1
00:00:09,389 --> 00:00:12,839
John Greenewald: Did you miss
it? The DoD Inspector General

2
00:00:12,839 --> 00:00:16,589
Office released their report
summarizing what they called

3
00:00:16,619 --> 00:00:22,199
their evaluation into how the
DOD has handled the UAP issue.

4
00:00:25,739 --> 00:00:30,959
But what, if anything, can we
learn? Well, to my surprise, a

5
00:00:30,959 --> 00:00:35,279
lot more than you might think,
let's explore the highs, and the

6
00:00:35,279 --> 00:00:41,939
lows, and everything in between.
Join me, John Greenwald, Jr, as

7
00:00:41,939 --> 00:00:47,399
we take a deep dive into what we
can all take away. So stay

8
00:00:47,399 --> 00:00:51,389
tuned, you're about to journey
inside the black vault.

9
00:01:17,550 --> 00:01:20,010
That's right, everybody. As
always, thank you so much for

10
00:01:20,010 --> 00:01:23,490
tuning in and taking this
journey inside the black vault

11
00:01:23,490 --> 00:01:26,820
with me. I'm your host, John
Greenewald, Jr, founder, creator

12
00:01:26,820 --> 00:01:29,970
of the black vault.com. And
today, we're taking a deep dive

13
00:01:29,970 --> 00:01:35,370
into that new DoD inspector
general report that summarizes

14
00:01:35,370 --> 00:01:41,040
their what they call evaluation
into how the DoD handled the UAP

15
00:01:41,070 --> 00:01:45,750
issue. Now, there was very, very
little known about this, and I

16
00:01:45,750 --> 00:01:48,120
tried through FOIA to get more,
we got a little bit of a

17
00:01:48,120 --> 00:01:50,640
glimpse, I'm gonna go through
some of those documents to give

18
00:01:50,640 --> 00:01:53,520
you a little bit better of a
background. But then go over the

19
00:01:53,520 --> 00:01:56,940
report itself. I know deep dives
are not for everybody. So after

20
00:01:56,940 --> 00:02:00,720
the live version of this, I'm
gonna put channel markers so

21
00:02:00,720 --> 00:02:04,320
that way, if you want to skip
around, you can do so. Because

22
00:02:04,320 --> 00:02:07,500
again, a lot of detail is not
for everybody. But in this

23
00:02:07,500 --> 00:02:11,640
instance, it's absolutely
worthwhile to take a little bit

24
00:02:11,640 --> 00:02:14,850
of extra time to truly
understand this. So let's just

25
00:02:14,850 --> 00:02:18,930
go ahead and get get into it
here. Let me go ahead and pull

26
00:02:18,930 --> 00:02:22,950
up the PowerPoint presentation.
I've got a bunch of slides to go

27
00:02:22,950 --> 00:02:28,770
over with you. So let's just go
ahead and dive in. If you missed

28
00:02:28,770 --> 00:02:32,520
it, here is the cover page of
the report that was was released

29
00:02:32,520 --> 00:02:38,610
on January 24 2024, titled
unclassified summary of Report

30
00:02:38,880 --> 00:02:45,840
Number DoD IG Dash 2023 Dash 109
evaluation of the DoD actions

31
00:02:45,840 --> 00:02:52,320
regarding unidentified anomalous
phenomena, August 15 2023. Now,

32
00:02:52,350 --> 00:02:56,550
what's the date difference
there? August 15 2023, was when

33
00:02:56,550 --> 00:03:00,000
they finally came out and said
that they finished their

34
00:03:00,000 --> 00:03:05,400
evaluation, which was first
started in May of 2021. That

35
00:03:05,430 --> 00:03:11,310
classified report that came out
in August of last year. But we

36
00:03:11,340 --> 00:03:15,390
we the people had to wait until
a unclassified version or

37
00:03:15,390 --> 00:03:19,410
summary, if you will, of those
findings came out. So that's

38
00:03:19,410 --> 00:03:23,730
what we're gonna go over. Now,
just so you're aware, in August,

39
00:03:23,760 --> 00:03:26,790
the moment that this was
announced, I went after that

40
00:03:26,790 --> 00:03:29,040
through what's called a
mandatory declassification

41
00:03:29,040 --> 00:03:33,600
review, or MDR, that essentially
mandates them to review that

42
00:03:33,600 --> 00:03:37,140
classified product and hopefully
in hopes that will get some type

43
00:03:37,140 --> 00:03:40,350
of release, whether or not
that's going to happen. Your

44
00:03:40,350 --> 00:03:43,500
guess is as good as mine. But
let's before we dive into that

45
00:03:43,500 --> 00:03:46,770
report, let's get a little bit
of history, in case you guys

46
00:03:46,770 --> 00:03:50,190
have not followed this. Don't
know what I'm talking about.

47
00:03:50,310 --> 00:03:55,200
Let's go ahead and take a look
at this. May 3 2021 was when we

48
00:03:55,200 --> 00:03:58,590
all found out about it. And
again, when I say all the

49
00:03:58,590 --> 00:04:01,920
general public, this was
something that was announced on

50
00:04:01,920 --> 00:04:06,690
the website. This was something
that the DoD IG talked about

51
00:04:07,110 --> 00:04:12,240
openly but details were very
thin about what exactly it was

52
00:04:12,240 --> 00:04:15,600
that they were doing. You can
see from this memo dated May

53
00:04:15,600 --> 00:04:20,340
3 2021. Evaluation of DOD
actions regarding the

54
00:04:20,370 --> 00:04:24,000
unidentified aerial phenomena
and then it gives a long project

55
00:04:24,000 --> 00:04:28,890
number we plan to begin the
subject evaluation in May 2021.

56
00:04:29,280 --> 00:04:33,420
The objective of this evaluation
is to determine the extent to

57
00:04:33,420 --> 00:04:37,500
which the DOD has taken actions
regarding unidentified aerial

58
00:04:37,500 --> 00:04:42,450
phenomena or UAP. We may revise
the objective as the evaluation

59
00:04:42,450 --> 00:04:45,900
proceeds and we will consider
suggestions for management for

60
00:04:45,900 --> 00:04:51,030
additional or revised objections
object objectives, excuse me.

61
00:04:51,270 --> 00:04:55,170
So, in other words, there was
not a whole lot known there

62
00:04:55,170 --> 00:04:59,970
really wasn't. And this was it.
This was all we were allowed to

63
00:05:00,000 --> 00:05:04,770
to essentially understand about
it. And when this was announced,

64
00:05:04,800 --> 00:05:08,340
I immediately started going
after records. And I've, as I've

65
00:05:08,340 --> 00:05:11,100
already mentioned, we'll get
into some of those that came

66
00:05:11,100 --> 00:05:15,570
out. But looking at the original
announcement, very, very little

67
00:05:15,570 --> 00:05:20,670
was known about it. This was the
distribution of this memo. So

68
00:05:20,670 --> 00:05:24,840
this memo essentially instructed
them, hey, we need some liaisons

69
00:05:25,110 --> 00:05:30,090
from your agencies for this
evaluation. That way we can take

70
00:05:30,090 --> 00:05:34,440
a look at the UAP Issue. Issue,
you know, essentially how the IG

71
00:05:34,440 --> 00:05:37,620
works is they'll evaluate the
issue, and then submit some

72
00:05:37,620 --> 00:05:41,070
recommendations or whatever
their findings are, and go from

73
00:05:41,070 --> 00:05:44,460
there. So they needed those
liaisons that were connected to

74
00:05:44,460 --> 00:05:48,600
those agencies. And here's a
list of those agencies. I won't

75
00:05:48,600 --> 00:05:51,660
go over all of them. Everything
is linked in the show notes

76
00:05:51,660 --> 00:05:54,600
below. So you can follow along
with me with the documents or

77
00:05:55,140 --> 00:05:58,320
take your time and read it more
in detail at your leisure. But

78
00:05:58,320 --> 00:06:02,880
you can see here, CENTCOM was on
there North calm, Special

79
00:06:02,880 --> 00:06:07,710
Operations Command, DARPA, dia
DTRA, the Defense Threat

80
00:06:07,710 --> 00:06:11,070
Reduction Agency, Missile
Defense Agency, the NSA, the

81
00:06:11,070 --> 00:06:14,670
NRO, the Army, the Navy, the Air
Force, so essentially, they were

82
00:06:14,670 --> 00:06:18,840
going across the gamut on who
they wanted to speak with during

83
00:06:18,840 --> 00:06:23,430
the course of their evaluation.
Again, what did that evaluation

84
00:06:23,430 --> 00:06:27,540
entail other than what was in
the memo? Well, I tried shortly

85
00:06:27,540 --> 00:06:31,500
after that memo was issued to
contact the IGs office at the

86
00:06:31,500 --> 00:06:35,880
DOD, and say that I was covering
the topic which I was not only

87
00:06:35,880 --> 00:06:39,180
on this YouTube channel, but but
on my website, the black

88
00:06:39,180 --> 00:06:44,430
vault.com as well, trying to
inform all of you what is going

89
00:06:44,430 --> 00:06:48,420
on, because there was a lot of
rumors at this time to one of

90
00:06:48,420 --> 00:06:51,510
the one of which being that they
were evaluating how they were

91
00:06:51,510 --> 00:06:55,830
treating Luis Elizondo. As time
went on, it was known that he

92
00:06:55,830 --> 00:06:59,130
submitted a inspector general
complaint. So some people

93
00:06:59,130 --> 00:07:01,800
believe that this was part of
that. So what was it so I

94
00:07:01,800 --> 00:07:04,830
reached out to them. And as you
can see here, the DOD does not

95
00:07:04,830 --> 00:07:07,890
have any additional information
to offer, beyond what is

96
00:07:07,890 --> 00:07:10,080
published on our project
announcement that gives the big

97
00:07:10,080 --> 00:07:15,360
old long address. And here was
the announcement page. I already

98
00:07:15,360 --> 00:07:19,410
read to you, very briefly the
memo. But this is where you

99
00:07:19,410 --> 00:07:21,690
could download that memo. You
see down here, the related

100
00:07:21,690 --> 00:07:26,220
documents. That number here is
for that that memorandum that I

101
00:07:26,220 --> 00:07:31,230
went over, but essentially, it
was the same very scant detail

102
00:07:31,620 --> 00:07:34,920
announcement where they say we
plan to begin the subject in May

103
00:07:34,920 --> 00:07:39,000
of 2021. The objective is the
evaluation to determine the

104
00:07:39,000 --> 00:07:41,520
extent to which the DOD has
taken actions regarding

105
00:07:41,520 --> 00:07:44,670
unidentified aerial phenomena
UAP, the exact same wording. So

106
00:07:44,670 --> 00:07:48,240
there was absolutely nothing
helpful of trying to figure out

107
00:07:48,360 --> 00:07:51,720
what this was. So that's when I
started hammering through FOIA.

