1 00:00:07,020 --> 00:00:09,150 David Grusch: My name is David Charles grush. I was an 2 00:00:09,150 --> 00:00:12,720 intelligence officer for 14 years in the US both in the US 3 00:00:12,720 --> 00:00:16,680 Air Force, both active duty Air National Guard and Reserve. 4 00:00:16,860 --> 00:00:17,160 There has 5 00:00:17,160 --> 00:00:19,440 John Greenewald: been a lot of talk about UFO whistleblower 6 00:00:19,440 --> 00:00:22,710 David grush lately, and it all started when he submitted a 7 00:00:22,710 --> 00:00:25,980 complaint to the Department of Defense Office of the Inspector 8 00:00:25,980 --> 00:00:32,070 General back in 2021. We know now about at least one meeting 9 00:00:32,070 --> 00:00:35,190 grush had with them thanks to new documents released via the 10 00:00:35,190 --> 00:00:38,970 Freedom of Information Act. And we have an idea of what was 11 00:00:38,970 --> 00:00:44,430 talked about. To my surprise, not only were there very few 12 00:00:44,430 --> 00:00:47,820 redactions, but there was a bit of a surprise to go along with 13 00:00:47,820 --> 00:00:52,590 it. Stay tuned, you're about to journey inside the black vault. 14 00:01:17,220 --> 00:01:19,500 That's right, everybody. As always, thank you so much for 15 00:01:19,500 --> 00:01:23,340 tuning in and taking this journey. Inside the black vault 16 00:01:23,340 --> 00:01:26,430 with me. I'm your host, John Greenewald, Jr. And today, as 17 00:01:26,430 --> 00:01:29,370 you just heard, we're diving into some new documents that 18 00:01:29,370 --> 00:01:32,790 came to me through the Freedom of Information Act straight from 19 00:01:32,790 --> 00:01:35,880 the Department of Defense's Office of the Inspector General. 20 00:01:36,120 --> 00:01:39,600 Now, for some quick background, if you aren't aware, the UFO 21 00:01:39,600 --> 00:01:44,100 whistleblower David grush, in about July of 2021, has had 22 00:01:44,100 --> 00:01:48,870 submitted a complaint to the DoD IG about some stuff he was 23 00:01:48,870 --> 00:01:53,910 finding when it came to UFOs UAP reverse engineering crash 24 00:01:53,910 --> 00:01:57,660 retrieval biologics as he referred to them non human 25 00:01:57,660 --> 00:02:00,990 intelligence, he was seeing all of this stuff and issued a 26 00:02:00,990 --> 00:02:05,760 complaint to the DoD IG essentially alerting them that 27 00:02:05,760 --> 00:02:09,180 Congress was not made aware a lot of about a lot of these 28 00:02:09,180 --> 00:02:12,930 programs. Now he felt according to him that there was some 29 00:02:12,930 --> 00:02:16,620 reprisal from that, that they started, essentially maybe not 30 00:02:16,620 --> 00:02:19,500 treating him right. We don't know the details of that. He 31 00:02:19,500 --> 00:02:22,830 doesn't like to go into them in the interviews that he has done, 32 00:02:22,950 --> 00:02:27,210 simply because he he I, from what I understand, anyway, feels 33 00:02:27,210 --> 00:02:30,510 that if he were to go into that detail, and may harm an ongoing 34 00:02:30,630 --> 00:02:35,160 investigation, we've we've really kind of very heard very 35 00:02:35,160 --> 00:02:38,640 little about that. So there's there's not many details to 36 00:02:38,640 --> 00:02:42,300 report. So what I did is I filed multiple FOIA requests on 37 00:02:42,300 --> 00:02:45,030 everything that he has said, anything that I could kind of 38 00:02:45,030 --> 00:02:49,110 pick up on, maybe find a paper trail of, and one of those 39 00:02:49,110 --> 00:02:52,440 things, was digging into the Department of Defense inspector 40 00:02:52,440 --> 00:02:55,200 general complaint that he had submitted. And any 41 00:02:55,200 --> 00:02:57,930 communications that went along with it again, the timeframe 42 00:02:57,930 --> 00:03:03,090 from what we were told, was circa July of 2021. So I filed 43 00:03:03,090 --> 00:03:06,300 the request, went after those documents. And to my surprise, 44 00:03:06,300 --> 00:03:10,740 some stuff came up not exactly what I was thinking, not exactly 45 00:03:10,740 --> 00:03:14,040 what I was expecting. But there was some surprises and a little 46 00:03:14,040 --> 00:03:17,730 bit of a twist that came along with it. So if you haven't seen 47 00:03:17,730 --> 00:03:20,310 this article, I published it a couple of weeks ago, it was 48 00:03:20,310 --> 00:03:24,870 January 12, to be exact. And I just sadly, just didn't have my 49 00:03:24,870 --> 00:03:28,050 new office here set up to where I can create a video for you 50 00:03:28,050 --> 00:03:32,940 guys here in the in the video realm versus just the textual 51 00:03:32,940 --> 00:03:35,910 one when I publish these articles. So with that being 52 00:03:35,910 --> 00:03:39,750 said, I will put the link to the article in the show notes below, 53 00:03:39,750 --> 00:03:42,060 it will give some other source links. And we'll give a little 54 00:03:42,060 --> 00:03:46,020 bit more detail from this video as well, along with the links to 55 00:03:46,020 --> 00:03:48,780 the documents that we're about to go over. There's not a whole 56 00:03:48,780 --> 00:03:51,840 lot of them. But I think that it's pretty important to go 57 00:03:51,840 --> 00:03:55,770 ahead and highlight. So one of the let me just go ahead and 58 00:03:55,770 --> 00:03:59,460 scroll down here to the documents themselves. Now when I 59 00:04:00,540 --> 00:04:05,100 got these things, again, I was kind of more expecting some 60 00:04:06,630 --> 00:04:11,220 correspondence from him about his complaint. So see his 61 00:04:11,220 --> 00:04:13,680 complaint, or