents. It's 776 00:51:07,290 --> 00:51:14,100 clearly a security concern. And I'll bounce down to what he 777 00:51:14,100 --> 00:51:20,760 said. There's a you can see a lot here. I published all 778 00:51:20,760 --> 00:51:26,130 questions in the interest of transparency. verbatim what I 779 00:51:26,130 --> 00:51:30,120 sent to Christopher Mellon and Luis Elizondo my I won't read 780 00:51:30,120 --> 00:51:33,390 the questions outright Tia, but essentially they surrounded the 781 00:51:33,390 --> 00:51:36,990 videos, asked him about the resignation letter why that was 782 00:51:36,990 --> 00:51:39,810 on his web server. The one thing that I haven't said that yet in 783 00:51:39,810 --> 00:51:44,820 this video was the NY Mellon has a tie to this was that back in 784 00:51:44,820 --> 00:51:50,100 2018, a Twitter user was roaming around Christopher melons 785 00:51:50,100 --> 00:51:53,100 website stumbled on an unsecured directory, it wasn't hacking, 786 00:51:53,490 --> 00:51:56,910 and found Luis Elizondo, his resignation letter, some a tip 787 00:51:56,910 --> 00:52:01,230 documents, a unredacted assessment that TTSA was 788 00:52:01,230 --> 00:52:04,650 distributing but it had personal contact information, especially 789 00:52:04,650 --> 00:52:08,040 those witnesses with the Nimitz encounter. It was kind of an 790 00:52:08,040 --> 00:52:11,940 embarrassing moment, but also the packaging the photos that I 791 00:52:11,940 --> 00:52:15,390 just showed you. Those were all stored on Christopher melons 792 00:52:15,390 --> 00:52:18,480 website. So I asked him about the resignation letter why he 793 00:52:18,480 --> 00:52:21,540 had it what he thought of the the first resignation letter 794 00:52:22,770 --> 00:52:25,350 that I asked him about the packaging that he has referenced 795 00:52:25,350 --> 00:52:27,750 with Elizondo his name on it. It's like, well, how did you get 796 00:52:27,750 --> 00:52:31,050 that? Did somebody steal it from the Pentagon from Elizondo his 797 00:52:31,050 --> 00:52:35,220 desk you know, I mean, that's the only thing that makes sense 798 00:52:35,670 --> 00:52:37,800 because of Elizondo said he didn't give it to anybody. And 799 00:52:37,800 --> 00:52:40,740 he wanted internal use, Oh, somebody's lying, somebody's not 800 00:52:40,740 --> 00:52:46,020 telling us the truth. And then I went into the fact that Elizondo 801 00:52:46,020 --> 00:52:50,370 in the recorded interview with me completely contradicts kind 802 00:52:50,370 --> 00:52:54,180 of what Mr. Mellon story is, and so on. Here's his response. This 803 00:52:54,180 --> 00:52:57,960 I will read to you. I appreciate your efforts to bring credit to 804 00:52:57,960 --> 00:53:00,480 the brave individual who provided me the famous 805 00:53:00,480 --> 00:53:05,700 unclassified DoD UAAP videos. However, I am compelled to honor 806 00:53:05,700 --> 00:53:09,630 their request for privacy in due time, hopefully, that individual 807 00:53:09,630 --> 00:53:12,870 will receive the credit they richly deserve, for helping our 808 00:53:12,870 --> 00:53:16,050 nation overcome a glaring intelligence failure, and an 809 00:53:16,050 --> 00:53:19,260 unfortunate and misplaced prejudice against the legitimate 810 00:53:19,260 --> 00:53:23,760 and vitally important UAP issue. Keep up the good work, perhaps 811 00:53:23,760 --> 00:53:27,090 someday the black vault will succeed in bringing to light 812 00:53:27,090 --> 00:53:30,390 information that has a comparable benefit for science 813 00:53:30,390 --> 00:53:34,860 and national security. Boy, I can't tell the snarkiness there, 814 00:53:34,860 --> 00:53:38,940 Mr. Melon, glad you work that in. But in the interest of 815 00:53:38,940 --> 00:53:44,280 transparency, that's what he said. And, and look, that was 816 00:53:44,310 --> 00:53:47,430 that was silly. I never asked about the identity of the 817 00:53:47,430 --> 00:53:51,450 leaker. I asked for him to confirm what was going on with 818 00:53:51,450 --> 00:53:53,820 the resignation