108
00:07:52,410 --> 00:07:56,850
Later that year, in 2021, I was
able to get out some documents

109
00:07:56,850 --> 00:08:00,930
that shed not much, but a little
bit more light on it now going

110
00:08:00,930 --> 00:08:03,600
over this, not only for the
history, but to show you guys,

111
00:08:03,900 --> 00:08:08,460
this is how you piece together
the puzzle, and try and figure

112
00:08:08,460 --> 00:08:12,240
out and unfold what they're
doing behind the scenes. Because

113
00:08:12,240 --> 00:08:17,040
as I got the response from the
IG, a little bit more again

114
00:08:17,040 --> 00:08:20,640
unfolded where they declassified
a

115
00:08:22,680 --> 00:08:26,730
PowerPoint presentation that
talked about the evaluation. Now

116
00:08:26,730 --> 00:08:30,210
I say declassified actually
wasn't classified it was CUI or

117
00:08:30,360 --> 00:08:33,420
controlled unclassified
information. But essentially,

118
00:08:33,420 --> 00:08:35,820
you know, has to go through a
review process, not everything

119
00:08:35,820 --> 00:08:39,810
is able to be released to the
public. So you still have that

120
00:08:39,810 --> 00:08:44,010
review process. The FOIA yielded
it. There's a video on this

121
00:08:44,010 --> 00:08:47,370
channel if you want to go ahead
and see even more of what was

122
00:08:47,370 --> 00:08:50,730
revealed. But I'm just going to
show you a couple key points.

123
00:08:50,820 --> 00:08:55,920
This was that cover of the
PowerPoint presentation, you can

124
00:08:55,920 --> 00:08:59,640
see that it was made in June of
2021, only took them about a

125
00:08:59,640 --> 00:09:03,000
month to create this
presentation. Not exactly known.

126
00:09:03,750 --> 00:09:09,240
Exactly what for it was exactly
what it was for. But rather it

127
00:09:09,240 --> 00:09:12,660
gave a little bit more detail on
this evaluation. You can see

128
00:09:12,660 --> 00:09:16,020
here by this slide the
evaluation process it this was

129
00:09:16,020 --> 00:09:18,930
the little more light I was
talking about, on what they were

130
00:09:18,930 --> 00:09:21,510
going to do. They were going to
be doing data requests,

131
00:09:21,630 --> 00:09:25,680
interviews, site visits,
documentation, review and

132
00:09:25,680 --> 00:09:28,980
analysis during their
evaluation, fieldwork, so

133
00:09:29,430 --> 00:09:32,040
doesn't really tell us much, but
at least it tells us that they

134
00:09:32,040 --> 00:09:33,870
were going to be actively
looking into things,

135
00:09:33,870 --> 00:09:36,810
interviewing people and so on.
They were going to create a

136
00:09:36,810 --> 00:09:40,950
draft report to where they were
going to have official

137
00:09:40,950 --> 00:09:44,520
management, look at it, have
about a month to review it,

138
00:09:44,520 --> 00:09:49,350
submit comments, so on and so
forth. The final response, same

139
00:09:49,350 --> 00:09:51,510
deal, they were going to make
sure that everybody had their

140
00:09:51,510 --> 00:09:55,350
two cents in there. So it just
gave a little bit of an idea of

141
00:09:55,350 --> 00:10:00,000
how it was going to unfold. The
other thing that was fairly

142
00:10:00,000 --> 00:10:04,860
interesting about this was the
list of people that were

143
00:10:04,860 --> 00:10:09,300
involved in this evaluation from
the IGs office, the majority of

144
00:10:09,300 --> 00:10:13,650
them were redacted. Now, that's
not too uncommon. A lot of times

145
00:10:13,800 --> 00:10:16,980
these agencies will redact for
privacy reasons, people that

146
00:10:16,980 --> 00:10:20,130
work for their agency or that
are involved in projects. Why?

147
00:10:20,250 --> 00:10:22,650
Well, we're seeing a little bit
of a glimpse of it. Now, if

148
00:10:22,650 --> 00:10:27,120
you're paying attention to
NASA's different meetings and

149
00:10:27,120 --> 00:10:30,450
broadcasts that they've talked
about their UFO personnel that

150
00:10:30,450 --> 00:10:34,170
were studying these phenomena
for the depth for that agency,

151
00:10:34,440 --> 00:10:37,170
and were subjected to quite a
bit of harassment from the

152
00:10:37,170 --> 00:10:40,770
general public. Dr. Shawn
Kirkpatrick has come out, he was

153
00:10:40,770 --> 00:10:45,240
talking about harassment from
the general public, to him in

154
00:10:45,240 --> 00:10:48,150
his office, and even his family.
Apparently, somebody showed up

155
00:10:48,150 --> 00:10:52,200
at his house and was arrested, I
guess they got federal

156
00:10:52,200 --> 00:10:57,750
authorities involved. So there's
a lot of reason to cover up. But

157
00:10:57,750 --> 00:11:00,570
I don't mean that in a negative
way, but to cover up and redact

158
00:11:00,780 --> 00:11:03,690
those types of names, you did
have a couple though Randolph

159
00:11:03,690 --> 00:11:08,160
stone, he was the one that that
signed the original memo. So

160
00:11:08,190 --> 00:11:11,220
when you have more public
figures, that's when you more

161
00:11:11,220 --> 00:11:15,570
get a glimpse, Michael Ruark,
the Deputy Inspector General for

162
00:11:15,570 --> 00:11:18,510
evaluations, his name was on
there, again, obviously much

163
00:11:18,510 --> 00:11:22,020
more public name. And then stone
was the Assistant Inspector

164
00:11:22,020 --> 00:11:26,460
General for space, intelligence,
engineering, and oversight. Now,

165
00:11:26,460 --> 00:11:28,560
even though these names here
were all redacted, you can at

166
00:11:28,560 --> 00:11:31,350
least see where they came from,
again, shedding that little more

167
00:11:31,350 --> 00:11:34,890
light space missile and nuclear
division, sensitive activities,

168
00:11:34,890 --> 00:11:37,170
division, intelligence,
division, research and

169
00:11:37,170 --> 00:11:39,720
engineering division, and then
all these project managers and

170
00:11:39,720 --> 00:11:43,140
evaluators and an auditor in
there as well. So you get an

171
00:11:43,140 --> 00:11:46,680
idea of how big the team was,
where they were coming from, and

172
00:11:46,680 --> 00:11:50,910
again, just those different
types of offices that they were

173
00:11:50,910 --> 00:11:56,460
coming from. So that was a
little bit of a help, before

174
00:11:56,460 --> 00:12:00,510
this report came out to see how
it was going on behind the

175
00:12:00,510 --> 00:12:07,020
scenes. Now, fast forward to
August of 2023. You can see here

176
00:12:07,020 --> 00:12:12,240
on the website, this was a
public posting of the classified

177
00:12:12,540 --> 00:12:17,070
report from that evaluation. So
So we've gone over the 2021

178
00:12:17,070 --> 00:12:20,040
material, but it probably but
but you know, there was

179
00:12:20,040 --> 00:12:25,200
absolutely nothing else until
August 15 2023, when they

180
00:12:25,200 --> 00:12:29,310
announced that the classified
report was done. But it was just

181
00:12:29,310 --> 00:12:33,450
done. That was it, we didn't get
to see it. And we didn't get to

182
00:12:33,450 --> 00:12:37,500
understand anything about what
they found, what they concluded

183
00:12:37,620 --> 00:12:41,730
what they recommended, what they
wanted to do next. Nothing,

184
00:12:41,760 --> 00:12:45,060
nothing was given to the general
public. All we were told was

185
00:12:45,060 --> 00:12:48,990
that at a later date, a
unclassified report would come

186
00:12:48,990 --> 00:12:51,660
out. Now, as I've already
mentioned, I'm going after that

187
00:12:51,660 --> 00:12:54,870
classified report, some of you
may say, Hey, that's a big fat

188
00:12:54,870 --> 00:12:57,450
chance, there's no way you're
gonna get that. Well, I've

189
00:12:57,450 --> 00:13:02,190
gotten the previous one of any
way the classified UA UAP

190
00:13:02,190 --> 00:13:05,220
reports submitted to Congress,
although it was partially

191
00:13:05,220 --> 00:13:10,050
released, it still spoke volumes
about the classified level of

192
00:13:10,050 --> 00:13:13,110
what they were talking about.
Same here, I hope to have the

193
00:13:13,140 --> 00:13:16,530
same luck. And there's other
cases as well, which will

194
00:13:16,560 --> 00:13:19,530
probably have very similar
outcomes where he won't see

195
00:13:19,530 --> 00:13:22,380
everything, but you'll start to
get a better understanding of

196
00:13:22,380 --> 00:13:26,970
what's in that classified
version. So now, last week, now

197
00:13:26,970 --> 00:13:30,870
we're caught up. Now that
unclassified version came out.

198
00:13:31,140 --> 00:13:36,780
And we get a idea about the
evaluation, what they did, what

199
00:13:36,780 --> 00:13:41,640
they talked about, and what they
recommended for the Department

200
00:13:41,640 --> 00:13:45,600
of Defense. So let's get back
into that report. Again, this is

201
00:13:45,600 --> 00:13:49,680
the cover page, all linked in
the show show notes below. So

202
00:13:49,680 --> 00:13:52,800
you have it this to the
classified version of the

203
00:13:52,800 --> 00:13:56,310
evaluation, or excuse me, a
classified version of the

204
00:13:56,310 --> 00:14:00,240
evaluation of the DoD is actions
regarding unidentified anomalous

205
00:14:00,240 --> 00:14:03,780
phenomena form the basis of this
unclassified summary. So just

206
00:14:03,780 --> 00:14:06,930
pointing out a punching the
note, this takes from that

207
00:14:06,930 --> 00:14:12,180
classified version, and puts on
there, essentially, the, the

208
00:14:12,180 --> 00:14:15,000
shield, if you will, for the
classified information softens

209
00:14:15,000 --> 00:14:18,090
everything makes it a lot less
interesting and boring. And

210
00:14:18,090 --> 00:14:20,940
that's why it's unclassified.
I'm not going to read the whole

211
00:14:20,940 --> 00:14:25,110
report to you, it's not really
long. But for the sake of time

212
00:14:25,110 --> 00:14:27,600
here, we're just going to kind
of focus in on the most

213
00:14:27,600 --> 00:14:31,080
important parts, but the way
that it did start was a

214
00:14:31,080 --> 00:14:34,350
historical background. And it
gives you all the way back to

215
00:14:34,350 --> 00:14:38,880
the 1940s of how the US
government collected UFO

216
00:14:38,880 --> 00:14:42,510
information looked into case
files, talked about Project

217
00:14:42,510 --> 00:14:46,290
Bluebook and then they
themselves fast forwarded into

218
00:14:46,290 --> 00:14:49,230
the year 2000. That's what I'm
going to zoom in on because I

219
00:14:49,230 --> 00:14:52,980
know that this created quite a
firestorm when it first came out

220
00:14:52,980 --> 00:14:56,520
a lot of our has a lot of I told
you so and all of that good

221
00:14:56,520 --> 00:15:00,330
stuff. Specifically, people
really honed in on this Hi lated

222
00:15:00,330 --> 00:15:03,510
portion. The DoD did not
officially look at UAP again

223
00:15:03,510 --> 00:15:08,280
until mid 2000. When select
members of Congress initiated

224
00:15:08,280 --> 00:15:12,060
and funded a program to study
UAP called the advanced

225
00:15:12,060 --> 00:15:16,200
aerospace Weapon System
Applications Program, or all

226
00:15:16,200 --> 00:15:21,630
SAP, as many of you have heard
it referred to, well look, this

227
00:15:21,630 --> 00:15:27,750
yet adds another muddy layer on
a already very muddy and

228
00:15:27,750 --> 00:15:32,070
convoluted story. I have
followed this since day one

229
00:15:32,280 --> 00:15:36,720
since October of 2017. When we
learned of what what Luis

230
00:15:36,720 --> 00:15:42,750
Elizondo called a aerial threat
Research Program, never said a

231
00:15:42,750 --> 00:15:47,310
tip never said OS app, and
rather just more talked about

232
00:15:47,310 --> 00:15:52,950
aerial threats. So I've followed
it since then, and have tried to

233
00:15:52,950 --> 00:15:57,030
unravel the mystery. It wasn't
till the next year that we

234
00:15:57,030 --> 00:16:00,960
learned about this offset
program. And as we continued to

235
00:16:00,960 --> 00:16:05,100
dig, then we realized that
December 2017, New York Times

236
00:16:05,100 --> 00:16:08,850
article was wrong in a lot of
areas. And don't take my word

237
00:16:08,850 --> 00:16:11,940
for that. You know, I'm not
trying to take a shot at them,

238
00:16:11,940 --> 00:16:16,950
but rather take the director of
offset that's not disputed. Dr.