at least a portion thereof, obviously, they'll 62 00:04:13,680 --> 00:04:17,190 redact some of that, and maybe some correspondence about what 63 00:04:17,190 --> 00:04:20,310 he had submitted. On the contrary, there wasn't really 64 00:04:20,310 --> 00:04:25,110 anything about that, but rather it had tied into the evaluation 65 00:04:25,470 --> 00:04:29,580 that the DoD IG was doing that they started back in May of 66 00:04:29,580 --> 00:04:35,010 2021, shortly before the interview with David grush, and 67 00:04:35,010 --> 00:04:39,210 when he was communicating with this specific office, and if 68 00:04:39,210 --> 00:04:41,760 you're not familiar with that evaluation, I'll link this as 69 00:04:41,760 --> 00:04:44,940 well, but essentially that what they were doing was creating 70 00:04:44,940 --> 00:04:50,700 what they called it a evaluation on the DoD actions regarding 71 00:04:50,730 --> 00:04:55,590 UAP. There wasn't a whole lot of scope or context or mission 72 00:04:55,590 --> 00:04:59,490 objectives on this. So we were kind of left a little bit out to 73 00:04:59,490 --> 00:05:03,030 dry But when it came to why exactly they were doing this, 74 00:05:03,270 --> 00:05:06,840 but we knew that the IG was starting to look into it. Well, 75 00:05:06,870 --> 00:05:11,040 unbeknownst to us, the general public a couple of months after, 76 00:05:11,040 --> 00:05:14,190 that's when David grush submitted what he did, and the 77 00:05:14,220 --> 00:05:17,850 ball started rolling, so to speak, that kind of led to him 78 00:05:17,850 --> 00:05:22,230 coming out into the open a couple years thereafter. And 79 00:05:22,230 --> 00:05:26,010 essentially, really creating a little bit of a storm with his 80 00:05:26,010 --> 00:05:33,360 claims. And, and what he kind of bombshell to the world, very 81 00:05:33,360 --> 00:05:36,540 controversial, obviously, not a whole lot of proof or evidence 82 00:05:36,540 --> 00:05:40,500 that went along with his claims. But it has gotten a lot of 83 00:05:40,500 --> 00:05:45,390 press. So these documents then, were about this evaluation, 84 00:05:45,390 --> 00:05:48,450 which I was pretty surprised at. Let me scroll down here. This is 85 00:05:48,450 --> 00:05:52,050 the the foyer release letter. Anybody can verify these FOIA 86 00:05:52,050 --> 00:05:54,870 cases and so on. Don't worry, that's a public address. So I'm 87 00:05:54,870 --> 00:05:57,750 not flashing where I live or anything. But I always 88 00:05:57,750 --> 00:06:00,330 appreciate those concern comments when I flashed my 89 00:06:00,330 --> 00:06:04,380 address that is public, so no worries there. So let's talk 90 00:06:04,380 --> 00:06:09,390 about what first came up. Now. This was a July 12 2001 meeting. 91 00:06:09,900 --> 00:06:12,780 We don't know the exact date that David Gresh had submitted 92 00:06:12,780 --> 00:06:16,170 what he did to the IG we can only assume since he was on the 93 00:06:16,170 --> 00:06:20,280 radar to be interviewed, it was likely prior to that July 12, 94 00:06:20,280 --> 00:06:23,640 date, purpose of this workpapers to document our interview with 95 00:06:23,640 --> 00:06:27,780 major David grush on July 12 2021. So obviously the IG sat 96 00:06:27,780 --> 00:06:30,660 down with him on that day, we interviewed major graphs to 97 00:06:30,660 --> 00:06:33,030 determine whether he could provide background information 98 00:06:33,030 --> 00:06:36,780 that might be relevant to our evaluation. So obviously, they 99 00:06:36,780 --> 00:06:40,980 were looking at him to provide something that could help them 100 00:06:41,010 --> 00:06:44,490 about the DoD actions. Again, we don't know really what the exact 101 00:06:44,490 --> 00:06:50,130 scope of this evaluation was or is. So that's kind of the gray 102 00:06:50,130 --> 00:06:53,550 area here where we have no idea what they were really looking 103 00:06:53,550 --> 00:06:57,150 for. The overall classification of this meeting was at the top 104 00:06:57,150 --> 00:07:01,110 secret, no foreign or no foreign intelligence level due to the 105 00:07:01,140 --> 00:07:04,200 vulnerabilities subject matter discussed and potential 106 00:07:04,200 --> 00:07:07,680 compilation of information sources. The interview was 107 00:07:07,680 --> 00:07:11,340 conducted on June 12 2021. Here are the attendees. Now these are 108 00:07:11,340 --> 00:07:14,640 one of the few redactions we obviously no major David grush 109 00:07:14,640 --> 00:07:20,070 was there. And then on behalf of the IG, those are redacted for 110 00:07:20,070 --> 00:07:23,760 privacy reasons. That's not uncommon. I wouldn't. Again, if 111 00:07:23,760 --> 00:07:26,370 you're not used to seeing these types of redactions, it's not 112 00:07:26,370 --> 00:07:29,700 really an alarm. I've dealt with a lot of these documents before. 