letter in the packaging and why I'd had 819 00:53:53,820 --> 00:53:57,360 Elizondo 's name and why nobody story agrees with each other. So 820 00:53:57,360 --> 00:53:59,730 it's great that he that he had some great things to say about 821 00:53:59,730 --> 00:54:03,000 whoever this hero is, and that's fine. We can love the result 822 00:54:03,000 --> 00:54:06,960 here. But we should actually get the you know the answer to some 823 00:54:06,960 --> 00:54:09,690 of this I mean, who's lying who's not telling us the truth 824 00:54:09,690 --> 00:54:13,650 here? Because nobody can be all right here. Somebody is either 825 00:54:13,650 --> 00:54:17,310 lying or really misguided with what they are telling everybody. 826 00:54:17,520 --> 00:54:21,240 So I'm glad he worked in the snarkiness against me but and, 827 00:54:21,630 --> 00:54:25,650 and that's fine. But he had an opportunity to answer this and 828 00:54:25,650 --> 00:54:30,690 he decided not to now with Mr. Elizondo. Let's get into him. 829 00:54:31,140 --> 00:54:33,630 For those who don't know, Mr. Elizondo will not speak to me 830 00:54:33,630 --> 00:54:36,030 directly anymore. I have to go through Todd McMurtry, his 831 00:54:36,030 --> 00:54:39,420 attorney, and I want to say up front, I have no bad things to 832 00:54:39,420 --> 00:54:42,960 say about Mr. McMurtry. He has been a pleasant person to speak 833 00:54:42,960 --> 00:54:48,600 with. Absolutely no issues there. I'm not just saying that 834 00:54:48,600 --> 00:54:51,720 because he's an attorney and I'm afraid or anything. But quite 835 00:54:51,720 --> 00:54:54,180 the contrary. I was I was very impressed. There was a lot of 836 00:54:54,180 --> 00:54:58,260 professionalism there. He was very appreciative that I wanted 837 00:54:58,590 --> 00:55:01,680 Elizondo side of the story. But also I want to just for the 838 00:55:01,680 --> 00:55:04,980 record, I mean, it was the professionalism was on his side 839 00:55:04,980 --> 00:55:08,820 as well that he understood what I was doing and, and, and 840 00:55:08,820 --> 00:55:12,360 realized that I was not trying to defame Luis Elizondo so So, 841 00:55:12,450 --> 00:55:14,940 so credit to him, you know, because sometimes attorneys are 842 00:55:14,940 --> 00:55:18,930 not so pleasant to deal with. But in this case, you know, for 843 00:55:18,930 --> 00:55:22,020 the record, it was it was fine. So I submitted the questions to 844 00:55:22,020 --> 00:55:26,130 him asking about that second resignation letter. You know, 845 00:55:26,130 --> 00:55:31,200 and what the, what the idea was behind it, kind of going into 846 00:55:31,200 --> 00:55:33,780 the uncertain provenance on the letter that we were showing, 847 00:55:33,780 --> 00:55:37,440 like who delivered it? If it wasn't Mr. Elizondo, why was 848 00:55:37,440 --> 00:55:42,210 there uncertain provenance to that? Talking about let me see 849 00:55:42,210 --> 00:55:45,390 here. And again, I'm not going to read all of these to you, I 850 00:55:45,390 --> 00:55:48,960 invite you to I published it. And this is a verbatim copy and 851 00:55:48,960 --> 00:55:53,370 paste, I made zero edits on what I submitted. But essentially the 852 00:55:53,370 --> 00:55:58,320 discrepancies behind what we keep hearing, even in these DoD 853 00:55:58,320 --> 00:56:02,100 documents, but also by Mr. Elizondo, his interviews with me 854 00:56:02,340 --> 00:56:06,390 and elsewhere asked about the reasoning for resignation, 855 00:56:07,410 --> 00:56:10,500 talking about, you know, his statement to me that he had no 856 00:56:10,500 --> 00:56:14,280 idea that TTSA had the videos, and that the New York Times was 857 00:56:14,280 --> 00:56:17,910 going to publish them. But essentially, in October of 2017, 858 00:56:17,910 --> 00:56:21,540 was saying, Hey, we meaning TTSA are going to release these never 859 00:56:21,540 --> 00:56:25,470 before seeing videos very, very again, trying to dig into the 860 00:56:25,500 --> 00:56:29,850 very, very, very again, straightforward