239
00:16:16,950 --> 00:16:21,180
James McCaskey from the DIA take
his word for it, that he

240
00:16:21,180 --> 00:16:23,910
published a book and in there,
I'm paraphrasing this part. But

241
00:16:24,090 --> 00:16:28,170
essentially, he said I'm here to
set the record straight. So he

242
00:16:28,170 --> 00:16:32,310
said that the New York Times was
not accurate when they portrayed

243
00:16:32,310 --> 00:16:36,570
what they had labeled a tip. But
in reality that $22 million went

244
00:16:36,570 --> 00:16:40,650
to OS app. Well, here's where it
gets even kind of more muddy is

245
00:16:40,650 --> 00:16:45,390
that the government has denied
that OS app, which was nicknamed

246
00:16:45,450 --> 00:16:49,470
a tip nine unless you listen to
Luis Elizondo, and he says it

247
00:16:49,470 --> 00:16:53,100
was a program but regardless,
because it gets really, really

248
00:16:53,100 --> 00:16:56,370
bad when it comes to the
confusion. But back to the

249
00:16:56,370 --> 00:17:00,450
government, they say no, these
were not UFO research programs.

250
00:17:00,840 --> 00:17:03,720
But what a lot of people forget
is the government finally

251
00:17:03,720 --> 00:17:07,350
amended their statement and
stance. This was an article I

252
00:17:07,350 --> 00:17:11,790
published in 2021, the
government made kind of a

253
00:17:12,510 --> 00:17:17,280
cobbled together but much larger
statement about a tip. Now why

254
00:17:17,280 --> 00:17:20,730
is that messy? Well, they're
really calling it. They're

255
00:17:20,730 --> 00:17:24,540
calling it a tip, but really, it
was all SAP. And that's just by

256
00:17:24,540 --> 00:17:27,960
their own documentation. But
regardless, they gave this

257
00:17:27,960 --> 00:17:33,930
longer statement of the A tip
program, and

258
00:17:35,340 --> 00:17:40,890
essentially said that they
utilized some UAP material for

259
00:17:40,890 --> 00:17:46,710
OS app, but it was not a UAP
research program. Rather, it was

260
00:17:47,460 --> 00:17:50,910
aimed to investigate foreign
advanced aerospace weapon system

261
00:17:50,910 --> 00:17:54,690
applications with future
technology progress projections

262
00:17:54,690 --> 00:17:58,230
over the next 40 years. And to
create a center of expertise for

263
00:17:58,230 --> 00:18:02,370
advanced aerospace technologies.
The goal was to help understand

264
00:18:02,370 --> 00:18:04,830
the threat posed by
unconventional or leap ahead

265
00:18:04,830 --> 00:18:07,560
aerospace vehicles and
technologies that could have

266
00:18:07,560 --> 00:18:11,310
national security implications
for the United States. It goes

267
00:18:11,310 --> 00:18:16,080
into much more details. But down
here is obviously kind of like

268
00:18:16,080 --> 00:18:19,260
that, I would say one at a
little bit, where they kept

269
00:18:19,260 --> 00:18:22,800
saying no, it did not deal with
UAP. And then all of a sudden,

270
00:18:23,280 --> 00:18:25,620
they say in developing the
reports and exploring how to

271
00:18:25,620 --> 00:18:29,310
create a center of expertise.
The contract allowed for

272
00:18:29,310 --> 00:18:33,150
research drawn from a wide
variety of sources, including

273
00:18:33,150 --> 00:18:39,030
reports of UAPs. However, the
examination of UAP observations

274
00:18:39,180 --> 00:18:44,220
was not the purpose of a tip.
Now again, kind of confusing,

275
00:18:44,400 --> 00:18:48,540
but this is something that they
were referring to as a tip, but

276
00:18:48,540 --> 00:18:53,730
in reality was more so awesome.
Now, this was submitted in 2021.

277
00:18:53,730 --> 00:18:58,920
But even as early as last year,
in 2023, The New York Post's

278
00:18:58,950 --> 00:19:02,340
specifically Stephen Green
Street, got more statements in

279
00:19:02,340 --> 00:19:06,270
detail from the Pentagon on all
of these issues. And

280
00:19:06,270 --> 00:19:09,150
essentially, they reinforced
that these types of programs off

281
00:19:09,150 --> 00:19:15,810
SAP, a tip were not UFO or UAP.
specifics. So this seems to be

282
00:19:15,810 --> 00:19:18,900
the current stance of the
Department of Defense in the

283
00:19:18,900 --> 00:19:23,430
Pentagon. So where did that
thing go arrive in this new

284
00:19:23,430 --> 00:19:27,690
report? Or is it arrived?
Meaning is it now accurate that

285
00:19:27,690 --> 00:19:34,440
these were created for UAP
research purposes? We only know

286
00:19:34,650 --> 00:19:37,830
what has come out thus far. So
in addition to this report, I

287
00:19:37,830 --> 00:19:40,680
went over the PowerPoint
presentation. Well, in other

288
00:19:40,680 --> 00:19:44,340
FOIA requests, I was able to
determine that during the course

289
00:19:44,340 --> 00:19:48,330
of this evaluation, they spoke
with Luis Elizondo, and they

290
00:19:48,330 --> 00:19:51,960
spoke with David grush, both of
which were connected to the

291
00:19:51,960 --> 00:19:57,270
evaluation. So how much did they
dig? Did they listen to these

292
00:19:57,270 --> 00:20:01,350
guys and formulate that section
of The report based on the

293
00:20:01,350 --> 00:20:05,070
testimony there and just not
fact, check it beyond. Is this

294
00:20:05,070 --> 00:20:08,250
the absolute gospel? I don't
know, I don't know the answer to

295
00:20:08,250 --> 00:20:13,830
that. All we know is this
material came out, and we know

296
00:20:13,830 --> 00:20:16,440
who they spoke with. So I
reached out to the Inspector

297
00:20:16,440 --> 00:20:20,220
General's office again, tried to
figure out the answer to that

298
00:20:20,220 --> 00:20:24,840
stated that the official
Pentagon stance has been X, why

299
00:20:24,840 --> 00:20:28,830
are you guys stating why? They
told me that they are working on

300
00:20:28,830 --> 00:20:32,490
that, but by the recording of
this, they have not given me any

301
00:20:32,490 --> 00:20:35,730
answer whatsoever. And I've
tried to follow up a couple

302
00:20:35,730 --> 00:20:39,150
times. It's why it took me
nearly a week or so to record

303
00:20:39,150 --> 00:20:42,540
this video piece. Because I
can't I can't get an answer. And

304
00:20:42,540 --> 00:20:45,390
I wanted to get an answer for
you guys. Regardless of what the

305
00:20:45,390 --> 00:20:48,120
answer is, I'll bring it to you,
and I'll report it. But it's

306
00:20:48,120 --> 00:20:51,090
just so weird, right? It doesn't
matter what you believe you

307
00:20:51,090 --> 00:20:55,110
could think that it was a UFO
research programming, you think

308
00:20:55,110 --> 00:20:58,140
it wasn't? It doesn't matter. We
should all agree on how

309
00:20:58,140 --> 00:21:02,580
absolutely horrible the
government has been describing

310
00:21:02,580 --> 00:21:07,920
these programs. Why is that?
What, what's wrong with it? And

311
00:21:07,950 --> 00:21:11,070
whose fault is that? If
anybody's why are we getting

312
00:21:11,250 --> 00:21:15,240
mixed messages? I don't have an
answer for you on that. But it

313
00:21:15,240 --> 00:21:19,320
is fascinating to see unfold,
because here we are years after

314
00:21:19,320 --> 00:21:23,640
we first heard the acronym
ative, and they still can't keep

315
00:21:23,640 --> 00:21:27,060
their story straight. Who knows
what's right or wrong. But we

316
00:21:27,060 --> 00:21:29,910
can't keep our stories straight
here on the side of the

317
00:21:29,910 --> 00:21:34,320
government. And and that's
absolutely ridiculous. It

318
00:21:34,320 --> 00:21:37,800
really, truly is. So hopefully,
somebody will add clarity and

319
00:21:37,800 --> 00:21:40,860
maybe I can do an update video
to this. But as of now,

320
00:21:40,920 --> 00:21:45,270
absolutely nothing has been
clarified. I also wrote to Susan

321
00:21:45,270 --> 00:21:49,620
Goff in the Pentagon, but but
also the IGs office and their

322
00:21:49,620 --> 00:21:53,280
media affairs and said, Hey, you
guys are completely

323
00:21:53,280 --> 00:21:56,520
contradicting each other. Can
you please tell me what's going

324
00:21:56,520 --> 00:22:01,620
on? And well, nothing yet. So
back to the report. We have this

325
00:22:01,620 --> 00:22:04,200
section here chapter six, title
10. United States Code

326
00:22:04,200 --> 00:22:07,290
establishes the authorities of
combatant commanders who are

327
00:22:07,290 --> 00:22:10,410
responsible for detecting,
deterring, and preventing

328
00:22:10,410 --> 00:22:13,680
threats and attacks against the
US and its territories,

329
00:22:13,800 --> 00:22:18,570
possessions and bases. After a
review of the laws, policies and

330
00:22:18,570 --> 00:22:23,430
guidance issued by Congress, the
DOD and other federal agencies,

331
00:22:23,580 --> 00:22:26,400
we determined that while the
services and components have an

332
00:22:26,400 --> 00:22:29,730
important role to play, the
combatant commands would be the

333
00:22:29,730 --> 00:22:35,310
logical organizations to detect,
report, collect and identify UAP

334
00:22:35,310 --> 00:22:38,700
incidents to arrow, it was kind
of an interesting thing to put

335
00:22:38,700 --> 00:22:43,170
into this report, to note that
the combatant commands would be

336
00:22:43,410 --> 00:22:47,070
kind of at the forefront of
this, because maybe they aren't,

337
00:22:47,400 --> 00:22:49,950
maybe they haven't submitted
that. And it's kind of

338
00:22:49,950 --> 00:22:53,310
interesting that, for example,
some of these commands are where

339
00:22:53,970 --> 00:22:58,440
the UAP material has leaked from
especially the Middle East

340
00:22:58,440 --> 00:23:03,090
material over Baghdad or over
Missoula. So we're obviously

341
00:23:03,090 --> 00:23:07,920
talking about a very interesting
point on top of that's where the

342
00:23:07,920 --> 00:23:11,670
leaks are coming from. So not
really sure if there's a

343
00:23:11,670 --> 00:23:14,580
correlation there. But it should
be interesting to note, but if

344
00:23:14,580 --> 00:23:16,710
you're not familiar with the
combatant commands, here they