113 00:07:29,940 --> 00:07:33,420 And agencies very much protect their own personnel. So unless 114 00:07:33,420 --> 00:07:35,850 it's their director or assistant director or somebody who's in 115 00:07:35,850 --> 00:07:38,670 the news all the time, generally, they will redact that 116 00:07:38,670 --> 00:07:42,510 under what's called exemption B six, but we at least get to know 117 00:07:42,600 --> 00:07:47,400 where they're from within the IGs office of the DOD, space 118 00:07:47,400 --> 00:07:50,820 missile and nuclear division, research and engineering 119 00:07:50,820 --> 00:07:56,610 division, evaluations, and the intelligence portion of their 120 00:07:56,610 --> 00:08:00,060 evaluations as well. So essentially, all from the IGs 121 00:08:00,060 --> 00:08:04,050 office, all from different, you know, departments if you want to 122 00:08:04,050 --> 00:08:07,170 call them that within their office, and they were all part 123 00:08:07,200 --> 00:08:11,910 of this meeting. Now, here's the scope of the meeting. The stated 124 00:08:11,910 --> 00:08:14,610 objective of the project is to determine what actions the DOD 125 00:08:14,610 --> 00:08:17,820 has taken in regard to UAP reporting and policies. The 126 00:08:17,820 --> 00:08:20,670 scope of this interview is to determine what efforts DARPA has 127 00:08:20,670 --> 00:08:23,670 published, developed, received and implemented, that is 128 00:08:23,670 --> 00:08:27,030 associated with UAP, sightings and events. Now, this started to 129 00:08:27,030 --> 00:08:31,140 now give a little bit of a scope very, very briefly of what the 130 00:08:31,140 --> 00:08:35,520 evaluation was, which led to the scope of this particular 131 00:08:35,670 --> 00:08:40,500 interview. The mention of DARPA and what DARPA had published was 132 00:08:40,500 --> 00:08:43,890 kind of an interesting little tidbit there. But essentially, 133 00:08:43,890 --> 00:08:46,710 we got a little bit of a peek into what exactly they were 134 00:08:46,710 --> 00:08:50,220 looking for. Next section methodology the interview was 135 00:08:50,220 --> 00:08:53,730 accomplished to gain testimonial evidence from a member of the 136 00:08:53,730 --> 00:08:57,390 UAP Task Force to gain a better understanding into what the DOD 137 00:08:57,390 --> 00:09:01,020 has done and should be doing regarding the UAP problem set. 138 00:09:01,740 --> 00:09:03,720 The team prepared a list of questions to guide the 139 00:09:03,720 --> 00:09:06,390 discussion with major grush regarding the DOD has actions 140 00:09:06,390 --> 00:09:09,270 taken in response to unidentified aerial phenomena. 141 00:09:09,420 --> 00:09:12,600 However, the interview was conducted in less in a less 142 00:09:12,600 --> 00:09:15,480 structured manner, allowing major grush to provide any 143 00:09:15,480 --> 00:09:19,020 information he believed was relevant to our evaluation, all 144 00:09:19,020 --> 00:09:22,080 pretty straightforward info summary of the interview on July 145 00:09:22,080 --> 00:09:26,430 12 2021, we met with David grush. To obtain information he 146 00:09:26,430 --> 00:09:30,960 had regarding our evaluation of the DoD is actions taken in 147 00:09:30,960 --> 00:09:35,550 response to unidentified aerial phenomena or UAP. A redacted 148 00:09:35,550 --> 00:09:38,910 name recommended that we speak to major grush regarding the 149 00:09:38,910 --> 00:09:42,960 topic of our evaluation, refer to the quote Source tab of his 150 00:09:42,990 --> 00:09:46,230 of this work paper. For a specific list of the meeting 151 00:09:46,260 --> 00:09:49,200 attendees we've already gone over that the overall 152 00:09:49,200 --> 00:09:51,840 classification of this meeting was at the top secret no foreign 153 00:09:51,840 --> 00:09:54,600 level due to the vulnerabilities, subject matter 154 00:09:54,600 --> 00:09:58,020 discussed and potential compilation of information. The 155 00:09:58,020 --> 00:10:01,320 remainder of this work papers summarizes the discussion that 156 00:10:01,320 --> 00:10:03,450 occurred during the meeting. And the statements that were 157 00:10:03,450 --> 00:10:07,350 attributed to major David grush. Major Gresh provided us with 158 00:10:07,350 --> 00:10:10,890 general background information on the DOD has actions regarding 159 00:10:10,920 --> 00:10:15,660 UAP. To his knowledge. Now here's one of the bigger 160 00:10:15,660 --> 00:10:17,280 redactions and 161 00:10:18,510 --> 00:10:22,740 one that's obviously a much bigger than a name. Major grush 162 00:10:22,740 --> 00:10:26,730 stated that and then if you're listening to this, there's, you 163 00:10:26,730 --> 00:10:31,050 know, in total about two or three lines, full line and then 164 00:10:31,050 --> 00:10:34,350 two half lines or so a little bit more than half. So we don't 165 00:10:34,350 --> 00:10:36,780 know exactly what's under there. But Major gruff stated that and 166 00:10:36,780 --> 00:10:40,320 then a bunch of redaction, he stated that he has been studying 167 00:10:40,320 --> 00:10:45,000 UAPs for 15 years, and that he serves as the NRO liaison to the 168 00:10:45,000 --> 00:10:49,680 UAP Task Force. This became a very controversial line. When I 169 00:10:49,680 --> 00:10:53,550 published the article, I left this alone, simply because I 170 00:10:53,550 --> 00:10:56,910 have tried, but cannot get a response from David grush. 171 00:10:56,910 --> 00:11:01,980 myself. So I to be blatantly honest with you just didn't want 172 00:11:01,980 --> 00:11:05,820 to go ahead and create an accusation that he was lying 173 00:11:05,820 --> 00:11:09,030 about this, because this is a clear contradiction to what he 174 00:11:09,030 --> 00:11:13,680 has said publicly. So when I read that I just kind of like to 175 00:11:13,680 --> 00:11:16,950 myself rolled my eyes a little bit and go, Okay, I know that 176 00:11:16,950 --> 00:11:20,940 I'm not going to be able to get a line to him. The only contact 177 00:11:20,940 --> 00:11:24,150 information I found for him was bunk. And I don't do the 178 00:11:24,150 --> 00:11:28,350 stalker, you know, look him up and find his phone number thing. 