trying to dig in 861 00:56:30,000 --> 00:56:31,980 to these different claims and trying to make sense of the 862 00:56:31,980 --> 00:56:38,760 contradictions. And then, lastly, about the role, the 863 00:56:38,760 --> 00:56:43,200 packaging and the role he played, if any, in the leaking 864 00:56:43,230 --> 00:56:47,610 of these videos in a pentagon parking lot. Why was his name on 865 00:56:47,610 --> 00:56:53,010 the envelope? And could he address that? Here's what I got 866 00:56:53,010 --> 00:56:56,580 on behalf of Mr. Elizondo from his attorney. Thank you for 867 00:56:56,580 --> 00:56:59,190 allowing Mr Elizondo the opportunity to respond to your 868 00:56:59,190 --> 00:57:02,370 questions. He believes he has already answered these questions 869 00:57:02,370 --> 00:57:06,090 repeatedly, and will stand by his prior public statements. To 870 00:57:06,090 --> 00:57:09,570 clarify one point his memorandum or of resignation directed to 871 00:57:09,570 --> 00:57:13,620 John Garrity was simply an official notification to his 872 00:57:13,620 --> 00:57:16,050 direct supervisor. His resignation letter to the 873 00:57:16,050 --> 00:57:21,240 Secretary of Defense and the DoD was his explanation as to why he 874 00:57:21,240 --> 00:57:23,790 was resigning and expressing his concern with the bureaucratic 875 00:57:23,790 --> 00:57:26,910 challenges and other issues that created hurdles for the 876 00:57:26,910 --> 00:57:29,910 investigation of UAP, which present national security 877 00:57:29,910 --> 00:57:33,960 concerns as Mr. Elizondo his resignation letter states under 878 00:57:33,960 --> 00:57:36,930 estimating or ignoring these potential threats is not in the 879 00:57:36,930 --> 00:57:40,560 best interest of the DOD and the American people. And he hoped 880 00:57:40,560 --> 00:57:43,680 resigning and calling attention to these matters would encourage 881 00:57:43,680 --> 00:57:47,760 positive change as evidence, excuse me, as evident by where 882 00:57:47,760 --> 00:57:51,090 we are today in the UAP disclosure process, his efforts 883 00:57:51,090 --> 00:57:55,650 were clearly successful. As a reminder, you are aware of the 884 00:57:55,650 --> 00:57:59,040 fact that Mr. Elizondo was cleared of any wrongdoing by an 885 00:57:59,040 --> 00:58:03,360 official afosr, investigation and 2019. As for the remainder 886 00:58:03,360 --> 00:58:06,780 of your questions, Mr. Elizondo will be addressing many of these 887 00:58:06,780 --> 00:58:10,320 points in his upcoming book and prefers to rely upon that 888 00:58:10,320 --> 00:58:13,950 writing rather than creating a separate account through this 889 00:58:13,950 --> 00:58:19,410 response. So he pitched his book to get answers to the questions 890 00:58:19,410 --> 00:58:22,200 that I submitted. And again, I invite you to read them, because 891 00:58:22,200 --> 00:58:24,720 they are a little bit lengthy. But they were very direct and 892 00:58:24,720 --> 00:58:28,530 pointed to try and clarify what many people not just me, but 893 00:58:28,530 --> 00:58:31,440 when many people have been a little concerned about now for 894 00:58:31,440 --> 00:58:34,020 the course of a couple of years. So now that we get a little bit 895 00:58:34,020 --> 00:58:36,930 part of the DoD side, and it connects a lot of these dots, 896 00:58:37,470 --> 00:58:41,130 even more, so take this opportunity to answer this, as 897 00:58:41,130 --> 00:58:45,090 you can see, snarkiness and all for Mr. Melon, I publish it, I 898 00:58:45,090 --> 00:58:48,630 won't hide from it. You know, this is your opportunity. And 899 00:58:48,630 --> 00:58:51,420 that is a word that I gave to Mr. McMurtry. On the last 900 00:58:51,420 --> 00:58:54,690 article I wrote. And I followed through with that, that 100% of 901 00:58:54,690 --> 00:58:58,440 what they give me, I will publish 100% There's not a lot 902 00:58:58,440 --> 00:59:01,680 of journalists that will promise that however, I give the 903 00:59:01,680 --> 00:59:05,220 friendly caveat