345
00:23:16,710 --> 00:23:19,590
are, here's a list of them,
including Africa Command,

346
00:23:19,590 --> 00:23:23,640
CENTCOM, Cyber Command, Space
Command, Strategic Command, full

347
00:23:23,640 --> 00:23:27,390
list is on your screen there. So
that's, that's an idea of, of

348
00:23:27,420 --> 00:23:30,210
maybe where they're going with
this, that maybe it's the war

349
00:23:30,210 --> 00:23:34,290
zones, the active military
presences that really are the

350
00:23:34,290 --> 00:23:36,690
ones that are driving a lot of
these sightings. Obviously,

351
00:23:36,690 --> 00:23:40,020
that's been their focus from
what we've been told. But it

352
00:23:40,020 --> 00:23:43,440
sounds like that they want a
little bit more coordination out

353
00:23:43,440 --> 00:23:46,860
there with their commands, in
the introduction part give a

354
00:23:46,860 --> 00:23:50,130
little bit more detail on the
objective, not much. The

355
00:23:50,130 --> 00:23:53,340
objective of this evaluation was
to determine the extent to which

356
00:23:53,340 --> 00:23:56,910
the DoD military services,
defense agencies and military

357
00:23:56,910 --> 00:23:59,340
department counter intelligent
counter intelligence

358
00:23:59,340 --> 00:24:02,610
organizations took intelligence,
counterintelligence and force

359
00:24:02,610 --> 00:24:07,140
protection actions to detect,
report, collect, analyze, and

360
00:24:07,140 --> 00:24:12,630
identify UAP. Not a whole lot
different than then the very,

361
00:24:12,960 --> 00:24:19,530
very, I would say, brief
objectives that they originally

362
00:24:19,530 --> 00:24:22,590
published. But it shows you that
they really didn't update their

363
00:24:22,590 --> 00:24:25,020
objectives. They did note in the
past, especially in that

364
00:24:25,020 --> 00:24:28,740
original memo, they may actually
update. It's clear they didn't

365
00:24:28,770 --> 00:24:32,580
they were just looking at how
the DoD was handling the UAP

366
00:24:32,580 --> 00:24:37,800
issue. Now, one thing and this
is primarily for all my FOIA

367
00:24:37,800 --> 00:24:41,190
people out there that you're
kind of exploring documents,

368
00:24:41,340 --> 00:24:46,230
these are the best things to
look for. And generally, they're

369
00:24:46,230 --> 00:24:50,190
in finer print, buried at the
bottom of the pages. These are

370
00:24:50,190 --> 00:24:56,640
the citations. It gives, in some
cases, gives FOIA fodder,

371
00:24:56,760 --> 00:25:01,140
meaning stuff to go after, or
start Just to paint pictures

372
00:25:01,140 --> 00:25:04,560
about things that we didn't know
a whole lot or and all about

373
00:25:04,770 --> 00:25:08,220
prior, for example, some of the
citations in the beginning of

374
00:25:08,220 --> 00:25:11,460
the report, look at this
classified annex to the Senate

375
00:25:11,460 --> 00:25:15,180
Armed Services Committee report
on the fiscal fiscal year 2020

376
00:25:15,180 --> 00:25:20,070
NDAA. enclosure two entitled
advanced operational

377
00:25:20,070 --> 00:25:24,300
capabilities, collection,
exploitation, and research.

378
00:25:24,450 --> 00:25:28,560
That's from July of 2019.
Another citation references the

379
00:25:28,560 --> 00:25:34,110
same document, but enclosure 13
unidentified aerial phenomena,

380
00:25:35,250 --> 00:25:39,210
that would be an excuse me, not
the same report. Exactly. But

381
00:25:39,240 --> 00:25:43,170
same report, but that one for
fiscal year 2022. Sorry about

382
00:25:43,170 --> 00:25:47,910
that. And that was from October
19 2021. So you start to see a

383
00:25:47,910 --> 00:25:50,640
little bit of a picture.
Obviously, that's very minimal,

384
00:25:50,640 --> 00:25:53,370
we don't get to see the
classified annex, or at least

385
00:25:53,370 --> 00:25:57,690
not yet. But now we know it's
there. Now we start to see what

386
00:25:57,690 --> 00:26:02,700
the enclosures are about. And
you piece these puzzles

387
00:26:02,730 --> 00:26:06,180
together, to move forward and
see if you can get a hold of it

388
00:26:06,180 --> 00:26:10,680
at a later date. So I could be
wrong. But I don't believe that

389
00:26:10,680 --> 00:26:15,750
report was ever known before. I
searched to see if maybe there

390
00:26:15,750 --> 00:26:20,610
was a public annex that was out
there a public report that may

391
00:26:20,610 --> 00:26:23,970
have had this kind of stuff. And
know the only references that

392
00:26:23,970 --> 00:26:27,150
come up, especially when you're
using search engines are

393
00:26:27,150 --> 00:26:31,650
actually going right back to
this report. So there's not a

394
00:26:31,650 --> 00:26:35,310
whole lot known about this
report, if at all. So very

395
00:26:35,310 --> 00:26:38,400
interesting to take a look at
those citations. So I bring that

396
00:26:38,400 --> 00:26:42,300
up, because those are great
things to look for. When you're

397
00:26:42,300 --> 00:26:46,320
trying to piece together, things
to look for later, through FOIA

398
00:26:46,350 --> 00:26:48,840
or at least trying to get a
picture of those classified

399
00:26:49,530 --> 00:26:54,300
annexes and reports and so on.
This was a very important part

400
00:26:54,330 --> 00:26:58,290
of the IG report and one that
really deserves a mention. The

401
00:26:58,290 --> 00:27:00,750
DOD does not have a
comprehensive coordinated

402
00:27:00,750 --> 00:27:04,590
approach to address UAP. We
reviewed the DOD has policies,

403
00:27:04,590 --> 00:27:07,110
procedures and actions for
detecting, reporting,

404
00:27:07,380 --> 00:27:11,010
collecting, analyzing and
identifying UAP and determined

405
00:27:11,010 --> 00:27:14,970
that, among other things, the
DOD has not used a coordinated

406
00:27:14,970 --> 00:27:19,200
approach to detect, report,
collect, analyze and identify

407
00:27:19,200 --> 00:27:23,940
UAP DoD components have largely
excluded geographic combatant

408
00:27:23,940 --> 00:27:27,120
commands, which are responsible
for detecting, deterring, and

409
00:27:27,120 --> 00:27:30,510
preventing threats and attacks
against the US and its

410
00:27:30,510 --> 00:27:33,840
territories possessions and
bases in their respective areas

411
00:27:33,840 --> 00:27:33,930
of

412
00:27:33,929 --> 00:27:37,649
responsibility, and developing
UAP policies and procedures.

413
00:27:37,919 --> 00:27:40,799
That's obviously the combatant
commands we talked about earlier

414
00:27:40,799 --> 00:27:44,099
and how they've kind of been it
seems like excluded from all of

415
00:27:44,099 --> 00:27:47,759
this. And finally, DOD
components develop varying

416
00:27:47,999 --> 00:27:53,579
processes to collect, analyze
and identify UAP incidents. As a

417
00:27:53,579 --> 00:27:56,189
result, the DoD may not have
developed a comprehensive and

418
00:27:56,189 --> 00:27:59,129
coordinated strategy for
understanding identifying and

419
00:27:59,129 --> 00:28:03,509
protecting against the UAP that
may present a safety threat to

420
00:28:03,509 --> 00:28:08,009
military personnel and
territory. The DoD has not

421
00:28:08,009 --> 00:28:11,459
issued a comprehensive UAP
response plan. The DoD has not

422
00:28:11,459 --> 00:28:16,169
issued a comprehensive UAP
response plan that identifies

423
00:28:16,169 --> 00:28:19,619
roles, responsibilities,
requirements and coordination,

424
00:28:19,799 --> 00:28:22,919
procedures for detecting,
reporting, collecting, analyzing

425
00:28:23,249 --> 00:28:27,929
and identifying UAP incidents.
As a result, the DoD response to

426
00:28:27,929 --> 00:28:32,129
UAP incidents is uncoordinated
and concentrated within each

427
00:28:32,129 --> 00:28:35,879
military department. Officials
from the military services and

428
00:28:35,879 --> 00:28:39,539
MD CEOs stated that they have
been waiting for the DOD to

429
00:28:39,539 --> 00:28:43,499
issue comprehensive UAP guidance
before developing their own

430
00:28:43,499 --> 00:28:47,759
guidance. Essentially, what
they're saying there, the DoD as

431
00:28:47,759 --> 00:28:52,799
a whole should create some type
of central procedure, something

432
00:28:52,799 --> 00:28:56,999
that all the Army, the Navy, the
Air Force, can model their

433
00:28:56,999 --> 00:29:00,209
procedures after and the DoD
never did it. We'll touch on

434
00:29:00,209 --> 00:29:04,169
that again in a second. DOD
components have largely excluded

435
00:29:04,169 --> 00:29:06,839
geographic combatant commands
and UAP processes. So they're

436
00:29:06,839 --> 00:29:09,509
punching this point again. We
interviewed senior officials at

437
00:29:09,509 --> 00:29:13,349
Oh USD ins, the military
services, the MDC o's and the

438
00:29:13,349 --> 00:29:16,859
defense agencies to learn how
their organizations detect,

439
00:29:16,979 --> 00:29:20,489
report, collect, analyze and
identify UAP incidents. We

440
00:29:20,489 --> 00:29:23,609
concluded that these
organizations generally adapted

441
00:29:23,639 --> 00:29:27,719
existing systems and that the
DoD components existing UAP

442
00:29:27,719 --> 00:29:31,769
processes largely exclude the
role of the geographic combatant

443
00:29:31,769 --> 00:29:35,069
commands. We also reviewed the
geographic combatant commands

444
00:29:35,069 --> 00:29:38,579
processes for responding to UAP
incidents, and determine that

445
00:29:38,579 --> 00:29:41,969
the commands processes also
generally adapted existing

446
00:29:42,119 --> 00:29:47,129
systems to report UAP incidents.
Chapter Six title 10 US Code

447
00:29:47,129 --> 00:29:50,249
establishes the authorities of
combatant commanders who are

448
00:29:50,249 --> 00:29:53,249
responsible for detecting,
deterring and preventing threats

449
00:29:53,249 --> 00:29:56,669
and attacks against the US and
its territories possessions

450
00:29:56,669 --> 00:30:00,509
basis. Therefore, the combatant
commands would be the logical

451
00:30:00,509 --> 00:30:04,559
organizations to detect, report
collect and identify UAP

452
00:30:04,559 --> 00:30:08,249
incidents to arrow. So they're
really punching that point. And

453
00:30:08,249 --> 00:30:11,279
you'll see there's a lot of
repetitiveness here also. So the

454
00:30:11,279 --> 00:30:15,989
report kind of would have been
better served to be trimmed down

455
00:30:15,989 --> 00:30:19,139
even more. But hey, that's just,
you know, that's just me.

456
00:30:19,259 --> 00:30:21,749
footnote here at the bottom
though don't miss this. We made

457
00:30:21,749 --> 00:30:25,679
other classified observations
and findings that are not

458
00:30:25,679 --> 00:30:29,669
included in this unclassified
summary. So obviously, there's a

459
00:30:29,669 --> 00:30:32,459
lot more here that's kind of a
given, but it's always good to

460
00:30:32,459 --> 00:30:36,899
see it in writing. So let me ask
you something. And this is

461
00:30:36,899 --> 00:30:40,679
something I think that we have
to deal with. Take yourself out

462
00:30:40,679 --> 00:30:45,299
of the storyline that we've
heard from some of these

463
00:30:45,389 --> 00:30:51,359
individuals and look at it with
a broader lens from 2007 to

464
00:30:51,779 --> 00:30:56,669
2008, depending upon who you
listen to, all the way to 2023.