179 00:11:28,350 --> 00:11:32,310 So I know some people that that works for them. I don't agree 180 00:11:32,310 --> 00:11:36,060 with that. So it's well known that I've been wanting to talk 181 00:11:36,060 --> 00:11:40,200 to him. I know that for a fact that people have passed on. And 182 00:11:40,200 --> 00:11:42,900 he does not care to reach out, which is fine. That's his right. 183 00:11:42,900 --> 00:11:46,950 He doesn't owe me anything. So I left this part out, I just 184 00:11:46,950 --> 00:11:51,030 didn't want to create, you know, this drama, well, a lot of you 185 00:11:51,030 --> 00:11:54,720 are very smart, and you pay attention. And you noticed it. 186 00:11:55,020 --> 00:11:59,310 And it started popping up on social media, that it stated he 187 00:11:59,310 --> 00:12:03,900 was involved in studying UAPs for 15 years, when essentially 188 00:12:03,900 --> 00:12:06,600 he was telling everybody that he didn't really have an interest, 189 00:12:06,780 --> 00:12:11,850 or think about him until, you know, much more recent days. So 190 00:12:11,880 --> 00:12:14,400 that was a clear contradiction. Now I'm going to stop reading 191 00:12:14,400 --> 00:12:18,780 the document and read something to you. I have tried, since this 192 00:12:18,780 --> 00:12:22,320 appeared online to verify it. And I'm going to be honest with 193 00:12:22,320 --> 00:12:26,310 you and say I haven't, because I don't have a line to David 194 00:12:26,310 --> 00:12:30,660 grush. And I've reached out to Ross Coltart he did not respond. 195 00:12:31,080 --> 00:12:34,530 Sadly, that is not new. I've reached out to him a couple 196 00:12:34,530 --> 00:12:38,520 times about David grush, in hopes that either he can help me 197 00:12:38,730 --> 00:12:42,810 and assist me in getting answers or put a line to him. For me, 198 00:12:42,810 --> 00:12:47,040 and neither has been successful. I have no reason to doubt this 199 00:12:47,040 --> 00:12:50,670 though. So I'm going to read it to you anyway. This was 200 00:12:50,730 --> 00:12:54,660 according to Michelangelo given to him through direct message 201 00:12:54,660 --> 00:12:59,640 from Ross Coltart essentially Mike, who was a Twitter user or 202 00:12:59,640 --> 00:13:03,990 ex user, who has quite a following posts a lot of videos, 203 00:13:05,160 --> 00:13:08,850 a lot of information from from various angles of this 204 00:13:08,850 --> 00:13:14,490 conversation. He had posted this and explained that when he 205 00:13:14,490 --> 00:13:17,880 reached out to Ross Coltart he got this this on the record 206 00:13:17,880 --> 00:13:22,800 comment in return relating to what I published. So this is 207 00:13:22,800 --> 00:13:28,290 what David grush said. The DoD IG foyer released to black vault 208 00:13:28,290 --> 00:13:33,060 today highlights an organization proposal to succeed UAP TF that 209 00:13:33,060 --> 00:13:36,360 myself and my colleagues developed on our own time before 210 00:13:36,360 --> 00:13:40,650 the arrow office was created. Not only did I briefed DoD IG 211 00:13:40,650 --> 00:13:44,040 evaluations team on this proposal, but I also presented 212 00:13:44,040 --> 00:13:48,600 the same chart deck to Senator Harry Reid in April of 2021. in 213 00:13:48,600 --> 00:13:51,930 a personal capacity for his guidance, he was very 214 00:13:51,930 --> 00:13:55,740 enthusiastic on the idea of a National Space Lab to receive 215 00:13:55,740 --> 00:14:00,150 records and UAP material from exact executive branch agencies 216 00:14:00,390 --> 00:14:05,310 who would then federate it out to academia, and other partners 217 00:14:05,310 --> 00:14:08,280 and a whole of government approach. He was going to use 218 00:14:08,280 --> 00:14:12,720 the OSA our proposal as a basis of this next discussion with 219 00:14:12,720 --> 00:14:16,530 President Biden, the interviewer reports that I've been studying 220 00:14:16,530 --> 00:14:21,690 UAP for 15 years, I have not, and may have misconstrued my 221 00:14:21,690 --> 00:14:25,740 total time in uniform service Cadet plus commissioned officer 222 00:14:25,740 --> 00:14:29,250 at the time. And that was from David grush. The first part of 223 00:14:29,250 --> 00:14:31,260 that may not make sense to you. If you haven't seen the document 224 00:14:31,260 --> 00:14:33,930 yet. Don't worry, we'll get to that. I'm just not there yet. 225 00:14:33,930 --> 00:14:37,350 But I wanted to make sure that I put this in there that David 226 00:14:37,350 --> 00:14:41,220 grush has refuted what was in these documents. But I will say 227 00:14:41,220 --> 00:14:44,130 and again, this is something that I would love to ask him 228 00:14:44,130 --> 00:14:47,520 about. If you look at all this stuff, and the summation of what 229 00:14:47,520 --> 00:14:51,960 was talked about, there are very few quotes direct quotes the use 230 00:14:51,960 --> 00:14:56,460 of quotation marks. Interestingly, this was in a 231 00:14:56,460 --> 00:15:01,050 quote. So the document states he stated that he He and then in 232 00:15:01,050 --> 00:15:05,760 quotes, has been studying UAPs for 15 years and that he serves, 233 00:15:06,300 --> 00:15:10,230 unquote. And that he serves as the NRO liaison. So whatever. So 234 00:15:10,230 --> 00:15:13,020 whatever this was, it came from somewhere. I mean, I'm guessing, 235 00:15:13,440 --> 00:15:17,220 you know, these guys, when they do these, these summations and 236 00:15:17,220 --> 00:15:20,490 so on. They're not just pulling it off the top of their head and 237 00:15:20,490 --> 00:15:24,900 making it up as they go. When it comes to exact quotations. What 238 00:15:24,900 --> 00:15:29,130 does that mean? Who knows? Look, if it was a mistake, then it's a 239 00:15:29,130 --> 00:15:31,200 mistake. We'll move on. But I wanted to make sure I got 240 00:15:31,200 --> 00:15:35,430 Gratias words in there. Back to the document, major grush stated 241 00:15:35,430 --> 00:15:38,040 that there was no formal reporting mechanism for 242 00:15:38,040 --> 00:15:42,180 reporting UAP observations and initiating investigations. 