that for my article itself, I will cut it 904 00:59:05,220 --> 00:59:09,690 down but not change context, and not maliciously omit any any 905 00:59:09,690 --> 00:59:13,230 type of statement to make him look bad. You know, but rather 906 00:59:13,230 --> 00:59:16,740 for ease of reading, I mean, you you can sometimes see especially 907 00:59:16,740 --> 00:59:19,590 in the last article, answers you get can be like paragraphs and 908 00:59:19,590 --> 00:59:22,920 paragraphs. So it's not fair to a reader who maybe wants a more 909 00:59:22,920 --> 00:59:26,520 condensed version. So I give that caveat, I will trim it 910 00:59:26,520 --> 00:59:29,610 down. But to ensure that I am not taking anything out of 911 00:59:29,610 --> 00:59:33,060 context or changing meaning, or being malicious and omit 912 00:59:33,060 --> 00:59:36,030 something 100% of that will be published at the bottom and that 913 00:59:36,030 --> 00:59:41,340 was agreeable. There was no negotiating, you know, meaning 914 00:59:41,340 --> 00:59:44,130 like, like all parties were very happy with that. It was like oh, 915 00:59:44,130 --> 00:59:46,920 great, thanks. So that was great. And so this time around, 916 00:59:46,920 --> 00:59:50,040 I did the same thing. long winded way of saying this is an 917 00:59:50,040 --> 00:59:53,910 opportunity to address all of this, and to finally put some of 918 00:59:53,910 --> 00:59:56,970 this to bed if they have easy answers. Phenomenal. Let's go 919 00:59:56,970 --> 01:00:00,420 ahead and see it. And yet I didn't get answered. from either 920 01:00:00,420 --> 01:00:03,030 one of them, neither one of them helped. Christopher Mellon 921 01:00:03,030 --> 01:00:06,630 answered a question I didn't even ask. And Luis Elizondo did 922 01:00:06,630 --> 01:00:11,760 a book pitch for his book. And no, look, I have nothing against 923 01:00:11,760 --> 01:00:15,630 books. I fully support books. I've written books myself, I've 924 01:00:15,630 --> 01:00:18,240 always said, if you're going to write a book, all my best, I 925 01:00:18,240 --> 01:00:21,330 hope you do great. Hope you sell millions of copies, I truly mean 926 01:00:21,330 --> 01:00:25,110 that. It's not easy to put a book together. But in a context 927 01:00:25,110 --> 01:00:29,130 like this, where new information is revealed, and there are clear 928 01:00:29,130 --> 01:00:33,000 contradictions to the story, and there's clearly problems. We 929 01:00:33,000 --> 01:00:37,800 need to address those. Because this, this story is important. 930 01:00:38,340 --> 01:00:41,790 At least I think it is not because it's Mr. Luis Elizondo 931 01:00:41,790 --> 01:00:44,040 not because it's Christopher Mellon. No, it's the 932 01:00:44,040 --> 01:00:46,950 implications behind what they are claiming. 933 01:00:48,030 --> 01:00:53,250 It all ties to the root of what they have been talking about for 934 01:00:53,250 --> 01:01:00,090 years. What are UAP? Do they tie into some extra terrestrial 935 01:01:00,450 --> 01:01:05,940 presence, or now the buzzword of today is non human. The 936 01:01:05,940 --> 01:01:09,990 implications behind this are staggering. So let's get the 937 01:01:09,990 --> 01:01:13,980 story. Right. And as I said, on the top of this, I know every 938 01:01:13,980 --> 01:01:17,160 puzzle piece is not of, of interest to every person out 939 01:01:17,160 --> 01:01:21,210 there. They want to focus on on on the pictures on the videos, 940 01:01:21,480 --> 01:01:25,530 and that and today, and that's fine. But I want to know how we 941 01:01:25,530 --> 01:01:29,520 got here, because that's important. Because where we are 942 01:01:29,520 --> 01:01:35,100 today, was built on all of this that I've been going over the 943 01:01:35,100 --> 01:01:38,910 New York Times article, the Luis Elizondo claims the videos that 944 01:01:38,910 --> 01:01:45,000 had leaked out all of it. All of it is built on that foundation. 