465
00:30:57,119 --> 00:31:00,809
These guys here on the screen,
which includes Luis Elizondo

466
00:31:00,809 --> 00:31:05,669
with a tip excuse me, there we
go, Luis Elizondo with a tip,

467
00:31:05,969 --> 00:31:09,839
you've got Dr. Shawn Kirkpatrick
with Arrow you've got Dr. James

468
00:31:09,839 --> 00:31:15,629
McCaskey with us AP, you've got
John J. Stratton, J. Stratton is

469
00:31:15,629 --> 00:31:21,239
generally how he's referred to
with the UAP Task Force. All of

470
00:31:21,239 --> 00:31:26,189
these guys collectively have 16
years of leadership. And if you

471
00:31:26,189 --> 00:31:28,829
believe all of them and take the
controversy of whether or not

472
00:31:28,829 --> 00:31:32,309
this is a UAP, you know,
research effort with or SAP or a

473
00:31:32,309 --> 00:31:35,939
tip or was a tip a program, take
all of that out of the equation

474
00:31:35,939 --> 00:31:40,949
for purposes of this. For 16
years, none of these guys were

475
00:31:40,949 --> 00:31:45,839
able to develop any type of
program policy or procedure that

476
00:31:45,839 --> 00:31:48,839
the DoD could utilize. Now,
let's just say some of these

477
00:31:48,839 --> 00:31:51,539
individuals were in on the
ground floor, and their

478
00:31:51,539 --> 00:31:55,589
intentions were 100% genuine and
they wanted to make this happen.

479
00:31:56,369 --> 00:32:01,499
Fine. But why is it that no one
was able to make it happen all

480
00:32:01,499 --> 00:32:05,639
through those 16 years, that
these guys lead their respective

481
00:32:05,639 --> 00:32:09,899
programs, even those that aren't
disputed as being UAP? specific

482
00:32:09,899 --> 00:32:14,069
efforts? What happened during
those years? Now, I'm not trying

483
00:32:14,069 --> 00:32:17,999
to specifically blame these
guys, but they are the leaders.

484
00:32:18,329 --> 00:32:21,929
A lot of people out there throw
a lot of hate at Dr. Shawn

485
00:32:21,929 --> 00:32:25,409
Kirkpatrick. And you know what,
maybe, and I would even say

486
00:32:25,499 --> 00:32:30,869
myself that it is deserved. But
if you blame him, you have to

487
00:32:30,869 --> 00:32:35,069
blame the others that came
before him. What did they do? It

488
00:32:35,069 --> 00:32:39,299
should be noted. Now, I'm sorry,
it has to be noted that there is

489
00:32:39,299 --> 00:32:48,179
not a single UAP research report
from our SAP, or from a tip that

490
00:32:48,179 --> 00:32:50,969
leads us to believe that they
did anything from a

491
00:32:50,969 --> 00:32:55,139
investigative standpoint, the
material that came out through

492
00:32:55,139 --> 00:32:59,189
the offset program was all
things that were non UFO

493
00:32:59,189 --> 00:33:02,879
related. The exception was the
one dird report that talked

494
00:33:02,879 --> 00:33:06,569
about UAP effects. But the one
that leaked out and was

495
00:33:06,569 --> 00:33:10,319
published, I believe, first by
Popular Mechanics was actually

496
00:33:10,319 --> 00:33:14,489
different from the one that dia
submitted and released out via a

497
00:33:14,489 --> 00:33:18,179
FOIA request. So what happened
there? Are they hiding it? Well,

498
00:33:18,179 --> 00:33:23,639
maybe. But let's just say for a
moment that there was UAP angles

499
00:33:23,639 --> 00:33:28,469
to all SAP? Where is that
material? And this is an age old

500
00:33:28,469 --> 00:33:33,329
question that some out there are
so sick and tired of me asking,

501
00:33:33,389 --> 00:33:37,559
but we have to keep asking it.
What happened to the 10s of

502
00:33:37,559 --> 00:33:40,679
millions of dollars if this
really was a research program

503
00:33:41,369 --> 00:33:46,229
devoted to UAP where's that
material? And if it's sitting in

504
00:33:46,229 --> 00:33:50,399
the private sector, well, they
don't own it, the DIA and the

505
00:33:50,399 --> 00:33:56,099
taxpayers do. So you know, I can
go off on a whole tangent on on

506
00:33:56,099 --> 00:34:01,109
OS app alone. And the idea and
concept and allegation and rumor

507
00:34:01,439 --> 00:34:04,859
that they with taxpayer money,
meaning bass, the contractor

508
00:34:05,129 --> 00:34:09,539
purchased databases like MUFON,
which, you know, I know that

509
00:34:09,539 --> 00:34:14,039
Bigelow did get involved with
that. But was it taxpayer money?

510
00:34:14,279 --> 00:34:18,359
Was this something that the DIA
wanted? Fast forward to a tip?

511
00:34:18,509 --> 00:34:23,789
Was it a continuation of all
SAP? Specific to UAP? Nuts and

512
00:34:23,789 --> 00:34:28,139
Bolts, aerial threats, not the
paranormal stuff that Skinwalker

513
00:34:28,139 --> 00:34:32,069
Ranch, but specifically to that,
okay, let's say it is where is

514
00:34:32,069 --> 00:34:35,969
there any supporting
documentation to support that?

515
00:34:36,749 --> 00:34:39,839
And what were they doing for
years, it wasn't just Luis

516
00:34:39,839 --> 00:34:43,289
Elizondo, he had other people,
right. It wasn't just James

517
00:34:43,319 --> 00:34:44,129
kasky. He

518
00:34:44,130 --> 00:34:47,220
had other people, right. What
happened there fast forward to

519
00:34:47,220 --> 00:34:51,540
the UAP taskforce and J.
Stratton. What happened there?

520
00:34:51,780 --> 00:34:56,220
So there's a lot of unanswered
questions here that yeah, I've

521
00:34:56,220 --> 00:34:59,730
asked for years, but we need to
continue asking them because

522
00:34:59,730 --> 00:35:03,600
it's a fascinating tale to see
unfold. And the story is not

523
00:35:03,600 --> 00:35:07,020
told yet. And it doesn't matter
if you believe me or support the

524
00:35:07,020 --> 00:35:09,840
questions that I asked. The
bottom line is we still don't

525
00:35:09,840 --> 00:35:13,800
have the answers. And what's
even more interesting about this

526
00:35:13,800 --> 00:35:17,850
is those that you see on the
screen here, don't agree about

527
00:35:17,850 --> 00:35:21,780
the relationship between their
own programs. For example, if

528
00:35:21,780 --> 00:35:26,880
you read and hear and listen to
James McCaskey from the DIA, DIA

529
00:35:27,180 --> 00:35:31,260
and his leadership of OSS app,
he contradicts Luis Elizondo.

530
00:35:31,260 --> 00:35:34,500
Why is that why why don't more
people care about that? What

531
00:35:34,500 --> 00:35:37,380
happened there? What's the
disconnect? So those types of

532
00:35:37,380 --> 00:35:40,530
things? Yeah, I mean, may have
an easy answer. But you know

533
00:35:40,530 --> 00:35:45,000
what, the longer it goes without
answers, without these gentlemen

534
00:35:45,000 --> 00:35:49,260
actually addressing it, the more
interested I get, and the more

535
00:35:49,260 --> 00:35:52,680
loud I will become asking the
questions because there's

536
00:35:52,680 --> 00:35:55,140
something there, there's
something there that they don't

537
00:35:55,140 --> 00:35:59,730
want us to see. Not about UAP,
but about these programs

538
00:35:59,730 --> 00:36:03,450
themselves, and what is that?
And we can speculate until our

539
00:36:03,600 --> 00:36:07,470
eyes fall out. But until we get
those answers, that's all what

540
00:36:07,470 --> 00:36:12,090
we're left to do. So let's just
keep asking, keep pushing. And

541
00:36:12,090 --> 00:36:15,510
hopefully, we'll get some
clarity. Because yes, it is

542
00:36:15,510 --> 00:36:19,620
absolutely important to these
topics. And yes, it is important

543
00:36:19,620 --> 00:36:24,870
because it shows how we got here
today. It's the foundation, we

544
00:36:24,870 --> 00:36:28,230
can all at least agree to that
right. It was the foundation

545
00:36:28,230 --> 00:36:32,820
that led us to Congress doing
what they're doing today, and

546
00:36:32,820 --> 00:36:36,870
creating the legislation, the
legislation that they have. And

547
00:36:36,870 --> 00:36:41,220
so if this is the foundation,
then let's understand how strong

548
00:36:41,580 --> 00:36:46,650
or how weak it is. That's why
it's important. Some people just

549
00:36:46,650 --> 00:36:49,080
want to shove it to the side.
They're like, yeah, yeah, leave

550
00:36:49,080 --> 00:36:52,290
it alone, John, you're really
annoying. Well, maybe. But I'm

551
00:36:52,290 --> 00:36:55,020
not going to leave it alone.
Because again, this is the

552
00:36:55,020 --> 00:37:00,510
foundation that everything that
we talked about, in 2024 and

553
00:37:00,510 --> 00:37:06,030
beyond, is built on. And if that
starts to crumble, then

554
00:37:06,030 --> 00:37:08,970
everything else will crumble
along with it. And are we seeing

555
00:37:08,970 --> 00:37:13,410
that as we speak? Is that
something that's going on? Is

556
00:37:13,410 --> 00:37:16,410
Congress losing interest? I said
it a little while ago, to be

557
00:37:16,410 --> 00:37:18,810
honest with you, I'll stand by
that. There's not a whole lot of

558
00:37:18,810 --> 00:37:20,820
people that are out here
advocating for the issue.

559
00:37:20,970 --> 00:37:24,840
There's some, but there's not a
lot. And some of those that were

560
00:37:24,840 --> 00:37:28,080
champions a year and a half ago,
kind of fall off the map. They

561
00:37:28,080 --> 00:37:30,870
haven't really been around.
You've had some others that have

562
00:37:30,870 --> 00:37:34,800
come forward. But their
strength, let's just say and

563
00:37:34,800 --> 00:37:38,460
that's not supposed to be
disrespectful. But the power,

564
00:37:38,460 --> 00:37:41,910
the strength of the power they
they yield within the Senate or

565
00:37:41,910 --> 00:37:46,350
Congress is not necessarily as
strong as it was maybe a year

566
00:37:46,350 --> 00:37:49,680
and a half ago. So what's going
on? What what are we? What are

567
00:37:49,680 --> 00:37:53,670
we seeing unfold here. So that's
why a lot of that history is

568
00:37:53,670 --> 00:37:57,300
important. And that's why we
need to figure it out because it

569
00:37:57,300 --> 00:38:01,260
makes a lot of these other
things that makes it a lot

570
00:38:01,710 --> 00:38:06,270
easier to understand and grasp.
Back to the report and some of

571
00:38:06,270 --> 00:38:10,350
the findings, DOD components
developed varying processes to

572
00:38:10,350 --> 00:38:16,620
detect and report UAP incidents.
The NDAA of 2022 assigns arrow

573
00:38:16,620 --> 00:38:19,950
under the Oh USD ins
responsibility for synchronizing

574
00:38:19,950 --> 00:38:23,340
and standardizing the collection
analysis and identification of

575
00:38:23,340 --> 00:38:28,410
UAP incidents. However, the DOD
has not yet issued comprehensive

576
00:38:28,470 --> 00:38:32,130
UAP guidance. So again,
Kirkpatrick is just to blame

577
00:38:32,130 --> 00:38:35,700
just as those other guys in the
early days. In the absence of

578
00:38:35,700 --> 00:38:38,820
DOD level guidance, the DoD
components have developed

579
00:38:38,820 --> 00:38:43,140
varying informal processes to
detect and report UAP incidents.