243 00:15:42,480 --> 00:15:45,900 However, he stated that there were some forms that should be 244 00:15:45,900 --> 00:15:53,250 emailed to and then the there was a redaction. That's just an 245 00:15:53,250 --> 00:15:56,580 unnamed by the way, in case that wasn't clear, major grush stated 246 00:15:56,580 --> 00:16:00,060 that, in his opinion, the analysis done for the Director 247 00:16:00,060 --> 00:16:04,980 of National Intelligence UAP report was not very in depth, 248 00:16:04,980 --> 00:16:08,640 there's another quote was not very in depth, major grush 249 00:16:08,640 --> 00:16:12,180 stated that we should speak with and then a redacted name, and 250 00:16:12,180 --> 00:16:15,900 Air Force point of contact regarding potential recovered 251 00:16:15,930 --> 00:16:21,690 UAP materials. Now, this was the most interesting part of this 252 00:16:21,690 --> 00:16:25,470 document. Because this was the only thing as you'll see, as we 253 00:16:25,470 --> 00:16:32,130 go through this. That touched on UAP material of some kind, what 254 00:16:32,130 --> 00:16:36,600 we have come to know about David grush, biologics, nonhuman 255 00:16:36,600 --> 00:16:41,220 intelligence retreat, crash retrieval programs. All of that 256 00:16:41,820 --> 00:16:46,260 was absent from this discussion. Why I mean, that I don't 257 00:16:46,260 --> 00:16:49,980 understand. This was his opportunity to really put in the 258 00:16:49,980 --> 00:16:53,820 evaluation by the DOD, hey, there's some stuff going on 259 00:16:53,820 --> 00:16:57,930 here. The DoD has not treated this correctly. They are not 260 00:16:57,930 --> 00:17:00,720 informing Congress about this. This is what they're doing. It's 261 00:17:00,720 --> 00:17:05,010 illegal. He mentions white collar crime in his, in his 262 00:17:05,010 --> 00:17:07,470 interviews, there's all sorts of stuff that he could have put in 263 00:17:07,470 --> 00:17:11,190 here, and he doesn't, but this one line did actually allude 264 00:17:11,190 --> 00:17:16,170 that someone from the Air Force had or knew where to get 265 00:17:16,170 --> 00:17:19,650 potential recovered UAP material that to me was really 266 00:17:19,650 --> 00:17:23,340 interesting. who that is, it would be very, very helpful if I 267 00:17:23,340 --> 00:17:27,840 knew, or if we all knew, sadly, we don't, but at least we got a 268 00:17:27,840 --> 00:17:32,490 little bit of a of a hint there. Now back to the document. Major 269 00:17:32,490 --> 00:17:35,400 growth stated that he recommended the DoD fund and 270 00:17:35,400 --> 00:17:40,320 conduct quote, red and blue assessments, unquote, of UAP, in 271 00:17:40,320 --> 00:17:43,380 addition to establishing a permanent office to investigate 272 00:17:43,620 --> 00:17:48,030 what he called strategic anomalies. Additionally, major 273 00:17:48,030 --> 00:17:51,600 grush provided us with a copy of a briefing regarding a proposed 274 00:17:51,600 --> 00:17:56,310 permanent office to handle such strategic anomalies, including 275 00:17:56,310 --> 00:18:00,480 UAP. Conclusion major grush provided us with general 276 00:18:00,480 --> 00:18:04,860 background information on the DoD actions regarding UAP to his 277 00:18:04,860 --> 00:18:08,640 knowledge, updated by and then again, some redactions there for 278 00:18:08,640 --> 00:18:12,030 names and so on, and so forth. The next part was a little bit 279 00:18:12,030 --> 00:18:15,570 of a surprise. This was obviously like a PowerPoint 280 00:18:15,570 --> 00:18:19,560 presentation or a printout of a presentation, strategic anomaly 281 00:18:19,560 --> 00:18:24,300 resolution. But look at this, look at the seal here, Office of 282 00:18:24,300 --> 00:18:29,520 Strategic anomaly resolution. Something that was never before 283 00:18:29,520 --> 00:18:32,790 revealed. So when I first saw this, I'm thinking, okay, is 284 00:18:32,790 --> 00:18:37,380 this a government proposal? The thing that I noticed right off 285 00:18:37,380 --> 00:18:39,450 the bat, there's no classification markings, which 286 00:18:39,480 --> 00:18:45,900 indicates likely not official. And then if we go back when we 287 00:18:45,900 --> 00:18:50,700 go back to his statement, that ended up being correct. So if 288 00:18:50,700 --> 00:18:57,990 you remember, let me see here. The proposal to succeed UAP TF 289 00:18:57,990 --> 00:19:01,920 that myself and my colleagues developed on our own time. So 290 00:19:01,950 --> 00:19:04,590 when I had kind of asked that question in the article for 291 00:19:04,590 --> 00:19:07,920 those that that did read it originally, that ended up being 292 00:19:07,920 --> 00:19:12,900 confirmed where it was not not official. But you can see here, 293 00:19:13,470 --> 00:19:17,550 as we go through the proposal by David grush, for this office, 294 00:19:17,550 --> 00:19:21,240 which is, you know, pretty, pretty interesting to see. You 295 00:19:21,240 --> 00:19:23,850 can see here with a task force resolution here, right in the 296 00:19:23,850 --> 00:19:27,360 center, we have one side of the spectrum, on the slide for 297 00:19:27,360 --> 00:19:30,960 background where you go from green all are explainable, 298 00:19:30,960 --> 00:19:34,020 whether aeroplane balloons, space debris, but you can kind 299 00:19:34,020 --> 00:19:38,730 of see the spectrum of what he's trying to propose. And we just 300 00:19:38,730 --> 00:19:41,250 have to guess a little bit of exactly what went along with the 301 00:19:41,250 --> 00:19:45,270 presentation if he was there, you know, giving some kind of 302 00:19:45,660 --> 00:19:51,030 idea for the DOD to implement who knows. But you can see here 303 00:19:51,030 --> 00:19:55,560 Task Force right in the center. A task force is temporary, what 304 00:19:55,560 --> 00:19:58,500 should an enduring comprehensive capability look like? So 305 00:19:58,500 --> 00:20:01,410 obviously must have talked about that. objectives key questions? 