945 01:01:45,450 --> 01:01:49,410 So shouldn't we understand where that foundation isn't, how it 946 01:01:49,410 --> 01:01:53,190 was built, and why. For those who only want one side of the 947 01:01:53,190 --> 01:01:57,000 story, and again, that story very, very well may be true, but 948 01:01:57,000 --> 01:02:00,330 wants to ignore any other thing that may challenge it. That 949 01:02:00,330 --> 01:02:06,690 means that foundation is weak. Full stop. See, I don't mind 950 01:02:06,690 --> 01:02:09,450 hearing Luis Elizondo, even though I'm skeptical about some 951 01:02:09,450 --> 01:02:13,620 of the things he claims, because I know that he has experience. 952 01:02:13,770 --> 01:02:16,980 And I know not everything is a bold faced lie, or at least I 953 01:02:16,980 --> 01:02:21,750 hope not. But I can still be skeptical. I can look at the DoD 954 01:02:21,750 --> 01:02:28,140 because I'm not afraid of being challenged over what I believe 955 01:02:28,140 --> 01:02:32,250 is really going on. I'll meet the DoD head on through legal 956 01:02:32,250 --> 01:02:36,630 channels, because I know what's there. I've done this for almost 957 01:02:36,630 --> 01:02:41,370 27 years. So it doesn't scare me at all. If the DoD wants to push 958 01:02:41,370 --> 01:02:44,340 back, like in my last video on this channel, and say, No, John, 959 01:02:44,340 --> 01:02:48,150 you can't access anything well, game on. And yeah, I will file 960 01:02:48,150 --> 01:02:51,480 those appeals. And yeah, I will continue to pursue it. I'm not 961 01:02:51,480 --> 01:02:54,870 afraid of any legal challenge. But in the same respect, I'm not 962 01:02:54,870 --> 01:03:00,420 afraid of anybody on the outside either. I'm just not. My beliefs 963 01:03:00,420 --> 01:03:04,620 are my beliefs. But regardless, every piece of the puzzle is 964 01:03:04,620 --> 01:03:09,330 important to try and figure out how strong is the foundation 965 01:03:09,450 --> 01:03:14,610 that holds up where we are today? And answering those those 966 01:03:14,610 --> 01:03:17,280 questions that I send to Mr. Mellon and Mr. Elizondo through 967 01:03:17,280 --> 01:03:20,700 his attorney, those are important to figuring out that 968 01:03:20,700 --> 01:03:23,460 answer. And if we determine beyond any shadow of a doubt, 969 01:03:23,460 --> 01:03:27,900 that foundation is super strong, then great. Let's build another 970 01:03:27,900 --> 01:03:32,340 couple stories on this building. But if it's weak, and people 971 01:03:32,340 --> 01:03:36,240 want to throw mud and sling mud and launch attacks against me, 972 01:03:36,240 --> 01:03:39,420 or whomever is asking these questions, then I think that's a 973 01:03:39,420 --> 01:03:42,690 pretty good indicator that the foundation is weak. And all 974 01:03:42,690 --> 01:03:46,710 that's doing is making me push harder. The harder the DoD 975 01:03:46,710 --> 01:03:51,060 pushes back on me, the harder I will push back on them. But the 976 01:03:51,060 --> 01:03:54,450 same is true for people on the outside, if people are making 977 01:03:54,450 --> 01:03:58,020 gigantic claims. And I challenge that just as much as I challenge 978 01:03:58,020 --> 01:04:01,650 a DOD statement or document or, or stance or spokesperson 979 01:04:01,650 --> 01:04:07,020 statement. I know that I have to push harder, because that to me 980 01:04:07,020 --> 01:04:09,840 is the indicator. There's something there that either the 981 01:04:09,840 --> 01:04:13,590 DoD or those outside people don't want me to know. And 982 01:04:13,590 --> 01:04:15,840 what's interesting is even though it's like pulling teeth 983 01:04:15,840 --> 01:04:19,170 with the Pentagon, trying to get statements, at least they're 984 01:04:19,170 --> 01:04:22,350 talking, at least they don't have snarky remarks. I may not 985 01:04:22,350 --> 01:04:24,690 believe what they have to say. But at least they're willing to 986 01:04:24,690 --> 01:04:28,290 try and put something on paper. But when I get snarky remarks 987 01:04:28,290 --> 01:04:31,080 and a book pitch, when I'm trying to make sense of some of 988 01:04:31,080 --> 01:04:35,400 this stuff, I'm sorry, that's a red flag to me. And that means 989 01:04:35,400 --> 01:04:38,160 I'm just gonna push harder. I know that there are more 990 01:04:38,160 --> 01:04:40,680 documents like the ones that I just sent to you. I know that 991 01:04:40,680 --> 01:04:44,370 for a fact. I'll prove it to you real easy tab a that already 992 01:04:44,370 --> 01:04:47,220 went over. I know there's more documents on a tip and yes, I 993 01:04:47,220 --> 01:04:50,160 will go for the declassification of that record. I think I'll 994 01:04:50,160 --> 01:04:54,090 have a good chance of getting it. On top of that. You'll see 995 01:04:54,090 --> 01:04:57,120 that on that third memo that I showed you with the six 996 01:04:57,120 --> 01:05:01,290 different questions they were in quotations. That was pulled from 997 01:05:01,290 --> 01:05:04,410 somewhere whether an email or a memorandum that was sent to Gary 998 01:05:04,410 --> 01:05:08,070 Reed regardless, that shows me there's more to the story. I 999 01:05:08,070 --> 01:05:09,960 have other reason to believe that in the months that 1000 01:05:09,960 --> 01:05:12,660 followed, all the way through the end of the afosr 1001 01:05:12,660 --> 01:05:16,650 investigation and beyond, there is much more tied to the story. 1002 01:05:17,760 --> 01:05:20,790 So I go back to me asking those questions, why wouldn't people 1003 01:05:20,790 --> 01:05:24,330 want to deal with them? Why wouldn't people want to address 1004 01:05:24,540 --> 01:05:28,770 what we all want to know? Because the end is where we're 1005 01:05:28,770 --> 01:05:31,680 trying to get. I know, some, some people just don't care 1006 01:05:31,680 --> 01:05:35,040 about the puzzle at all. And they four wheel drove over the 1007 01:05:35,040 --> 01:05:37,140 line, and they're at the end, and they're like, we're in 1008 01:05:37,140 --> 01:05:41,970 disclosure. And that's fine. I love those people, too. We're 1009 01:05:41,970 --> 01:05:45,390 not that's okay. That's where they are. I'm still behind the 1010 01:05:45,390 --> 01:05:49,620 line trying to uncover what in the world is going on. And I'm 1011 01:05:49,620 --> 01:05:52,560 still trying to see how strong that foundation is and answers 1012 01:05:52,560 --> 01:05:56,700 like this. Answers and statements of pitching a book, 1013 01:05:56,880 --> 01:06:00,990 or answering a question I didn't even ask but then ignoring the 1014 01:06:00,990 --> 01:06:03,330 follow up, that's the one thing I didn't mention, he ignored my 1015 01:06:03,330 --> 01:06:05,970 follow up, which was can you at least just deny that Luis 1016 01:06:05,970 --> 01:06:09,930 Elizondo had a role in this? Like he says, That's it, just 1017 01:06:09,930 --> 01:06:13,740 say, No, he had no and no response. These are missed 1018 01:06:13,740 --> 01:06:18,300 opportunities for us to actually work together and get to that 1019 01:06:18,300 --> 01:06:22,440 finish line. Because if that's truly the intent, let's work 1020 01:06:22,440 --> 01:06:25,530 together. If I didn't care about what they had to say, I would 1021 01:06:25,530 --> 01:06:28,020 have never reached out to them. I wouldn't publish these these 1022 01:06:28,020 --> 01:06:34,020 memos last week, and say, Aha, look, the truth. But no, I 1023 01:06:34,020 --> 01:06:37,230 wanted to make sure they have their word. And sadly, they 1024 01:06:37,230 --> 01:06:40,710 didn't want to give it. Now, they don't owe me anything. 