580
00:38:43,440 --> 00:38:48,390
For example, an Air Force
remotely piloted aircraft, and

581
00:38:48,390 --> 00:38:50,970
airborne intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance

582
00:38:50,970 --> 00:38:55,710
technical adviser, stated that
the Air Force designated UAP as

583
00:38:55,710 --> 00:38:59,940
a special interest item, which
requires air crews to document

584
00:38:59,940 --> 00:39:04,020
and report UAP observations
within 24 hours of engine

585
00:39:04,020 --> 00:39:08,340
shutdown and mission completion
using the Marauder system. An

586
00:39:08,340 --> 00:39:11,610
army Senior Advisor for Science
and Technology and Innovation,

587
00:39:11,880 --> 00:39:15,090
stated that army personnel also
use the Air Force's Murata

588
00:39:15,090 --> 00:39:19,050
system to document and report
UAP observations. Because the

589
00:39:19,050 --> 00:39:23,940
army has not developed its own
UAP specific processes. The

590
00:39:23,940 --> 00:39:27,450
military services and MTC O's
have sent some UAP incident

591
00:39:27,450 --> 00:39:32,670
reports to arrow, but the DOD
does not currently currently

592
00:39:32,670 --> 00:39:38,430
formally require them to do so.
That is an explosive and in my

593
00:39:38,430 --> 00:39:42,180
opinion, one of the more
important parts of this report

594
00:39:43,260 --> 00:39:46,710
all that stuff about the Air
Force and how the Air Force is

595
00:39:46,710 --> 00:39:53,520
collecting even informally, the
UAP incidents and reports. So,

596
00:39:53,940 --> 00:39:58,380
the one military branch that has
mysteriously been mum, for

597
00:39:58,380 --> 00:40:02,430
years, they don't talk Got this
kind of stuff, really at all.

598
00:40:02,820 --> 00:40:06,810
Now all of a sudden, we find out
that they've got this special

599
00:40:06,810 --> 00:40:12,210
interest item label over UAP.
And that they are using systems

600
00:40:12,480 --> 00:40:17,190
to catalog these reports and in
some cases, or maybe all, send

601
00:40:17,190 --> 00:40:21,600
them over to arrow. So that that
to me was a pretty interesting

602
00:40:21,600 --> 00:40:26,340
part of this because when you
look at the citation on the same

603
00:40:26,340 --> 00:40:29,970
page, US Air Force Special
Interest item, unidentified

604
00:40:29,970 --> 00:40:35,370
aerial phenomena reporting April
8 2022, Air Force Lifecycle

605
00:40:35,370 --> 00:40:38,310
Management Center Marauder
mission reporting User Guide,

606
00:40:38,310 --> 00:40:41,850
September 2021. The broader
system provides the Global

607
00:40:41,850 --> 00:40:45,300
Mission reporting capability on
the secret Internet Protocol

608
00:40:45,300 --> 00:40:48,690
router network, including report
drafting, quality control,

609
00:40:48,840 --> 00:40:52,110
rejection and approval pipeline
to ensure fidelity of reporting,

610
00:40:52,350 --> 00:40:55,410
publication of reports for
Global Access and export of

611
00:40:55,410 --> 00:40:59,130
published reports for analysis.
In other words, they're using a

612
00:40:59,160 --> 00:41:03,570
established system that ties
into this Marauder mission, and

613
00:41:03,570 --> 00:41:07,230
labeling UAP special interest
items and gender and using that

614
00:41:07,230 --> 00:41:10,500
system to generate the reports
and potentially get them over to

615
00:41:10,500 --> 00:41:13,290
arrow for analysis. So even
though it's all in formal,

616
00:41:13,650 --> 00:41:16,950
they're taking action, and they
have been proactive to do their

617
00:41:16,950 --> 00:41:20,220
own reporting procedure. To me,
that's absolutely fascinating

618
00:41:20,220 --> 00:41:23,310
because again, this is the Air
Force, that military branch that

619
00:41:23,310 --> 00:41:27,540
denied any interest for decades
since project Bluebook, then was

620
00:41:27,540 --> 00:41:32,280
mysteriously mom when the Navy's
just blurting out stuff. Every

621
00:41:32,280 --> 00:41:36,480
day, it seemed like there for a
little bit. On UAP, the Air

622
00:41:36,480 --> 00:41:39,180
Force was quiet now we're seeing
that they were actually doing a

623
00:41:39,180 --> 00:41:42,750
lot behind the scenes. The DoD
is lack of a comprehensive

624
00:41:42,750 --> 00:41:46,050
coordinated approach to address
UAP may pose a threat to

625
00:41:46,050 --> 00:41:50,640
military forces and US national
security. We determined that the

626
00:41:50,640 --> 00:41:54,270
DOD has no overarching UAV
policy. And as a result, it

627
00:41:54,270 --> 00:41:56,520
lacks assurance that national
security and flight safety

628
00:41:56,520 --> 00:42:00,480
threats to the US from UAP have
been identified and mitigated.

629
00:42:04,590 --> 00:42:07,650
So obviously, they're not doing
much. They're doing these

630
00:42:07,650 --> 00:42:13,980
informal things. But beyond
that, not so much. Now,

631
00:42:14,010 --> 00:42:16,800
according to the press release
for this report, there were 11

632
00:42:16,800 --> 00:42:20,100
recommendations that were
generated by the IGs office five

633
00:42:20,100 --> 00:42:26,070
of which were listed in the
report itself. Now, I know it

634
00:42:26,070 --> 00:42:28,560
gets a little bit tedious
reading these, but I think it's

635
00:42:28,560 --> 00:42:31,320
important not only for the audio
version of this particular

636
00:42:31,320 --> 00:42:34,590
podcast, but on top of this to
really hear it out loud and to

637
00:42:34,590 --> 00:42:39,090
understand exactly what the IG
determined what they want done

638
00:42:39,120 --> 00:42:42,600
and whether or not anything was
done about it. Recommendation

639
00:42:42,600 --> 00:42:45,120
one, we recommend that the
Undersecretary of Defense for

640
00:42:45,120 --> 00:42:48,300
intelligence and security, in
coordination with the all domain

641
00:42:48,300 --> 00:42:51,810
anomaly Research Office
Director, issue a Department of

642
00:42:51,810 --> 00:42:55,740
Defense Policy to integrate
unidentified anomalous phenomena

643
00:42:55,740 --> 00:42:58,950
roles, responsibilities and
requirements and coordination

644
00:42:58,950 --> 00:43:01,440
procedures into existing
intelligence,

645
00:43:01,440 --> 00:43:04,440
counterintelligence, and force
protection policy and

646
00:43:04,440 --> 00:43:07,770
procedures. The policy should
include methods and address

647
00:43:07,800 --> 00:43:11,700
unidentified anomalous phenomena
incidents, and should align with

648
00:43:11,700 --> 00:43:15,690
policies and procedures for the
protection of the US person's

649
00:43:15,720 --> 00:43:18,570
civil liberties. So now they're
just trying to address

650
00:43:18,570 --> 00:43:20,610
everything that we've gone over.
And it seems again, like it's

651
00:43:20,610 --> 00:43:23,160
pretty repetitive in this
report. They're trying to

652
00:43:23,160 --> 00:43:26,670
address it create some kind of,
you know, uniform system for

653
00:43:26,670 --> 00:43:31,020
this Undersecretary of Defense
for intelligence and security

654
00:43:31,020 --> 00:43:33,540
and all domain anomaly
resolution office comments.

655
00:43:35,070 --> 00:43:37,530
The Undersecretary of Defense
for intelligence and security

656
00:43:37,530 --> 00:43:41,250
responding for the owe us the
ins and the arrow director

657
00:43:41,460 --> 00:43:45,330
agreed with the recommendation.
The Undersecretary noted that

658
00:43:45,330 --> 00:43:49,230
the findings that inform excuse
me, that informed the

659
00:43:49,230 --> 00:43:51,630
recommendation appear to be
based on observations that

660
00:43:51,630 --> 00:43:55,680
largely predate the established
of air the establishment of aro

661
00:43:55,830 --> 00:44:00,510
organizationally aligned under
the Oh USD ins on July 2020 22.

662
00:44:01,230 --> 00:44:03,780
The Undersecretary also
commented that the report

663
00:44:03,780 --> 00:44:08,220
describes aro as having been
operational at the time of its

664
00:44:08,220 --> 00:44:13,740
established establishment, when
in fact, the office was not at

665
00:44:13,740 --> 00:44:17,910
initial operational capability.
The Undersecretary stated that

666
00:44:17,910 --> 00:44:21,270
arrow will achieve full
operational capability using the

667
00:44:21,270 --> 00:44:24,900
resources provided in the in the
future year defense plan,

668
00:44:25,050 --> 00:44:29,970
beginning in fiscal year 2020.
For the under the undersecretary

669
00:44:29,970 --> 00:44:33,870
also stated that arrows progress
and detecting, identifying and

670
00:44:33,870 --> 00:44:37,230
resolving UAP includes the
development of analytic

671
00:44:37,230 --> 00:44:40,170
framework science plan,
operational framework of

672
00:44:40,170 --> 00:44:43,950
strategic communications plan,
and implementing guidance on the

673
00:44:43,950 --> 00:44:47,670
UAP related roles and
responsibilities of the Office

674
00:44:47,670 --> 00:44:51,210
of the Secretary of Defense,
arrow, combatant commands,

675
00:44:51,300 --> 00:44:55,650
military services and combat
support agencies. The

676
00:44:55,650 --> 00:44:59,340
Undersecretary stated that arrow
is developing policy guidance

677
00:44:59,340 --> 00:45:03,780
including Recently released
General Administration guidance

678
00:45:03,930 --> 00:45:07,740
through the Joint Staff to the
combatant commands to delineate

679
00:45:07,740 --> 00:45:12,180
UAP roles, responsibilities,
requirements and coordination

680
00:45:12,210 --> 00:45:15,750
efforts, or excuse me
procedures. This guidance will

681
00:45:15,750 --> 00:45:18,690
modify existing intelligence,
counterintelligence and force

682
00:45:18,690 --> 00:45:22,470
protection policies and
procedures as well as adhere to

683
00:45:22,470 --> 00:45:25,500
all policies and procedures for
the protection of US persons

684
00:45:25,500 --> 00:45:29,070
civil liberties. Our response
are the IG comments from the

685
00:45:29,070 --> 00:45:31,980
Undersecretary of Defense for
intelligence and security fully

686
00:45:31,980 --> 00:45:36,060
addressed the recommendation.
Therefore, the recommendation is

687
00:45:36,060 --> 00:45:39,750
resolved but open. We will close
the recommendation when the Oh

688
00:45:39,750 --> 00:45:43,860
USD ins in coordination with
Arrow provides us with the issue

689
00:45:43,860 --> 00:45:47,700
of DOD policy to integrate UAP
roles, responsibilities,

690
00:45:47,700 --> 00:45:51,300
requirements, and coordination
procedures into existing

691
00:45:51,300 --> 00:45:53,880
intelligence,
counterintelligence and force

692
00:45:53,880 --> 00:45:57,900
protection policies and
procedures and procedures. A

693
00:45:57,900 --> 00:46:01,980
mouthful from top to bottom. But
you can see that it looks like

694
00:46:01,980 --> 00:46:05,400
the DoD is starting to take
action. The second

695
00:46:05,400 --> 00:46:08,280
recommendation we recommend that
the Secretary of the Army issue

696
00:46:08,280 --> 00:46:11,070
interim guidance for
unidentified anomalous phenomena

697
00:46:11,100 --> 00:46:14,610
while waiting for the Department
of Defense to issue policy at a

698
00:46:14,610 --> 00:46:18,720
minimum, this guidance for
unidentified anomalous phenomena

699
00:46:18,720 --> 00:46:22,560
should a integrate existing
intelligence counterintelligence

700
00:46:22,800 --> 00:46:26,220
and force protection policies
and procedures be integrate

701
00:46:26,220 --> 00:46:29,100
procedures for coordinating with
geographic combatant commands,

702
00:46:29,370 --> 00:46:31,680
see incorporate roles,
responsibilities and

703
00:46:31,680 --> 00:46:34,770
requirements for the military
services and their respective

704
00:46:35,160 --> 00:46:38,160
military department
counterintelligence operations.