306 00:20:01,650 --> 00:20:05,430 What is it? How does it work? Those are the primary questions, 307 00:20:05,670 --> 00:20:08,880 operations and Intelligence Research and Development. That's 308 00:20:08,880 --> 00:20:12,180 the focus secondary, what do we know about it? How do we talk 309 00:20:12,180 --> 00:20:13,710 about it? How do we work with others? How 310 00:20:13,710 --> 00:20:17,280 do we protect our equities, enablers, policy, communication, 311 00:20:17,280 --> 00:20:21,270 partnership security. So again, he's obviously got some kind of 312 00:20:21,270 --> 00:20:26,040 proposal slash presentation that goes along with all this written 313 00:20:26,040 --> 00:20:28,980 stuff. So this isn't a document that should be read by its own. 314 00:20:29,640 --> 00:20:32,580 But again, I'll link it in the show notes, I'll stop, you know, 315 00:20:32,580 --> 00:20:36,210 regurgitating and just guessing what the slides fully meant. But 316 00:20:36,210 --> 00:20:40,350 you did get a little bit of an idea here, I'll keep scrolling, 317 00:20:40,710 --> 00:20:43,770 you get a little bit of an idea of where he was going with what 318 00:20:43,770 --> 00:20:49,860 he felt should come after the UAP T F. Here are some of the 319 00:20:49,860 --> 00:20:52,650 more colorful slides strategic anomaly and observation 320 00:20:52,650 --> 00:20:56,670 resolution, or soar, prototype, knowledge management, visible 321 00:20:56,700 --> 00:21:00,510 visual visualization, the goal is create an environment to 322 00:21:00,510 --> 00:21:03,480 capture store and interact with data in an intuitive and rapid 323 00:21:03,480 --> 00:21:06,570 manner. Integrate an analytics package to create both 324 00:21:06,570 --> 00:21:10,290 standardized and customizable outputs for trend analysis and 325 00:21:10,290 --> 00:21:13,230 prediction, and prediction incorporate artificial 326 00:21:13,230 --> 00:21:17,010 intelligence algorithms to continually assess data quality 327 00:21:17,010 --> 00:21:21,240 through association or erroneous data identification, Project 328 00:21:21,240 --> 00:21:23,970 Bluebook used his first test case, so he was really getting 329 00:21:23,970 --> 00:21:27,690 into this and trying to create a system where they can just make 330 00:21:27,690 --> 00:21:30,420 one central source for all of the data that sounds great, 331 00:21:30,450 --> 00:21:33,630 nothing wrong with that this is, uh, you know, very cool, I would 332 00:21:33,630 --> 00:21:36,990 have hoped that the UAP TF would have tried to do something like 333 00:21:36,990 --> 00:21:41,970 this, or at least later the AOA MSG or later arrow, you know, I 334 00:21:41,970 --> 00:21:45,060 mean, the name the acronym, I would have hoped that they would 335 00:21:45,060 --> 00:21:48,990 do that, where they're bringing all that data together, he put a 336 00:21:48,990 --> 00:21:52,290 visualization using Project Bluebook, as as an example, 337 00:21:52,830 --> 00:21:57,810 there were over 10,000 case files. You know, that's, that's 338 00:21:57,900 --> 00:22:01,920 roughly, I mean, it was 12,006 18, I think was the exact 339 00:22:01,920 --> 00:22:05,790 number. But he must have, you know, integrated somehow the 340 00:22:05,790 --> 00:22:09,510 locales of all of those cases, just to kind of show an example 341 00:22:09,510 --> 00:22:12,390 of if they collected all of these particular sightings, how 342 00:22:12,390 --> 00:22:15,540 they could, you know, visually display it, see where those 343 00:22:15,540 --> 00:22:18,570 hotspots are, what's problematic, where are weak, 344 00:22:18,600 --> 00:22:22,380 weak points, and so on. Observations, obviously, you can 345 00:22:22,410 --> 00:22:25,620 zoom in on these particular cases, and then come up with 346 00:22:25,620 --> 00:22:29,820 case details, all of this very, very cool. And oddly, similar to 347 00:22:30,030 --> 00:22:33,240 some of the stuff that we are seeing on the private sector 348 00:22:33,240 --> 00:22:37,410 side. You know, those apps that keep coming around that there's 349 00:22:37,410 --> 00:22:42,030 a lot of controversy about seem to do exactly this, though, I 350 00:22:42,030 --> 00:22:46,260 don't think Russia is involved in that. Or those those 351 00:22:46,290 --> 00:22:49,200 projects. You know, this is very similar to what people are 352 00:22:49,200 --> 00:22:53,220 trying to do in the private sector as well. And in fairness, 353 00:22:53,520 --> 00:22:56,220 there's been a lot of us that have created a database, myself 354 00:22:56,220 --> 00:23:00,000 included with interactive maps and stuff like that. In fact, if 355 00:23:00,000 --> 00:23:02,190 you're not familiar with it, I'll just pull it up so you guys 356 00:23:02,190 --> 00:23:07,860 can see it. There's the MSN news site, so