1025 01:06:41,220 --> 01:06:45,390 Nothing. I'm a nobody. I get that. But people watch this 1026 01:06:45,390 --> 01:06:49,110 channel, they want to know what documents are coming. Sadly, I'm 1027 01:06:49,110 --> 01:06:51,660 one of the only ones that pursue stuff like this. There's a few 1028 01:06:51,660 --> 01:06:54,300 others don't get me wrong. But I'm one of the only ones that 1029 01:06:54,300 --> 01:06:57,960 covers it in this way. Others do the copy and paste journalism, 1030 01:06:58,140 --> 01:07:01,170 and they see one thing and one blog, and they just roll with 1031 01:07:01,170 --> 01:07:04,050 it. And you see it in all the British tabloids or whatever, 1032 01:07:04,050 --> 01:07:08,370 and the story is a mess. That's not me. I go for all the puzzle 1033 01:07:08,370 --> 01:07:13,470 pieces. So the bottom line for me is I really do, despite our 1034 01:07:13,470 --> 01:07:17,190 differences, despite my skepticism, despite me doubting 1035 01:07:17,310 --> 01:07:22,530 what people say sometimes. Let's work together. Let's try and 1036 01:07:22,530 --> 01:07:28,170 figure something out together. But the pushback just doesn't 1037 01:07:28,170 --> 01:07:32,280 help. And in the end, it's only going to make me push back that 1038 01:07:32,280 --> 01:07:37,410 much harder to try and figure out why. So I hope you all do 1039 01:07:37,410 --> 01:07:41,010 have an opportunity to read the article. Like I said, it is big, 1040 01:07:41,040 --> 01:07:45,150 long, I get it. There's a lot of words there. But there's a lot 1041 01:07:45,150 --> 01:07:47,670 of information to cover in these three. And it really is the 1042 01:07:47,670 --> 01:07:50,970 culmination of five and a half years of research. So I do hope 1043 01:07:50,970 --> 01:07:53,610 that you check out those anchor links, see the documents, read 1044 01:07:53,610 --> 01:07:57,150 them, read them carefully. And as always, I'm always interested 1045 01:07:57,330 --> 01:07:59,820 in your feedback, your questions or comments, even your 1046 01:07:59,820 --> 01:08:02,970 criticisms, all I ask is that you do stay respectful. If 1047 01:08:02,970 --> 01:08:06,030 you're watching here on YouTube, you can do so right below, on 1048 01:08:06,030 --> 01:08:09,180 your way down. If you think it's worthy punch that thumbs up 1049 01:08:09,180 --> 01:08:12,120 button, it really does does help the channel, make sure that you 1050 01:08:12,120 --> 01:08:14,490 are subscribed with notifications on but give me 1051 01:08:14,490 --> 01:08:17,130 your comments below. If you're watching or excuse me, if you're 1052 01:08:17,130 --> 01:08:20,460 listening on the audio podcast, just know that there's a video 1053 01:08:20,460 --> 01:08:24,510 version, just go to the black vault.com/live it'll bounce you 1054 01:08:24,510 --> 01:08:27,570 right to the YouTube channel. And if you don't know that 1055 01:08:27,570 --> 01:08:30,090 there's a podcast audio version of these types of shows these 1056 01:08:30,090 --> 01:08:33,870 longer ones anyway, you can find the podcast just go to the black 1057 01:08:33,870 --> 01:08:37,470 vault.com. There's a podcast link at the top all sorts of 1058 01:08:37,470 --> 01:08:41,850 ways to subscribe. Most major platforms have it under the 1059 01:08:41,850 --> 01:08:46,920 black vault radio. When you're there, I can't tell you to put 1060 01:08:46,920 --> 01:08:49,350 five stars but that's what I shoot for. So please offer a 1061 01:08:49,350 --> 01:08:52,500 rating if you can, a review is even more helpful. But those 1062 01:08:52,500 --> 01:08:54,900 types of things really, really do help spread the word about 1063 01:08:54,900 --> 01:08:58,110 this. So thank you all again for listening and watching. I know 1064 01:08:58,110 --> 01:09:01,080 that this is a controversial topic, as I said at the top of 1065 01:09:01,080 --> 01:09:03,990 this, and I'll say it again, at the back end of this. It is 1066 01:09:03,990 --> 01:09:07,260 controversial, but it is one that I hope that we all care 1067 01:09:07,260 --> 01:09:11,340 about in the same way that we want the truth behind it all. 1068 01:09:11,580 --> 01:09:15,090 Because it's not personal. It's not personal against anybody, 1069 01:09:15,480 --> 01:09:19,470 but that this is about the truth. At least I would hope 1070 01:09:19,470 --> 01:09:23,190 that that's what it's about for everyone else as well. That 1071 01:09:23,190 --> 01:09:26,160 said, this is John Greenewald Jr signing off. And we'll see you 1072 01:09:26,160 --> 01:09:26,670 next time