705
00:46:39,630 --> 00:46:43,320
The Secretary of the Army
comments, the Senior Advisor for

706
00:46:43,320 --> 00:46:46,650
Counter Intelligence Deputy
Chief of Staff of army G to

707
00:46:46,860 --> 00:46:50,100
responding for the Secretary of
the Army agreed in principle

708
00:46:50,250 --> 00:46:54,000
with the recommendation, the
Senior Advisor stated that army

709
00:46:54,000 --> 00:46:57,540
counterintelligence plans to
integrate existing intelligence,

710
00:46:57,810 --> 00:47:00,720
counterintelligence, and force
protection policies and

711
00:47:00,720 --> 00:47:07,050
procedures into interim guidance
for UAP IGS comments from the

712
00:47:07,080 --> 00:47:10,320
Senior Advisor for
counter-intelligence Deputy

713
00:47:10,320 --> 00:47:12,960
Chief of Staff of the Army G to
fully address the

714
00:47:12,960 --> 00:47:16,500
recommendation, therefore, the
recommendation is resolved. But

715
00:47:16,500 --> 00:47:18,870
open. We will close the
recommendation when the

716
00:47:18,870 --> 00:47:22,920
Secretary of the Army provides
us with the issued interim UAP

717
00:47:22,920 --> 00:47:26,280
guidance. The third
recommendation, we recommend

718
00:47:26,280 --> 00:47:30,510
that the Secretary of the Navy
issue interim guidance for UAP

719
00:47:30,510 --> 00:47:34,530
while waiting for DOD to issue
policy at a minimum, and it goes

720
00:47:34,530 --> 00:47:38,220
through essentially the same
points again. So I'll jump down

721
00:47:38,220 --> 00:47:40,860
to Secretary of the Navy
comments. The Secretary of the

722
00:47:40,860 --> 00:47:43,710
Navy did not provide official
comments for inclusion in our

723
00:47:43,710 --> 00:47:47,400
final report, as requested.
However, the director of

724
00:47:47,400 --> 00:47:49,890
intelligence Deputy
Undersecretary of the Navy,

725
00:47:50,070 --> 00:47:53,220
intelligence and security
responding for the Secretary of

726
00:47:53,220 --> 00:47:56,430
the Navy after our final report
issuance agreed with the

727
00:47:56,430 --> 00:48:00,120
recommendation and stated in the
response that the Navy began

728
00:48:00,120 --> 00:48:03,810
developing interim guidance for
UAP. Here's what's odd about

729
00:48:03,810 --> 00:48:09,450
this. The Navy years ago,
already had UAP guidelines. That

730
00:48:09,450 --> 00:48:13,770
story was first broken by
Politico and Brian bender. I

731
00:48:13,770 --> 00:48:17,640
went after it through FOIA, I'll
have to look back, I actually

732
00:48:17,640 --> 00:48:20,520
forgot to look at it. But
regardless, that case is still

733
00:48:20,520 --> 00:48:24,030
open. I don't have an ETA, I
don't think that's what I wanted

734
00:48:24,030 --> 00:48:28,170
to check. But the case is still
open. So clearly, there's

735
00:48:28,200 --> 00:48:30,300
there's kind of a disconnect
there, where they have this

736
00:48:30,300 --> 00:48:34,890
guidance years ago about how the
Navy was going to report UAP.

737
00:48:35,040 --> 00:48:38,430
And then fast forward, IG
recommends them to do it again,

738
00:48:38,460 --> 00:48:40,560
and they're going to do it
again. So it's like, Well, what

739
00:48:40,560 --> 00:48:43,860
happened to all that stuff from
years ago? It's just really

740
00:48:43,860 --> 00:48:47,850
weird when you try and truly
unraveled some of these details,

741
00:48:48,180 --> 00:48:51,660
and how you thought certain
things were done. And it was

742
00:48:51,660 --> 00:48:54,900
reported as being done and then
all of a sudden, we find out

743
00:48:54,900 --> 00:49:00,180
it's not or it's being redone.
Who knows. But IG stated in the

744
00:49:00,180 --> 00:49:03,180
report, comments from the
director of intelligence Deputy

745
00:49:03,180 --> 00:49:05,940
Undersecretary of the Navy
Intelligence and Security,

746
00:49:06,150 --> 00:49:08,700
Department of the Navy fully
addressed the recommendation.

747
00:49:09,060 --> 00:49:12,840
Therefore, the recommendation is
resolved. But open we will close

748
00:49:12,840 --> 00:49:16,530
the recommendation when the
Security Secretary of the Navy

749
00:49:16,530 --> 00:49:21,150
provides us with the issued
interim UAP guidance. We

750
00:49:21,150 --> 00:49:23,400
recommend that the Secretary of
the Air Force issue interim

751
00:49:23,400 --> 00:49:27,750
guidance for UAP get I'm gonna
jump down it's again, just a

752
00:49:27,750 --> 00:49:30,810
recommendation that the Air
Force do the same as the Navy

753
00:49:31,050 --> 00:49:33,750
and the Army and previous
recommendations. Secretary of

754
00:49:33,750 --> 00:49:36,540
the Air Force comments. The
Secretary of the Air Force did

755
00:49:36,540 --> 00:49:39,810
not provide official comments
for inclusion in this report, as

756
00:49:39,810 --> 00:49:43,500
we requested in our draft.
However, the strategic programs

757
00:49:43,500 --> 00:49:46,260
and Policy Associate Director
Secretary of the Air Force

758
00:49:46,260 --> 00:49:49,470
Inspector General, responding
for the Secretary of the Air

759
00:49:49,470 --> 00:49:53,820
Force provided us in formal
comments, stating quote in

760
00:49:53,820 --> 00:49:57,750
coordination with OSI and our
Secretary of the Air Force

761
00:49:57,900 --> 00:50:00,990
inspector general's special
investigate shins directorate,

762
00:50:01,260 --> 00:50:05,760
Deputy Director. We concur
without comment and look forward

763
00:50:05,760 --> 00:50:09,120
to the final published report.
Man, these titles get so

764
00:50:09,390 --> 00:50:13,890
difficult and wordy. So sorry
about that. But obviously

765
00:50:13,890 --> 00:50:19,020
they're they're acknowledging it
in a informal comment way. IG

766
00:50:19,020 --> 00:50:22,500
responds the strategic programs
and policy. Associate Directors

767
00:50:22,500 --> 00:50:25,200
in formal response stated that
the Air Force agreed with the

768
00:50:25,200 --> 00:50:28,530
recommendation. However, this
response did not provide the

769
00:50:28,530 --> 00:50:31,440
specific actions that the Air
Force would take and the dates

770
00:50:31,440 --> 00:50:34,320
for for those actions.
Therefore, this recommendation

771
00:50:34,320 --> 00:50:37,440
is resolved. But open, we will
close the recommendation when

772
00:50:37,440 --> 00:50:40,470
the Secretary of the Air Force
provides us with the issued

773
00:50:40,470 --> 00:50:45,210
interim UAP guidance. Here's the
last recommendation that they

774
00:50:45,210 --> 00:50:47,820
have. In this particular report.
We recommend that the Chairman

775
00:50:47,820 --> 00:50:49,830
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
issued guidance to the

776
00:50:49,830 --> 00:50:53,670
geographic combatant commanders
regarding UAP detection,

777
00:50:53,670 --> 00:50:57,690
reporting, collection, analysis
and identification with their

778
00:50:57,690 --> 00:51:01,290
area within their area of
responsibility. At a minimum,

779
00:51:01,470 --> 00:51:04,260
the guidance should include
tools to help commands determine

780
00:51:04,260 --> 00:51:08,520
the threats posed by UAP. The
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

781
00:51:08,520 --> 00:51:11,220
Staff did not provide official
comments for inclusion in our

782
00:51:11,220 --> 00:51:15,270
final report, as we requested,
however, in official from the

783
00:51:15,270 --> 00:51:18,150
Joint Staff J three responded
and agreed with the

784
00:51:18,150 --> 00:51:21,210
recommendation. Further, the
Joint Staff issued guidance to

785
00:51:21,210 --> 00:51:24,390
the geographic combatant
commanders on UAP detection,

786
00:51:24,570 --> 00:51:28,080
reporting, collection, analysis
and identification within their

787
00:51:28,080 --> 00:51:32,220
area of responsibility. Our
response, the formal response

788
00:51:32,220 --> 00:51:34,770
from the joint staff fully
addressed the recommendation,

789
00:51:35,070 --> 00:51:39,480
therefore the recommendation is
resolved and closed. Yet one

790
00:51:39,480 --> 00:51:44,460
thing that it's always fun to
see, but frustrating to see. And

791
00:51:44,460 --> 00:51:48,330
interesting all at the same
time, is how the Office of the

792
00:51:48,330 --> 00:51:53,190
Inspector General within the DOD
can't get their own military

793
00:51:53,190 --> 00:51:57,810
branches to respond properly.
And obviously, they have ample

794
00:51:57,810 --> 00:52:01,500
opportunity to do so. So it
seems like these offices have

795
00:52:01,500 --> 00:52:06,090
power that again, wield a lot of
power in their respective ways

796
00:52:06,360 --> 00:52:10,260
cannot get answers. You look at
the Senate, you look at the

797
00:52:10,260 --> 00:52:13,980
house, you look at politicians
that also wield their own

798
00:52:13,980 --> 00:52:18,000
respective power. And they try
and get answers from different

799
00:52:18,000 --> 00:52:21,900
either, and even the inspector
general. But other military

800
00:52:21,900 --> 00:52:25,470
branches and offices and the
Pentagon itself, you look at

801
00:52:25,470 --> 00:52:29,340
that and you realize, man, our
own government will not talk to

802
00:52:29,340 --> 00:52:34,800
each other. They will not help
with reports that are aimed to

803
00:52:34,800 --> 00:52:40,320
help pilots be safer in the
skies to help Americans be safer

804
00:52:40,320 --> 00:52:46,050
where they live to help national
security concerns. They don't