just ignore that for 357 00:23:07,860 --> 00:23:12,870 now. But this is actually a very, I would say under 358 00:23:12,870 --> 00:23:16,410 advertised on my end, I don't talk about it a lot. You see up 359 00:23:16,410 --> 00:23:18,870 here at the menu on the black vault, these FOIA documents, I 360 00:23:18,870 --> 00:23:23,400 have a case files as well. And you can go through all sorts of 361 00:23:23,400 --> 00:23:27,690 different case files. Included on there is a global map, same 362 00:23:27,690 --> 00:23:32,580 type of concept, where you have, in my case, a couple 1000 cases 363 00:23:32,610 --> 00:23:36,930 all around, and then you click on the particular locale of 364 00:23:36,930 --> 00:23:41,040 where the cases are icon stipulate what type of case you 365 00:23:41,040 --> 00:23:45,240 click on it, and then you can go right in and see what it is this 366 00:23:45,240 --> 00:23:51,840 is a scientific analysis on plastic found at Mac Brussels 367 00:23:51,840 --> 00:23:55,950 Ranch, in Roswell, New Mexico, just outside of Roswell. So 368 00:23:56,160 --> 00:23:58,500 there's all sorts of stuff there. My whole point being is 369 00:23:58,500 --> 00:24:02,160 that, you know, this concept really isn't new. But it would 370 00:24:02,160 --> 00:24:04,830 be very fascinating for the US government and military to 371 00:24:04,830 --> 00:24:09,090 implement it. And I think that David grush saw the value of 372 00:24:09,090 --> 00:24:11,310 that from an intelligence standpoint, so good for him. 373 00:24:11,670 --> 00:24:14,940 Data Analytics. So obviously a way to spit out all that data, 374 00:24:15,360 --> 00:24:18,630 federal Labtech exploitation. So again, it just kind of keeps 375 00:24:18,630 --> 00:24:21,180 going to the last slide, but it just kind of keeps going into 376 00:24:21,180 --> 00:24:25,980 what his ideas work. So that's a breakdown of what it is. So 377 00:24:25,980 --> 00:24:29,220 let's go to what what it wasn't where is all the stuff about the 378 00:24:29,220 --> 00:24:33,180 complaint? Right? Where is the stuff where if he submitted the 379 00:24:33,180 --> 00:24:37,320 material to the IG, where is their investigation? Now? Let's 380 00:24:37,320 --> 00:24:41,640 just play some hypothetical here. I think that this meeting 381 00:24:41,640 --> 00:24:46,890 took place post what he says he submitted to the IG. So again, 382 00:24:46,890 --> 00:24:51,180 July 2021, he submitted all that stuff to the IG. My guess is, it 383 00:24:51,180 --> 00:24:54,450 goes to the evaluation team. They go okay, maybe he can add 384 00:24:54,450 --> 00:24:59,490 something and they interview him. But where is all the talk 385 00:24:59,610 --> 00:25:04,800 about biologics crash retrieval, non human intelligence and 386 00:25:04,800 --> 00:25:11,160 really getting into what we know him for meaning that's what his 387 00:25:11,160 --> 00:25:15,000 claims are. That's That's it. This was his opportunity. Now 388 00:25:15,000 --> 00:25:19,500 that hypothetical, let's just say that this came just prior to 389 00:25:19,500 --> 00:25:23,190 him submitting that IG complaint. This was a perfect 390 00:25:23,190 --> 00:25:26,850 opportunity for him to say, hey, look, guys, by the way, because 391 00:25:26,850 --> 00:25:29,940 it was a top secret meeting. So nobody come back at me and say 392 00:25:29,940 --> 00:25:33,870 all that and they weren't cleared to hear it. No, they had 393 00:25:33,870 --> 00:25:38,340 this top secret umbrella, shielding this interview for a 394 00:25:38,340 --> 00:25:43,650 reason. So the fact that David grush just does not say anything 395 00:25:44,100 --> 00:25:48,900 whatsoever, about that kind of stuff. Look, that's, that's a 396 00:25:48,900 --> 00:25:51,630 little bit of a red flag to me, you would think that you would 397 00:25:51,660 --> 00:25:55,980 you would have that you would think that you would make 398 00:25:55,980 --> 00:25:59,550 mentioning it. And it's nowhere to be found. Now, I'm not saying 399 00:25:59,550 --> 00:26:03,360 that there's anything nefarious with that. But what I am saying 400 00:26:03,360 --> 00:26:06,570 is, why not. And that's another one of those really weird things 401 00:26:06,570 --> 00:26:10,950 here. Because if you look at the timeline, if you look at what he 402 00:26:10,950 --> 00:26:15,630 was trying to accomplish, that July 2021 timeframe was getting 403 00:26:15,630 --> 00:26:20,550 the IG IG knowledgeable about what he had discovered through 404 00:26:20,550 --> 00:26:24,330 the 40 eyewitnesses that he talked to, which tie into again, 405 00:26:24,330 --> 00:26:28,170 that nonhuman intelligence or Nhi, the crash retrieval 406 00:26:28,170 --> 00:26:32,700 program, all of that all of that stuff, the biologics, none of 407 00:26:32,700 --> 00:26:36,180 that is in there, the only mention was the Air Force point 408 00:26:36,180 --> 00:26:41,790 of contact, regarding potential recovered UAP material. So 409 00:26:41,820 --> 00:26:46,110 that's just something to keep in mind. I mean, the like he he had 410 00:26:46,110 --> 00:26:50,070 an opportunity here and didn't take it. So none of that is 411 00:26:50,070 --> 00:26:53,970 there. Now, since this request, I have filed a new one. Because 412 00:26:53,970 --> 00:26:57,360 the way that my wording worked, and I always it's kind of a 413 00:26:57,360 --> 00:27:00,810 double edged sword here, right? If you stipulate a tighter 414 00:27:00,810 --> 00:27:04,470 timeframe, which I did on this request that it was circa July 415 00:27:04,470 --> 00:27:10,560 2021. How do they then stop searching? Do they just go to 416 00:27:10,560 --> 00:27:15,540 present day? Or do they only stick around the July 2021 417 00:27:15,540 --> 00:27:19,620 timeframe? So I filed an additional request with a wider 418 00:27:19,620 --> 00:27:22,980 net, and stating you can exclude everything in this particular 419 00:27:22,980 --> 00:27:28,140 case. But give me everything that you have on communication, 420 00:27:28,140 --> 00:27:31,320 essentially the same wording that yielded this, but with a 421 00:27:31,320 --> 00:27:35,280 much broader net? When it comes to the timeframe? What will come 422 00:27:35,280 --> 00:27:39,180 out of that? I really don't know. But it will be interesting 423 00:27:39,180 --> 00:27:43,950 to to see what did the IG do post this interview. If 424 00:27:43,980 --> 00:27:47,520 anything, there are other cases that I have just to give you a 425 00:27:47,520 --> 00:27:51,630 kind of a quick teaser of what that is. They are open on key 426 00:27:51,630 --> 00:27:56,640 individuals within the DOD IG office, one or two of which are 427 00:27:56,640 --> 00:28:03,240 probably one of these. One or two oops, I went too far, one or 428 00:28:03,240 --> 00:28:09,000 two of these redacted names here on on this particular page. So 429 00:28:09,000 --> 00:28:14,820 you'll be able to hopefully see a glimpse into not only who was 430 00:28:14,820 --> 00:28:17,610 there, but what were they talking about outside of the 431 00:28:17,610 --> 00:28:21,780 meeting via email. And those cases strategically target, so 432 00:28:21,780 --> 00:28:24,690 to speak, those individuals that were likely involved in the 433 00:28:24,690 --> 00:28:28,290 meeting, including some of the upper brass within the IGs 434 00:28:28,290 --> 00:28:32,640 office, including the IG himself. But that being said, 435 00:28:32,670 --> 00:28:35,670 hopefully that will yield some even more stuff. So lots of 436 00:28:35,670 --> 00:28:38,790 puzzle pieces that are still missing. We have still lots of 437 00:28:38,790 --> 00:28:41,790 questions that remain unanswered. And if anybody's 438 00:28:41,790 --> 00:28:44,730 watching this, and you have aligned to David grush, let them 439 00:28:44,730 --> 00:28:49,260 know, I am not interested in making anybody look bad. I just 440 00:28:49,260 --> 00:28:52,650 want to try and answer some of those outstanding questions. So 441 00:28:52,680 --> 00:28:55,830 if you know him, let them know about this video, let them know 442 00:28:55,830 --> 00:28:58,350 that we're exploring these documents. And we're kind of 443 00:28:58,350 --> 00:29:01,230 left with a lot of questions. And he can offer some 444 00:29:01,230 --> 00:29:05,730 unclassified, but very helpful context to the conversation. And 445 00:29:05,730 --> 00:29:06,900 that's all I'm interested in. 446 00:29:07,290 --> 00:29:10,650 Hopefully, someone out there, you can help me out HOW DO ME A 447 00:29:10,650 --> 00:29:14,430 SOLID and get aligned to him? I'm pretty easy to find online. 448 00:29:14,460 --> 00:29:17,340 So all my contact information goes right to me, the black 449 00:29:17,340 --> 00:29:21,090 vault is just one single person you're looking at him. So any 450 00:29:21,090 --> 00:29:23,940 contact form he fills out will come right to me. Other than 451 00:29:23,940 --> 00:29:26,700 that, we're just left to kind of explore this on our own. Ask 452 00:29:26,700 --> 00:29:28,980 those questions, throw them out into the cosmos and hope one 453 00:29:28,980 --> 00:29:32,220 day, they get answered. But you know, I keep digging. I'll keep 454 00:29:32,220 --> 00:29:35,310 digging. I'll post those FOIA request responses when they come 455 00:29:35,310 --> 00:29:38,070 in even the denials. But this was a very cool one because 456 00:29:38,070 --> 00:29:41,700 again, no redactions when it came to national security 457 00:29:41,700 --> 00:29:45,300 information, which was kind of a weird thing in itself, but hey, 458 00:29:45,330 --> 00:29:48,240 I'll take it when it happens. We got a little bit of a glimpse. 459 00:29:48,570 --> 00:29:51,030 That said, Thank you so much for listening and watching if you 460 00:29:51,030 --> 00:29:54,660 can, if you're watching on YouTube, clicking that thumbs 461 00:29:54,660 --> 00:29:57,060 up, making sure you're subscribed to the channel is a 462 00:29:57,060 --> 00:30:00,000 huge help. If you find the content worthwhile, please 463 00:30:00,000 --> 00:30:02,730 Spread the word. That's the biggest way that you can help me 464 00:30:03,300 --> 00:30:07,410 get more exposure to this channel and get the message out 465 00:30:07,410 --> 00:30:11,040 all of this information you can find in the show notes below. 466 00:30:11,040 --> 00:30:13,650 Feel free to click if you're listening on a podcast channel, 467 00:30:13,950 --> 00:30:18,180 the black vault radio is the title on most any podcast 468 00:30:18,180 --> 00:30:21,000 platform of your choice. Just search for that. And if you're 469 00:30:21,000 --> 00:30:24,060 listening on one of those, I aim for five stars I won't tell you 470 00:30:24,060 --> 00:30:27,060 what to do. But if you can add a review, I'd really appreciate 471 00:30:27,060 --> 00:30:30,900 it. I do shoot for the five star rating as well. All of that is a 472 00:30:30,900 --> 00:30:33,360 huge help to the channel. It's good to be back. Thanks for 473 00:30:33,360 --> 00:30:36,630 tuning in and watching. This is John Greenewald Jr signing off. 474 00:30:36,930 --> 00:30:37,890 And we'll see you next time.