805
00:52:46,050 --> 00:52:49,380
talk. So you see it. And like
every recommendation, we asked

806
00:52:49,380 --> 00:52:53,340
for this, but we didn't get it.
It's like come on, like try and

807
00:52:53,340 --> 00:52:57,480
talk to each other to help us
understand what's going on

808
00:52:57,480 --> 00:53:00,720
number one, but number two, what
are you doing about it. And

809
00:53:00,720 --> 00:53:05,130
that's something that's really
important to look at. The last

810
00:53:05,130 --> 00:53:09,540
slide that I want to talk to you
guys about is the scope and

811
00:53:09,540 --> 00:53:14,250
methodology. And you look again,
won't read the whole page here

812
00:53:14,250 --> 00:53:16,860
but we interviewed senior
officials and requested UAP

813
00:53:16,860 --> 00:53:20,130
related data and organizational
policies, procedures and

814
00:53:20,130 --> 00:53:24,900
guidance from the following DoD
organizations, oh Usdi and s

815
00:53:25,260 --> 00:53:29,580
arrow military services like the
Army, Navy and Air Force,

816
00:53:29,820 --> 00:53:33,390
military service intelligence
command components army G to

817
00:53:33,420 --> 00:53:37,950
Navy and to Air Force A to MDC
owes, which include the army

818
00:53:37,950 --> 00:53:42,780
counter intelligence NCIS Office
of Special Investigations, that

819
00:53:42,780 --> 00:53:45,630
would be for the Air Force,
Defense Intelligence agencies

820
00:53:45,630 --> 00:53:49,080
which included the DIA, the
National Geospatial Intelligence

821
00:53:49,080 --> 00:53:54,450
Agency, or NGA, the National
Reconnaissance Office or NRO and

822
00:53:54,450 --> 00:53:58,140
NSA, the National Security
Agency. You know what that is,

823
00:53:58,170 --> 00:54:04,710
that is a list. Now that we have
a a roadmap for someone like me,

824
00:54:04,710 --> 00:54:08,940
and any of you that are watching
on who was directly involved

825
00:54:08,940 --> 00:54:14,760
with this particular evaluation,
spoiler alert, I have filed

826
00:54:14,970 --> 00:54:19,560
requests to each and every one
of those that I just went over

827
00:54:19,770 --> 00:54:24,030
to look at what was the
coordination between the IG

828
00:54:24,030 --> 00:54:29,310
during this evaluation and those
respective branches, offices and

829
00:54:29,310 --> 00:54:33,510
so on. That will help us so a
lot of people were let down at

830
00:54:33,510 --> 00:54:36,480
this report, you know, I don't
know what they expected. I'm not

831
00:54:36,480 --> 00:54:40,020
sure what they wanted to see. I
don't know I think it's across

832
00:54:40,020 --> 00:54:44,010
the gamut when you when you talk
to to various people and, and

833
00:54:44,040 --> 00:54:47,820
and groups and so on, that they
they have their heart set on

834
00:54:47,820 --> 00:54:52,020
something. For me. I always I've
learned over the years learned

835
00:54:52,020 --> 00:54:56,010
over the decades actually don't
have any expectations, because

836
00:54:56,010 --> 00:54:59,610
you never know what you're gonna
get. And that's kind of why I

837
00:54:59,610 --> 00:55:04,860
wanted To do this particular
deep dive, when you look at that

838
00:55:04,860 --> 00:55:10,410
information, and you look at
what they have told us, your

839
00:55:10,410 --> 00:55:14,190
expectations, if you have them
way, way too high, it's going to

840
00:55:14,190 --> 00:55:17,670
be blown out of the water. But
when you look at it for what it

841
00:55:17,670 --> 00:55:23,640
is, you look at it for, for, for
trying to get some more puzzle

842
00:55:23,640 --> 00:55:27,360
pieces and put this picture
together. That's when it becomes

843
00:55:27,360 --> 00:55:31,410
really interesting. And in this
respect, there was so much that

844
00:55:31,410 --> 00:55:34,590
someone like me and all of you
out there that do FOIA requests

845
00:55:34,590 --> 00:55:38,880
and look for things. There were
so many leads in this. And that

846
00:55:38,880 --> 00:55:42,330
was actually unexpected. Again,
I try not to have expectations,

847
00:55:42,330 --> 00:55:45,930
but I didn't expect that many
leads. Because this now offers

848
00:55:45,930 --> 00:55:49,800
an opportunity to go and dissect
not only that list I just went

849
00:55:49,800 --> 00:55:53,520
over. But all those citations
that I said, Hey, look, look at

850
00:55:53,520 --> 00:55:57,870
look at these, I can't go after
congressional records. But I can

851
00:55:57,870 --> 00:56:02,100
go after Air Force policy and
procedure, I can dig in there, I

852
00:56:02,100 --> 00:56:06,150
can go into communication
between the IGs office and these

853
00:56:06,150 --> 00:56:09,270
respective agencies. Because
keep in mind that classified

854
00:56:09,270 --> 00:56:13,650
report may take a while to get
that MDR case that I talked to

855
00:56:13,650 --> 00:56:16,500
you earlier about in this
presentation. But what won't

856
00:56:16,500 --> 00:56:20,460
take as much time is the
information that was passed on,

857
00:56:20,460 --> 00:56:28,710
let's say, from the army, or the
Navy, or NCIS or aft OSI, that

858
00:56:28,710 --> 00:56:33,870
information is processed at the
agency itself, not the IGs

859
00:56:33,870 --> 00:56:38,070
office. So the report itself is
going to take a while because it

860
00:56:38,070 --> 00:56:42,030
has to coordinate with all of
those offices. And then it has

861
00:56:42,030 --> 00:56:46,680
to wait until the end. But the
information I can go after

862
00:56:46,680 --> 00:56:50,760
directly with AF OSI or the navy
or whatever, specific to this

863
00:56:50,760 --> 00:56:54,870
DoD IG evaluation, that will not
take as long and why am I

864
00:56:54,870 --> 00:56:57,120
telling you that because I know
some of you are bored stiff,

865
00:56:57,360 --> 00:57:01,320
it's the way you have to look at
this. And and I always try and

866
00:57:01,320 --> 00:57:04,590
throw in those FOIA tips and
hints if I can, for those that

867
00:57:04,590 --> 00:57:08,010
may be thinking about using it
or may maybe you've started but

868
00:57:08,010 --> 00:57:11,250
you're not entirely sure what to
look for. That's what you look

869
00:57:11,250 --> 00:57:15,030
for. You look at every single
word and character in reports

870
00:57:15,030 --> 00:57:18,360
like these, because it's not the
main brunt of the report, that's

871
00:57:18,360 --> 00:57:21,930
the most interesting, it's the
fine print. And it's those

872
00:57:21,930 --> 00:57:26,580
little things that you can pick
up on and used to create one or

873
00:57:26,580 --> 00:57:31,950
two, or 10 or 20 other FOIA
cases, to all of these other

874
00:57:31,950 --> 00:57:37,050
agencies. So that's something to
look out for. Overall, again,

875
00:57:37,050 --> 00:57:42,360
this was a great, I think, a
great report for the research

876
00:57:42,360 --> 00:57:46,800
end, not necessarily for telling
the public anything other than

877
00:57:46,920 --> 00:57:53,010
the DoD hasn't done anything to
set up UAP policies, procedures

878
00:57:53,010 --> 00:57:56,520
that are uniform, DOD wide.
That's the bottom line. So the

879
00:57:56,520 --> 00:57:59,550
general public is going to walk
away with very little from this,

880
00:57:59,880 --> 00:58:03,990
again, other than the DOD has
failed. And we do have to ask

881
00:58:03,990 --> 00:58:08,280
that one question 10s of
millions of dollars at least

882
00:58:08,280 --> 00:58:12,030
have gone into these programs
over the course of that 16

883
00:58:12,030 --> 00:58:15,780
years. So what is it that
they've done? These are a lot of

884
00:58:15,780 --> 00:58:20,070
failure marks from the Inspector
General's office. And those

885
00:58:20,070 --> 00:58:23,610
recommendations, the ones that
we could read should never be in

886
00:58:23,610 --> 00:58:26,760
there if everybody else was
doing their job. And let's just

887
00:58:26,760 --> 00:58:32,010
say the most structured effort,
likely or arguably, being arrow,

888
00:58:32,580 --> 00:58:35,940
what have they been doing? Like,
why can't they get some type of

889
00:58:35,940 --> 00:58:41,130
a system down? As the general
public, we are not privy to

890
00:58:41,130 --> 00:58:44,100
everything? So again, maybe
there is a fair answer. Maybe

891
00:58:44,100 --> 00:58:47,790
there's a fair answer with why a
tip didn't do it or why OSS app

892
00:58:47,790 --> 00:58:52,080
didn't do it. There's a lot of,
you know, question marks there.

893
00:58:52,410 --> 00:58:55,950
But the bottom line is they
didn't do their job. And that's

894
00:58:55,950 --> 00:58:59,460
what we have to look into and
ask why and how are we going to

895
00:58:59,460 --> 00:59:05,160
fix it? Obviously, the IG issued
their recommendations, will the

896
00:59:05,160 --> 00:59:09,420
DoD take action? Time will tell.
But I had a lot of fun going

897
00:59:09,420 --> 00:59:11,610
over this report with you guys.
Hopefully, you learned at least

898
00:59:11,610 --> 00:59:16,500
one thing in the past hour or
so. So thank you for joining me.

899
00:59:16,770 --> 00:59:19,920
If you can, if you're watching
the live stream version or the

900
00:59:20,190 --> 00:59:25,080
the replay version, please click
the thumbs up if you can. That's

901
00:59:25,080 --> 00:59:28,920
a huge, huge help here on
YouTube. Or if you are listening

902
00:59:28,920 --> 00:59:33,120
on any podcast platform for the
audio version, please please

903
00:59:33,120 --> 00:59:36,960
take a moment give a rating put
a review if you can shoot for

904
00:59:36,960 --> 00:59:40,290
five stars. All of that helps me
in the grander scheme because

905
00:59:40,290 --> 00:59:44,040
then accusin All those podcast
platforms or YouTube Hey people

906
00:59:44,040 --> 00:59:48,240
like this channel. The biggest
help is that on top of if you

907
00:59:48,240 --> 00:59:52,320
find the content worthwhile,
please just share it. I don't

908
00:59:52,320 --> 00:59:55,950
ask for anything but that if you
if you find it worthwhile, post

909
00:59:55,950 --> 00:59:58,290
the link out there to your
respective followers. Hopefully

910
00:59:58,290 --> 01:00:01,260
they'll find it of interest as
well. While and if you feel so

911
01:00:01,260 --> 01:00:03,480
inclined, there are different
ways that you can support the

912
01:00:03,480 --> 01:00:08,940
channel with donations. The 100%
of everything that comes in goes

913
01:00:08,940 --> 01:00:13,440
right back into the channel
itself goes to FOIA cases, which

914
01:00:13,440 --> 01:00:17,280
do yield charges on. Sadly, a
growing number of cases

915
01:00:17,280 --> 01:00:21,600
nowadays, web hosting fees
keeping this channel alive. That

916
01:00:22,170 --> 01:00:25,350
is a huge huge help. links are
all down below. So thank you

917
01:00:25,350 --> 01:00:27,720
guys for listening and or
watching. This is John

918
01:00:27,720 --> 01:00:30,390
Greenewald, Jr, signing off, and
we'll see you next time.